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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Economic Sustainability of Oil 
Economies
Giacomo Luciani and Tom Moerenhout
1  What Is sustaInable?
When can oil economies be deemed sustainable? This complex question 
has been profusely debated in the last 5 years. The timing of this debate is 
no coincidence. On the one hand, the pace of environmental degradation 
has aggravated, in terms of air pollution, carbon emissions and the impacts 
of the planet’s warming. On the other hand, volatile international oil mar-
kets and the acceleration of the energy transition have challenged the 
notion that oil revenues are sufficient to sustain oil economies in the near 
to medium term. With current challenges predicted to pursue in the near 
future, a more in-depth discussion about sustainability is warranted.
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2
The debate on sustainability in general, and on economic sustainability 
in particular, suffers from lack of conceptual clarity. What is the meaning 
of economic sustainability? As technology and the availability of goods and 
services constantly evolve, no economy is sustainable in a stationary state. 
Every economy, enterprise and individual needs to constantly evolve and 
adapt to changing circumstances. What is sustainable today may not be 
sustainable tomorrow: in the debate about sustainability, a concept of 
adaptability is implicit. As we cannot predict the future, and economies are 
constantly subjected to unforeseen shocks, we do not know what will be 
sustainable tomorrow, or for how long. Oil economies are confronted 
with this exact challenge. The current reform drive begs the question: 
What reforms should really be driven?
Adaptability is a function of many things. It is often considered as a 
function of diversification. Per se, economic logic rather favors specializa-
tion in one’s comparative advantage than diversification. The increasing 
importance of global value chains for development emphasizes this eco-
nomic logic, by moving competition from entire sectors to single stages of 
production, and even individual jobs. However, changing circumstances 
(movements in terms of trade) can be unfavorable for the given specializa-
tion. Economic history provides several examples of the rapid demise of 
specific industries due to technological progress or exhaustion of natural 
resources. In some cases, economic actors whose specialization has been 
challenged have successfully reinvented themselves, adapting more or less 
radically to a new specialization; in other cases, this has not succeeded, and 
economic actors have decayed and disappeared.
The pressure on many Gulf countries is high, but it is not equal as Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are heterogeneous. Some coun-
tries still hold a very strong comparative advantage in oil and gas produc-
tion, so why should their governments not tailor their economies to this 
sector and approach their own diversification in the context of the value 
chain of petroleum products? One might argue that countries with large 
resource reserves and small populations could then simply accept, for the 
time being, that price shocks will happen periodically. Other GCC states, 
however, are faced with declining reserves and sizeable populations. It is 
in this context, with the additional drivers of technological advancements 
and environmental unsustainability, that it is more urgent to discuss diver-
sification. As they accelerate diversification of value added and revenue, 
the pressure is on to invest in those sectors and stages of production that 
can yield results for some time to come.
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2  What Is unsustaInable?
More than understanding what is sustainable, we may more easily know 
what is not sustainable. Adaptability, after all, is also a function of the abil-
ity to identify unsustainable trends early on, and correct them before very 
large costs are incurred. Current trends may be clearly unsustainable if 
extrapolated into the future: this is especially the case with respect to envi-
ronmental impact and some socioeconomic trends such as rising inequali-
ties and poverty. Thus, one way to discuss sustainability is to point to 
aspects, which are clearly unsustainable. All economies display such traits 
that are unsustainable; the question is whether they can be corrected on 
time before they cause excessive costs. It is very likely that some costs will 
need to be borne anyhow, before issues are corrected; the question is: 
what type of costs and how large can they be, before they become acutely 
“unsustainable”?
The lack of economic sustainability and the lack of diversification in oil 
economies in the Gulf have been discussed for decades and have often 
been equated. They have also featured in many previous development 
visions. In recent years, however, and in part due to the oil price collapse 
and a changing international energy landscape, diversification has become 
a more pronounced objective. But it appears that the debate on diversifica-
tion suffers from path dependency, lacks specificity and still insufficiently 
takes into account the particular political economy constraints of GCC 
countries.
The first challenge, for example, lies in its definition: diversification of 
what? Of value added? Of exports? Of revenue? Quite clearly, it is the latter 
that lies at the basis of the post-2014 obsession with diversification, but a 
sole focus on revenue can undermine a fruitful discussion about what is 
possible in terms of policy-making on the medium term. A focus on what 
is acutely unsustainable would be a significant contribution to this debate 
on economic sustainability.
3  thIs book
The chapters in this edited volume document discussions held in the con-
text of the 2018 Gulf Research Meeting held by the Gulf Research Center 
at the University of Cambridge (UK). It starts from the acknowledgment 
that there is no widely accepted definition and measure of sustainability. 
All authors however try to capture not only political and economic factors, 
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but also social and cultural influences on economic reform in GCC 
countries.
While authors have argued in total autonomy from each other and 
some divergent opinions remain, the thrust of the book is to conclude that 
some GCC economies have made significant progress toward diversifica-
tion, reducing exclusive reliance on oil with respect to both composition 
of GDP and exports. This book also investigates a number of pronounced 
economic sustainability challenges in the Gulf’s oil producers, in terms of 
not only the threats to fiscal balances, but also the nationalization and 
privatization of labor markets, environmental pressures on GCC countries 
and soaring income inequalities within Gulf countries.
This edited volume has four parts, discussing various facets of economic 
sustainability. In a first part, authors provide a holistic discussion of cur-
rent trends in, and projections about, the sustainability of oil economies in 
the Gulf. The second part of this edited volume discusses trends in fiscal 
sustainability, given the quest, and need, of governments in the Gulf to 
diversify not just the economy, but especially their revenue base. These 
chapters also tie in fiscal reforms to the goal of Gulf economies to diversify 
and to adjust labor market structures. The third part addresses labor mar-
ket policies and labor market reforms. The fourth part discusses strategies 
of oil economies toward international climate action. This fourth part 
misses an assessment of environmental consequences of climate change 
that can threaten Gulf economies. The editors consider it essential that the 
content of this volume is complemented by such assessments.
4  a holIstIc, and RealIstIc, PIctuRe
In Chap. 2, Giacomo Luciani frames the debate on economic sustainabil-
ity of oil economies. He questions the popular notion that Gulf economies 
are not sustainable by discussing the progress on diversification as well as 
the continued relevance of hydrocarbons. Highlighting that the oil rent is 
likely to shrink over time, he points out the core challenge of developing 
taxation and fostering the development of an independent and competi-
tive private sector. He also emphasizes the need for further labor sector 
reform and the challenges of income inequality.
In Chap. 3, Ishac Diwan argues that the current focus in Saudi Arabia 
of replacing a rentier economic model with economic diversification in 
tradables is unrealistically ambitious. Rather, he proposes a Norway-like 
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model where public sector jobs are complemented with private sector 
employment in middle productivity and high-wage jobs. He discusses the 
challenges in labor market reform and the trade-off between slow adjust-
ment and large-scale financing of new investment to support this transition.
In Chap. 4, Ali Al-Saffar explores the outlook for producer economies. 
He discusses current risks and emerging pressures to producer economies, 
arguing that uncertainties in oil demand and supply have strengthened the 
need for further diversification. He reviews the results of two scenarios 
toward 2040, one in which oil demand continues to grow and another 
where oil demand tapers off. He concludes by pressing the role of a more 
efficient and productive energy sector in the Gulf’s economic reform 
initiatives.
In Chap. 5, Bassam Fattouh and Anupama Sen argue that the broader 
characteristics of the current energy transition toward low carbon energy 
sources will be more important than when oil demand will eventually 
peak. They expect that the diversification strategy of exporters will be con-
ditioned by the speed of that transition, and that during the transition, the 
oil sector will continue to play a key strategic role. In reverse, also the pace 
of the global transition will be influenced by the speed and success of eco-
nomic diversification in oil economies.
In Chap. 6, Joerg Beutel reveals the usefulness of an input-output 
approach to better understand the growing importance of intermediates 
when discussing economic diversification. He compares the performance 
on economic diversification and sustainable development of GCC econo-
mies with a reference case (Norway). He concludes that GCC countries 
have performed well on diversification, but less so on sustainable develop-
ment, which includes, among others, the depletion of natural resources 
and environmental pollution.
In Chap. 7, Manal Shehabi redefines economic sustainability in 
resource-dependent states by offering a new definition that accounts for 
the economic challenges of resource dependence. She elaborates on the 
changing and elusive definition of economic sustainability, and then sug-
gests an alternative definition that centers around volatility and depletion. 
She discusses the specific policies that successful growth-sustaining poli-
cies would imply, such as the regulation of oligopolies and human capital 
development.
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5  FIscal sustaInabIlIty
In Chap. 8, Tom Moerenhout discusses fuel and electricity pricing reform 
as core tenets of Gulf reform programs. He argues that pricing reforms 
were successfully used post-2014 to avoid an even more menacing collapse 
of state budgets. While future reforms will still be needed, he warns for a 
potential double-edged sword. If the extent and pace of pricing reforms is 
too ambitious, then it might erode the comparative advantage of indus-
trial consumers and as such complicate efforts to achieve (within sector) 
diversification.
In Chap. 9, Monica Malik and Thirumalai Nagesh look at fiscal sustain-
ability and the types of fiscal reforms (including the introduction of value- 
added tax) that have been implemented following the oil price collapse in 
2014. They argue that those reforms have been deeper than earlier cycles, 
but that it remains difficult for many GCC governments to implement a 
multi-year fiscal reform process given the pressure that his would cause on 
the private sector and the population.
6  laboR MaRket ReFoRM
In Chap. 10, Monica Malik and Thirumalai Nagesh discuss the relevance 
of population dynamics and labor markets to fiscal capacity. They elabo-
rate on the opposition between the existing social contract and fiscal labor 
market needs in the area of reducing public sector employment. While 
noting that the greater burden of fiscal reforms has fallen on the expatriate 
population, they argue that an evolution in the social contract remains 
essential as governments seek to create private sector jobs for the youth 
population and downsize the public sector.
In Chap. 11, Martin Hvidt applies a value chain perspective to the 
question of economic diversification and job creation in oil-producing 
countries in the Gulf. He suggests that such a value chain perspective can 
provide more clarity on whether newly created jobs are in the lower or 
higher value-added segment. He suggests that Gulf countries should aim 
at creating jobs in the high-value segment, as this will create a virtuous 
process including the upskilling of the labor force. It will also require a 
readjustment of the current reliance on expatriate labor.
 G. LUCIANI AND T. MOERENHOUT
7
7  envIRonMental sustaInabIlIty
In Chap. 12, Jim Krane analyzes how oil export-dependent states have 
adopted three near-term strategies to protect oil rents and revenue. A “dig 
in” strategy aimed at insulating the oil industry from climate risk and 
undermining global action on climate change. A “join in” strategy aimed 
at rational domestic energy policies and with greenhouse gas reduction 
benefits. And a “throw in” strategy seeks to frame mitigation efforts as 
more expensive than climate change damages. He provides a case study on 
Saudi Arabia’s response to global climate action.
8  sustaInabIlIty oF Gcc develoPMent
In Chap. 13, Ibrahim Elbadawi and Samir Makdisi review the develop-
ment experiences of the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, 
starting from the observation that they have been able to avoid the most 
explicit consequences of the resource curse. They highlight that the 
unusual high rents per capita have resulted in a developmental and politi-
cal equilibrium. The authors conclude that the dependence of GCC coun-
tries on such high rents casts a shadow over the future sustainability of this 
equilibrium, especially under a new emerging global oil order, which will 
likely be characterized by lower oil prices.
In Chap. 14, Giacomo Luciani and Tom Moerenhout conclude. They 
underline that no unequivocal and final answer to what determines the 
sustainability of oil economies exists, but that, equally, not all oil econo-
mies should be stereotyped as unsustainable.
If one overall message can be distilled from this book, it is that we 
should move on from the simplistic branding of the Gulf economies as 
unsustainable, and tackle the details of which adaptations they might need 
to undertake. In this approach, developing fiscal tools to greatly reduce 
reliance of recurrent expenditure on the oil rent, and moving away from a 
model of low-cost, low-productivity expatriate labor to a model of higher 
wages and productivity emerge as the two decisive challenges. Both have 
direct implications for political institutions, which consequently will also 
need to adapt.
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CHAPTER 2
Framing the Economic Sustainability of Oil 
Economies
Giacomo Luciani
1  IntroductIon: My FIrst VIsIt to Abu dhAbI
I first visited Abu Dhabi in the early 1980s, traveling with an economist 
colleague and friend. As we were driving into town, I was pleasantly sur-
prised at the greenery along the streets (which was a priority for Sheikh 
Zayed, the Amir) and the well laid-out urban environment (which has 
become more chaotic in the intervening decades), and positively com-
mented on it. Yet my friend objected: “But you see, Giacomo, this will all 
revert to dust as soon as oil is finished”. That was also the time when The 
Economist was advising Kuwait not to invest in the country, as it would be 
futile anyhow, and the prevailing opinion was that Saudi Arabia would 
never succeed in establishing a petrochemical industry.
The stereotype according to which Gulf oil economies are not sustain-
able continues to be widely maintained. The original fear that “oil at some 
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point will run out” has lately been replaced by the expectation that oil will 
lose all economic value because of global warming and “unburnable car-
bon”, but the essence of the narrative has not changed.
The unsustainability mantra is rooted in the poor understanding of eco-
nomics and the way markets work. There has never been in contemporary 
history a country that has reverted to dust. Economies are constantly 
adapting to changing circumstances, and no economy is sustainable in its 
steady state if no change is allowed. The same is true for political systems: 
some systems are more flexible and capable of adapting gradually, while 
others are rigid and may cause forfeiting potential growth for a period of 
time—but eventually change comes about. In some (too numerous) cases, 
resistance to change, or the inability to agree on the governance of it, has 
led to violent conflict entailing extensive losses of capital and human life. 
In some such cases, however, the economic recovery process has been 
swift and has opened the door to phases of relative prosperity.
This chapter elaborates on what sustainability actually entails. I devote 
the second section to the simple but frequently forgotten truth that no 
economy is sustainable without change, thus putting the case of the Gulf 
oil economies in a broader global perspective; the third section is devoted 
to the importance of identifying the needed change in order to be able to 
discuss the appropriate development strategies. While the standard line is 
that the Gulf oil economies have not diversified and “remain too depen-
dent on oil”, I argue in the fourth section that measurable and significant 
diversification has taken place. While further diversification in the compo-
sition of GDP and exports is certainly needed, an ongoing process is 
underway in this direction.
The fifth section discusses the standard economic threat that resource- 
rich countries must cope with, that is, the so-called Dutch disease. The 
Gulf oil countries have quite successfully dealt with it through a strategy 
of investment in infrastructure and almost unlimited importation of expa-
triate labor. The latter has caused its own problems, social and economic—
notably a pattern of declining productivity, which is discussed in Sect. 6. 
This pattern must be reversed because, in the longer run, it is incompati-
ble with a growing GDP per capita. This, I argue, is by far the most impor-
tant challenge that these economies must now face.
In the seventh section, I discuss excessive dependence on hydrocarbons 
in the generation of aggregate value added, and argue that it is not an 
intractable problem. The Gulf economies have abundant opportunities to 
decarbonize domestic energy consumption as well as the production and 
transformation of hydrocarbons. Systematically embracing the capture of 
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CO2 to avoid emissions in the atmosphere, and using captured CO2 in 
enhanced oil recovery (EOR), possibly including also the use of imported 
CO2 captured elsewhere in the world, makes the production of negative-
emissions hydrocarbons technically possible (albeit expensive and cur-
rently uneconomic). The progressive transformation of crude oil and gas 
into non-fuel products or hydrogen, and the possible advent of a hydro-
gen economy, may eventually eliminate emissions from burning hydrocar-
bons directly.
It is therefore quite possible that hydrocarbons will retain economic 
value for decades to come, while their use evolves in ways that make it 
compatible with maintaining global warming within the limits mandated 
by the Paris Agreement and supported by climate science. This, however, 
would certainly entail an increase in the cost of production and corre-
spondingly a reduction of the net rent accruing to the treasury of the 
major producing countries. In the eighth section, I argue that, combined 
with growing population, gradually declining access to rent implies that 
states whose financial wherewithal continues to be highly dependent on 
the oil rent must urgently develop fiscal tools to extract revenue from the 
domestic economy. This entails the progressive reversal of the rentier state 
paradigm, whereby the state economically supports society, to a more 
common situation of society paying for the state. This reversal is unlikely 
to happen without concomitant evolution of the political order away from 
patrimonial absolute monarchies to a situation in which, while monarchies 
may well remain in place, some form of accountability will need to be 
enforced. Hence, if one assumes that no political evolution is possible, 
then surely the Gulf oil states are fiscally unsustainable—but no political 
order can endure unchanged in the face of changing circumstances.
The need to raise taxes mandates a degree of separation between the 
State and its taxed subjects. Taxes cannot be raised exclusively or primarily 
on government employees and state-owned enterprises: a genuinely inde-
pendent and competitive private sector must develop, which is capable of 
walking on its own legs and not depend solely on government procure-
ment. As discussed in the ninth section, government policies toward the 
private sector have so far allowed for the accumulation of large fortunes 
but have fallen significantly short of truly empowering the private sector. 
Priority for state control of strategic assets has hindered privatization of all 
but marginal activities, and obsession for control and loyalty to the regime 
prevents the emergence of a truly entrepreneurial bourgeoisie.
Finally, social and political cohesion requires that greater attention be 
paid to income distribution. In the absence of any income or wealth 
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taxation, oil-fueled economic growth has disproportionately favored a 
minority of citizens, and, after an early period characterized by significant 
social mobility, all opportunities now seem reserved for the elite. In the 
last section, I thus discuss the aspect of social sustainability, meaning that 
the development path must be such that some opportunities for upward 
mobility are offered also to the many that have been left behind.
2  no EconoMy Is sustAInAblE WIthout chAngE
Economic life is a process of continuous creative destruction, and no 
economy is sustainable if it does not continuously adapt. Changing con-
sumer demand—and especially evolving technology and the constant 
introduction of new products—imposes continuous adaptation on all 
economies. No economy is sustainable unless it adapts continuously to 
changing circumstances.
Sustainability is therefore closely related to adaptability. Existing com-
parative advantage may be lost and new comparative advantage acquired: 
it all depends on investment decisions, based on starting circumstances. 
Protecting existing competitive advantages or acquiring new ones is more 
of an art than a science, and it is normal that some competitors will lose 
ground while others will gain. The losers may eventually disappear, if we 
are talking about individual companies; but countries do not disappear.
Countries whose economy loses competitiveness will experience a 
worsening of their trade balance. If not compensated by an inflow of for-
eign capital or other transfers, their currency will eventually depreciate 
relative to other currencies. In recent times, many countries have experi-
enced dramatic devaluations until they found a new equilibrium in exter-
nal accounts.
It should be noted that the Gulf countries enjoy trade surpluses in most 
years, and their imports include non-essential and non-productive items 
such as notably weapons systems. They also host large numbers of expatri-
ate workers who generate large flows of remittances, which burden the 
respective balance of payments (and contribute to inflating imports). That 
said, the possibility of allowing a devaluation of the respective national 
currencies has repeatedly been considered (and rejected) in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Devaluation would discourage 
imports and improve the competitiveness of some local products.
Devaluations restore competitiveness but damage the purchasing power 
of all wages paid in the local currency. Hence, countries that lose ground 
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in competitiveness generally experience lower growth in income per cap-
ita, while countries whose competitiveness is improving experience higher 
growth in income per capita. Differential growth in income per capita is a 
common experience, and major changes have taken place since the end of 
World War II in the relative position of individual countries—generally in 
the sense that countries that had lower income per capita have been able 
to reduce the gap separating them from countries with the highest income 
per capita. Thus, it may be said that the latter have lost competitiveness, 
but no one would conclude that they are not sustainable.
The question of sustainability for the GCC economies therefore means 
being able to adapt to changing circumstances, preserving past gains in 
income per capita for their citizens, and possibly further closing the gap 
with the richest countries.
3  IdEntIFyIng nEEdEd chAngE
In this discussion, it is important to exactly identify the nature of the prob-
lem in order to suggest the right policy decisions. The economies of the 
GCC countries are certainly not sustainable if the assumption is that no 
change will take place—all economies must continuously adapt. Thus, the 
mantra that GCC economies are not sustainable has limited use in guiding 
expectations and policies unless the exact nature of the required change is 
identified.
The literature oscillates between different definitions of non- 
sustainability, and these do not necessarily converge in a reasonably clear 
policy agenda. Is the problem linked to the high share of GDP that is 
generated by the oil and gas sector? Or to the dominant share of oil and 
gas in total exports? If we conclude so, we should say that sustainability is 
linked to improved economic diversification. Or is it linked to the belief 
that oil and gas may lose economic value in a world that needs to rapidly 
decarbonize? In this case, sustainability may rather be linked to investment 
to preserve the economic value of hydrocarbons in a decarbonizing world.
Is non-sustainability linked to excessive dependence on expatriate labor 
combined with unemployment among the nations’ youth? Is it related to 
the phenomenon of declining productivity of labor, which is closely related 
to dependence on expatriates? In this case, the issue should primarily be 
viewed as one of reforming labor policies.
Or is non-sustainability primarily linked to government finance—the 
fact that governments have not developed a system of taxation that may 
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progressively wean them from excessive dependence of a possibly declin-
ing source of revenue, that is, hydrocarbon rents? In this case, the ques-
tion should be primarily one of making sure that a taxation base is created 
and the required imposition system established. It is perfectly possible for 
the economy to remain competitive and for the state to be unable to 
extract sufficient revenue from it with appropriate taxes.
4  dIVErsIFIcAtIon hAs tAkEn PlAcE
Contrary to the frequent assertion that the Gulf economies have not 
diversified as evidenced by their continuing high reliance on oil and gas as 
shares of both GDP and exports, statistics tell us that significant value- 
added diversification has taken place. This is hardly surprising for any 
observer that is aware of the impoverished and extremely simple status of 
the economies in question before the advent of the oil era.
The discussion of diversification in oil economies is complicated by the 
impact of variable oil prices. Whenever prices are high, value added from 
oil and gas upstream is also increased, more so than value added in the rest 
of the economy, and it will appear that the economy is losing diversity. 
Whenever prices are decreasing, the opposite will be the case, and it will 
show that the economy is now more diversified. Higher oil prices are a 
good thing for oil-producing countries, notwithstanding the fact that they 
will appear to be less diversified. In fact, it is not just appearance: the 
higher prices are a reality and reduced diversification an inevitable conse-
quence. That said, it does not make sense to discuss diversification trends 
unless price variations are also taken into account. There are no other 
commodities as important as oil whose price is as volatile as that of oil, 
otherwise this would be a common problem for many countries.
We therefore need to resort to more complex measures of diversifica-
tion, as extensively discussed in the chapter by Joerg Beutel in this volume. 
Although even the more sophisticated indices aimed at measuring the 
structural interrelations of an economy, such as those based on input- 
output tables, are not immune from reflecting changes in relative prices, 
their behavior tends to be more stable. Beutel shows that several diversifi-
cation indices do not tell us that the economies of the GCC countries, in 
particular Saudi Arabia, are much less diversified than the comparator 
country Norway.
A converging conclusion is arrived at if we use the Economic Complexity 
Index (ECI) developed by Ricardo Hausmann and César Hidalgo at 
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Harvard and MIT (Hausmann et  al. 2014). The index is based on the 
mapping of what the authors call the products space, in which each prod-
uct category is mapped in proximity of other products requiring similar 
technology and know-how, meaning that the producer of one product 
could relatively easily shift to producing a proximate product. This creates 
an image in which some products, mostly primary products, appear in 
isolated positions at the margins, while others, mostly manufactured prod-
ucts, are located in several interlocking clusters at the center. The eco-
nomic complexity of a country is:
a measure of the knowledge in a society as expressed in the products it 
makes. The economic complexity of a country is calculated based on the 
diversity of products a country exports and their ubiquity, or the number of 
the countries able to produce them (and those countries’ complexity). 
Countries that are able to sustain a diverse range of productive know-how, 
including sophisticated, unique know-how, are found to be able to produce 
a wide diversity of goods, including complex products that few other coun-
tries can make. (CID, Atlas, Glossary)
The Economic Complexity Index ranks countries based on how diversi-
fied and complex their export basket is. Countries that are home to a great 
diversity of productive know-how, particularly complex specialized know- 
how (and including know-how originating from abroad but attracted and 
implemented locally), will be able to produce a great diversity of sophisti-
cated products.
Table 2.1 ranks key Gulf exporters’ ECI scores for 1996 and 2016. The 
table includes several comparator countries, to highlight the extent to 
which superficial impressions may be misguided.
There are several interesting points to be noted in this table. To begin 
with, all oil or commodity exporters, including advanced countries, have 
low economic complexity because of their relative specialization. Thus, 
the USA ranks lower than one may expect of the leading techno-economy 
in the world and will probably show a further decline in the coming years, 
thanks to Donald Trump’s push for “energy dominance” (White House 
2019; DOI 2017). It is striking that Mexico is ranked as more complex 
than Canada, and both are more complex than Norway, which is normally 
viewed as the success case par excellence among oil exporters. Russia and 
India are rated barely more complex than Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates. The latter two are doing better than New Zealand, and all 
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Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are doing better than 
Australia, while Iran does just a bit worse. We normally do not worry 
about the sustainability of any of the comparator countries (except maybe 
Russia)—so the Gulf economies may be unsustainable, but lack of eco-
nomic complexity does not appear to be the reason for it.
Between 1996 and 2016, all Gulf countries, including Iran, signifi-
cantly improved their ECI position, while all comparator countries except 
Mexico lost ground. So diversification is indeed happening, and economic 
complexity is increasing.
As well as other measures of diversification, the ECI is vulnerable to 
changes in oil prices and quite unstable for major oil exporters—for exam-
ple, Saudi Arabia ranked 36th in 2004, a year of low oil prices, and 104th 
in 2008, a year of peak oil prices. However, oil prices were relatively low 
in both years compared here (1996 and 2016), so the improvement is 
clearly not just due to changes in oil prices. Furthermore, oil prices affect 
all oil exporters, so that GCC improvement relative to other oil exporters 
must be real. It remains true, however, that low oil prices sustain diversifi-
cation and high oil prices hinder it. At times of growing oil prices, 
Table 2.1 Ranking of Gulf countries and selected comparator countries by 
Economic Complexity Index
2016 1996
Country Rank ECI value Rank ECI value
United States 10 1.55 7 1.868
Mexico 21 1.11 25 0.817
Canada 35 0.696 23 0.898
Norway 39 0.638 32 0.592
Russian Federation 48 0.235 38 0.420
India 49 0.191 56 0.007
Saudi Arabia 50 0.171 65 −0.153
United Arab Emirates 51 0.162 80 −0.476
New Zealand 54 0.124 42 0.313
Oman 71 0.292 82 −0.510
Kuwait 73 0.314 89 −0.666
Qatar 76 −0.396 109 −0.955
Australia 86 −0.592 60 −0.026
Iran 87 −0.611 106 −0.915




diversification may well be taking place, but it will be obscured by the 
inflation of value added in the oil sector. When prices decline again, diver-
sification becomes visible.
Some further comments are in order. First, the structural transforma-
tion of an economy takes time. Global oil demand may peak in 20 years (at 
a level above today’s), but there is no credible prospect of oil losing eco-
nomic significance for at least the next 50 years (more on this in Fattouh 
and Sen’s chapter in this book). Diversification may become more chal-
lenging after the early successes (it is difficult to gain in diversity when you 
are diversified to begin with), but we should certainly expect further 
improvement in the ranking of the Gulf oil exporters. Some massive 
investment projects that have been undertaken in the past 10 years (such 
as the Sadara petrochemical j.v. between Saudi Aramco and Dow, the alu-
minum project going from mining bauxite to rolling mills developed by 
Maaden in association with Alcoa, or Borouge’s new plants in Ruwais) 
have yet to fully impact export statistics, because of their long gestation 
and the progressive ramp-up of production.
Second, there are major differences between Gulf oil exporters. The 
gap in 2016 between Saudi Arabia and Iran is significant. We do not have 
an ECI for Iraq, but it would surely be much worse than Iran’s. And the 
gap between the Gulf economies and oil exporters elsewhere in the world 
is even larger: Nigeria ranked 125 (out of 127 countries), Azerbaijan 120, 
and Angola 116. Not all countries are doing equally well, and relatively 
few can be said to have made real progress in diversification.
My conclusion is that GDP and export diversification are not good 
reasons to conclude that the Gulf oil export economies are unsustainable. 
Of course, the global economy is constantly evolving. Demand, supply, 
and terms of trade of individual products change constantly, and adapta-
tion is a never-ending task; however, the Gulf economies are diversifying 
and are today much more adaptable and competitive than they were three 
or four decades ago. Diversification is happening and likely to continue, 
progressively reducing dependence on the oil sector—even if oil remains a 
valuable and important internationally traded commodity.
5  dutch dIsEAsE And ExPAtrIAtE lAbor
By “Dutch disease” we mean the appreciation of the real exchange rate as 
expressed by the relative terms of trade of non-tradable relative to tradable 
goods and services. The change in the relative terms of trade is caused by 
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the emergence of new natural-resource-based exports, which leads to an 
increase in revenue and domestic expenditure. Because the supply of trad-
ables is elastic, the price is established by international competitive forces 
and is not expected to change. In contrast, supply of non-tradables is lim-
ited in the short term, and increased demand will lead to an increase in 
their average price. So non-tradables become more expensive than trad-
ables (which is the definition of appreciation of the real exchange rate), 
and capital is incentivized to move from the production of tradables to 
that of non-tradables. If a country has a developed tradables sector at the 
beginning of the process, it may de-industrialize: this is what was feared 
for the Netherlands when large resources of gas were discovered in the 
Groningen field. Typically, non-tradables consist of real estate, personal 
and hospitality services and maybe perishable food products, while trad-
ables consist of all industrial products.
In the short run (defined as the time that it takes for a new investment 
to take place and increase productive capacity), there is nothing that can 
be done to prevent the Dutch disease, except refraining from spending the 
additional revenue from natural resources. This is what Norway has done, 
but no poor country would reasonably be expected to do the same. The 
narrative of the Dutch disease is therefore almost invariably supported by 
empirical observation in the aftermath of a natural resources bonanza: 
housing and services become very expensive, local craft industry and fre-
quently also agriculture are wiped out, and real estate investment becomes 
the only game in town. The Gulf countries in the 1970s fully conformed 
to this pattern.
But in the longer run, when investment can take place and change the 
economy’s production possibility frontier, the real appreciation of the 
exchange rate may be countered. This can be achieved by expanding the 
production of non-tradables, thus countering the expected increase in 
relative prices (Sachs 2007), and importing labor to overcome the limita-
tions in the supply of domestic, especially skilled, workers. The Gulf coun-
tries adopted both strategies early on: the state stepped in to quickly 
increase the supply of non-tradables, and the door was flung open to 
essentially unlimited importation of expatriate labor (yet with discrimina-
tion based on the country of origin).
Coupled with very weak protection of workers’ rights, this has meant 
that the Gulf countries have imported the wage level of their poorer 
neighbors in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) or South Asia. The 
end result has been that wage-push inflation has been contained, but 
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dependence on expatriates has reached levels not seen anywhere else in the 
world. Most nationals are employed by the government, but just a few are 
employed in the private sector in white-collar occupations. Essentially all 
blue-collar jobs are filled by expatriates, but a significant number of for-
eigners, mostly skilled, also work for the government.
Is this a sustainable state of affairs? While there will always be foreigners 
willing to take employment in the Gulf, notwithstanding the sometimes 
oppressive conditions, such high reliance on expatriates creates significant 
problems. Expatriates are mostly interested in remitting their incomes to 
their families and countries of origin; they are very conscious of their pre-
carious state and are reluctant to “take roots” and invest in their host 
countries, even when this is allowed—and normally it is not. Thus, much 
of the aggregate wage bill exits the local economy almost immediately, 
meaning that the Keynesian multiplier is very low.
Secondly, expatriates have an income target and are likely to react to 
income taxation by simply requesting higher wages or returning to their 
countries of origin. The latter has been confirmed by the response to 
increases in fees enacted after the decline in oil prices from 2014. As there 
is considerable turnaround in the expatriate population, and the wages on 
offer already are set at the minimum level required to attract them, new-
comers will focus on net income if taxes are imposed. This means that 
taxes on expatriates will end up being paid by employers. In the absence of 
policies to consolidate the expatriate population (policies which all Gulf 
governments abhor), foreign residents offer an intermediate, not an ulti-
mate, taxable base.
Thirdly, the abundant supply of low-wage workers is distorting the 
competitiveness of industry. Investment is attracted in labor-intensive and 
low-skill activities simply because it is so cheap to hire workers—but these 
lines of production do not conform to the underlying comparative advan-
tage of the Gulf countries, which is in capital-intensive industries requiring 
more sophisticated skills. Therefore, their longer-term commercial viabil-
ity is uncertain to say the least.
6  thE ProductIVIty IssuE
Considering the functioning of the labor market and the almost complete 
openness to importation of expatriate labor, it is not surprising to see that 
labor productivity, that is, value added per worker employed, has been 
declining throughout the Gulf economies, in contrast with the experience 
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of almost all other countries in the world (Hertog 2018). The private sec-
tor has primarily aimed at minimizing the cost of labor, and has been ready 
to accept lower skills and qualifications for the sake of lower wages. This 
has mostly taken the form of shifting hiring practices as in between coun-
tries of origin, because the minimum reservation wage of expatriates is 
frequently related to the average wage in the country of origin.
In economies where the workforce is stable, it is normal to expect a 
progressive improvement in skills simply due to the permanence in the 
same job for long periods of time. But the high turnaround rate, which is 
characteristic of expatriate labor in the Gulf, works in the opposite direc-
tion, undermining learning by doing, and actually facilitating the recourse 
to progressively less skilled laborers, if they come cheaper.
When labor is cheap, there is little incentive to invest in machinery that 
may improve its productivity. Operating a machine normally requires at 
least a modicum of training and higher skills, thus improving productivity, 
which opens the door to higher wages. It also makes the turnaround of 
workers more difficult, because some retraining might become necessary. 
Therefore, the attitude has been rather in favor of keeping things simple 
and basic, avoiding productivity-enhancing investment.
In fact, the cost of labor is so low, and the hassle of recruiting from 
abroad so significant, that many employers indulge in labor hoarding. 
Because expatriate workers sometimes desert their employers, either 
because they somehow find a better job—although this may be against the 
law—or simply give up and return home, employers want to make sure 
that they have a certain number of “spare workers” at hand, just in case. 
This is a recipe for permanently declining productivity.
The meaning of declining productivity is that economic growth is 
achieved exclusively, thanks to adding to the number of expatriates. While 
this may allow for expanding the share of GDP accruing to profits in the 
private sector, it is hardly compatible with improving economic conditions 
for salaried nationals. Only nationals that possess capital and employ expa-
triates can benefit from increasing profits. But profits are difficult to tax, 
and the creation of a taxation base will remain an elusive task.
An economy in which labor productivity constantly declines is there-
fore not sustainable, because it deprives the state of an easily taxable base. 
Sustainability requires moving away from extreme reliance on expatriate 
labor. Labor-saving investment is necessary, coupled with acceptance of 
progressively higher wages. This in turn will reduce the gap between the 
wages of nationals and those of expatriates, thus creating conditions for 
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overcoming the paradox of high unemployment among nationals, while at 
the same time so many jobs are taken by expatriates. It may also open the 
door to the creation of a taxable income base.
7  PotEntIAl For FurthEr dIVErsIFIcAtIon 
And dEFEnsE oF hydrocArbons’ VAluE
While the Gulf countries have, comparatively speaking, made good prog-
ress in diversifying their economies, the potential for further diversification 
exists, specifically in the direction of developing industrial activities that 
may allow the continuing use of hydrocarbons, even while eliminating 
greenhouse gas emissions and countering climate change. The frequently 
held opinion according to which only zero use of hydrocarbons may be 
compatible with zero CO2 emissions may turn out to be unfounded. 
There are many ways in which the Gulf oil and gas producers may contrib-
ute to decarbonization while continuing to use oil and gas.
7.1  Decarbonize the Production of Oil and Gas
Growing attention is being devoted to the fact that the production of oil 
and gas is not equally emission-intensive across regions and fields (Masnadi 
2018; IEA 2018a, 73–76). Focusing on the abatement of emissions con-
nected to upstream and midstream activities is a significant strategy in the 
context of fighting global warming. In the case of gas, special attention 
has been attracted to reducing or eliminating flaring and venting. In the 
case of oil, energy requirements connected with fracking for shale oil or 
use of other enhanced oil recovery methods, and the heat required for the 
production of heavy oils and oil from bituminous sands have negative 
consequences for the environment even before the oil or gas is burned. To 
a large extent, the heat and power for oil and gas production, which is now 
derived from burning hydrocarbons, could be derived instead from renew-
able or clean sources. In Oman, the Miraah solar thermal power plant 
produces steam that is injected in the nearby Amal oil field, and at 
1021 MW of capacity, it is one of the largest solar power plants in the 
world (IEA 2018a, 76; PDO 2017). Steam-based enhanced oil recovery is 
not very common in the prolific fields of the Gulf, but is likely to be 
increasingly in use as fields mature and decline. Steam and high tempera-
tures are also needed in refining and petrochemicals. Electric power is 
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needed in field operations as well as in transportation by pipeline and in 
refining and petrochemicals—and it could be derived from renewable or 
clean sources. While burning hydrocarbons inevitably produces CO2, it 
may be possible to produce zero-CO2 hydrocarbon fuels in the sense that 
no CO2 needs to be emitted in the production process.
7.2  Carbon Capture and Sequestration
The next logical step is engaging in systematic carbon capture and seques-
tration (CCS) in the oil and gas fields. The oil industry has extensive expe-
rience of capturing CO2 and injecting or re-injecting it in oil and gas fields 
(IEA 2016; McGlade 2019). This also facilitates the production of oil and 
gas (KAPSARC 2018), and is therefore either a method of avoiding vent-
ing CO2, which is present in the field in association with methane, or of 
capturing CO2 produced from other sources and sequestering it under-
ground. It is conceivable that all CO2 emitted from burning hydrocarbons 
in stationary plants may be captured and either used in other industrial 
uses or sequestered underground in oil and gas fields. If the Gulf oil and 
gas exporters are keen to preserve the economic value of their resources in 
a carbon-constrained world, carbon capture and sequestration should be 
their technology of choice.
In fact, CCS has attracted considerable scholarly interest (FT 2018b), 
and examples of implementation are slowly coming to the fore. In Abu 
Dhabi, the Al Reyadah project takes CO2 from a steel plant owned by 
Emirates Steel and pumps it to the Rumaitha and Bab oilfields, where it is 
injected in the ground for enhanced oil recovery (Gulf News 2016). This 
is just a first, but eventually systematic capture from all plants (power 
plants first and foremost—at least until oil and gas-fired power plants will 
still be in use) should be envisaged.
But considering the centrality of CCS for allowing some continued reli-
ance on fossil fuels, the level of engagement of the oil-producing countries 
(and major international oil corporations) in pursuing deployment of this 
technology is patently insufficient. Notwithstanding the keen interest in 
CCS demonstrated by the International Energy Agency and some 
European oil-producing countries (the UK and Norway) (IEA 2018b), 
and notwithstanding the multiple studies that have been carried out by 
research institutions notably in Saudi Arabia, there is not a single major 
project in the process of being implemented.
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The consequence is that public and even expert opinion does not con-
sider CCS as a viable alternative for global decarbonization. The special 
report of the IPCC issued in 2018 (IPCC 2018) strongly insists on the 
need for CCS and negative emissions down the road, and the major pro-
ducing countries could very well position themselves as potential suppliers 
of storage services for CO2, including that which may be captured in other 
countries that might not have appropriate geological sites for this purpose. 
True, for the time being we do not have a price for carbon sufficient to 
justify the economics of capturing, transporting, and storing CO2, but 
hydrocarbon producers need to think strategically and anticipate the mar-
ket if they wish to convincingly argue that there is a future for their prod-
ucts in a world that needs to rapidly decarbonize
7.3  Further Integrate Downstream Toward Non-fuel Uses
A parallel defense strategy consists in emphasizing the use of hydrocarbons 
to produce products that are not meant for burning as fuels. The palette 
of oil products has always included lubricants and bitumen, but the major 
case in this category clearly is that of petrochemicals.
Demand for petrochemicals is growing rapidly in the world, much 
more rapidly than GDP, and there is little expectation that it may slow 
down in the coming decades (IEA 2018c). The petrochemical industry is 
sometimes mistaken for a low-technology industry, and little more than a 
producer of plastic bags polluting the oceans—but this is a caricature. 
While production of basic petrochemicals may rely on proven technology, 
and indeed yield simple products that may damage the environment if not 
properly recycled (plastic bags and the like), the industry is extremely 
diversified and increasingly sophisticated, producing an incredible array of 
materials that find use in almost all manufacturing.
Although polymers can be produced from organic material rather than 
from fossil feedstock, the prevalence of the latter is unquestionable. Size 
and plant synergies being essential to competitiveness and product diver-
sification, it is difficult to envisage that the petrochemical industry might 
move away from reliance on fossil hydrocarbons. To the extent that use of 
fossil fuels might decline, oil will tend to be cheaper, and petrochemical 
materials ever more attractive in a wide range of utilizations. Saudi 
Aramco’s and SABIC’s effort to develop a crude to petrochemicals refin-
ery (which would essentially produce no fuels) evidently is an early mani-
festation of this strategy (Arab News 2018).
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7.4  The Hydrogen Economy
The final, decisive strategy to preserve the economic value of fossil fuels in 
a decarbonizing world is to separate them into hydrogen and CO2, captur-
ing the latter and using the former as fuel. Hydrogen is an energy carrier, 
not a primary energy source, and can be produced starting from several 
molecules containing it. The perspective of a hydrogen economy has been 
discussed for decades (IEA 2019), and is normally considered part and 
parcel of decarbonization strategies, especially in conditions when excess 
electricity might be available (from excess non-dispatchable renewables or 
nuclear) for electrolysis of water. The concept of a hydrogen economy 
thus is relevant even independently of the desire to preserve the economic 
value of fossil fuels; yet it has considerable synergy with the latter, because, 
on the one hand, hydrogen is easily produced from light hydrocarbons 
with steam reforming, a well-established technology(“Natural gas accounts 
for around three-quarters of the annual global dedicated hydrogen pro-
duction” IEA 2019, 38), and, on the other hand, hydrogen can substitute 
for methane in pipeline networks and can be used as transportation fuel in 
fuel cells—a technology that has considerable advantages in battery elec-
tric vehicles for extended range driving.
Oil and gas producers could then position themselves as pioneers of the 
hydrogen economy, through either exporting hydrogen (presumably in 
liquid form, unless export pipelines are available), or transforming hydro-
carbons into hydrogen close to the final consumer and taking responsibil-
ity for the capture, sequestration, or utilization of CO2.
Considered as a whole, these four interlocking strategies for maintain-
ing the economic relevance of hydrocarbons in a decarbonizing world 
envisage the further profound transformation of the economic structure 
of the Gulf oil countries. This transformation has not even started yet, and 
it is not clear that it will be pursued at all. It requires a degree of anticipa-
tion and forward looking that the existing governance structures may not 
be able to provide. Obviously today, the reality of relative prices—notably 
the absence of a sufficiently high price for carbon and consequent lack of 
CO2 valorization—does not support massive investment in the direction 
envisaged. The question remains whether the major Gulf oil producers 
should not anticipate future global decarbonization policies in view of 
demonstrating that it may not be necessary to move away from hydrocar-
bons, rather to change the use that is made of them.
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8  nEEd For dEVEloPIng tAxAtIon
Even in the perspective that I sketched in the previous section, it is clear 
that decarbonizing the production of hydrocarbons or turning them into 
hydrogen for clean burning as fuel will entail significant additional cost, 
which will go to reduce the size of the rent. In other words, the oil and gas 
business will come to more closely resemble all other lines of business, 
where a very significant profit margin is sometimes possible, but not such 
a huge rent as to allow to almost completely pay for the state from this 
source alone.
Developing additional sources of revenue requires time and progressive 
strengthening of the administrative capabilities of the state. Some taxes are 
easier to collect than others, but the easiest ones—excise taxes on specific 
categories of goods or taxes on imports—are not sufficient to diversify 
state revenue to the extent needed. In fact, the Gulf oil-producing coun-
tries have recently introduced excises on several goods such as tobacco or 
sugary beverages, but fuels, which are subjected to large excises in many 
countries, are made available at relatively low prices (or “subsidized”), and 
alcoholic beverages—another frequent target of excises—are either 
restricted or prohibited altogether.
The GCC countries have decided to implement VAT starting at a low 
level of 5%, but only Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE did so. Saudi 
Arabia further increased VAT to 15% in July 2020. VAT is a tax on con-
sumption which is regressive, because higher incomes consume propor-
tionately less, and weighs more on nationals than on expatriates, because 
the latter are likely to remit or consume abroad a larger share of their 
income. Other things being equal, a VAT will tend to increase the level of 
domestic prices and erode the purchasing power of all fixed income 
earners.
In the end, the imposition of taxes on income and/or wealth for indi-
viduals and/or corporations will be inevitable. Taxing corporations may 
be politically less problematic and administratively simpler, but will meet 
resistance from domestic entrepreneurs. Subsidiaries of foreign corpora-
tions are likely to have ways to shift income to other jurisdictions, or 
compensate taxes paid locally with deductions in their home countries or 
other jurisdictions. Local corporations will not enjoy the same financial 
agility.
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Taxes on personal income will meet with the greatest resistance, and 
may trigger demands for accountability of power holders and calls for 
more democratic institutions. In countries where semi-democratic institu-
tions exist, such as Kuwait, the probability of gaining the support of the 
parliament to enact income taxes is realistically close to nil. Furthermore, 
as the vast majority of nationals is employed by the state, imposing a tax 
on their salaries would be equivalent to reducing the same. The net gain 
would be limited to the revenue that the tax may raise out of income from 
investment or from salaries of employees of the private sector.
Taxing private sector salaries would contrast with the strategic priority 
that must be attributed to encouraging nationals to take employment in 
the private sector. It would however also encourage expatriates to ask for 
higher wages and eventually possibly help in reducing the wage gap 
between expatriates and nationals.
Imposing an income tax on expatriates only has been repeatedly consid-
ered and rejected. Imposing all wage earners and then offering exemp-
tions or other benefits to nationals employed in the private sector may be 
a more productive approach. In any case, a personal income tax scheme 
would need to be strongly progressive to counter the growing inequality 
of incomes and wealth which is inevitable in the absence of redistribution 
mechanisms.
A strong argument may be put forward in favor of a wealth tax, both 
because it would at least conceptually be close to the traditional form of 
Islamic taxation, that is, zakat, and because a lot of wealth has been accu-
mulated in the form of real estate, which could be easier to assess than 
financial or other forms of wealth. However, zakat already is levied, at least 
on paper, and the extent to which it might be increased or administered 
more effectively is uncertain.
9  gEnuInE rElIAncE on PrIVAtE sEctor
The need for nurturing a strong base for taxation is the main argument to 
conclude that economic sustainability eventually requires the consolida-
tion of a competitive and independent private sector. The Gulf oil- 
producing countries have over decades implemented various converging 
policies to favor the birth of private entrepreneurs and allow them to amass 
very sizable fortunes, but the tendency always has been to consider the 
private sector as an appendix and a client (economically as well as politi-
cally) of the state. With the exception of a relatively short period of time 
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in the very early years of the current century, when some of the GCC 
states, including most notably Saudi Arabia, seemed ready to accept a 
more active role of the local bourgeoisie (Luciani 2005), the state has 
mostly moved to limit the scope of private initiative in multiple fields that 
are considered strategic. There has been an almost total disjuncture 
between an official discourse that always insisted on the role of private 
enterprises, on privatization, on supporting small and medium enterprises; 
and the reality of a state profoundly suspicious and unappreciative of the 
qualities of the national bourgeoisie.
The latest episode in the difficult relationship between the state and 
holders of political power on the one hand and the entrepreneurs on the 
other has been the imprisonment of many leading Saudi business people 
in the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Riyadh and their significant dispossession. 
This process, which has been carried out with zero transparency and com-
plete disregard of any accepted judicial procedure, has been justified as a 
cleanup of extensive corrupt practice; however, no specific case of corrup-
tion has been made public. The government authorities have repeatedly 
announced, as proof of success, the fact that assets supposedly worth 
100 bn dollars have been sequestered: whether this is in fact the case or 
not is impossible to say, but the discouraging effect on private investment 
and initiative in the Kingdom is absolutely certain (FT 2018a).
A radical change of tack is required if the private sector is indeed to 
become the protagonist of the next phase of economic growth and pro-
vide the state with a taxable base capable of offering a source of income in 
alternative to the oil rent. The will to accept an arm’s-length relationship 
between the state and private enterprises through adherence to the rule of 
law and promotion of a level playing field is currently not detectable. 
Under these circumstances, the state is postponing adaptation and again 
relying on income from oil, plus possibly other international financial 
placements. This may well work for a time, depending on oil demand and 
prices, and on how successful the investment decisions of sovereign wealth 
funds will turn out to be. It may work better for the very high rent per 
capita countries (Elbadawi and Makdisi in this volume) than for the oth-
ers. For the latter, the danger is clearly that the shift in attitude may come 
very late in the day, only when the state will have lost its financial auton-
omy and will need to solicit the support of the private sector from a posi-
tion of weakness.
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10  tAcklE InEquAlIty
The combination of issues related to excessive dependence on expatriate 
labor, underdevelopment of fiscal tools, and lack of acceptance of a genu-
inely independent private sector results in a pattern of increasing inequal-
ity in the distribution of income and wealth which may translate into 
growing political discontent.
We have limited systematic information on the distribution of income 
and wealth in the GCC countries, including because of the absence of 
direct taxes, which deprives the state of crucial knowledge tools in this 
respect. But basic facts are very visible. We know that a majority of nation-
als work for the government, and their wages are not such that you can 
build a fortune with the savings. They are secure and guaranteed for life 
by generous retirement schemes that trigger early in life, but do not allow 
for much luxury. At the opposite extreme, we know that quite a few pri-
vate entrepreneurs are independently assessed by Forbes to be billionaires 
or multibillionaires. Some members of the royal family are included in this 
list, but others would certainly belong to it if Forbes had the information 
to assess their wealth, or they cared to appear in it. At the same time, social 
mobility has stalled: stories of rags to riches were common in the 1970s, 
but are very unusual today. Only the scions of the wealthy families have a 
chance to occupy prominent positions in business or public service.
There is nothing exceptional in this trajectory. It has been well docu-
mented that income inequality is growing almost everywhere in the world 
(Atkinson 2015; Piketty 2013), and inheritance is again more important 
than earned income to define the economic status of the vast majority of 
individuals, even in more mobile and meritocratic societies. We also know 
that progressive income taxes are an essential tool to prevent ever-greater 
concentration of income and wealth, and the fact that taxes have become 
less progressive than they used to be is one of several causes of growing 
inequality.
Growing inequality is breeding discontent in many countries, and the 
dilemmas that this poses are a focus of growing political attention. The 
sustainability of inequality is a question mark for the future of many coun-
tries, and of democratic as well as authoritarian regimes. The Gulf oil- 
producing countries are no different—except that not much attention is 
paid to the issue.
Yet sustainability and inequality are very closely related. Sustainability 
requires reduced reliance on expatriate labor, increased national 
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employment in the private sector, increased productivity and wages, more 
value-added creation in market conditions rather than in the government 
sector; in other words, more independent and economically active citizens. 
The political system would inevitably be impacted: will the transition be 
traumatic?
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CHAPTER 3




The drop in oil prices since mid-2014 has opened up a twin-deficit in the 
state budget and the balance of payment of Saudi Arabia. The specificities 
of the current shock are its extraordinary size (50 percent fall in oil prices), 
the fact that it comes on the heels of a long period of high prices 
(2000–2014), and the high probability that it will be permanent rather 
than transitory. As a result, the non-oil economy will have to be taxed to 
balance the books. But the implied tax rates are very high because of the 
narrowness of the non-oil economy and its dependence on the oil econ-
omy. Thus, unless the tax base grows over time, deep cuts in domestic 
consumption will have to be envisaged. But while the current shock brings 
more immediacy to the question of how to adjust to lower oil revenue, 
with a rising population, and oil revenue expected to fall over time as 
interest in climate change increases, the rentier mode of development fol-
lowed by Saudi Arabia was clearly unsustainable to start with.
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On this diagnostic, most analysts agree. But what should replace the 
current economic model? Here, pundits are deeply divided: some believe 
that the inadequacies of the current economic model will necessarily lead, 
sooner or later, to a doomsday scenario of instability and pauperization; 
others advocate a move from the current economy still dominated by 
hydrocarbons to a modern and diversified knowledge-based economy, 
OECD- style. What seems to be missing in the current discourse on Saudi 
Arabia is a more reasonable vision for the future, one that not only resolves 
the problem of non-sustainability of the current path but that, at the same 
time, would also be desirable and feasible.
This confusion in the economic discourse about the kingdom has its 
source in the unusual structure of its labor market. The steep dualism 
between expatriates and national workers is unique among large countries. 
The main problem with the current economic system is that under it, 
nationals are simply not employable in large numbers in the private sector. 
In this chapter, I argue that the main challenge to building a better future 
is to find ways to employ them productively. Doing so would greatly boost 
growth: indeed it may be the only source of growth that is currently read-
ily available. It would also save on the foreign exchange now being remit-
ted by expatriates abroad, reducing the need to produce tradables besides 
oil. But because the current division of labor between nationals and expats 
is deeply inscribed in the current social contract, the Kingdom will have 
difficulty in balancing the interests of businesses and society at large.
This chapter explores these issues in turn—the size of the current shock 
and the magnitude of the fiscal challenge, the need to find a realistic and 
effective new growth model, the challenge of increasing the national labor 
force participation, the implied policy challenges at the macro and corpo-
rate levels and, finally, the type of political economy constraints that will be 
encountered. Its value added is not so much with highlighting each of 
these issues, which have been somewhat explored in the past, as much as 
it is with its claim that addressing the current challenge requires a strategy 
that “normalizes” the Saudi economy. The discussion also highlights the 
main areas of economic and social behavior that require a much better 
understanding for effective policies to be devised in the years ahead.
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2  SIzIng-up the Macro Shock
The first specificity of Saudi Arabia (KSA thereafter) today is the extraor-
dinary size of the macro shock that has hit its economy. According to the 
IMF (2017, 2018), oil exports dropped by half, from around $300 bil-
lion/year during 2012–2014, to $140–160  billion/year during 
2015–2018. Oil revenues that accrued to the state budget represented 
close to 90 percent of government revenues in 2014, and they have 
dropped from SAR 913 billion in 2014, to an estimated SAR 454 billion 
in 2017–2018.
By most accounts, the current depressed level of oil prices, which 
dropped from about $100/barrel during the decade that ended in 2010, 
to about $50 afterwards, is unlikely to fully recover in the medium term, 
given demand and supply projections. This means that there is a good 
chance that the old level of prices will never be recovered. Although this 
assertion can be debated, we will consider this hypothesis as our starting 
point. The implication is that the fiscal deficit resulting from this massive 
negative shock cannot be financed forever, and that there is therefore a 
need, sooner or later, to adjust the budget to the new level of oil prices.
The burden of the adjustment is made harder by the fact that by 2014, 
a year with record oil revenues, the budget was already running a (small) 
deficit. This is unlike the situation of the previous oil shock of the 1990s, 
when the kingdom was running a large surplus, and when the needed 
expenditure cutback was therefore more limited. It is also unlike the situ-
ations of most other GCC countries today (except Bahrain and Oman), 
which were running large surpluses in 2014, and where the negative shock 
only reduced this surplus, or turned it into a small deficit.
The size of the shock can be appreciated in several ways. In 2015–2016, 
the fiscal deficit was about SAR 400 billion/year (or 16 percent GDP), in 
spite of the initiation of some budget cutting measures. By 2017, the defi-
cit was cut by nearly half, to about SAR 240 billion (9.3 percent GDP), 
largely through deep cuts in public investment, which were running at a 
record high level to start with. In addition, a long-standing taboo was 
broken with the introduction of several new taxes (excise, VAT), and the 
initiation of increases in the domestic prices of energy and water, sectors 
that have been heavily subsidized to date. By 2017, public investment has 
fallen to a third of its 2014 level, to 7 percent of GDP, and non-oil reve-
nues rose from 4.6 to 7.5 percent of GDP (see Table 3.1). So, by the end 
of 2017, what has been achieved is already a large fiscal adjustment by 
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global standards. But the adjustment so far has been relatively easy, as 
there is not more room left for reductions in the investment budget.
In spite of these considerable efforts, the fiscal deficit remained sizable 
at the end of 2017, as there was still about SAR 241 billion of excess of 
expenditure over revenues (9.3 percent GDP). Since the deficit has to be 
financed from the non-oil part of the economy, one gets a better sense of 
its magnitude by expressing it as a share of non-oil GDP. By this measure, 
it stood at 13 percent of non-oil GDP at the end of 2017, a large figure 
(down from 22 percent of non-oil GDP in 2015 and 2016). At the same 
time, the need to finance the deficit during the past 4 years has led public 
debt to rise from 1.6 to 19 percent GDP already, and external reserves to 
be reduced from $724 to $473 billion between 2014 and 2017.
The challenge ahead will be more difficult, as the type of expenditure 
left on the budget are more difficult to compress. Wages and compensa-
tion of public servants now approach 50 percent of expenditure, and inter-
est payments have started to rise. Moreover, as new taxes and new tariffs 
start hurting poorer households, the need for some compensation will 
arise. The government is finalizing a cash transfer program (called the citi-
zen account), which should start disbursing during 2018.
Table 3.1 Central Government Budget 2014–2022 (SAR, billions)
Prelim. Projected
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Revenue 1044 612 519 649 757 851 982 1019 1053
  Oil 913 446 309 455 454 463 479 500 519
  Non oil 131 166 210 194 303 388 503 519 534
  o/w taxes 38 41 54 63 116 155 187 194 199
  o/w energy/water 20 35 81 119 198 203 210
Expenditures 1141 999 936 890 936 982 1023 1056 1077
  Wages 335 394 439 412 422 433 444 455 466
  Goods and services 286 229 229 234 236 239 244 250 252
  Interest 4 3 5 11 17 26 32 35 36
  Subsidies 45 42 54 60 75 81 86 89 91
  Investments 471 331 209 173 186 203 217 227 232
Deficit −97 −387 −417 −241 −179 −131 −41 −37 −24
Notes
  GDP 2836 2454 2424 2596 2713 2795 2896 3018 3095
  o/w non oil GDP 1615 1768 1797 1859 1966 2047 2136 2239 2308
Source: IMF article IV (2017)
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The government is thus left with only two choices in the short term: to 
increase revenues and to finance (the remaining) deficit.1 The government 
has taken an aggressive stance at deficit reduction, signaling that it intends 
to increase taxes and cost-recovery rapidly. Whether this will happen, how-
ever, remains to be seen. To get a sense of the magnitude of the needed 
adjustment, government plans foresee to eliminate the deficit by 2020. To 
achieve this ambitious goal, tax revenues are projected to rise to SAR 
200  billion by 2022 (VAT initially at 5 percent and rising afterwards, 
excise on tobacco and drinks, and higher expat fees), from a base of SAR 
38 billion in 2014, and water and energy cost recovery are projected to 
rise by SAR 210 billion. In addition, non-tax revenues are expected to also 
rise due to an ambitious program of privatizations. This financing effort 
represents, therefore, about SAR 400 billion of additional revenues that 
will have to be paid by national households, corporations, and expatriate 
workers.
The important question is whether these expectations are realistic. The 
risk is that the planned increase in revenues meets serious social resistance 
and is rolled-back, and that the gap will continue to be filled up with debt. 
By some estimates, the kingdom can borrow abroad and sell assets to 
theoretically finance at least 10 years of deficits at the current level, before 
going bankrupt. This allows it to kick the can down the road rather than 
find more sustainable solutions, as has often happened to regimes built on 
oil (Karl 1997).
3  the StabIlIzatIon challenge
To gage of the realism of the kingdom’s fiscal objectives, it is important 
(but difficult) to get a sense of the incidence of the planned fiscal effort on 
the various parts of the population.
Expats do create a buffer for the economy but are unlikely to be part of 
the tax base. The predominance of expats in the construction sector 
(Fig.  3.1) meant that, unlike other countries, the recent and ongoing 
closing- down of major infrastructure projects has not created large unem-
ployment among nationals, as instead, the expat labor force has shrunk 
(Mahroum 2016). One presumes however that expats are being paid their 
reservation wage, and while they can be fired at will, it is not possible to 
1 Ending the war in Yemen would also lead to savings—but these costs are not detailed in 
the government budget as presented in IMF and other public documents.
3 FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY, THE LABOR MARKET, AND GROWTH IN SAUDI… 
36
compress their net incomes by much and keep them employed. Thus, 
while several fees are levied on them already (work permit, residence per-
mit, training charges), and while these fees are expected to rise more in the 
future (by a total 2.2 percent of GDP by 2022, according to IMF projec-
tions), one expects that such additional costs will have to be borne by their 
employers rather than through a compression of their net income.2 Some 
more research on this issue, taking advantage of recent increases in these 
fees, will be useful to understand this central set of issues better.
The burden of taxation and cost recovery will, therefore, have to fall 
largely on Saudi households and firms. Concerning firms, there is little 
knowledge of how large their profits are—there is actually no such data, 
since corporate revenues are not taxed. Thus, it is not clear to what extent 
they would be willing to absorb the new taxes and higher input prices 
through reductions in their profits, as opposed to choosing to either close 
down their operations (especially for those in the traded sector), or to pass 
on the increased burden to consumers (especially for those in 
2 The same logic applies to the VAT and rise in utility tariffs that apply to them.




non-tradables). There are indications that, in the aggregate, profitability is 
on the high side: the non-oil corporate sector has been growing fast in the 
past decade, and its investment rates can be estimated roughly from the 
national account to be about 25 percent of non-oil GDP, a pretty high 
figure which suggests overall high levels of profitability. Large firms traded 
on the stock exchange, and listed in the Orbis database, tend to report 
large profits.3 Moreover, the private sector as a whole has relatively high 
access to credit, as total credit to the private sector is reportedly at about 
90 percent of non-oil GDP, again, a large figure by international standards.
But it seems plausible to think that the corporate sector is highly dual-
istic, with large corporations benefitting from a privileged access to the 
credit market, and facing less competitive pressures than smaller firms 
(Hanieh 2016). This would imply that large firms are able to absorb more 
losses than SMEs. It should be noted however that state ownership in the 
largest firms is quite sizable—directly at about 45 percent, and overall 
even more, given state stakes in banks and insurance companies that own 
another 15 percent of these firms (Coksun et al. 2018—see Fig. 3.2). This 
3 Excluding the petrochemical companies and energy utilities, their profit rates (relative to 
revenues) were of the order of 17 percent in 2014, falling to 15 percent in 2016 (IMF 
2017). This can be considered high by international standards.
Fig. 3.2 Ownership of traded companies in the GCC. (Source: Coskun 
et al. 2018)
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limits the net financial gains of passing the burden of adjustment on such 
firms. At the same time, there are indications that smaller firms operate in 
a highly competitive environment, and that they are already hurting from 
the deteriorating market conditions. More research is needed to under-
stand in more detail the performance of the corporate sector and its ability 
to sustain more taxation, as this will help devise better policies in the 
years ahead.
There is a possibility of taxing wealth, such as bank accounts, and other 
forms of assets. There has been to date no indication that this may take 
place formally, although the episode of the Ritz-Carleton hotel suggests 
that this may take place informally, at least at the top of the corporate pyra-
mid. There have been reports of large amounts of capital flight in recent 
years, which suggests that capital-holders are trying to shield their assets 
from potential taxation and state predation.
To get a sense of magnitude of the burden on households and corpora-
tions implied by the IMF projections, I will try below to heroically esti-
mate a lower and upper bound aggregate tax rate. As described above, the 
new taxes announced are essentially a VAT and excise taxes, which will fall 
directly on households; higher expat fees, which indirectly affect profits 
and consumer prices; and increased utilities prices, which fall directly on 
consumers and firms, but that may end up falling more on consumers via 
their indirect influence on output prices.
One extreme assumption one can make is that all of the burden will fall 
on Saudi households. If that were the case, the burden would be unbear-
able. To get a feel of magnitudes, 70 percent of working Saudis work for 
government, and their total compensation in 2017 was SAR 412 billion 
(Table 3.1). Even if one accounts generously for income earned by Saudis 
in the private sector (which is unlikely to be more than a third of this 
amount), and from non-labor sources (such as return on savings and other 
assets), it is apparent that the burden of the extra taxes and utility costs will 
be a large proportion of their income—possibly more than half!
A lower bound would consider a larger tax base that includes corporate 
profits and self-employment earnings. Non-oil GDP stood at SAR 1.8 tril-
lion in 2017. One can estimate based on ministry of labor data that total 
expats income is about SAR 600 billion. Taking this out leaves about SAR 
1.2 trillion of non-oil national income, which, together with the public 
sector wage bill, adds to a total tax base of about SAR 1.6 trillion. With 
this larger tax base, a lower bound estimate of the average tax burden 
would stand at about 25 percent, a lower, but still quite a large burden.
 I. DIWAN
39
We can conclude that the current financing goals are not realistic. For 
the burden of adjustment to become bearable in the medium term, non- 
oil GDP needs to rise in ways that boosts the tax base. More realistically 
then, a strategy to eliminate fiscal deficits that can work would be more 
gradual, and it would rely centrally on pro-growth reforms that increase 
the size of the tax base over time. As long as this does not happen, public 
debt is likely to continue to rise. There are moreover financial limits to the 
extent of gradualism, since both slow fiscal adjustment and growth- 
inducing reforms require financing. There is thus a central trade-off: if 
adjustment is too fast, it would be resisted socially; but if it is too slow, it 
would consume much of the fiscal space, leaving little financing resources 
available to invest sufficiently in new sources of growth.
4  What groWth Strategy?
The government has announced ambitious plans to boost private sector 
growth, including improvements in the business climate, in trade logistics, 
and in the application of the rule of law. In the IMF scenario—which is 
reportedly more conservative than government expectations—these 
reforms are expected to increase non-oil GDP growth by 3 points by 
2020, for a total of 3.5 percent growth per year. This seems quite optimis-
tic, given the large weight of government spending in fostering growth in 
the past; and it says little about the potential for medium term growth, 
because the growth model itself remains fuzzy and poorly defined. The 
question of interest is, therefore, what growth model can deliver a larger 
tax base? From a longer-term perspective, oil rents are not sufficient any-
more to finance anything close to the current consumption levels of the 
population, and this can only get worse over time in the absence of a new 
source of growth. With its current population of 23 million, and oil reve-
nues of only $6000 per capita, Saudi Arabia has clearly outgrown its cur-
rent model. A new growth model would also allow consumption to grow 
again after a necessary adjustment, and a credible model could even justify 
a temporary smoothing of consumption until growth picks up again, 
fueled by a new economic reactor.
In the short term, growth will be made harder by the headwinds cre-
ated by fiscal stabilization itself. Cuts in government expenditure create a 
drag on non-oil GDP growth, whose size depends on the size of the “fiscal 
multiplier”. The multiplier depends on how much of government spend-
ing ends up as imports and remittances—the larger these, the smaller the 
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“multiplier”. It has been estimated, based on historical data that the short- 
term multiplier is quite low at about 0.5 (Espinoza et  al. 2013). This 
means that large leakages reduce the growth impact of government expen-
ditures. Still, one would expect a cumulative fall in the growth of non-oil 
GDP on account of a stabilization effort of about 10 percent of GDP to 
be about 5 percent points. Already, non-oil GDP growth, which was 
growing fast before the 2014 shock, has halted to about zero. The stabili-
zation drag is expected to continue to operate for several years as firms 
adjust their level of operation to lower levels of government spending.
But what will drive economic growth in the medium and long terms? 
There are several reasons to believe that the main source of growth avail-
able in the medium term is the increase in the labor force participation of 
Saudi nationals.
From a tax collection perspective, GDP growth per se does not tell us 
much about the economy’s ability to absorb increased revenue collection, 
which depends not just on growth rates, but on the type of growth. A path 
of labor intensive growth leveraged on expat labor can allow for larger 
taxation of corporate profits, but if it does not manage to increase employ-
ment among Saudis, it would require more social spending to preserve 
social peace, and thus, would not be conducive to correcting the macro- 
imbalances. On the other hand, growth based on the expansion of Saudi 
labor would lead to a broader tax base over time.
More broadly, only 40 percent of working-age nationals participate in 
the labor force (but only 35 percent work, as the rest are unemployed). 
This compares to labor participation rates of about 60 percent in the 
OECD. Low Saudi participation rates are largely due to very low partici-
pation by women (19 percent), but men’s participation (55 percent) is not 
high by international standards either. Huge gains could be made if they 
were instead encouraged to do so, because Saudi nationals are both grossly 
underemployed and increasingly well educated, thus increasing the oppor-
tunity cost of low participation. To give a sense of the potential gains if 
national labor was employed more effectively, a simple projection model 
suggests that, with participation rates growing from 40 to 60 percent of 
the working-age population and unemployment dropping to its natural 
rate, non-oil national income would more than double if the additional 
workers join the non-oil sector at current productivity levels. Improvements 
in labor productivity would add to this growth rate further. Altogether, it 
can be estimated that this addition to national wealth is comparable in 
magnitude to the kingdom’s current oil wealth.
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The extent of economic gain that can be obtained by fixing other inef-
ficiencies, or by removing other constraints to growth, pales in compari-
son. The total cost of energy subsidies is about 7 percent GDP—there is 
certainly much over-consumption given low prices, but the extent by 
which the economic pie can actually be increased on this front is limited. 
Importing technology to increase productivity, the classical catch-up 
development policy, is desirable, but the reason for the relatively low labor 
productivity in the past has not been the lack of openness of the Saudi 
market to outside influences, but rather, the incentive of firms to use 
labor-intensive technologies, which is itself connected to the widespread 
availability of cheap (imported) labor.
This poses the question of the employability of Saudi citizens. Jobs can-
not come from an expansion of the civil service. The government is no 
longer hiring all Saudis who are willing to work. And in the current eco-
nomic environment, nationals are simply not employable in large numbers 
in the private sector. Already, unemployment is officially at 11.6 percent 
overall, 32.8 percent for women, and 29.4 for youth, and rising. Moreover, 
there are about 200,000 new entrants to the labor market every year.
One can envision a worst case scenario, where dwindling oil revenues 
continue to be shared among the nationals, cheap labor continues to be 
freely imported, and Saudi reservation wages only fall slowly over time as 
oil rents per capita decline. In such a scenario, the kingdom will turn into 
an increasingly impoverished welfare state, with rising unemployment and 
lower labor force participation. Moreover, income inequality would rise 
fast, as business-owners continue to enrich themselves by exploiting cheap 
expat labor, while the rest of the population gets poorer over time. 
Governance, which has relied largely on the co-optation of citizens, could 
become more repressive, as has happened in the countries of the region 
with smaller oil endowments and larger populations, such as Iraq or 
Algeria (Cammett et al. 2019).
Besides the no-reform slow-impoverishment scenario, an equally unde-
sirable strategy is one that uses the existing fiscal space to finance a costly 
pie-in-the-sky national project that does not deliver sustainable growth. 
Some elements of the Vision 2030 can be read in this manner, and espe-
cially those that project Saudi Arabia to become a sort of Dubai on ste-
roids, with Saudi youth managing a large population of migrant workers 
in a super-competitive knowledge economy. The challenge for such a 
strategy is to make middle-skill Saudi workers complementary to expat 
workers. Such a vision seems too ambitious at the macro level for a 
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country the size of KSA. One can think at best of particular sectors, where 
such a production strategy can make sense, but it cannot cover the whole 
economy. But even then, insulating sectors with cheap foreign labor from 
others that employ higher skill national workers runs again in the same 
problem as with the current quantitative restrictions on labor use—the 
existence of cheap unskilled expats will reduce the incentives of firms to 
increase capital investment and improve efficiency and wages in the sectors 
selected for upgrades.
While the more pessimistic scenario is the more likely of the two, both 
fail to present a reasonable vision for the country’s next 20 years, when oil 
revenues are likely to remain sizable, but not sufficient to sustain the cur-
rent model of development. It must be evident to many Saudis that it is 
high time for the productive structure to adapt to the new realities. The 
country’s human and real assets have changed profoundly in the past 
50 years. While importing labor to build the country made sense in the 
past, there are now large cohorts of educated Saudis graduating and aspir-
ing to productive employment. The situation is thus profoundly different, 
and it requires profoundly different economic incentives. The massive 
import of foreign labor was a response to an exceptional situation, unseen 
in these proportions in any other country at any other time. This period 
has now to come to an end.
To employ its youth gainfully, Saudi Arabia now needs to become a 
“normal” oil economy—like, for example, Norway—that exports mostly, 
if not only, oil, but that derives national income from the work of its own 
population, primarily in the service sector. In this “normal” model, Saudi 
workers would replace expatriates, largely in service jobs. The economy 
would remain dominated by a large oil sector (which includes backward- 
and forward-linked sub-sectors), employing specialized national workers 
(e.g., about 50,000 oil engineers). A large share of the Saudi labor force 
(say half) would remain employed in government; and many public-sector 
firms would continue to play an important economic role, employing spe-
cialized Saudi workers in the oil, health, academic, telecom, and finance 
industries.
The new jobs would largely be in high-productivity occupations in the 
service sector. Except in a few areas of comparative advantage, not many 
firms would produce globally competitive tradables; those that do so now 
would be unlikely to survive given that unskilled wages would rise, capital 
would come at a higher cost, subsidies would be cut, and taxes would be 
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introduced. At best, a few tradable sectors could thrive, such as religious 
tourism and sectors with close linkages with petroleum—at least initially.
At the end of this transition, millions of expatriates would have returned 
to their home countries, having provided a vital contribution to the task of 
building up a modern country at record speed. The Saudi economy would 
become smaller, but it would employ a large share of its own population 
productively. At the end of the day, the 6 million expats working in private 
sector firms may be replaced by less than 1 million Saudi workers, employed 
at higher productivity and at higher wages. The private sector may shrink 
considerably—even as the tax base grows. The economy may end up with 
a lower GDP, but it would produce a larger national income. Oil would 
remain central, but it would have a much larger multiplier effect in terms 
of the domestic employment of nationals.
In sum, the main economic challenge of the transition to a normal 
economy is to create highly productive jobs for nationals. It is easy enough 
to create high-paying jobs—in the public sector, including the security 
forces, or by replacing migrants in labor-intensive private-sector occupa-
tions. But the first option (creating new public-sector jobs) would expand 
fiscal deficits unsustainably. The second option (replacing expatriate work-
ers with nationals) can deliver high wages in the non-tradable service sec-
tor if the total number of migrant workers is reduced sharply. But unless 
productivity rises too, this would be reflected in higher non-tradable 
prices, eroding standards of living.
In spite of the relative complexity of the task ahead, one should keep in 
mind that the overall challenge remains modest—to find productive jobs 
for about 1 million Saudis over the next five years, in an economy whose 
GDP is close to $1 trillion. What is needed is a three-prong strategy that 
tweaks the time-tested Saudization strategy further, by moving faster and 
more ambitiously on increasing the cost of expat labor, and that supple-
ments labor policies with an industrial policy that helps domestic firms 
adapt faster to a new set of input prices, and by a conducive macro envi-
ronment that makes room for the necessary investment needed to raise 
labor productivity. The rest of the chapter explores each of these themes 
in greater detail.
5  the central challenge: SaudIS eMployabIlIty
The key challenge then is to provide incentives for Saudi women and men 
to join the labor market in larger numbers, and for Saudi firms to hire them.
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As a background for this discussion, lets us summarize the well-known 
duality of the Saudi labor market. About 70 percent of nationals work for 
the public sector, while expatriates fill 80 percent of private sector jobs. 
About 4 million Saudis work for the public sector, and 1 million in the 
private sector.
According to data from the Central Authority for Statistics, the wage 
ratio between Saudi men that work in the public sector over that of those 
that work in the private sector is about 2 (Fig. 3.3). This means that Saudi 
current reservation wage is at around half the public sector wage. 
Unemployment benefits, close family ties and support, and the hope to 
get a wasta (connection) to join some part of the public sector will keep 
reservation wages from falling rapidly, even as the prospect of getting a 
public sector job fades away.
At the same time, a small proportion of Saudis already work in the pri-
vate sector, where the men among them earn on average twice more than 
expats (and higher multiples for those with lower levels of education). 
Firms are thus willing to hire Saudis at wages above those of expats. This 
may reflect in part constraints on firms imposed by the Saudization pro-
gram and, in parts, the comparative advantages of nationals in some sec-
tors. But clearly, the demand by firms for national labor must be severely 
constrained by the size of the wage differentials.
Unemployment in such circumstances reflects both demand and supply 
constraints—Saudis with reservation wages too high given private sector 




wages for nationals, and firms finding it more profitable to hire cheaper 
expats. To improve the national labor force participation, expat wages 
need to go up in order to improve the attractiveness of national workers 
to firms, and/or national reservation wages need to go down to expand 
labor supply. The more movement in these prices, the faster Saudi employ-
ment would expand. The balance in the use of the two approaches will 
determine the terms of the burden sharing of reforming the labor market, 
that is, the welfare loss of workers versus that of firms. While cultural 
norms of low participation may initially create a resistance to the expan-
sion of work, it is highly unlikely that these norms will not adjust to eco-
nomic opportunities as they get created, as is the case around the world.
The labor market would therefore have to become much tighter, with 
constraints placed on the total number of migrants in the country—and 
not just firm-level quotas that are poorly applied, as is the case now. So far, 
the Saudization effort has largely focused on a system of quota for Saudi 
nationals in various sectors. But it has become clear over time that a system 
of growing quotas cannot work effectively unless the cost of employing 
expat rises at the same time, so that the (rising) quotas remain close to the 
quantity of national labor effectively demanded by the market. As long as 
it is cheaper to employ expats, rent-seeking would ensure that the quota 
system will leak.4 The current policy stance also includes efforts to shrink 
the Saudi-expat wage gap. The government-stated goal is to reduce it by 
20 percent by 2022. This goal seems however too modest. The main rea-
son for the modest approach is that Saudization policies are naturally 
resisted by the corporate sector, since they lower profitability in the 
short term.
The alternative of squeezing the population into accepting lower reser-
vation wages generates social discontent and resistance leading to delays 
and to policy reversals—so far, the government has backed down on sev-
eral reforms that hurt the population (including wage cuts). Given the 
scale of the challenge, there is therefore a need to broaden the policy 
toolkit. There are three other ways to improve the labor force participa-
tion of Saudis in the non-oil sector besides taxing the expats and pushing 
Saudis to accept lower reservation wages: (1) to subsidize the private 
4 This will be exacerbated by the highly crony nature of the private sector, whose heights 
remain dominated by royals and families close to the court, and who had, until recently, a 
decisive influence over the application of policies and regulatory norms to their business 
concerns (Mazaheri 2016).
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sector wages of Saudis with a negative income tax; (2) to subsidize their 
in-firm training so as to improve their productivity; (3) to influence social 
norms and work condition in ways that encourage Saudi women to work 
more in the private sector. More likely, a successful strategy would use all 
these instruments.
The discussion above assumes that the challenge of creating jobs for 
Saudis is a problem of riches and that all that KSA needs to do is to substi-
tute Saudi for foreign workers in existing positions. But simple substitu-
tion will not do. As stressed by various analysts, the 6 million jobs currently 
occupied by expats in the non-oil sector are either overly low skill or high 
skill intensive (Hertog 2014; Kabli 2014). This dualistic production struc-
ture has been molded by economic incentives—whenever possible, firms 
have tended to use production methods that take advantage of the low 
cost of unskilled labor, which saves on the necessity to invest in machinery 
and other productive assets.5 At the same time, the generous energy sub-
sidies, and the large supply of loanable funds have also advantaged capital 
intensity among large firms, resulting overall in a two-peak aggregate pro-
duction function, focused around the employment of low and high skills 
workers, to the detriment of technologies using middle levels of skills 
more intensely.
The problem with this two-peak dual production structure is that it 
does not correspond to the relative scarcity of national factors, as the Saudi 
labor force is now predominantly of a medium skill level (see Fig. 3.4). 
Thus, the type of needed structural change is one that upgrades labor- 
intensive sectors, by adding capital, skills, and technology. On the positive 
side, such middle-skill jobs would be at higher productivity, allowing pri-
vate firms to pay the higher wages needed to attract national labor without 
generating too much inflationary pressures. Such job upgrading should 
over time eliminate much of the menial positions occupied presently 
by expats.
The good news is that the education level among young Saudis has 
risen, which makes it possible for them to occupy jobs at relatively high 
productivity levels. The bad news, however, is that existing incentives have 
pushed firms in the private sector to create jobs that require either very 
low skills (especially in services) or very high skills (especially in the energy 
sector). To create jobs that are attractive for Saudis, who have mostly 
5 This is also reflected in a decline in aggregate labor productivity over the past decade, 
even as non-oil GDP rose fast.
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mid-level skills, there is therefore a need for structural change in the pro-
duction methods used by the private sector in response to changes in fac-
tor endowments and prices.
6  the polIcy agenda ahead
There are two types of additional economic challenges to transitioning to 
a “normal” economy, besides the tightening up of the labor market (and 
a multitude of political-economic ones discussed in Sect. 6). These are 
related to the need: (1) to improve the dynamism of the private sector so 
as to support structural change; and (2) to make the right macroeconomic 
choices as related to speed in order to leave enough financial headroom for 
the financing of a technological upgrading of the private sector.
The first issue about the need for a more dynamic private sector is 
related to the need for structural change discussed above. The Vision 
2030 document puts a lot of emphasis on the development of new small 
and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) to make the market economy more 
dynamic. According to national statistics, there are however more than 
1.1 million firms with less than 50 employees, which is already a large 
figure.6 Indeed, a recent survey of SMEs by the General authority on 
Statistics reveals that an important constraint facing SMEs in KSA was too 
much competition and the implied lack of profitability (General Authority 
6 This can be compared to 1.5 million such firms in Turkey, a country with a population 
four times that of KSA.
Fig. 3.4 Nationals and Expats employment in the non-oil sectors in relation to 
educational levels, 2010. (Source: Kabli 2014, using Ministry of Labor statistics)
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of Statistics 2017). What is needed then is not a net rise in the number of 
SMEs, but rather, the replacement of the old labor-intensive firms by new 
skill intensive ones.
Successful SMEs should afford to pay sufficient wages to attract Saudi 
workers by investing in more capital- and skill-intensive production meth-
ods, and by training their workers to improve their productivity. To 
encourage their entry will require however a much more ambitious effort 
to improve the business climate, which remains opaque and constraining, 
and to open up access to finance, which is now severely restricted for 
SMEs. These efforts will only help if, at the same time, the less efficient 
firms face higher labor costs and are pushed to close down and exit. Efforts 
should thus also be needed to facilitate the exit of firms that cease to be 
profitable, including a reform of the bankruptcy code.7
To help SMEs quickly adjust to the evolving input price structure (more 
expensive labor and other input costs), more targeted industrial policies 
would also be needed. The key challenge is to support the transformation 
of whole sectors—reforming the construction industry so that it can move 
from its current labor-intensive techniques to more capital- and skill-
intensive methods, or helping to create new SMEs that cater to a world 
where housework is three to four times more expensive, by creating sub-
stitute services in the transport, cleaning, child-care, and food sectors. In 
this transformation, individual firms face several externalities: (1) their 
(costly) discoveries will be imitated by others; (2) they may need to rely on 
inputs (say machinery) that are not yet produced (or serviced); and (3) 
they risk losing the workers that they train at great cost to their competi-
tors. As with industrial policies more generally, the question is not as much 
whether such policies are needed, but rather how to implement them in 
ways that work. Success here would be judged by their ability to elicit 
innovation by the private sector, while avoiding rent-seeking (on this, see 
Rodrik 2009). It has been noted that Saudization is more achievable in 
sectors where the wage gap is smaller (Hertog 2014). In sectors with large 
wage gaps, a decision needs to be made about whether to sacrifice or res-
cue the sector. Construction and commerce are two sectors that would 
almost certainly need to be rescued given their important size (see 
Fig.  3.4). These sectors attract at present nearly 4  million uneducated 
expats and use labor-intensive methods to produce about 20 percent of 
7 Moreover, policies that help firms survive the coming hard times—such as support to 
compensate for higher energy costs—should carefully discriminate between firms that 
should, and those that should not survive.
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non-oil GDP (see Fig. 3.1). They need to be incentivized to increase their 
labor productivity by investing in machinery and technology.
In the absence of supporting policies, there is a risk of migrant jobs 
disappearing, but being replaced with only a limited number of jobs for 
nationals, as has been observed in the Saudization policies followed so far 
(Hertog 2014; Peck 2017). The recent work of Jennifer Peck (2017) on 
the effects of the Nitakat program between 2011 and 2012 illustrate well 
the risks of a half-baked strategy. Using a detailed dataset at the firm level, 
she finds that the new quotas imposed by the program managed over a 
period of 16 months to increase the number of Saudi jobs by 93,000. But, 
at the same time, the destructive effect of the program was considerable: 
11,000 firms (mostly small ones) preferred to exit rather than have to 
respect the new quotas (or pay the fine); and 934,000 expat jobs were 
eliminated. These stark results owe much to the precipitous nature of the 
program—if firms were given more time, and had better access to finance, 
more of them might have adjusted in ways that would have rescued 
more jobs.
The second major set of policy issues is related to the broad macro 
framework and, specifically, to that of the speed of adjustment. As dis-
cussed earlier, the required new investments would generate large new 
financing needs. In order to pay sufficiently to attract Saudi workers and 
use their skills most productively, the new economy will need to invest in 
more capital- and skill-intensive production methods. These new financ-
ing needs are likely to be large. At the aggregate level, to create about one 
million jobs every 5 years, they can be of the order of $0.5 trillion over the 
next ten years. These funds will have to come from the national banking 
and financial sectors, FDI, or from public funds. At the same time, overly 
capital-intensive firms and sectors, which rest on massive energy and capi-
tal subsidies, may need to be scaled down or eliminated, as financial capital 
becomes more scarce and in higher demand in medium-skill intensive 
sectors.
At the macro level, the need for large amount of investment finance 
creates a trade-off with the speed of adjustment. Large amounts of public 
financing of deficits would crowd out funds needed to finance private- 
sector investment. Given that the private investment required for a suc-
cessful structural reform strategy is large, there is also a global finance 
trade-off. In the back-of-the-envelope calculations cited above, KSA’s fis-
cal space can be evaluated at about $1 Trillion. This makes it possible to 
wait 10 years to adjust, if nothing goes to investment. Alternatively, half of 
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the space would be needed to create one million good new jobs. Thus, 
choices will have to be made. Slowing adjustment too much would con-
strain how much can be invested to upgrade jobs and productivity.
7  the polItIcal econoMy challenge
Important elements of the reforms needed for KSA to become a “normal” 
economy are already in place. Vision 2030 focuses on many aspects of this 
agenda. Taxes are rising and subsidies are coming down slowly. Saudization 
policies, which were started a decade ago, are becoming more binding, 
and expats are becoming more expensive and are starting to leave in 
droves. And policy signals have been sent to encourage more innovative 
SMEs to enter domestic markets. But overall, the program projected by 
Vision 2030 is not sufficiently focused on the creation of jobs for nationals 
and is overly concerned with an unattainable diversification agenda. As 
such, it remains blurred and lacks credibility. To send an unmistakable 
signal that productive jobs are the priority, Saudization policies, and pri-
vate sector development efforts, would need to become more ambitious. 
Mega-projects (such as Neon city) that could easily turn into white ele-
phants should also be replaced by pragmatic industrial policies that help 
whole sub-sectors to upgrade rapidly.
In developing these policies, and beyond the important economic com-
plexities discussed above, the deeper constraints to progress need to be 
found in the particular political economy of the Kingdom. It is only a bit 
of a caricature to state that the current growth model rests on a two sepa-
rate deals: one deal with businesses for a free hand at importing labor from 
abroad, and one with citizens for guaranteed public sector jobs and life- 
long support. With lower oil rents to share, the domestic settlement comes 
under strain. Cutting support for businessmen, the population, or both 
risks undermining the current national pact. The economic elites would 
oppose policies that lead to more restrictions on their ability to hire expats 
at low cost. They would claim that most Saudis’ education and attitude are 
not favorable to their employment. National workers will resist a reduc-
tion in their reservation wage, claiming that it is the responsibility of the 
state to protect their consumption level.
To build support for reforms, the perception that the costs of reform 
are fairly shared by all groups will be essential. The main challenge for a 
successful transition to a “normal” economy is to avoid distributional 
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fights. Often, reforms that have significant distributional implications end 
up pitting different groups against each other, with each trying to shift the 
burden of adjustment by engaging in a “war of attrition” in an attempt to 
wait the other group out (Alesina and Drazen 1991). This happens more 
when actors have low trust that costs and gains will be fairly shared among 
themselves.
Moreover, in order to reduce opposition to change, it does make sense 
for the state to try to smooth out the initial consumption drop by only 
lowering the fiscal deficit gradually, at the speed at which the private sector 
picks up steam in creating jobs for nationals.
On the political side, there are three main risks. First, a populist 
reform program that advantages labor over firms will have a hard time 
generating a supply response. The risk here is that expat jobs will be 
eliminated, but they would not be replaced by new Saudi jobs. But sec-
ond, a program that puts firms ahead of labor will not manage to increase 
the size of the tax base, because as long as the current incentive system 
of firms does not change fundamentally, the creation of more jobs will 
only attract more migrants rather than employ more Saudis. There is 
thus a fine line to walk in order to ensure that the (largely front-loaded) 
burden and (mainly long-term) benefits of the reforms will be fairly bal-
anced among the population. A failure to ensure such a balance brings in 
the third type of risk, which is that of ending up doing nothing, kicking 
the can down the road, and borrowing to avoid reform as long as pos-
sible. Such a path would only lead to slow decay, and the need for harsher 
adjustment down the road.
Finally, beyond economic plans that manage to reduce opposition to 
stabilization and reform by sharing the burden of reforms more fairly 
across groups and time, one cannot avoid wondering how politics will 
adjust in the long term to the demands of a more autonomous popula-
tion and private sector. How the current political regime will choose to 
adjust the ways the country is governed once circumstances change 
remains highly uncertain. In the long term, rent distribution will become 
less dominant and it will become unable to neutralize political voice as 
much as it did in the past. KSA’s truest exceptionalism—the richest non 
democratic large country in the world—will surely come under stress as 
incomes start shifting from a rentier logic, to one based on private 
initiative.
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1  IntroductIon: rIsks to Producer economIes—
current Problems and emergIng Pressures
The oil price cycle of the last decade has exposed once more some of the 
enduring structural economic weaknesses in “producer economies”, those 
countries for whom oil and gas revenue constitutes a significant propor-
tion of exports and fiscal revenue.1 As the most prominent producing 
region in the world, the impact of the change in oil prices has been par-
ticularly acute in the Middle East, where average net incomes from oil and 
gas fell by 40% in 2015–2018 compared to their highs in 2010–2014 
(International Energy Agency 2018). The public debate on the need to 
1 For the purpose of this chapter, it is assumed that producer economies are those countries 
in which oil and gas exports make up at least one-third of total goods exports, and where 
revenues from oil and gas contribute to at least one-third of total fiscal revenue.
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diversify oil- and gas-dependent economies has once again gathered steam, 
with several countries announcing ambitious reform programmes aimed 
in large part at reducing their dependence on hydrocarbons revenue.
In the past, the imperative to reform has waxed and waned, following 
closely the oil price cycle, but the combination of pressures from shale oil 
in the United States, which accounted for 7 in every 10 incremental bar-
rels since 2008, and the long-term uncertainty over demand for oil and 
gas are intensifying the imperatives for change (ibid.). Fundamental 
changes to the development model in resource-rich countries look 
unavoidable. This chapter will enumerate how pressures on producers 
across the Middle East could evolve, using the results of the International 
Energy Agency’s New Policies and Sustainable Development Scenarios. 
While acknowledging that the reform agenda will necessarily be much 
broader than just energy, it will propose ways in which the energy sector 
can be leveraged to help promote a more balanced economy.
2  How do tHe economIc Pressures In Producer 
economIes evolve goIng Forward?
There are multiple uncertainties affecting the outlook for hydrocarbons 
and the revenue flows that sustain producer economies, not only because 
of fluctuating prices, but also because of questions concerning long-term 
demand. How the economic pressures on producer economies evolve in 
the future depends largely on what the energy sector looks like going for-
ward. To get a sense of the range of possibilities, we will examine two 
distinct trajectories.
The New Policies Scenario provides a measured assessment of where 
today’s policy frameworks, and policies that have been announced but not 
yet implemented, together with the continued evolution of known tech-
nologies, could take the energy sector. In this scenario, equilibrium prices 
for oil and natural gas (in the context of rising global demand for both 
commodities) rise gradually from today’s levels. The pace of oil demand 
growth slows markedly, but there is no peak in global consumption, and 
demand is expected to reach 106 million barrels per day (mb/d) by 2040. 
Demand for natural gas increases strongly and accounts for a quarter of 
global primary energy demand by 2040.
The combination of continually growing oil demand and the attendant 
robust prices may at first appear to offer a relatively benign outlook for 
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major producers—by the late 2020s, annual net income from oil and gas 
is higher for all Middle East producers than it was in 2010–2017 (Fig. 4.1). 
But several important factors need to be considered that would suggest 
that even here, the incentive to diversify oil-dependent economies 
remains strong.
The first is that the short- and medium-term market dynamics differ 
considerably from the long-term ones. The majority of the growth in oil 
production until 2025 continues to come from countries outside of the 
Middle East, particularly from the United States. It is only after 2025, 
once the US tight oil plateaus and then starts to fall back, that the world 
again becomes more reliant on the major conventional oil resource- 
holders to balance the market. This is why, in most cases, the pick-up in oil 
net income takes place only in the latter years. These latter years are the 
ones where there is the most uncertainty about the outlook for demand.
Secondly, while the broad pattern may show absolute levels of income 
growth, this masks the volatility imposed by price cycles, which, in the 
absence of new policy tools in many producers, could translate into uncer-
tain fiscal spending and unpredictable economic growth.
Lastly, it is crucial to incorporate the impact of population growth. For 
sizeable producers with relatively small populations (e.g., the United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar), this is less of a concern. However, in the 
region’s two largest producers Iraq (+28 million increase in population 
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Fig. 4.1 Average annual net income from oil and gas in Middle East producers. 
(Source: International Energy Agency)
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has significant implications for net income from oil and gas when calcu-
lated on a per-capita basis. This indicator will decline in Saudi Arabia over 
the period until 2025 and increase only modestly overall until 2040, 
despite a large increase in total net income (Fig. 4.2).
Population growth also has implications for patterns of employment. If 
we assume that the public sector employs the same proportion of the 
labour force in 2030 as it does today, Iraq’s public sector wage bill would 
increase by almost 150%, even without any real increase in average salaries, 
reaching over $70 billion in 2030 (equivalent to 40% of its net income 
from oil and gas in 2030). The public sector wage bill in Saudi Arabia 
would increase even more, reaching almost $200 billion (or 60% of its net 
income from oil and gas in 2030). Pressure for reform in some key pro-
ducer economies remains high, even in a world where demand for oil 
continues to increase and oil prices remain robust.
The possibility that the energy sector moves in another direction is 
examined in the Sustainable Development Scenario. This scenario starts 
from some key energy-related components of the Sustainable 
Development Goals2 and then works back to the present to see how 
2 These goals include achieving universal access to modern energy by 2030, reducing dra-
matically the premature deaths due to energy-related air pollution and delivering on the Paris 
Agreement—this scenario is therefore fully aligned with the Agreement’s goal of limiting the 






























they might be achieved. It sets out the major changes that would be 
required to deliver these goals simultaneously. As such, it incorporates 
not only price effects for oil and gas, but also a major change in the 
volumes demanded. In this scenario, oil demand peaks in the near term 
and will then decline to around 70 mb/d by 2040, while natural gas 
consumption rises by only one- quarter the amount projected in the 
New Policies Scenario.
An energy sector that is set on a trajectory that complies with the Paris 
Climate Agreement looks significantly different to the one that prevails 
today, and indeed from the New Policies Scenario discussed earlier. For 
producer economies, the effects of a smaller market for oil are com-
pounded by lower prices for it, causing cumulative net incomes across the 
Middle East to fall until 2040 by over one-quarter relative to their levels 
in the New Policies Scenario. In such a scenario, constrained government 
revenues make it harder to manage immediate budgetary requirements 

























Fig. 4.3 Total net income from oil and gas in the Sustainable Development 
Scenario. Note: The change in average annual net income until 2040, relative to 
the New Policies Scenario, is shown in brackets. (Source: International 
Energy Agency)
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3  tHe macro-economIc ImPact 
oF tHe two scenarIos
Beyond the decrease in net income, what could lower oil prices mean for 
the economic outlook in producer economies?
To help answer this question, we coupled the results of the International 
Energy Agency’s World Energy Model with the Organisation of Economic 
Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) computable general equilib-
rium model, ENV-LINKAGES, to generate results for the Middle East. 
This modelling does not assume that major structural economic changes 
take place among the world’s major hydrocarbon producers, but instead 
assumes a degree of continuity with the past, in which diversification 
efforts have made steady, rather than transformative, progress.
The results of this economic modelling show that as export revenues 
decline in the period until 2025 in a lower oil price environment, the trade 
balance falls into deficit for the Middle East as a whole and stays in deficit 
through to 2040. For countries that have a floating exchange rate, the 
resulting currency depreciation makes imports ever more expensive. For 
countries that have pegged regimes, such as the Gulf producers and Iraq, 
maintaining the link becomes an increasingly difficult and expensive prop-
osition. Furthermore, reduced revenues impinge on the ability of coun-
tries to pursue expansionary fiscal policies to stimulate growth. This hits all 
sectors of the economy, with the business services and public sector output 
each around 20% smaller in 2040 than in the New Policies Scenario, and 
construction output reduced by more than 15%. This has implications for 
jobs in the Middle East: there will be 8 million fewer jobs in 2040 than in 
the New Policies Scenario.
The net impact of these effects is that wider economic output is severely 
curtailed compared with the New Policies Scenario. In the Middle East 
alone, the cumulative economic losses between 2018 and 2040 amount to 
$11 trillion, five times the current GDP of the region, and the economy is 
one-fifth smaller by 2040 than in the New Policies Scenario. This has a 
clear impact even at the household level where the average person in the 
Middle East has $1500 less disposable income per year than they would in 
the New Policies Scenario to 2040.
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4  tHe Future role oF a comPetItIve 
energy sector
The reform agenda for producers looking to diversify their economies and 
make them more resilient to commodity price movements is, fundamen-
tally, much broader than energy. However, the overall reform efforts could 
benefit from a well-functioning energy sector. If channelled efficiently, it 
could provide a platform, both in terms of revenue and comparative 
advantage, for achieving broader social and economic objectives. We iden-
tify six key areas where producer economies can leverage their energy sec-
tors to provide long-term advantage and increase their resilience to a range 
of future market and policy possibilities.
4.1  Capturing More Value from Hydrocarbons
Across the Middle East, producers have already made significant efforts to 
move downstream in an effort to capture additional value from hydrocar-
bons resources. The Middle East currently accounts for around 10% of 
global refinery runs, and this share is set to increase as several large-scale 
projects, such as the Jubail, Yanbu and the Jizan complex in Saudi Arabia, 
are already under construction across the region. Countries are not limit-
ing this increase in capacity to their home territories, and several are pur-
suing growing markets, notably in Asia. Saudi Aramco recently reached 
agreements to invest in refineries in China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
the United States, while the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation is looking at 
investments in India’s Bina Refinery.
There are several motivations behind this downstream drive, including 
a wish to extract more value from the oil the region produces and to 
secure outlets for crude exports. The expansion increases revenues for 
each barrel produced, and thereby also risks increasing dependency on oil 
revenue. However, downstream earnings typically move in a different 
direction from upstream earnings—they tend to be higher when crude oil 
prices are low, and vice versa—so they also provide a hedge against lower 
oil prices.
Producers across the Middle East are also pursuing large investments in 
petrochemicals complexes. Beyond the attraction of potentially higher and 
more resilient margins, the likelihood of a robust outlook for petrochemi-
cals products in all scenarios means that these offer a degree of hedging 
against the possibility of a contraction of oil demand as a result of a rapid 
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uptake of electric vehicles or higher levels of efficiency improvements in a 
transitioning energy world. Indeed, even though there is growing atten-
tion on reducing single-use plastics and increasing plastic recycling, espe-
cially in advanced economies, the impact of these trends is more than 
offset by a surging demand in developing economies and the increasing 
use of plastics in place of other materials such as wood and metal. As such, 
oil demand for petrochemicals is expected to increase by around 5 mb/d, 
accounting for the largest share in incremental oil demand growth 
until 2040.
Middle East chemical production is expected to double between today 
and 2040—allowing the region’s share in global chemical production to 
increase by four percentage points, reaching 17% by 2040 on the back of 
feedstock cost advantage and the high level of efficiency of newly built 
facilities. A corollary of this increase in downstream activity is that out of 
a 6.5 mb/d incremental increase in oil supply until 2040 from the region, 
only 800 kb/d is exported as crude (with additional 2.1 mb/d passing 
through refineries, and 3.6 mb/d being used in petrochemicals 
production).
4.2  Using Natural Gas Strategically in Support 
of Diversification Goals
In several prominent oil producers in the Middle East, natural gas has 
been considered as being a sometimes-convenient by-product of oil extrac-
tion. Rising consumption, particularly in power generation, and the lim-
ited availability of associated gas (with the exception of Qatar) now require 
that gas be sought and produced as a commodity in its own right, and 
often imported. This requires a reassessment of pricing policies to incen-
tivise upstream activity, as well as a review of the priority sectors for gas 
consumption.
There is also a pressing case for a fundamental rethink of the strategic 
importance of natural gas, including where it is likely to bring the best 
value within the energy system, especially in countries where there are 
strains on the gas balance. In many cases, gas can bring value by displacing 
oil in domestic energy use, especially where oil is combusted to generate 
electricity. But there is a strong economic case across the Middle East for 
faster deployment of solar PV to displace gas as well as oil in power genera-




The potential significance of natural gas is broader than the direct 
incomes that it can bring; it can underpin an industrial strategy in a way 
that oil cannot, and in this sense can be an important conduit to economic 
diversification. At present, most industrial applications of gas are capital- 
but not labour-intensive. For example, the Qatar Petrochemical Company 
generates more than $1 billion in annual revenues, but employs just 1000 
people. These large industrial complexes, however, can act as anchor con-
sumers to help underwrite large infrastructure investments that bring ben-
efits to smaller industrial consumers, supporting the emergence of lighter 
manufacturing and small and medium enterprises, which thereby contrib-
ute to economic diversification and job creation. Indeed, in the projec-
tions of the International Energy Agency’s (IEA)s World Energy Outlook, 
industry is a key driver of natural gas consumption growth in the Middle 
East, increasing by 65 bcm until 2040, reaching 170 bcm.
4.3  Tapping the Large, Underutilised Potential of Renewables
The anticipated growth in demand for electricity in a number of producer 
economies raises questions about the economic viability of the current 
mode of electricity supply. Across the Middle East, for example, a 5.7% per 
year increase in electricity demand has translated to a doubling in the 
region’s oil consumption for power generation over the last 20  years, 
reaching around 1.8 mb/d in 2017. This diverts oil away from exports 
towards inefficient domestic consumption and incurs a significant oppor-
tunity cost—especially significant in periods when global spare production 
capacity look thin.
At present, peaking capacity in many parts of the Middle East is pro-
vided by oil-fired plants, often burning crude oil directly or using heavy 
fuel oil. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the daily load curve in summer 
reaches almost twice its peak in winter months because of air conditioning 
use. This means that 20–25 gigawatts out of a total of 88 gigawatts of 
capacity are used only for around half the year. These are mostly oil-fired 
plants, and they increase daily liquids burn by as much as 500 kb/d in 
peak summer periods relative to winter months. In the future, without a 
significant improvement in efficiency over time, and considering the large 
anticipated increase in the use of air conditioners across the Middle East 
(demand for space cooling alone could skyrocket from 135 terawatt-hours 
(TWh) today to over 300 TWh in 2040), the peak will grow significantly, 
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giving a measure of the imperative for a more efficient electricity system 
going forward.
Solar resources are abundant and are ideally suited to meeting this peak 
(daily demand for cooling peaks in the early afternoon, matching the nor-
mal peak in solar PV output). At present, this potential is almost entirely 
untapped, with the 1.2 GW of solar capacity making up less than 0.5% of 
total generation capacity in the Middle East (compared to over 90 GW of 
oil-fired capacity). But fast-falling costs for solar PV mean that, even if oil 
were priced for generation at $40/barrel, unsubsidised solar would be 
displacing it quickly on a cost competitive basis (Fig. 4.4).
Although the economic case for renewable power is compelling, reach-
ing deployment levels that reflect this will depend on removing barriers to 
their uptake. However, at current levels of deployment, concerns about 
the impact of variable renewables on grid stability in the Middle East are 
limited, although care will be needed to ensure that network planning 
matches plans for new utility-scale renewable projects. Most GCC coun-
tries in particular have generation fleets that are flexible enough already to 
enable a much higher penetration of renewables, and the rise in electricity 
demand for desalination could provide a further synergy for renewables, 
providing the option of being used as a demand response facility, helping 


































Fig. 4.4 Levelised cost for solar PV compared with existing oil-fired generation 
at $40 per barrel oil price. (Source: International Energy Agency)
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4.4  Phasing Out Subsidised Use of Energy to Improve 
Its Efficiency
According to estimates by the International Energy Agency, fossil-fuel 
consumption subsidies totalled around $105 billion across the Middle 
East in 2017 (Fig. 4.5). Prices for oil products and natural gas in most 
producer economies are well below the value that could be obtained for 
these commodities on the international market, even after transportation 
costs are taken into account. Eleven major producer economies in the 
world—Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, UAE and Venezuela—account for around half of the International 
Energy Agency estimate for worldwide fossil fuel consumption subsidies, 
which, in most cases, represent foregone revenue rather than actual bud-
getary payments.
Artificially cheap energy encourages wasteful consumption—primary 
energy demand in the Middle East has grown at 4.4% per year since 2000, 
a rate that is more than double the world average. Among other things, 
this has meant that two in every five new barrels of oil production have 
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Fig. 4.5 Estimated value of fossil fuel subsidies in selected producer economies, 
2017. (Source: International Energy Agency)
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now among the most energy-intensive in the world—the United Arab 
Emirates, the least intensive in the region, requires 10% more energy to 
generate a dollar of economic output than the world average.
Beyond the fiscal burden and their impact on consumption, subsidies 
also distort broader investment incentives across the energy sector. Low 
natural gas prices, for example, have reduced the incentive for private 
companies to invest in new exploration and production projects in parts of 
the Middle East. As well as accommodating for the fact that low-cost 
energy is deeply embedded in the social contract in many producer econo-
mies, successful reform must also reconcile the need to reform prices with 
the imperative of sustaining or even enhancing industrial competitiveness. 
Across the Middle East, even without subsidies, most oil and gas produc-
ers would still have a comparative advantage in energy, since a low produc-
tion cost base can provide a stable low domestic price.
The implications of pricing reform for energy consumers can be miti-
gated substantially if reform is paired with enhanced energy-efficiency 
measures. Raising fuel and electricity prices reduces the payback period for 
products with higher efficiency, and helps raise public awareness of the 
links between efficiency and the cost of the energy they consume, but a 
push is typically required on the supply side to ensure that more efficient 
products are available on the market.
4.5  Ensuring Adequate Investment for a Dynamic Upstream
The ability to maintain oil and gas revenues at reasonable levels provides 
an important element of stability for the economy as a whole, especially 
when market conditions are tough. In this regard, though it may sound 
counter-intuitive in the narrative surrounding economic diversification, it 
remains crucial for producers to attract investment and maintain or 
improve the productivity of their upstream sectors. In a scenario where oil 
demand does not peak before 2040, all key producer economies will need 
to increase investment over the next decade just to maintain production 
levels close to those in 2017 (Fig. 4.6).
The need to step up investment comes at a time when there are many 
competing priorities for domestic spending, potentially limiting the capi-
tal available to national companies. The improving prospects of a range 
of new production areas mean there is also likely to be strong competi-
tion for international investment capital. The situation is, of course, 
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different across the producer economies, but it is clear that oil revenues 
will be crucial to national solvency well into the future, and will be a vital 
ingredient for any government wishing to reorientate the economy 
going forward.
Occupying the bottom end of the oil supply cost curve, Middle East 
producers could remain integral producers even in a Paris-compliant 
energy landscape where oil demand peaks imminently and falls to around 
70 mb/d by 2040. Some producers, led by Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates, have already shown that through intensified efforts to 
ensure elimination of gas flaring and methane leakages, they are also 
extremely competitive on a greenhouse gas emissions intensity basis, one 
factor that could differentiate suppliers of oil in the future.
4.6  Supporting the Development of Cleaner and More Efficient 
Energy Technologies
Many producers have world-leading expertise in energy technologies; in 
addition to their potential in renewables, they are also well positioned to 
develop new approaches that reduce or minimise the life cycle emissions of 
oil and gas.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have made significant efforts to capture pro-
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Fig. 4.6 Average annual upstream oil and natural gas investment and production 
in selected Middle East producers. (Source: International Energy Agency)
4 OUTLOOK FOR PRODUCER ECONOMIES 
68
vent only very small volumes. This is also the case in Qatar and Kuwait. 
Despite the fact that the crude oil they produce is relatively sour, oil from 
these countries has among the lowest emission intensity of any source 
globally. Saudi Arabia and the UAE therefore point the way for other pro-
ducer economies to step up their endeavours to eliminate flaring and 
venting.
There are a number of other options to reduce the GHG emissions 
intensity of oil and gas extraction. One possibility is to use solar energy 
rather than oil and gas to provide the energy needed to extract oil from the 
subsurface. This is particularly attractive in many Middle East countries, as 
they have high-capacity factors for solar PV and solar thermal plants. 
Although Saudi Arabia already has some of the least emission-intensive oil 
in the world, it is continuing to explore options to reduce this further.
Another possibility is to enhance oil recovery (EOR) using CO2. CO2- 
EOR is one of the few options available today to monetise carbon capture, 
utilisation and storage (CCUS), since it can lead to higher levels of oil 
extraction while permanently keeping injected CO2 in the ground. There 
are important issues to be resolved—most notably ensuring that CO2- 
EOR leads to an overall reduction in the level of CO2 in the atmosphere—
but this represents an important opportunity for the producer economies 
to make a substantive contribution to the energy transitions. Not only 
could this help to reduce CO2 emissions directly, but as more capture, 
transport and CO2 storage facilities are deployed, it could help reduce the 
cost for future facilities, improving the economics of CCUS more gener-
ally. Saudi Arabia has expressed interest in these technologies and has a 
demonstration project that takes CO2 from a gas-processing plant for 
injection into the Uthmaniyah area of the super-giant Ghawar field.
Some producer economies are also considering possible alternative uses 
for oil and gas in the future which would minimise overall GHG emis-
sions. One option is to increase the levels of hydrocarbons in non- 
combustion uses such as petrochemicals (discussed in the previous section). 
Another is to convert the hydrocarbons to a zero-carbon-vector such as 
hydrogen. This can be produced from methane using steam. If the CO2 
from this process is stored underground, this zero-carbon hydrogen could 
help decarbonise a number of end-user sectors across the global energy 
system while still providing a mechanism to monetise the producer econo-
mies’ hydrocarbon resources.
The economic argument for such measures becomes particularly com-
pelling when synergies are found to couple industries in a mutually 
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beneficial way. This is already happening, to some extent, for example, in 
the United Arab Emirates, where over 40 million standard cubic feet per 
day of carbon dioxide are being captured at the Al Reyadah steel plant 
before being piped to be used in enhanced oil recovery. This has the added 
benefit of freeing up the much-needed natural gas that would otherwise 
be used for the same purpose. Oman is pioneering the use of large concen-
trating solar projects for enhanced oil recovery, which could displace natu-
ral gas in providing the thermal energy needed in its oil production, 
thereby reducing the emission intensity of upstream production while at 
the same time freeing up increasingly scarce and valuable gas for domestic 
consumption or export.
5  ImPlIcatIons and conclusIons
The objective to diversify hydrocarbon-dependent economies and reduce 
their reliance on oil and gas is not new, and the reform discussions unfold-
ing in many countries today have many parallels with previous efforts. The 
longstanding nature of these efforts underscores that diversifying away 
from commodity dependency is genuinely challenging and raises a com-
plex set of policy questions that do not have a straightforward solution.
Even in a relatively benign market and policy environment that assumes 
continued demand growth and relatively robust prices, the current eco-
nomic model that recycles oil and gas incomes into jobs is unsustainable 
for some of the world’s major producers. The challenges facing producer 
economies in the Sustainable Development Scenario are more profound—
the strong policy push for reductions in emissions, accompanied by rapid 
technological change, would imply persistent pressure on oil markets and 
consequently on the producers as well. Here, there is an inescapable 
imperative to prepare for a world in which hydrocarbons are no longer the 
main source of revenue, even if there may be alternative ways to monetise 
hydrocarbon resources that do not contribute to global emissions.
The starting conditions among even the Middle East’s producers are 
very different, and risks are not evenly distributed. Collectively, however, 
these countries constitute an integral component of global supply, both in 
terms of how they can influence the future trajectory of the energy system 
and how they will be affected by it. In all scenarios, the Middle East’s low- 
cost suppliers retain a significant share of global oil and gas supply.
Periods of higher prices caused by a supply crunch brought on by a 
period of under-investment may offer the possibility of temporary 
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financial relief for producer economies, but they also present a clear down-
side. The imperative for reform has, in the past, subsided during periods 
of higher prices, and here too, they risk easing the pressures for change at 
just the time when higher prices accelerate the policy momentum behind 
alternatives to oil and gas, especially in some of the emerging global energy 
demand giants in Asia that are particularly sensitive to price swings. Higher 
prices would also have implications on the supply side, encouraging new, 
higher cost production in other parts of the world, and setting the stage 
for prices to fall again. Such volatility would be commensurately reflected 
in revenues, and in the absence of pro-cyclical fiscal policies in producer 
economies, can lead to diminished long-term economic growth.
A successful transformation of producer economies would have pro-
found implications for the energy outlook. By reducing the “social costs” 
of production, that is, by diminishing the dependence on hydrocarbon 
revenues to finance areas such as education, health care and public sector 
employment, it would also lower the oil price at which these countries can 
manage without persistent fiscal deficits (Dale and Fattouh 2018). In such 
a case, oil markets could find an equilibrium at a lower price, with major 
low-cost producers taking a larger share of the market based on their posi-
tion at the lower end of the global supply cost curve.
The implications of lower oil prices for energy transitions are more 
ambiguous. On the one hand, low prices could facilitate some policy shifts, 
such as introducing an effective or actual price on CO2 emissions. On the 
other hand, experience since 2014 has underlined that lower prices can 
provide a boost to global hydrocarbon consumption. Payback periods for 
many efficiency measures increase, and the growth of renewable technolo-
gies, outside the power sector, becomes much more challenging. The case 
for electric vehicle technologies would be particularly disadvantaged. To 
achieve the same outcomes, policies would need to be strengthened to 
counteract the effect of lower oil prices on transport and industrial demand.
This raises the question of the strategy that producer economies might 
follow in a lower demand scenario, and whether the prospect of acceler-
ated energy transitions might invite producers to accelerate extraction of 
hydrocarbons (the so-called green paradox). The answer again is contin-
gent upon the pace and extent of their broader economic transformation. 
If investments were to be mobilised to maximise production in such a 
case, this would bring down prices. Yet oil prices that cause producer 




Ultimately, in a world where demand for energy services is only going 
to increase, resource-rich countries will always seek value from their 
endowments, hydrocarbon or otherwise. The task ahead is to make this 
quest compatible with the gathering pace of change in global energy.
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Economic diversification has been a key developmental goal for the Arab 
oil-exporting countries since the 1970s, as evidenced in their various 
national development plans. Some have undoubtedly made progress over 
the last few decades in diversifying their economic base, but despite these 
efforts, several indicators of economic complexity, diversity and export 
quality continue to be lower in Arab oil-exporting economies than even in 
many emerging market economies, including commodity exporters in 
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other regions (IMF 2016, 9–11).1 For the Arab oil exporters, the biggest 
challenge has been to diversify the sources of government income (for 
instance, through raising additional revenues by taxing individuals and 
businesses) and to generate non-oil export revenues (through building 
export-oriented industries) (Luciani 2019; Shehabi 2019). Following the 
oil price fall in 2014, the weakening of macroeconomic indicators, dete-
rioration in fiscal and current account balances and sharp decline in private 
sector activity indicate that government spending fuelled by oil revenues 
still remains the main engine for economic growth.
However, there is a renewed sense of urgency around diversification in 
these countries, driven by a paradigm shift around the future prospects of 
global oil demand, and whether the oil industry will continue to generate 
sufficient rents into the future to sustain oil exporters’ economies and their 
extensive welfare systems. There is a growing consensus that the pace of oil 
demand growth is likely to slow over time, eventually plateauing or declin-
ing, as efficiency improvements, technological advances, climate change 
and environmental policies and changing social preferences lead to substi-
tution away from oil in its traditional sectors (such as transportation), 
which have historically driven oil demand growth (Dale and Fattouh 2018, 
3). For example, the International Energy Agency predicts that even if oil 
prices remain within the range of $60–$70/barrel, net oil income across 
the Middle East oil exporting economies will not recover to the levels seen 
in 2010–2015. Without far-reaching reforms, this would translate into 
large current account deficits, downward pressure on currencies and lower 
government spending. The downside economic risk equates to a $1500 
drop in average annual disposable income per person (IEA 2018b, 11).
The concept of ‘peak oil demand’ is gaining consensus, with many 
scholars, company executives and policymakers predicting an imminent 
peak, as soon as before 2030. Increased uncertainty about the prospects 
of global oil demand is already influencing the behaviour of all oil market 
players, including the international majors, National Oil Companies 
(NOCs) and oil-exporting countries—which are intensifying their efforts 
to diversify their economies and sources of income. Regardless as to when 
1 Recent measures include the Economic Complexity Index which measures the number of 
products made by an economy and controls for the likelihood that the same product is also 
made by others, IMF Export Diversification Index which is a combined measure of the 
‘extensive’ and ‘intensive’ dimensions of diversification using trade data, IMF Export Quality 
Index which measures the average quality within any product category and Manufacturing 
Value-Added Gini which is constructed based on the relative value-added of different manu-
facturing industries within an economy (IMF 2016, 9–11).
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oil demand will eventually peak, the current debate matters as it signifies a 
shift of perception from scarcity to abundance. Consequently, the con-
cepts of scarcity premiums, the effectiveness of rationing oil supplies in an 
inter-temporal framework and the idea that oil kept underground today 
will command a higher price in the future need to be critically assessed, 
especially in the light of the region’s massive reserves (Dale and Fattouh 
2018). Fattouh et al. (2018, 19) highlight that this issue is far more seri-
ous for oil-exporting countries than it is for international oil companies—
while for the latter, reserve to production ratios typically range from 8 to 
10 years, for the former, they run into decades (e.g. 63 years for Saudi 
Arabia; 90 years for Kuwait).
Given these economies’ long-standing efforts to diversify, one might 
ask: what is different this time round? The renewed sense of urgency in 
fact constitutes a break with history—when the concern was mainly over 
the macroeconomic consequences of heavy dependence on a single export 
commodity with a highly volatile price—to the possibility that as demand 
slows down, global oil markets become increasingly competitive and oil 
industry margins decline, Arab oil exporters can no longer rely indefinitely 
on oil export revenues for their future economic prosperity. In the bigger 
picture, it is argued that the world is on the brink of an ‘energy transition’2 
in which hydrocarbons will eventually be substituted away in the global 
energy mix in favour of low or zero carbon energy sources, alongside a 
paradigm shift in energy technology, institutions and infrastructure 
(Fattouh et al. 2018, 5; Sovacool and Geels 2016).
Against this changing context, this chapter addresses some key ques-
tions: how soon can we expect ‘peak oil demand’ to occur? How are diver-
sification efforts in key oil exporters linked to the ongoing global energy 
transition? Will the hydrocarbon sector play any role during the energy 
transition? And will the emergence of renewables as competitive energy 
source impact economic diversification strategies in these countries?
We make three main arguments in this chapter. First, the speed of the 
energy transition is highly uncertain and heavily driven by government 
policies, implying that it will vary across regions and be unpredictable on 
a global scale. Second, the diversification strategy adopted by oil- exporting 
countries will be conditioned by the speed of the energy transition, during 
which the oil sector will continue to play a key role in these economies, 
including in their diversification efforts. Oil producers will need to be far 
2 Previous energy transitions have involved wood being substituted by coal, and coal being 
substituted by oil on a mass basis.
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more strategic in developing their energy sector, including the renewables 
sector, and strengthening forward and backward linkages to help diversify 
their economies. Finally, there is a co-dependence between the success of 
diversification efforts in oil exporters and the global energy transition. 
While the transition is already shaping the political and economic situation 
of the Arab oil exporters, the success (or failure) and the speed at which 
Arab oil exporters transition to a more diversified and more resilient econ-
omies will shape the global energy transition.
The next section reviews the debate on peak oil demand and the energy 
transition, and Sect. 3 summarises their implications for oil-exporting 
Arab countries. Section 4 considers the role of the oil sector in economic 
diversification and energy transition, and Sect. 5 discusses the implications 
of this changing context for traditional cooperation between oil produc-
ers. Section 6 concludes.
2  the energy transItIon and PercePtIons of Peak 
oIl demand
The current debate on peak demand tends to be dominated almost entirely 
by the time or point at which global oil demand is expected to peak. 
Consequently, most analyses of peak demand contain a wide range of pro-
jections, some suggesting that it could peak around the mid-2020s and 
others expecting it to grow beyond 2040. Figure 5.1 depicts these varia-
tions based on projections published by organisations such as BP, 
International Energy Agency (IEA) and US Energy Information 
Administration.
The IEA 2018 New Policies scenario, for instance, predicts that global 
oil demand will grow by around 1 million barrels per day (mb/d) on aver-
age each year until 2025; thereafter, average annual demand growth slows 
to around 0.25 mb/d, but global demand does not peak before 2040. All 
of this growth occurs in developing economies, whereas demand in 
advanced economies drops by over 0.4 mb/d on average each year until 
2040. In contrast, in its 2018 Sustainable Development Scenario, demand 
falls by 25 mb/d between 2017 and 2040 (IEA 2018c, 133–134). The 
IEA’s 2018 Oil Market Report, on the other hand, sees demand growing 
strongly until 2023 (expanding by 1.4 mb/d in 2018 alone), but its pace 
slowing down to 1 mb/d thereafter (IEA 2018a). BP’s 2018 Energy 
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Outlook contains three differing scenarios3 of which the Evolving 
Transition (ET) scenario envisages oil demand continuing to grow until 
the 2030s, and plateauing thereafter (BP 2018).4 The Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) in its 2017 International Energy Outlook ‘reference 
case’ scenario sees oil demand growing from 95  m/d in 2015 to 113 
mb/d by 2040, but in a ‘low oil price’ scenario reflecting abundant sup-
plies, it projects higher demand (5.5 mb/d more than the reference case) 
by 2040 (EIA 2017). In 2018, the EIA published three different ‘side 
cases’ on demand, focusing in detail on the way in which different macro-
economic scenarios might play out in three major world regions (China, 
India and Africa) and postulating different impacts on world primary 
energy demand as a consequence. While a full discussion of the latter is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, it highlights the range of uncertainty 
around various peak demand projections and the multitude of variables 
affecting the same.5
3 Evolving Transition (ET), Faster Transition (FT) and Even Faster Transition (EFT).
4 Demand in 2040 is projected at 109 mb/d.
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Fig. 5.1 Projections of world oil demand (million barrels/day). (Source: IEA 
2018c; EIA 2017; BP 2018)
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An obvious question that arises from the multitude of peak demand 
forecasts is as follows: what kind of a scenario should Arab oil-exporting 
countries be preparing for? While exercises in forecasting peak demand 
contribute towards providing a renewed motivation for diversification, 
they should not be the sole factor upon which these strategies are under-
taken. This is because the speed of the energy transition matters. At the 
same time, the speed of the transition will also be influenced by the man-
ner in which key actors in the energy sector, including the Arab oil- 
exporting economies, choose to respond to it. The risks associated with 
the energy transition may be felt by investors much faster than the times-
cale within which the transition is completed. For example, this could be 
because of government policy signals supporting new low-carbon energy 
technologies vis-à-vis hydrocarbons, which contribute to improving the 
future competitiveness of these technologies. Investors in the hydrocar-
bon sector may therefore adjust their current risk preferences in relation to 
new investment and operational decisions (Fattouh et al. 2018, 2).
The wide range of forecasts on peak demand allows us to draw some 
key observations to set the context of this discussion. First, the range of 
uncertainty is high. Peak demand forecasts are highly dependent upon 
their underlying assumptions. For instance, while the IEA’s New Policies 
scenario is based on government policies that have already been announced 
or implemented, its Sustainable Development Scenario assumes a tighten-
ing of climate and environmental policies that are sufficiently aggressive 
for carbon emissions to decline at a rate that is broadly consistent with 
achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement reached at COP21  in 2015 
(Dale and Fattouh 2018, 4). However, many of the more ambitious com-
mitments made by the countries that are likely to pose the largest share of 
rising emissions in the future (e.g. China and India) are voluntary rather 
than binding, and therefore partially dependent upon the resolve of poli-
cymakers to fulfil them.6
It is also difficult to entirely discount the possibility of countries reneg-
ing on some of their commitments, as some governments have recently 
acquiesced to domestic political pressures and rising rhetoric around trade 
6 We state that thats is partially dependent, as stringent environmental policies in developed 
countries have encouraged innovation, driving down the costs of clean energy technologies 
to make them cost-competitive on a global basis.
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protectionism.7 Another illustration of the complexity of assumptions 
around peak demand projections relates to the consensus that the majority 
of oil demand growth until 2040 will come from non-OECD Asia, on the 
back of rising incomes and car ownership. The EIA, for instance, has pre-
dicted that China’s use of liquid fuels for transportation could increase by 
36 per cent from 2015 to 2040, while India’s use over that period could 
increase by 142 per cent (EIA 2017, 36). At the same time, most forecast-
ing organisations also allow for a scenario in their forecasts which takes 
into account the impact upon transport oil demand of vehicle electrifica-
tion, automation and shared mobility. These, in turn, entail very different 
sorts of impacts in different combinations. For instance, in its 2018 Energy 
Outlook, BP did not see electrification on its own impacting oil use in 
transport significantly. But automation—which reduces the cost of shared 
mobility by 40 to 50 per cent—was seen as having a bigger impact.
BP estimated that electric vehicles (EVs) would account for 15 per cent 
of about 2 billion cars on the road in 2040, but for 30 per cent of all pas-
senger car transportation measured by distance travelled (due to the 
uptake in shared mobility). A prominent academic paper by Fulton et al. 
(2017, 15–29) estimated a 50 per cent reduction in energy use in trans-
port in an automation-electrification-shared mobility scenario over an 
automation-electrification scenario, by 2050. On the other hand, the BP 
Energy Outlook predicted that oil use in transport would remain almost 
unchanged in 2040, from 18.6 mb/d in 2016, with gains from efficiency 
and electrification offset by a doubling of overall demand in car travel (FT 
2018). These variations in forecasts from different organisations show that 
the confidence intervals around any peak demand forecast are likely to be 
large, reflecting the high uncertainty about the speed of the transition and 
the factors shaping the transition.
The second key observation is the possibility of not one, but multiple 
peaks. An important consideration while assessing peak demand scenarios 
is the ‘rebound effect’—that is, the premise that a peak in oil demand 
could cause oil prices to fall, triggering higher demand from consumers 
and a potentially more than one peak. For instance, the EIA in its 2017 
Outlook predicted that in a ‘low oil price’ scenario, global oil demand in 
2040 would be 4.5 mb/d higher than in the reference case, as low prices 
stimulate higher consumption (EIA 2017, 34). Dale and Fattouh (2018, 
7 For instance, the USA pulled out of the Paris Agreement in June 2017, although the 
consensus is that this will not derail the Agreement between the remaining signatories.
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5) argue that this effect can lead to multiple peaks. Their examination of 
data on US oil and gasoline demand shows that US oil demand peaked in 
2005, declining at an average rate of 1 per cent per annum over the next 
8 years—but since oil prices fell in 2014, US demand has begun to grow 
again, and a continuation of low prices8 could result in US demand exceed-
ing the 2005 peak.9 The ‘rebound effect’ is also evident in past energy 
transitions, in which new energy sources have unlocked new energy 
demand. For instance, Fattouh et al. (2018, 8) argue that the advent of 
coal in the nineteenth century opened up new forms of transportation, 
and its first use in the steam railway engine around 1829 was followed by 
an acceleration in global energy demand that was 1 per cent per annum 
higher than that of global population growth for nearly 50 years thereafter.
The third key observation that can be drawn from the range of peak 
demand forecasts is that oil will continue to be an important part of the 
energy mix for the foreseeable future. The incumbent advantages of oil as 
an energy source, including its high energy density and an existing infra-
structure ecosystem geared around it, imply that even if oil demand peaks, 
it is unlikely to ‘fall off a cliff ’. Instead, the broader characteristics of the 
current energy transition from hydrocarbons to low-carbon energy sources 
and the speed of transition are of more relevance to economic diversifica-
tion, rather than predictions of when oil demand will peak. But while 
there is unlikely to be a sharp discontinuity in oil use, it is also unlikely that 
the current transition will exactly mirror the speed of past transitions, as it 
has some fundamentally different characteristics.
Historical data and evidence indicate that past energy transitions have 
been slow. Fattouh et al. (2018, 10) state, for instance, that fast transitions 
have rarely happened, and, when they have, they have been anomalies that 
are related to countries or specific contexts with little scope for replicabili-
ty.10 The scale and complexity of energy transitions tend to create path 
dependency and ‘lock-in’ of infrastructure that has been developed over 
long periods of time. Energy transitions also involve ‘fighting’ against an 
entire infrastructure ecosystem based on the incumbent energy source 
which represents massive sunk investments—this is visible, for instance, in 
8 This was not evident at the time of writing.
9 US gasoline consumption reached its highest ever level in 2016 after falling for much of 
the previous 10 years.
10 Examples of fast transitions include Sweden’s shift to efficient lighting in nine years; 
Indonesia’s substitution of kerosene with LPG in 3 years; Brazil’s substitution of petroleum 
with ethanol in 90 per cent of all new vehicles in six years (Fattouh et al. 2018, 12).
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efforts to substitute internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) with 
EVs. Fattouh et al. (2018, 10) show that the key empirical evidence for a 
slow transition is past inter-fuel competition, which led to the substitution 
of coal for pre-industrial biomass and muscle power, and oil for coal. The 
market share of coal increased from 5 per cent to 60 per cent between 
1830 and 1914, peaking in the year that the First World War broke out. 
Oil increased from 1 per cent to 40 per cent between 1900 and 1973, 
peaking in the year of the first OPEC oil shock (2017). Gas increased from 
4 per cent in 1945 to 24 per cent in 2018, while nuclear rose from zero 
per cent in 1954 to 2 per cent in 2000. There are also very few examples 
of major energy sources disappearing from the global energy mix. BP’s 
2018 Energy Outlook, for instance, sees most oil demand growth after the 
2030s coming from non-combustible uses, although this could also face a 
slowdown if measures to curb environmental pollution from materials 
(e.g. plastics) are tightened/enforced.
However, the possibility of a fast transition cannot be entirely dis-
counted either, as the current transition bears characteristics that represent 
a clear break with the nature of past transitions. Historical transitions were 
more about developing technologies in an age of scarcity based on mar-
kets and innovation, whereas low-carbon transitions are more about 
adjusting the environmental selection in an age of abundance, via policies, 
regulations and incentives (Sovacool and Geels 2016). Therefore, while 
past transitions were opportunity-driven, the current transition is solution- 
driven. At the same time, since the current transition is heavily driven by 
government commitments on mitigating their emissions and consequently 
by national policies, its speed could differ across regions as well as sectors, 
making it difficult to draw firm conclusions on a global scale.
The discussion therefore underscores the futility of adopting an 
approach whose starting point is ‘oil will no longer be demanded by a 
certain date’, or, in other words, preparing for some ‘distant future’. 
Instead, it is necessary to adopt a more dynamic analysis that moves 
beyond the potential role that the oil sector and oil rents would play in the 
transition phase.
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3  the ImPlIcatIons for arab 
oIl-exPortIng countrIes
How should Arab oil-exporting countries respond to this changing con-
text? The aforementioned discussion suggests that, on balance, oil- 
exporting countries should adapt to the energy transition which is already 
underway, but given that the speed of the transition is uncertain, in doing 
so they could take into account the consolidation of three key trends.
3.1  Oil Demand Is Unlikely to Increase Strongly Over the Next 
Two Decades
Government oil substitution policies point in the direction that oil demand 
is not likely to increase strongly over the next two decades, although the 
timing of when oil demand growth will start slowing down and turn nega-
tive is still highly uncertain. These policies are prevalent in OECD and 
non-OECD countries. Some countries11 in OECD Europe have for 
instance announced bans on ICEVs by 2040 as part of their carbon reduc-
tion targets which are among the world’s most ambitious, while in non- 
OECD Asia, China and India have both announced ambitions to scale up 
EVs in the vehicle fleet12—with China attempting to integrate the EV 
sector into its overall industrial strategy. The two countries also have local-
ised (state or province level) restrictions on ICEVs, through lottery sales 
and bans of older models. Further, both countries are moving towards the 
adoption of stricter fuel-efficiency standards by the early 2020s.13 The 
drive to reduce urban air pollution could also accelerate substitution. The 
‘ET’ scenario in BP’s 2018 Energy Outlook sees China’s energy demand 
growing by just 1.5 per cent per annum (less than a quarter of its historical 
20-year growth rate), with renewables overtaking oil to become the larg-
est energy source by 2040. India, on the other hand, is seen as overtaking 
China as the main engine of oil demand growth, although it remains 
smaller in terms of absolute volumes consumed. This trend has implica-
tions for future market share strategies of the Arab oil exporters, which 
should be taken account of in their diversification strategies.
11 The UK and France, for example.
12 For instance, India is targeting 30 per cent of the vehicle fleet by 2030.
13 India plans to leapfrog from Euro IV to Euro VI standards by 2020.
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3.2  Large Investments Will Still Be Needed in the Oil Sector 
to Fill the Gap in Supply
Even in the event of peak demand and in the absence of investment in the 
oil sector, the decline in supply will be faster than the decline in oil demand. 
Dale and Fattouh (2018, 5), in their analysis of peak scenarios for instance, 
assume a relatively conservative 3 per cent decline rate in production and 
no new investments until 204014 to illustrate that the gap between demand 
and supply could range from anywhere between 35 mb/d and 75 mb/d.15 
The IEA (2018c) estimates a near-term supply deficit of 26 mb/d by 
2025 even under the Sustainable Development Scenario. Upstream invest-
ment has not recovered since the 2016–2017 oil price fall; it was flat in 
2017, with a modest rise in 2018 mainly from USA’s use of light tight oil 
(Fattouh et al. 2018, 7). A survey by Fattouh et al. (2018) indicates that 
risk preferences of institutional investors (mainly in the USA and Europe) 
are already changing in response to the energy transition, reflected in 
much higher ‘hurdle rates’ required by investors now, relative to the last 
few years, to consider new long-term investments in oil exploration and 
development projects. Instead, there is a strong preference to concentrate 
oil and gas companies’ conventional activities in the ‘harvesting’ phase and 
away from the ‘exploration and appraisal’ phase.
As the world’s lowest-cost oil producers, Arab oil-exporting countries 
will most likely be required to fill this gap, but any expansion in productive 
capacity will require massive investments running into billions of dollars. 
These investments in productive capacity will need to be funded by suffi-
cient revenues, largely from oil exports. At the same time, Arab oil pro-
ducers face competing needs on their revenues given the social welfare 
measures funded by these revenues, which underpin their societies. Thus, 
although the physical cost of production and developing their reserves is 
low, one should add some measure of social costs in addition to the physi-
cal cost, as producers need higher prices for their economies to function 
and to expand productive capacity.16
14 We also show this in Fig. 5.1.
15 The lower bound represents the difference between projected production (assuming the 
3 per cent decline rate) and projected demand in 2040 under the IEA Sustainable 
Development Scenario, while the upper bound represents the difference with projected 
demand in 2040 under the EIA’s scenario.
16 In the age of abundance and greater competition, prices would ideally tend towards 
marginal cost, but MENA producers require a premium to finance their socioeco-
nomic models.
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Countries also require relatively stable political environments to make 
these investments. In the absence of such stability, it is possible that some 
countries with cheap reserves will be unable to develop these reserves. In 
other words, it is not necessarily true that low-cost producers will develop 
their reserves at the expense of high-cost producers with more stable envi-
ronments. In the long run, as economies diversify, the ‘social costs’ of 
production embodied by the fiscal breakeven price should naturally decline 
as economies are supported by a broader economic base (Dale and Fattouh 
2018, 8). The major caveat to this point is that if climate change emission 
reduction policies lead to a fall in oil demand at the same pace as, or faster 
than, production declines from existing fields, then there would be no 
supply-demand gap (Fattouh et  al. 2018, 7). The realisation of a con-
strained oil demand trajectory however depends on how determined poli-
cymakers in the developing world are (especially China and India) about 
moving away from fossil fuels—which we have discussed earlier in this 
chapter.
3.3  Renewables Are at an Inflection Point
While there are many uncertainties induced by the energy transition, there 
is almost a consensus among forecasts provided by various organisations 
that the share of renewables in the energy mix will rise (Fig.  5.2). As 
described in Fattouh et al. (2018, 4), renewable energy’s recent cost defla-
tion has been nothing short of revolutionary for the global energy indus-
try. Five years ago, US wind costs were $11 c/kWh (US cents per kilowatt 
hour) and solar costs were $17 c/kWh, on a fully loaded basis, including 
the capital costs of construction. Neither was commercial without subsi-
dies. In 2019, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) esti-
mated that solar PV costs in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) had 
declined to less than $3 c/kWh, leaving behind natural gas, LNG, coal, oil 
and nuclear. In Saudi Arabia and Oman, wind has emerged as another 
cost-effective option. The four bids submitted for the 400 MW Dumat Al 
Jandal wind project were reported to be between 2.13 US cents/kWh and 
3.39 US cents/kWh (IRENA 2019, 86).
As a result, on a plant-level basis and excluding the cost of dealing with 
intermittency, wind and solar have emerged as very competitive sources of 
energy globally (Fattouh et al. 2018, 4). The 2018 BP Energy Outlook 
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stated that the share of power generation gained by renewables over the 
Outlook period will be faster than any other energy source over a similar 
period—it saw renewables increasing fivefold and capturing 40 per cent of 
new demand growth (BP 2018). The EIA’s International Energy Outlook 
2017 similarly saw renewables as the fastest growing source of overall 
energy consumption and power generation in 2015–2040—renewables 
will more than double their share in energy consumption by 2040, with 
their share in power generation rising by an average of 2.8 per cent a year 
and reaching over 30 per cent by 2040, as technological improvements 
and government incentives in many countries support their increased use.
In the next section, we discuss how the aforementioned three trends 
feed into an economic diversification agenda for the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) which makes far more strategic use of the oil sector 
as the energy transition progresses, rather than one that simply envisages a 
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Fig. 5.2 Projected rising share of renewables in total primary energy demand 
(%). (Source: Calculated by Authors from BP 2018; IEA 2017; EIA 2017)
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4  the strategIc role of the oIl sector 
In the energy transItIon
As low-cost producers with some of the largest reserve bases, Arab oil 
producers are expected to fill the gap by heavily investing in their oil sec-
tor. Therefore, even in a world where oil demand growth is expected to 
slow down, the oil sector will continue to play the dominant role in these 
economies for the foreseeable future. However, as leaders develop new 
visions to transform their countries, the energy sector will be under 
increasing pressure to show that it can contribute to the diversification 
efforts, not only by generating the rents that could be used to create new 
industries and sectors, but also by extending the value chain and creating 
new industries within the energy sector through fostering backward and 
forward linkages. In the following section we discuss three important ele-
ments of this strategic role, which complement each other.
4.1  The Oil Sector Will Continue to Dominate the Economy, 
But it Needs to Play a More Active Role 
in the Diversification Process
Although the oil sector remains very profitable and enjoys higher margins 
than any new industries that government are aiming to establish, from a 
developmental perspective, it suffers from two major shortcomings. First, 
it does not generate a stable source of income as oil prices fluctuate con-
siderably, and in some countries the rents are not big enough to provide 
sufficient income for growing populations and an extensive welfare sys-
tem. In a world where demand is expected to peak, these challenges 
become more acute. Second, the oil industry is capital-intensive in nature 
and does not generate enough jobs for the hundreds of thousands enter-
ing the labour market each year.
Extending the value chain beyond simply producing crude oil and 
exporting it to international markets could in principle address some of 
these challenges. The Middle East currently accounts for around 10 per 
cent of global refinery runs, and countries are increasingly looking at pet-
rochemicals projects as well as refinery expansions as a way of pursuing 
higher and more resilient margins. By extending the value chain, Arab oil 
producers can create new industries with different types of jobs and whose 
products’ prices are not highly correlated with oil prices. In the past, the 
focus has been on exporting basic petrochemicals (for instance, converting 
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ethane to ethylene), which did not generate much of the expected benefits 
for two reasons. First, the prices of basic petrochemical products are highly 
correlated with oil prices. Second, refining and petrochemicals are also 
highly capital-intensive industries and do not generate many jobs. 
Therefore, the recent emphasis in some of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries has been on extending the value chain to more complex 
petrochemical products and even finished products manufactured in 
industrial parks that attract the private sector and foreign direct invest-
ment. The move towards non-combustible uses of oil also offers a degree 
of hedging against the possibility of a drop in oil demand (IEA 2018b).
For instance, Saudi Arabian Oil Company and Dow Chemical estab-
lished a joint venture in 2011, with an investment of $20 billion, which 
incorporates 26 integrated large-scale manufacturing plants with over 3 
million metric tonnes of capacity per annum. It has introduced many new 
products to Saudi Arabia (e.g. the first isocyanates and polyurethane 
plants), enabling many industries for intermediate products that either did 
not exist in the Kingdom or only existed through imports of raw materials, 
potentially opening up a range of new downstream opportunities. The 
Saudi Arabia Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) has similarly estab-
lished a number of industrial parks specialising in intermediate raw mate-
rial inputs and offering easy access to banking facilities, research resources, 
skilled workforce, logistic services and other inputs—it has a particular 
focus on the automotive industry which offers opportunities down the 
value chain.
According to the IEA (2018b), Middle East chemicals production is 
expected to double between now and 2040—allowing the region’s share 
in global chemicals production to increase by four percentage points, 
reaching 17 per cent by 2040 on the back of feedstock cost advantage and 
the high level of efficiency of newly built facilities. A corollary of this 
increase in downstream activity is that, out of a 6.5 mb/d incremental 
increase in oil supply until 2040 from the region, only 800  kb/d is 
exported as crude (with additional 2.1 mb/d passing through refineries 
and 3.6 mb/d being used in petrochemicals production). Adding more 
stages to the oil value chain in this way generates not only more jobs, but 
also different types of jobs including jobs in the service sector such as trad-
ing, marketing and sales, procuring and logistics, as well as supporting 
services such as accounting, finance and human resource management.
In this respect, the local content requirements (LCRs) that give priority 
to nationals in terms of employment, domestic companies in terms of 
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contracts and locally produced goods and services will only increase in 
importance. The objectives of such policies are to create a level playing 
field of local industries, create jobs for locals and enhance transfer of tech-
nology and technical expertise and skills. However, experience shows that 
such policies, if not properly implemented, can have unintended conse-
quences such as increasing the cost of projects, misaligning the interests 
between the government and investors and hence dis-incentivising private 
investment and even encouraging corruption.
Arab oil producers, as owners of large low-cost resources, have rationed 
their supplies in order to preserve their resources for future generations—a 
strategy which made sense during the age of scarcity (Dale and Fattouh 
2018). However, in carbon-constrained world, the main challenge for 
these producers in addition to maintaining the high levels of revenues 
upon which their economies are dependent is to monetise their massive 
reserve base in order to avoid to a greatest extent the possibility that sig-
nificant amounts of recoverable oil may never be extracted.17 This requires 
that Arab oil exporters play a key role in providing low-carbon solutions 
through developing and investing in low-carbon technologies that could 
extend the life of oil and gas.
Thus, rather than treating the oil industry as sunset industry in a 
world of heightened uncertainty about the prospects of oil demand, 
these countries will need to be much more strategic in terms of how the 
oil sector can further contribute to economic diversification. While the 
oil sector will continue to play a key role and to generate most of the 
income during the transition, it is expected to play a bigger role in the 
diversification and the economic transformation agenda. Business as 
usual for the oil sector and those who are leading it is no longer an 
option. Particularly, its success in extending the value chain and effec-
tiveness in implementing LCRs will determine the weight the sector 
plays in the decision-making process and in influencing the transition. 
But, as noted by Fattouh and Shehabi (2019), the extent to which the 
energy sector can play such a role depends on governments removing a 
wide array of structural barriers such as reducing the role of the public 
sector in employment generation and capital employment, diversifying 
the sources of income through serious tax reform and dismantling the 
oligopolistic market structure. After all, ‘the real problem lies in the 
economic and political structures and in policies surrounding the energy 
17 In other words, that countries are not effectively left with ‘stranded assets’.
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sector; these factors not only constitute barriers to meaningful diversifi-
cation, but also limit this sector’s contribution to broader and deeper 
diversification’ (Fattouh and Shehabi 2019).
4.2  The Use of Demand-Side Measures to Optimise 
the Resource Base
In addition to building new production capacity, these countries need to 
undertake other measures to optimise the use of the resource base. These 
include policies such as diversifying the energy mix and implementing 
energy efficiency measures and pricing reforms that liberate hydrocarbons 
that are currently used to meet soaring domestic demand at low (subsi-
dised) prices for export, which would add economic value (as long as the 
international price is above the fiscal breakeven price). Across the Middle 
East, for example, a 5.7 per cent annual increase in electricity demand has 
translated to a doubling in the region’s oil consumption for power genera-
tion over the last 20  years, reaching around 1.8 mb/d in 2017 (IEA 
2018b). This necessitates the implementation of energy-efficiency mea-
sures including subsidy reforms or price incentives. Indeed, subsidy 
reforms implemented in the GCC following the oil price fall of 2014–2016 
have largely continued despite the price recovery in 2018. Further, such 
measures are complementary to an overall economic diversification strat-
egy, which entails structural changes and fiscal reforms. For instance, the 
fact that all GCC countries (with the exception of Kuwait which has faced 
hurdles) have implemented energy pricing reform, constitutes an impor-
tant step towards meaningful economic diversification in the long term.
Matar et  al. (2017), for instance, explore the impact upon energy 
demand of various alternative policies to induce a transition to a more 
efficient energy system in Saudi Arabia, including immediately deregulat-
ing industrial fuel prices, gradually deregulating fuel prices and introduc-
ing investment credits or feed-in tariffs for efficient fuels. They find that 
the alternative policies result in nuclear and renewable technologies 
becoming cost-effective and producing 70 per cent of the Kingdom’s elec-
tricity in 2032  in contrast with hydrocarbons at present. They can also 
reduce the consumption of oil and natural gas by up to 2 million barrels 
of oil equivalent per day in 2032, with cumulative savings of 6.3 to 9.6 
billion barrels of oil equivalent. They estimate a net economic gain up to 
half a trillion US dollars from increased oil exports, even with investments 
in nuclear and renewables. However, given the rigidity of existing political 
5 ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION IN ARAB OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES… 
90
structures, institutions and the implicit social contract through which lim-
ited political participation is compensated for by distribution of hydrocar-
bon rents, gradual and small-scale reforms combined with mitigation 
measures can be implemented, but one should also not expect ‘speedy 
transformations’ of oil-exporting economies (Fattouh et al. 2018, 21).
4.3  Renewables as a Complement to Economic 
Diversification Strategies
Middle Eastern and in particular GCC oil exporters should not miss on 
the renewable ‘revolution’. They have great potential for renewable ener-
gies, owing to high levels of irradiation throughout these countries, and 
wind potential in some. Many countries in the region also have fewer limi-
tations on the use of land for construction of wind and solar farms. 
Furthermore, their locations are often close to the regions’ main energy 
markets. Collectively, these conditions create a unique opportunity for 
these countries to exploit their renewable resources to their full potential 
to serve rising domestic demand, whilst also harmonising with the chang-
ing global energy landscape in which renewables are fast becoming main-
stream (Poudineh et  al. 2016, 6). At present, this potential is almost 
untapped, with the 1.2 GW of solar capacity making up less than 0.5 per 
cent of total generation capacity in the Middle East (compared to over 90 
GW of oil-fired capacity) (IEA 2018b).
However, given the uncertainty in the speed of transition, Arab oil 
exporters need to adopt a strategy that is likely to be successful under a 
wide set of future market conditions (Fattouh et al. 2018, 4). Renewables 
may replace hydrocarbon resources in the domestic energy mix, but not 
immediately in the government budget, because investments in renew-
ables still do not generate the high returns that the oil and gas industry 
does. Furthermore, while the renewable energy industry is part of the 
diversification strategy, it alone cannot deliver the real needs of these econ-
omies, such as job creation and welfare improvements.
Therefore, these countries need to gradually ‘extend’ their energy 
model rather than completely ‘shift’ from hydrocarbons to renewables and 
integrate renewables into their hydrocarbon assets (i.e. oil-exporting 
countries cannot simply ‘transform’ into renewable exporting countries) 
(Fattouh et al. 2018, 4–5). Indeed, these countries have unique character-
istics that make the rationale of investment in renewables for them quite 
compelling. These countries have rising energy demand and are at a stage 
of development where economic growth is tied up with energy 
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consumption. The rise in energy demand is expected to strain the export 
capability of these countries. Countries such as Kuwait and the UAE are 
already net importers of natural gas. Investment in renewables could help 
boost the short-term revenues of oil-exporting countries as it frees up 
their hydrocarbon resources for export (as long as international prices are 
above the breakeven price).18 In short, for Middle Eastern oil exporters, 
investment in renewables addresses, to some extent, the government’s 
short-run revenue maximisation objective by freeing exports of hydrocar-
bons, but does not guarantee their long-term sustainability. In the long 
run, diversification of their economies remains the main adaptation strat-
egy that these countries need to pursue (Fattouh et al. 2018, 21).
5  the role of oIl PolIcy 
and Producer cooPeratIon
While diversification should remain the ultimate objective of Arab oil- 
exporting countries, the process is complex and fraught with challenges 
and potential setbacks and requires broad and deep structural reforms. 
Many oil producers may take a long time to develop alternative industries 
and activities that are as profitable as extracting low-cost oil. During the 
transition, the oil sector will continue to generate most of the income and 
therefore in addition to diversification, the oil exporting countries should 
18 The economics of renewables in exporting countries depends on the opportunity cost of 
domestic oil and gas consumption, which is reflected in international price of hydrocarbon 
resources. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2016), generating 1 
MWh of electricity requires 1.73 barrels of oil or 10.11 mcf of natural gas. The record low 
auction prices for solar photovoltaics (PV) in Dubai, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Abu Dhabi and 
Saudi Arabia have shown that, under the right circumstances, an LCOE (levelised cost of 
electricity) of $0.03/kWh for solar is achievable. IRENA also estimates the global average 
cost of solar PV to be around $0.06/kWh. If the lower band is considered (which is closer 
to costs of solar at the region), the break-even prices of oil and gas would be $17.34/bbl and 
$2.96/mcf, respectively, which are well below international prices. If we consider the global 
average costs of solar instead (which is pretty much conservative for the region), the break-
even prices will increase to $34.68/bbl and $5.93/mcf, which is still below the international 
price for oil but slightly higher than the average price for natural gas. Even if we add the costs 
of dealing with solar intermittency (at around $5/MWh) to these numbers, the economics 
of renewables is still winning over traditional resources in these countries. The economics of 
renewables will be boosted if we account for the gain that these countries will make from 
liberated oil and gas for exports. This highlights the importance of integrating renewable 
into the existing fossil fuel-based generation mix of oil-exporting countries (Fattouh et al. 
2018, 20).
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aim to maximise the income from their hydrocarbon assets. This implies 
that oil policy and oil monetisation strategies will remain key in shaping 
these countries’ economic strategies for the foreseeable future.
Faced with the possibility of significantly lower oil demand, some sug-
gest that these countries have no option, and indeed it is even rational that 
they monetise their reserves as quickly as possible and squeeze out high- 
cost producers and gain market share—just as with any other competitive 
market. However, this argument ignores the significant challenges that a 
shift to a competitive market poses for major oil-producing countries. If 
most low-cost producers adopt a similar strategy and increase supplies in 
the face of expected slowing demand growth, this will result in massive fall 
in oil prices and oil revenues, putting the political, social and economic 
stability of these countries at risk and derailing the entire economic diver-
sification agenda. In other words, the heavy reliance on oil revenues places 
a constraint on how fast Arab oil exporters can shift to a more competitive 
world where prices converge to the marginal cost of physical production. 
There is also the question as to whether low-cost producers can sharply 
increase their production capacity, especially in an environment of low oil 
prices. This is a major undertaking, which requires huge investments, and 
cannot be implemented in countries with unstable political and economic 
environment.
This discussion implies that even as we shift to more competitive mar-
kets, oil policy and managing producer-producer relations will continue to 
matter. Rather than simply pursue a policy of non-cooperation and com-
petition with low- and high-cost producers, it is most likely that producers 
would continue to cooperate and restrain their output in an attempt to 
maximise revenues. This is despite the fact that the challenges for produc-
ers pursuing a cooperative approach are immense, especially in a more 
competitive oil market.
To start with, the existing framework for cooperation is not well devel-
oped to deal with producers with different revenues needs and different 
degree of financial resilience. It also requires that producers constantly 
manage the market, based on newly developed criteria. Further, any coop-
erative action must go beyond output to include long-term investment 
plans; rapid investment and bringing on new capacity beyond what is 
needed in the market create problems similar to the high-output/low- 
price strategy. With many countries within OPEC and non-OPEC having 
ambitious plans to increase productive capacity, coordination on invest-
ment will be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Also, stabilising 
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expectations around a higher oil price will not only encourage US shale 
producers to increase output, but would also encourage investment in the 
long-term capital-intensive cycle (Curtis and Montalbano 2017). Above 
all, long-term cooperation requires unprecedented exercise of leadership 
to maintain the coalition among producers during good and bad times.
All these issues suggest that maintaining cooperation in a more com-
petitive world is very challenging, and while producers have the incentive 
to cooperate, the cooperation between producers has to take a different 
shape to what has existed in the past. For instance, producers should not 
only be concerned with low oil prices, but also be proactive when prices 
are too high, as high oil prices induce strong supply and demand responses 
and speed up the energy transition.
The cooperative solution, which results in a higher oil price, is also not 
without its costs, and those costs need to be managed by ensuring that 
prices don’t rise too high. It is also true that this cooperative strategy will 
be less effective over time in a carbon-constrained world. However, this 
does not imply that cooperation is not possible or sustainable for a pro-
longed period: as long as these economies are not diversified, the alterna-
tive of non-cooperation is also not sustainable. In a world where the 
prospects of oil demand and the speed of energy transition are highly 
uncertain, the immediate benefits from pursuing cooperation are more 
visible and certain than the benefits of pursuing the alternative strategy of 
fast monetisation of reserves.
Finally, it is worth stressing the co-dependence between diversification 
in oil exporters and the global energy transition. The transition is already 
shaping the political and economic outcomes in the Arab oil exporters, 
but the transition in the major Arab oil exporters to a more diversified and 
more resilient economies will also shape the global energy transition. In 
other words, this is a two-way street. If the transition in Arab countries 
does not go smoothly and countries fail in their diversification efforts, this 
could result in lower investment in the oil sector, output disruptions and 
more volatile oil prices. Also, in the absence of diversification, oil exporters 
will continue to push for higher oil prices. These have the effect of speed-
ing up the global energy transition (Fattouh et al. 2018, 21). In contrast, 
if these countries succeed in their diversification objectives, they will not 
only increase the resilience of their economies, but this would allow them 
to pursue a more flexible and proactive oil policy and adopt long-term 
strategies that could influence the speed of global energy transition and 
secure long-term oil demand.
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6  conclusIons
This chapter has added context to the debate on economic diversification 
by analysing it against the key arguments around peak oil demand and the 
energy transition. While exercises in forecasting peak demand contribute 
towards providing a new motivation for diversification as compared with 
the past, they should not be the sole factor upon which these strategies are 
undertaken. The starting point of any analysis of the Arab oil exporters 
should not be based on an approach solely predicated upon the timeline 
within which ‘oil will no longer be in demand’. Instead, it should take into 
account the consolidation of three key trends: first, that the range of 
uncertainty surrounding peak demand is high, and the speed of energy 
transition is highly uncertain and will not be uniform across the world. 
Second, that a single peak is not a certainty, particularly when taking into 
account the possibility of rebound effect. And third, that although an 
energy transition may be in progress, it is difficult to assume that the tran-
sition will result in a sudden and sharp discontinuity in oil demand, imply-
ing that oil will continue to be an important part of the energy mix 
(including in non-combustible uses) for the foreseeable future and that 
the oil sector will continue to play a key role in oil exporters’ economies.
The broader characteristics of the current energy transition from hydro-
carbons to low-carbon energy sources are of more relevance to economic 
diversification rather than predictions of when oil demand will peak. In 
this regard, although there is unlikely to be a sharp discontinuity in oil use, 
it is also uncertain whether the current transition will exactly mirror the 
slow speed of historical transitions which were more about developing 
technologies in an age of scarcity based on markets and innovation, rather 
than being problem- and policy-driven.
The diversification strategy adopted by oil-exporting countries will be 
conditioned by the speed of the transition, which could be decades, dur-
ing which the oil sector will continue to play a key role in these economies, 
both as a means to diversification (for e.g. extending the value chain 
beyond simply producing crude oil and exporting it to international mar-
kets) and as a generator of income. Arab oil producers will at the same 
time need to adopt complementary cost-effective strategies to optimise 
the use of their resource domestically to increase hydrocarbon exports. 
These strategies include taking advantage of the ‘inflection point’ in 
renewables, which has made renewable technologies competitive to liber-
ate hydrocarbons used in the domestic economy at subsidised prices, for 
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export, as well as adopt demand-side measures to encourage more effi-
cient energy use. These are more cost-effective strategies than simply 
increasing productive capacity, which is costly and requires massive 
investments.
At the same time, Arab oil exporters will need to be far more strategic 
in their use of the oil sector to diversify their economies. In a more com-
petitive world, oil policy will also continue to matter; cooperation between 
producers will be imperative, yet challenging, as a cooperative strategy 
could be less effective in a carbon-constrained world. The global energy 
transition will not only shape the political and economic outcomes in the 
Arab oil exporters, but the transition in the major oil exporters and the key 
choices they make will also shape the global energy transition.
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CHAPTER 6




For decades now, exports and imports of most countries have been grow-
ing more rapidly than domestic production. This is a strong indication 
that, besides foreign trade in final products, trade in intermediates is also 
becoming increasingly important. Globalisation in production is changing 
the way in which nations interact, and any analysis of diversification should 
therefore also encompass the worldwide exchange of intermediates in pro-
duction. For this reason, an input-output approach, which accounts for 
the role of intermediates, is more appropriate for any analysis of diversifi-
cation than a traditional approach based purely on macroeconomic data.
This chapter analyses economic diversification in the GCC using data 
from input-output tables to compare the performance of these econo-
mies with that of a ‘reference case’, Norway, which is considered as hav-
ing successfully diversified its economy despite having a large oil resource 
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base. It also assesses their relative progress on sustainable development 
using a new measure, adjusted net savings, which measures the ‘true’ 
rate of savings in an economy after accounting for investments in man-
made and human capital, depletion of natural resources and damage 
from environmental pollution. This view of sustainable development 
requires that the nation passes on an aggregate stock of physical capital, 
human capital and natural capital to the next generation that is not 
smaller than the one that currently exists. This requires that the loss of 
depleting resources be offset by increasing the stock of physical and 
human capital.
The article concludes that GCC countries have (contrary to expecta-
tion) collectively performed relatively well on diversification, but their 
performance on sustainable development varies between countries.
The required information for sustainable development and diversifica-
tion can be deducted from the national accounts in great detail. The 
main sources for analysis are monetary and physical supply and use tables, 
sector accounts, extended input-output tables and social accounting 
matrices.
2  trends In ProductIon and ForeIgn trade
Since the foundation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, 
trade boosted thanks to reduced barriers. Since then, exports and 
imports of most countries have been growing more rapidly than domes-
tic production. Globalisation in production is changing the way in 
which nations interact, and any analysis of diversification should there-
fore also encompass the worldwide exchange of intermediates in pro-
duction. This is the main reason why we promote an input-output 
approach for the analysis of diversification and sustainable development 
(Beutel 2012).
2.1  Exports and Imports
If exports and imports are growing faster than GDP, the shares of exports 
and imports in GDP are also increasing. Furthermore, if net exports grow 
faster than GDP, the purchasing power of the nation is increasing and 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































trade are shown for the 10 largest economies of the world (G10) for the 
last two decades. The most striking examples of an increase in the share of 
exports in GDP between 1995 and 2016 are Germany (+24.1 per cent), 
India (+7.9 per cent), Japan (+7.2 per cent), France (+6.9 per cent), Italy 
(+ 5.1 per cent) and Brazil (+5.1 per cent).
Substantial increases in the share of imports in GDP during the period 
1995–2016 are observed for Germany (+16.6 per cent), France (+10.3 
percent), India (+8.2 per cent), Japan (+7.5 per cent) and Italy (+ 5.4 per 
cent). For the 10 largest economies combined (G10) the increase of the 
export share in GDP during the period 1995–2016 was +4.7 per cent and 
of the import share in GDP +5.2 per cent.
In Table 6.2, the same information on GDP, exports and imports was 
collected for the GCC countries. If net exports of a nation grow more 
rapidly than GDP, the purchasing power of the nation is increasing. In 
consequence, imports tend also to grow more than GDP.  In the GCC 
countries, the share of exports in GDP increased by 12.9 per cent during 
the period 1995–2016, while the corresponding share of imports in GDP 
increased by 14.0 per cent. The most rapid increase of the export share 
was observed for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (+57.9 per cent) and 
Oman (+14.0 per cent). Similar results were observed for the import share 
in GDP for UAE (+41.3 per cent) and Oman (+17.0 per cent).
2.2  Intermediate Consumption, Value Added and Output
The numbers in the table suggest that during the last 20 years, the globali-
sation of economic activities has caused increasing worldwide interdepen-
dencies in production, leading to the intermediate consumption of goods 
and services becoming a key element in the intensification of economic 
diversification. If the consumption of intermediate products is growing 
above its GDP growth rate, an economy is moving towards more complex 
participation in inter-industrial production.
For the future, the challenge for many countries is to become a success-
ful member in the international chain of value added. As shown on 
Table 6.3, the share of intermediates in total output for G10 countries 
increased by 5.9 per cent in the period 1995–2011. As a consequence, the 
corresponding share of gross value added in output declined in the same 
period by 5.9 per cent. In other words, in this period, the production 
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Table 6.2 GDP and foreign trade at current prices of GCC countries






Gross domestic product (millions of US dollar)
1995 6787 26,554 13,650 8041 143,152 66,603 264,786
2000 9063 37,718 19,450 17,548 189,515 105,701 378,994
2005 15,969 80,798 31,082 43,998 328,461 182,978 683,286
2010 25,713 115,416 58,641 123,627 528,207 289,787 1,141,392
2015 31,126 114,059 69,832 164,641 651,757 358,135 1,389,551
2016 32,179 110,346 63,171 152,452 639,617 348,744 1,346,509
Exports of goods and services (millions of US dollar)
1995 4798 14,234 4757 3613 53,450 30,591 111,442
2000 7176 21,301 10,474 11,964 82,259 53,889 187,063
2005 13,397 51,692 19,633 29,017 187,389 122,071 423,199
2010 17,880 76,952 38,500 78,069 261,831 225,275 698,507
2015 26,326 62,024 39,166 92,291 218,010 359,401 797,218
2016 23,782 55,530 30,845 72,397 195,169 362,069 739,793
Imports of goods and services (millions of US dollar)
1995 4122 11,409 4009 3526 39,659 24,663 87,388
2000 5132 11,371 5054 3966 46,926 36,003 108,452
2005 10,287 22,839 11,173 13,208 81,798 83,671 222,975
2010 13,097 35,034 24,166 29,717 174,203 184,221 460,439
2015 22,302 51,627 36,667 59,271 253,555 265,950 689,371
2016 21,088 51,922 29,301 63,475 194,169 273,274 633,230
Net exports of goods and services (millions of US dollar)
1995 675 2825 749 86 13,791 5928 24,054
2000 2044 9930 5420 7998 35,333 17,886 78,611
2005 3110 28,853 8460 15,809 105,592 38,400 200,224
2010 4783 41,918 14,333 48,352 87,628 41,054 238,069
2015 4024 10,397 2500 33,020 - 35,544 93,451 107,848
2016 2694 3608 1544 8922 1000 88,795 106,563
Share of exports in GDP (%)
1995 70.7 53.6 34.9 44.9 37.3 45.9 42.1
2000 79.2 56.5 53.9 68.2 43.4 51.0 49.4
2005 83.9 64.0 63.2 66.0 57.1 66.7 61.9
2010 69.5 66.7 65.7 63.1 49.6 77.7 61.2
2015 84.6 54.4 56.1 56.1 33.4 100.4 57.4
2016 73.9 50.3 48.8 47.5 30.5 103.8 54.9
Increase of share of exports in GDP (%)
95–16 3.2 −3.3 14.0 2.6 −6.8 57.9 12.9
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process of the 10 largest economies became more complex and more 
interdependent. It is worth noticing that the share of intermediates in 
total output in China increased by 6.7 per cent, while the share of inter-
mediates in the USA slightly declined by −0.4 per cent.
For the GCC countries combined, the share of intermediates and gross 
value added in total output was more or less constant during the last 
20 years (see Table 6.4). However, among individual countries, the per-
formance has been mixed. While large increases of intermediates were 
reported for Bahrain (+10.6 per cent), Oman (+7.7 per cent), Kuwait 
(+5.4 per cent) and the UAE (+4.5 per cent), these were offset by the 
decline of intermediates in Saudi Arabia (−4.1 per cent).
3  economIc dIversIFIcatIon oF the gcc countrIes 
In InternatIonal comParIson
The sustainable development of nations involves economic, social and 
environmental changes. Within this process, diversification and structural 
change of production and demand are closely related to many areas of the 
economy and society.






Share of imports in GDP (%)
1995 60.7 43.0 29.4 43.9 27.7 37.0 33.0
2000 56.6 30.1 26.0 22.6 24.8 34.1 28.6
2005 64.4 28.3 35.9 30.0 24.9 45.7 32.6
2010 50.9 30.4 41.2 24.0 33.0 63.6 40.3
2015 71.7 45.3 52.5 36.0 38.9 74.3 49.6
2016 65.5 47.1 46.4 41.6 30.4 78.4 47.0
Increase of share of imports in GDP (%)
95–16 4.8 4.1 17.0 −2.2 2.7 41.3 14.0
Source: UNdata—National Accounts Estimates by Main Aggregates 1995–2016
Table 6.2 (continued)


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.4 Intermediates, value added and output at current prices of GCC 
countries






Intermediates at purchasers’ prices (million US dollar)
1995 3737 11,878 5131 3332 79,090 38,371 141,539
2000 7101 16,019 7440 5351 99,219 64,268 199,398
2005 14,009 43,685 13,197 14,670 164,159 117,210 366,929
2010 24,374 79,339 29,639 55,329 262,678 194,448 645,807
2015 26,396 74,149 39,613 68,906 307,508 252,409 768,981
Gross value added at basic prices (million US dollar)
1995 6782 26,879 13,685 8311 139,225 65,744 260,626
2000 9063 39,015 19,326 18,052 184,162 104,337 373,955
2005 15,969 83,808 31,784 44,053 319,210 180,617 675,441
2010 25,442 131,065 59,876 124,080 512,817 289,880 1,143,160
2015 30,835 131,530 73,675 165,245 651,097 357,949 1,410,331
Output at basic prices (million US dollar)
1995 10,519 38,757 18,816 11,643 218,315 104,114 402,165
2000 16,163 55,035 26,766 23,402 283,381 168,605 573,353
2005 29,978 127,493 44,981 58,723 483,369 297,827 1,042,370
2010 49,816 210,403 89,515 179,410 775,494 484,328 1,788,966
2015 57,231 205,679 113,288 234,151 958,604 610,358 2,179,312
Share of intermediates in output (%)
1995 35.5 30.6 27.3 28.6 36.2 36.9 35.2
2000 43.9 29.1 27.8 22.9 35.0 38.1 34.8
2005 46.7 34.3 29.3 25.0 34.0 39.4 35.2
2010 48.9 37.7 33.1 30.8 33.9 40.1 36.1
2015 46.1 36.1 35.0 29.4 32.1 41.4 35.3
Increase in share of intermediates in output (%)
95–15 10.6 5.4 7.7 0.8 −4.1 4.5 0.1
Share of gross value added in output (%)
1995 64.5 69.4 72.7 71.4 63.8 63.1 64.8
2000 56.1 70.9 72.2 77.1 65.0 61.9 65.2
2005 53.3 65.7 70.7 75.0 66.0 60.6 64.8
2010 51.1 62.3 66.9 69.2 66.1 59.9 63.9
2015 53.9 63.9 65.0 70.6 67.9 58.6 64.7
Increase in share of gross value added in output (%)
95–15 −10.6 −5.4 −7.7 −0.8 4.1 −4.5 −0.1
Source: UNdata—National Accounts Estimates by Main Aggregates 1995–2016; OECD
6 ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT… 
108
For income per capita to converge, countries must move towards more 
diversified and complex production structures incorporating more 
advanced technology and knowledge. Economic diversification means 
the diversification of exports and domestic production away from extreme 
dependence on a single dominant industry or a few natural-resource-
based products, as well as towards increased complexity and quality 
of output.
In the following two tables, data on gross value added by industry and 
on GDP by type of expenditure are presented for the GCC countries in 
2016 to discuss their different economic structure. In this comparison, 
Norway will act as the reference, as this country is highly developed in 
many ways, generating substantial oil and gas revenues and benefitting 
from a successful sovereign wealth fund. The Government Pension Fund 
Global, also known as Oil Fund, was established in 1990 to invest the 
surplus revenue of the Norwegian petroleum sector for the benefit of 
future generations. It has over US$1 trillion in assets, including 1.3 per 
cent of global stocks and shares, making it the world’s largest sovereign 
wealth fund.
Table 6.5 reveals that the industry structure of the UAE is similar to 
that of Norway. It is also striking to observe that the industry structure of 
Iran is similar to the structure of the GCC countries combined, except for 
agriculture.
If we compare the industry structure of the individual GCC countries, 
we observe that their structure is quite diverse. The share of mining and 
utilities in gross value added is much higher in Kuwait than in Bahrain. 
Manufacturing in Kuwait has a very low share in gross value added, but in 
Bahrain this share is more than three times larger.
The oil and gas dependency of Kuwait and Oman was still high in 
2016. The sector ‘Mining and utilities’ accounted for 51.4 per cent of 
gross value added in Kuwait, 42.6 per cent in Oman and 26.9 per cent in 
the GCC countries combined. The oil and gas dependency of Norway is 
considerably lower (19.0 per cent). And yet, if we compare Norway and 
the GCC in terms of the expenditure side of GDP, we observe a similar 
structure. But it is obvious that Norway is more developed concerning 
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In Table 6.6, we present similar information for the expenditure side of 
GDP in 2016 for consumption, capital formation and foreign trade. Here, 
we observe significant differences between the GCC countries. The share 
of household consumption in GDP is similar in Norway (45.5 per cent), 
Bahrain (45.0 per cent), Kuwait (42.9 per cent) and Saudi Arabia (42.8 
per cent). The share of government consumption is in the same range in 
Norway (24.3 per cent), Oman (28.2 per cent), Kuwait (27.7 per cent) 
and Saudi Arabia (25.8 per cent). By far the highest investment ratio is 
reported for Qatar (45.2 per cent) and for Oman (38.0 per cent). The 
shares of gross fixed capital formation in GDP in Norway (24.1 per cent) 
and in the GCC combined (23.6 per cent) are also similar.
In the bottom part of Table 6.6, we relate the results on the expendi-
ture side of GDP to the population. The highest GDP per capita is 
reported for Norway (70,617 Mio $/person), followed by the GCC 
countries Qatar (59.324 Mio $/person), UAE (37,622 Mio $/person) 
and Kuwait (27,229 Mio $/person). But what matters for the well-being 
of the people is less GDP per capita than final consumption per capita. In 
this respect, among the selected countries, the gold medal goes to Norway 
(32,140 Mio $/person), the silver medal to Canada (24,578 Mio $/per-
son) and the bronze medal to Qatar (15,312 Mio $/person).
3.1  Product Concentration and Product Diversification
The most widely quoted product concentration and diversification indices 
are published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD).
Figure 6.1 presents these indices for the GCC for the period 1995–2016. 
The product concentration index measures whether the exports and 
imports of the GCC are concentrated on a few products or distributed in 
a more homogeneous manner among a series of products. The diversifica-
tion index indicates whether the structure of exports or imports by prod-
uct differs in the GCC from the world pattern.
Both top two indices for GCC exports show a falling trend. The con-
centration index for exports indicates that today a broader range of prod-
ucts is exported than just oil and gas. The export diversification index 
shows that the divergence from the world pattern was significantly reduced.
The bottom two indices for imports are relatively stable. The concen-
tration index shows that imports are rather homogenously distributed 
among many of products. The diversification index for imports shows very 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.2  Economic Diversification of the Industrial Sector
The challenge is now to study the diversification of the industrial sector in 
the GCC countries. The key question is whether diversification has 
increased during the last 50 years.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is the most widely used measure to 
evaluate market concentration and industry concentration of an economy. 
This time, the index is the sum of squared shares of the various industries 
in total gross value added. In the normalised form, the index varies 
from 0 to 1.
In the case of a low value, the economy has a large number of industries 









































Fig. 6.1 Product concentration and diversification of exports and imports for 
GCC. (Source: UNCTADStat)
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Box 6.1 Product Concentration and Diversification Indices of Exports 
and Imports
Concentration Index:
The concentration index, also named Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 
is a measure of the degree of product concentration. The following 





















Hj = country or country group index
xij = value of export for country j and product i









n = number of products (SITC Revision 3 at 3-digit group level).
An index value closer to 1 indicates a country’s exports or imports 
are highly concentrated on a few products. On the contrary, values 
closer to 0 reflect exports or imports are more homogeneously dis-
tributed among a series of products.
Diversification Index:
The diversification index is computed by measuring the absolute 










hij = share of product i in total exports or imports of country or 
country group j
hi = share of product i in total world exports or imports.
The diversification index takes values between 0 and 1. A value 
closer to 1 indicates greater divergence from the world pattern.
Source: UNCTAD Merchandise: Product concentration and 
diversification indices of exports and imports, annual, 1995–2016
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index reaches 1, only one industry accounts for all gross value added, and 
a high concentration of economic activity is given. Thus, a decline in the 
index signifies less concentration in the dominant industry or greater 
diversification. If more concentration in the dominant sector is observed, 
the indicator will be higher.
Figure 6.2 plots the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for all GCC coun-
tries (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and UAE). The calcu-
lation is based on the UN Statistics Division’s long time series for value 
added by economic activity for the period 1970–2016, covering the fol-
lowing seven industries: (1) agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing, (2) 
mining and utilities, (3) manufacturing, (4) construction, (5) wholesale, 
retail trade, restaurants and hotels, (6) transport, storage and communica-
tion and (7) other activities.
Starting from the first oil boom in 1974 and the second oil boom in 
1978, the index steadily fell until 1998, indicating a successful process of 






































Fig. 6.2 Industry concentration index for the GCC countries. (Source: National 
Accounts Estimates of Main Aggregates—United Nations Statistics Division)
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prices after a long period of relatively low prices seemingly provoked a 
reversal in the trend of industrial diversification in most GCC countries.
In Fig. 6.3, the Herfindal-Hirschman Index is presented for the GCC 
as an aggregate in comparison with selected reference countries. This fig-
ure clearly demonstrates that the GCC countries combined moved since 
1995 in the concentration range of the reference countries Norway and 
Canada, while Malaysia and Iran manifested lower concentration.
4  new assessment For gcc countrIes 
wIth InPut-outPut data
The best way of measuring the relationship between intermediate con-
sumption, gross value added and final demand is through the use of input- 
output tables, which are derived from supply and use tables that are an 





































Fig. 6.3 Industry concentration index in international comparison. (Source: 




The input-output table is a matrix containing detailed information on 
the production of goods and services in an economy. It details the inter-
mediate and final uses of domestic and imported goods and services, and 
also covers net taxes on products and the gross value added of industries.
The required inputs and corresponding cost structures of industries 
and final demand categories (consumption, investment, exports) can be 
studied in the columns of the table, while the sales or output structure for 
goods and services and components of value added (compensation of 
employees, net taxes on production, consumption of fixed capital, net 
operating surplus) can be derived from the rows.
Extended input-output tables comprise other useful information 
derived from satellite systems which are integrated into the national 
accounts. The additional data include information in matrix form on 
investment and capital in values, while matrices on employment, energy, 
emissions, natural resources, waste, sewage and water show the corre-
sponding quantities.
The extended input-output table of Saudi Arabia for 2010 in Table 6.7 
has the following seven extensions with information in values and 
quantities:
 1. Gross fixed capital formation (million Saudi riyals)
 2. Capital stock (million Saudi riyals)
 3. Employment (1000 persons)
 4. Energy use (1000 tons of oil equivalent)
 5. Air emissions (1000 tons)
 6. Global warming, acid deposition, tropospheric ozone formation 
(1000 tons)
 7. Water use (million cubic metres)
The first part of the extended input-output table in rows 1–18 com-
prises the traditional input-output table. In rows 1–8, the use of domestic 
products in industries and final uses is shown. Imports and net taxes on 
products are presented in rows 10–11, followed by the various compo-
nents of gross value added in rows 13–16. Detailed information on 
imported products is given in a separate import matrix below the input- 
output table in rows 19–27.
Environmentally extended input-output tables and models have 
become a powerful tool in supporting environmental and economic 
analyses and policies. They play an important role in providing the 
database for studying sustainable development and the impact of 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Input-output table (bn SR)
  2   0   31   2   1   0   1   15   1   17   1   72
  0   2   79   6   8   5   0   0   2   3   2   731   838
  5   3   28   4   35   24   7   22   113   0   146   40   91   519
  1   0   9   1   5   10   2   5   13   5   2   0   53
  2   1   13   2   16   11   5   18   13   0   149   1   2   231
  7   4   64   4   30   67   9   31   127   5   58   22   47   475
  1   1   18   1   7   27   26   20   120   2   0   4   228
  2   2   12   2   3   13   3   12   51   344   0   0   445
  18   14   255   20   106   158   52   110   453   360   353   85   876  2 860
  5   3   44   4   33   34   11   27   129   40   126   37   79   574
  0   0   1   0   1   0   0   1   4   0   4   1   2   15
  24   17   300   24   141   193   64   137   585   400   484   123   957  3 449
  6   25   37   8   26   64   26   268   459
-  4   1   1   0   1   3   1   0   4
  46   795   182   21   64   214   137   39  1 498
  48   821   219   29   91   281   164   308  1 961
  72   838   519   53   231   475   228   445  2 860
Input-output table of imports (bn SR)
  0   0   8   0   0   0   0   4   0   5   0   19
  0   0   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   6   7
  3   2   20   3   25   17   5   16   80   0   104   29   64   369
  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
  0   0   1   0   1   1   0   2   1   0   13   0   0   20
  1   1   10   1   5   11   1   5   20   1   9   4   7   75
  0   0   3   0   1   4   4   3   18   0   0   1   34
  0   0   1   0   0   2   0   1   6   39   0   0   50
  5   3   44   4   33   34   11   27   129   40   126   37   79   574
EXTENSIONS
Gross fixed capital formation (bn SR)
  2   3   13   7   5   18   87   130   264
  2   0   13   8   5   19   4   5   57
  3   51   24   10   7   26   5   37   163
  7   54   49   26   17   64   95   172   484
Capital stock (bn SR)
  47   99   126   57   64   221  1 227  1 272  3 114
  6   6   52   13   90   140   91   36   434
  8   325   319   126   27   194   89   181  1 271
  61   430   498   197   181   556  1 408  1 489  4 819
Employment (1.000 persons)
  93   91   148   70   91   562   207  2 693  3 955
  199   13   509   27  1 006  1 679   221  1 225  4 880
  293   104   657   97  1 097  2 241   428  3 918  8 835
Energy (1.000 tons oil equivalent)
  19  161 112  20 596 - 5 046  294 881  471 562
 2 736  7 792  27 393  14 156   192  25 563   37   122  10 840  2 774  63 134  154 739
 15 138  21 193  30 161  66 492
  316   767  1 687  3 395   290  3 276   272  1 300  9 342  20 645
 3 052  23 716  211 385  68 309   482  28 838   309  1 422  20 182 - 2 272  358 015  713 438
Air emissions (1.000 tons)
 5 931  9 591  100 146  177 291   818  87 197   800  2 372  61 806  445 950
 1 903  51 110   575   336   2   519   2  5 637   227  60 310
 2 613   927  2 426   197   1   29   0   25   32  6 250
  58   568   786   702   1   16   1   7   46  2 185
  33   7   23   2   10   21   10   19   0   126
  39   7   40   594   8   766   4   7   91  1 556
  33   29   163   35   28  1 454   5   27   396  2 170
  10  1 552   200   37   21   330   128   59   57  2 394
  6   21   44   5   20   40   19   38   100   291
  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
 10 625  63 811  104 403  179 200   907  90 371   971  8 191  62 753  521 232
Global warming, acid deposition and tropospheric ozone formation (1.000 tons)
 855 913 1 370 291  864 363  245 552  1 032  106 942   975  128 473  76 419 3 649 960
  85   573   814  1 118   7   552   4   11   109  3 274





1 Prod. of agriculture, forestry, fis
2 Products of mining
3 Products of manufacturing
4 Electricity and water
5 Construction work
6 Trade, transport and communic
7 Financial and business service
8 Public and other services
9 Domestic products at basic pric
10 Imported products
11 Taxes less subsidies on produ
12 Products at purchasers' prices
13 Compensation of employees
14 Other net taxes on production
15 Consumption of fixed capital
16 Net operating surplus
17 Value added at basic prices
18 Input at basic prices
19 Prod. of agriculture, forestry, fis
20 Products of mining
21 Products of manufacturing
22 Electricity and water
23 Construction work
24 Trade, transport and communic
25 Financial and business service
26 Public and other services
27 Total
28  Buildings
29  Transport equipment
30  Machinery and other equipme
31 Total
32  Buildings
33  Transport equipment





39  Crude oil, NGL and feedstocks
40  Oil products
41  Natural gas
42  Electricity
43 Total
44 Carbon dioxide (CO2)
45 Methane (CH4)
46 Nitrous oxide (N2O)
47 Sulfur dioxide (SO2)
48 Ammonia (NH3)
49 Nitrogen oxides (NOx)
50 Carbon monoxide (CO)
51 Organic compounds (NMVOC)
52 Hydroflurocarbons (HFC)
53 Sulfur hexafluoride (SF6)
54 Total
55 Greenhouse gases 1)
56 Acid deposition 2)
57 Tropospheric ozone 3)
Water use (Mio. cubic meter)
58 Desalinated water   50   58   108   104   1   281   97   207   378  1 284
59 Renewable groundwater  2 260   16   31   30   0   68   23   50   90  2 568
60 Non-renewable groundwater  15 298   54   100   97   1   205   70   150   273  16 247
61 Total  17 608   128   239   231   3   553   189   407   742  20 099




environmental policies. If, for example, input-output tables are 
extended to include environmental information, a solid foundation for 
environmental policy analysis is provided. Life cycle analysis of prod-
ucts and their impact on the environment and sustainable use of natu-
ral resources are two prominent applications. The United Nations 
recently published the Handbook on Supply, Use and Input-Output 
Tables with Extensions and Applications (United Nations 2018, p. 518) 
in which the compilation of physical supply and use tables and extended 
input-output tables is promoted (Box 6.2). I was a member of the 
Editorial Board and heavily engaged in drafting the new Handbook for 
the national accounts.
4.1  Traditional Input-Output Indicators for GCC Countries
Only a few GCC countries compile and publish supply, use and input- 
output tables for their national accounts. At the time of writing, national 
tables were available only for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
A comparison of input-output data of Saudi Arabia and Norway 
reveals that the shares of intermediate consumption of products and 
gross value added in total output did not change much in both coun-
tries between 2005 and 2011. However, the shares of intermediates in 
total output were significantly lower in Saudi Arabia than in Norway 
(31 vs. 46 per cent of output), as were the shares of imported interme-
diates (5 vs. 10 per cent).
The first part of Table 6.8 is devoted to the analysis of direct input coef-
ficients, while in the second part of the table the cumulative input coeffi-
cients are explored. The input coefficients reflect the direct input 
requirements of products for a specific industry, while the cumulative 
input coefficients represent the direct and indirect input requirements of 
Source: Central Department of Statistics and Information (CDSI), Ministry of Economy and Planning 
(MOEP), Ministry of Water and Electricity (MOWE), International Energy Agency (IEA), World Bank 
(WB), World Input-Output Database (WIOD), European Commission (EDGAR), own estimates
Notes: (1) Carbon dioxide (CO2 = 1), methane (CH4 = 21) and nitrous oxide (N2O = 310) were trans-
formed with the documented factors to greenhouse gases in CO2-equivalents; (2) sulphur dioxide 
(SO2 = 1) and nitrogen oxides (NOx = 0.7) were transformed with the documented factors to acid deposi-
tions in SO2-equivalents; (3) substances causing tropospheric ozone formation: carbon monoxide (CO), 
non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC), methane (CH4), nitrogen oxides (NOx)
Table 6.7 (continued)
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Box 6.2 UN Handbook of Supply, Use and Input-Output Tables
The United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) announced in May 
2018 that the final draft of the Handbook on Supply, Use and Input- 
Output Tables with Extensions and Applications is now available on 
the website of UNSD at:
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/docs/
SUT_IOT_HB_wc.pdf
From the preface of the UN Handbook:
The Handbook on Supply, Use and Input-Output Tables with 
Extensions and Applications has been prepared as part of a series of 
handbooks on national accounting in support of the implementation of 
the System of National Accounts 2008 (2008 SNA). The objective of 
this Handbook is to provide a step-by-step guidance for the compilation 
of Supply and Use Tables (SUTs) and Input-Output Tables (IOTs) and 
an overview of the possible extensions of SUTs and IOTs which increase 
their analytical usefulness.
Supply and use tables and the institutional sector accounts consti-
tute the core of the national accounts.
The Institutional Sector Accounts provide detailed information 
on institutions (Non-financial corporations, Financial corporations, 
General Government, Households, Non-profit institutions serving 
households) in the production, the income and the capital account.
Supply and use tables show the relationship between input and 
output of industries in great detail including the components of 
value added, intermediate use of products in industries and final 
demand of products.
Supply and use tables are transformed into symmetric input- 
output tables on the basis of analytical assumption on technology 
and sales structure. Input-output models are often used to study the 
impact of exogenous changes of final demand or primary inputs on 
the rest of the economy. Input-output tables also provide the data-
base for different macroeconomic models.
A social accounting matrix (SAM) comprises all information of 
the supply and use tables and the institutional sector accounts in one 
matrix. The SAM is often used as the database of Computable 
General Equilibrium Model (CGE).
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products at all stages of production. The cumulative input coefficients are 
often used to identify the backward linkages of an industry.
In its simplest form, the strength of the backward linkage of an indus-
try is given by the column sum of the direct input coefficients. A more 
useful and comprehensive measure is provided by the column sum of the 
Leontief Inverse, which reflects the direct and indirect effects on other 
industries.
Backward linkages are input-oriented. The industry ‘Construction’ 
requires inputs from many other industries and therefore will have strong 
backward linkages. Forward linkages are output-oriented. The industry 
‘Electricity’ supplies electricity to all other industries, and therefore, this 
industry is expected to have strong forward linkages (many clients) but 
weak backward linkages (few inputs).
The column totals of the direct input coefficients and the Leontief 
Inverse input coefficients reflect the intensity of backward linkages. The 
row totals of the direct output coefficients and the Ghosh inverse output 
coefficients show the intensity of forward linkages.
In Table 6.8, the cumulative input coefficients per industry are reported 
for domestic products (column 2) and total (domestic and imported) 
products (column 4). The sum of cumulative input coefficients was divided 
by the number of industries, as the input-output tables comprise a differ-
ent number of industries in successive years. While the input coefficients 
for domestic products allow a high degree of substitution between domes-
tic and imported products, the input coefficients for total products reflect 
technical requirements.
On average, Saudi Arabia reached 95 per cent of the Leontief Inverse 
for domestic products of Norway. In other words, it can be said that by 
2011, Saudi Arabia has reached an international level of industrial 
The UN Handbook promotes the compilation of physical supply and 
use tables and extended input-output tables as an integral part of the 
national accounts. The additional tables offer new opportunities for the 
analysis of economic diversification and sustainable development models.
Box 6.2 (continued)




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6 ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT… 
124
diversification. If imported intermediate inputs are included, the level of 
diversification appears to have reached 86 per cent of that of Norway.
In Table 6.9, a similar comparison was made for the input-output 
data of Kuwait and Norway. Kuwait has a long history of compiling 
input- output data. We used the national input-output tables of Kuwait 
for 2005, 2010 and 2013. We refrained from using input-output tables 
which were compiled for the Global Trade Analysis Project (Green 
2011) as these tables have been generated in a mechanical process with 
only a few sources. The results for 2005–2013 show a clear trend for the 
use of domestic intermediates in Kuwait. In 2013, Kuwait, with 32.8 
per cent of output, has almost reached the level of Norway (35.2 per 
cent). However, the share of imported intermediate inputs (5.5 per 
cent) is much lower than the share in Norway (11.1 per cent). The 
share of gross value added in output of Kuwait (64.8 per cent) is about 
10 per cent higher than in Norway (54.6 per cent), indicating the 
potential for more diversification.
The backward linkages for domestic inputs in Kuwait reached 95.8 per 
cent that of Norway. They even exceeded the level of Norway (108.8 per 
cent) if imported inputs are included. Thus, in Kuwait, the potential to 
induce more diversification should not be based on a general policy of 
promoting more import substitution but rather on a specific policy of 
encouraging more imports of intermediates.
4.2  Primary Diversity Measure
Economic diversity has often been promoted as a means to achieve the 
economic goals of stability and growth. Empirical studies have been able 
to relate higher levels of diversity to both economic stability and overall 
levels of economic activity. Diversity measures, as used in these studies, 
have tended to be narrowly defined, usually emphasising the distribution 
of employment across industries. Such measures are unsatisfactory, because 
they do not capture inter-industrial linkages.
An alternative approach to measuring diversity, based on the technical 
coefficients matrix of an input-output model, was developed by Wagner 
and Deller (1998) who show that higher levels of diversification within the 
theoretical construct of input-output are associated with higher levels of 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































approach for Kuwait using input-output data for Kuwait and Norway 
for 2000.
The primary diversity measure of Wagner and Deller puts special 
emphasis on inter-industry relations and provides the best way to evaluate 
the diversification of economies. The index is a multiplicative combination 
of three components:
• The relative size of an economy (SI)—number of indigenous 
industries
• The density of the economy (DEN)—number of non-zero elements 
in the Leontief Matrix, indicating the diversity of transactions
• The condition number of the Leontief Matrix (CN)—indicator of 
inter-industry linkages
The Primary Diversity Measure (PDM) is defined as the simple multi-
plicative combination of these three characteristics, PDM = SI * DEN * CN.
The relative size of the economy is defined as SI = N/Nr, where N is the 
number of indigenous industries identified in the nation, and Nr is the 
number of indigenous industries in the reference country. This measure 
implies the larger the economy as compared to the base economy, the bet-
ter. The larger the regional economy, in terms of the number of industries 
contained within the economy, the greater the ability of the economy to 
absorb shocks. This is a measure of relative size, but does not contain any 
information on inter-industry linkages.
The density of the (I - A) matrix is defined as DEN = non-zero/N * N 
where non-zero is the number of transactions (non-zero elements) in the 
Leontief Matrix, and N is again the number of indigenous industries. The 
greater the number of non-zero elements contained in the table, the 
greater the degree of possible inter-industry linkages. This measure does 
not capture the relative magnitudes of the elements, nor does it capture 
the positions of these elements within the Leontief Matrix.
The third component measures the degree of inter-industry linkages. 
The condition number of the Leontief Matrix defines a scalar reflecting 
the inter-industry linkages.
The condition number is a measure of linear independence. Most com-
monly, it is used to test for the uniqueness of a solution to a set of linear 
equations. By definition, an identity matrix, of any size, has a condition 
6 ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT… 
128
number equal to one. Any divergence from an identity matrix will cause 
the condition number to increase. In terms of regional economics, diver-
gence from the identity matrix in terms of the (I - A) matrix implies more 
purchases from indigenous industries or a greater degree of inter-industry 
linkages. Thus, the higher the condition number, the more diverse the 
economy.
Common diversification measures focus on value added of industries 
and exports and imports of products. The main shortcoming of the tradi-
tional measures is the non-consideration of inter-industry nature of eco-
nomic activities. Input-output indicators for diversification comprise 
detailed information on supply and demand. They cover intermediate 
consumption of domestic and imported products, value added by industry 
and final uses of products (consumption, investment, exports). The 
Primary Diversity Index puts special emphasis on inter-industry relations. 
In our opinion, this indicator is the best choice to evaluate the diversifica-
tion of economies (Box 6.3).
Box 6.3 Input-Output-Based Primary Diversity Index
An alternative approach to measuring diversity based on the technical 
coefficients matrix of an input-output model was developed by Wagner 
and Deller and applied to the 50 US states. Empirical results suggest that 
higher levels of diversification are associated with higher levels of stability.
Ahmed Al-Kawaz implemented this approach also for Kuwait.
The diversity measure of Wagner and Deller is a multiplicative 
combination of three components:
Relative size of an economy (SI)—Number of indigenous industries
Density of the economy (DEN)—Number of non-zero elements 
in the Leontief Matrix indicating the diversity of transactions
The condition number of the Leontief Matrix (CN)—Scalar mea-
sure of the inter-industry linkages with the economy as captured in 
the Leontief matrix
The Primary Diversity Measure (PDMi) for a country (i) is defined 
as the simple multiplicative combination of these three characteris-
tics PDMi = SIi * DENi * CNi.
The relative size of the economy is defined as Si = Ni / Nr, where 
N is the number of indigenous industries in country (i) and Nr is the 
number of indigenous industries in the reference country.
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The results of the input-output-based diversity index for Saudi Arabia 
compared to Norway are presented in Table 6.10.
We used the input-output tables of the OECD (2018) for this analysis. 
All input-output tables of the database show 34 industries. In Norway and 
Saudi Arabia, only 33 indigenous industries were reported. This is why the 
size (SI) in Table 6.13 is always reported with 1.0 for all years. The num-
ber of non-zero elements in the table of Saudi Arabia was somewhat 
smaller than in Norway. This is why the density (DEN) of Saudi Arabia is 
a bit lower. The condition number (CN) reflects inter-industry linkages: in 
all years, it is lower in Saudi Arabia than in Norway, but the difference is 
not strikingly high. Consequently, the Primary Diversity Index of Saudi 
Arabia was lower than that of Norway for all years, but the distance has 
The density of the economy is defined as DENi = non-zeroi / Ni * 
Ni, where non-zero is the number of transactions in the Leontief Matrix 
(I-A), and Ni is again the number of indigenous industries in country (i).
The third component measures the degree of inter-industry linkages. 
The condition number of the Leontief matrix defines a scalar reflecting 
the inter-industry linkages. The condition number is defined as
CNi = ║(I - A)║║(I - A)−1║ = δl (I - A) / δs (I - A) where
║(I - A)║ is the 2-norm of the (I - A) matrix,
║(I - A)−1║ is the 2-norm of the (I - A)−1 (the Leontief inverse 
matrix),
δl(I - A) is the largest singular value of the (I-A) matrix, and
δs(I  - A) is the smallest singular value of the (I  - A) matrix, 
respectively.
The Primary Diversity Index is defined as PDI = PDMi/PDMr.
i = Country i
r = Reference country r
Sources:
John E. Wagner and Steven C. Deller (1998): Measuring the Effects 
of Economic Diversity on Growth and Stability, in: Land Economics, 
Vol. 74, No. 4. pp. 541–556; Ahmed Al-Kawaz (2008): Economic 
Diversification: The Case of Kuwait with Reference to Oil Producing 
Countries, in Journal of Economic Cooperation, 29, 3, pp. 23–48.
Box 6.3 (continued)
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shrunk. In 1995, Saudi Arabia was at 91.1 per cent of the corresponding 
level of Norway, but by 2011, it had increased to 96.2 per cent. Therefore, 
by 2011, Saudi Arabia almost reached the diversity level of Norway. This 
is a considerable achievement of the Saudi development policy.
Table 6.10 Input-output diversity index





N 33 33 33 33 33




Non-zero 1090 1089 1090 1090 1090
Number of 
elements
N*N 1156 1156 1156 1156 1156
Density DEN 0.9429 0.9420 0.9429 0.9429 0.9429
Condition 
number









N 33 33 33 33 33




Non-zero 1052 1053 1066 1077 1077
Number of 
elements
N*N 1156 1156 1156 1156 1156
Density DEN 0.910 0.911 0.922 0.932 0.932
Condition 
number C









0.9110 0.8024 0.8950 0.9051 0.9616
Source: OECD Input-Output Tables
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5  sustaInable develoPment oF natIons: adjusted 
net natIonal Income and savIngs
Since a long time, the World Bank is engaged in measuring sustainable 
development of nations (World Bank 2001). Given the exhaustible nature 
of oil resources, the long-term strategy for economic sustainability of the 
oil-producing countries must be to transform the non-renewable natural 
capital into other forms of capital like machinery, buildings and human 
capital, and so increase the gross national income per capita (Beutel et al. 
2013). In the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2018), we find two prominent indicators for sustainable economic 
development:
• Adjusted net national income, which is gross national income (GNI) 
minus consumption of fixed capital and natural resources depletion.
• Adjusted net savings, which are equal to net national savings plus 
education expenditure and minus energy depletion, mineral deple-
tion, net forest depletion, and carbon dioxide and particulate emis-
sions damage.
5.1  Adjusted Net National Income
Adjusted net national income is calculated by subtracting consumption of 
fixed capital and the depletion of natural resources from gross national 
income (GNI). Consumption of fixed capital reflects the decline of man- 
made capital (buildings, machinery, transport equipment), while the 
depletion of natural resources measures the decline in non-renewable nat-
ural resources through extraction.
Gross domestic product (GDP)
+  Net income from abroad
=  Gross national income (GNI)
− Consumption of fixed capital
=  Net national income (NNI)
− Natural resources depletion
=  Adjusted net national income
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Where:
Gross domestic product at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products.
Net income from abroad includes the net labour income and net prop-
erty and entrepreneurial income components of the SNA.
Gross national income (GNI) is the sum of value added by all resident 
producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valu-
ation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of 
employees and property income) from abroad.
Consumption of fixed capital represents the replacement value of capital 
used up in the process of production.
Net national income is gross national income (GNI) less consumption 
of fixed capital.
Natural resource depletion is the ratio of the value of the stock of 
natural resources to the remaining reserve lifetime (capped at 25 years). 
It covers coal, crude oil and natural gas. The World Bank provides valu-
able information for 10 minerals, 4 energy sources and the net forest 
depletion.
Adjusted net national income is GNI minus consumption of fixed capi-
tal and natural resources depletion.
5.2  Adjusted Net Saving
Adjusted net saving is a national accounting aggregate designed to mea-
sure the net change in assets in a national balance sheet that includes natu-
ral and human capital. The gross stock of natural capital, produced capital 
and human capital is growing if the adjusted net savings of a nation are 
positive.
There is an intrinsic link between change in the wealth of a nation and 
the sustainability of a development path. If genuine (adjusted) savings are 
negative at any point in time, then welfare in the future will be less than 




Specifically, the World Bank’s definition of adjusted net savings is as 
follows:
Gross national savings





− Net forest depletion
− Carbon dioxide emissions damage
− Particulate emissions damage
= Adjusted net savings (genuine savings)
Where:
Net national savings are equal to gross national savings less the value of 
consumption of fixed capital.
Education expenditure refers to the current operating expenditures in 
education, including wages and salaries and excluding capital investments 
in buildings and equipment.
Energy depletion is the ratio of the value of the stock of energy resources 
to the remaining reserve lifetime (capped at 25 years). It covers coal, crude 
oil and natural gas.
Mineral depletion is the ratio of the value of the stock of mineral 
resources to the remaining reserve lifetime (capped at 25 years). It covers 
tin, gold, lead, zinc, iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite and phosphate.
Net forest depletion is calculated as the product of unit resource rents 
and the excess of wood harvest over natural growth.
Carbon dioxide damage is estimated to be $20 per ton of carbon (the 
unit damage in 1995  US dollars) times the number of tons of carbon 
emitted.
Particulate emissions damage is the damage due to exposure of a coun-
try’s population to ambient concentrations of particulates measuring less 
than 2.5 microns in diameter (PM2.5), ambient ozone pollution and 
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indoor concentrations of PM2.5 in households cooking with solid fuels. 
Damages are calculated as foregone labour income due to premature 
death. Estimates of health impacts from the Global Burden of Disease 
Study 2015 are for 1990, 1995, 2000.
5.3  Test for Sustainable Development
An economy is sustainable if it saves more than the depreciation on its 
man-made and natural capital. In Table  6.11, an assessment has been 
made for all GCC countries and Norway.
The highest adjusted national income per capita (78.515 $/person) 
and adjusted net national saving per capita (22.363 $/person) were 
achieved in Norway. Among GCC countries, Qatar had the highest 
adjusted national income per capita (67.443 $/person), followed by UAE 
(38.670 $/person) and Kuwait (37,781 $/person). Qatar had also the 
highest adjusted net national saving per capita (34.570 $/person) fol-
lowed by Kuwait (13.421 $/person).
Among the GCC countries, only Oman (−1.052 $/person) recorded 
negative adjusted savings, and its combined capital stock of man-made 
capital and natural capital declined in 2014. This is well in line with the 
lowest level of the adjusted net national income per capita (10,556 $/
person). The net income from abroad was negative throughout the years.
Tables 6.12–6.17 contain complete information on a country by coun-
try basis, showing the evolution of sustainable development of the six 
GCC countries for the 20 years 1995–2015.
Earlier in the text in Table 6.5, it was reported that Bahrain had in 2016 
the lowest oil dependency (13.5% of gross value added) and Kuwait 
(51.4% of gross value added) the highest oil dependency among the GCC 
countries. The test for sustainable development of Bahrain in Table 6.12 
reveals that the adjusted net national income and the adjusted net saving 
are low compared to other GCC countries. In 2014, final consumption 
expenditure is high (68.2% of GNI) and education expenditure is low 
(2.9% of GNI), both resulting in a low adjusted savings ratio (10.3% 
of GNI).
The prospects for Kuwait in Table 6.13 are brighter. Despite substantial 
allocations for the depletion of natural resources, the savings ratios 
throughout the period 2000–2014 are impressive. The positive perfor-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































consumption ratios in recent years. Due to substantial net income from 
abroad, GNI is larger than GDP throughout the whole period.
Is Oman the problem-child of the GCC at present? Oman is the only 
GCC country for which the test for sustainable development failed. The 
adjusted net savings ratio in the last row of Table 6.14 is negative through-
out the period due to heavy allocation for energy depletion and negative 
income from abroad. As a consequence, it must be expected that the com-
bined capital stock of man-made capital and natural capital declined.
The test for sustainable development of Qatar in Table  6.15 shows 
favourable results. In 2014, the share of adjusted net savings in GNI is 
41.7% despite negative income from abroad. The allocations for natural 
resources depletion are relatively modest and the share of consumption in 
GNI very low.
In Table 6.16, the test of sustainable development is applied to Saudi 
Arabia. Saudi Arabia has significant net incomes from abroad, low alloca-
tions for consumption of fixed capital, moderate allocation for natural 
resource depletion and the highest allocations for education expenditures 
of the GCC countries. Since 2005, adjusted net savings are in the range of 
20–30 per cent of GNI. This level is an achievement as it even exceeded 
the corresponding level of Norway.
Table 6.17 includes the test for sustainable development of the United 
Arab Emirates. Unfortunately, no information is available on net transfers 
and education expenditure. Therefore, no estimate on net savings and net 
adjusted savings is available. However, the information on energy deple-
tion allows assessing the adjusted net national income. The reported shares 
of energy depletion in GNI are low compared to other GCC countries.
In 2006, the World Bank published the Little Green Data Book 2006 
(World Bank 2006). In this assessment, energy depletion is equal to the 
product of unit resource rents and the physical quantities of energy 
extracted. It should be noted that a recent change in methodology in the 
new time series of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators now 
estimates energy depletion as the ratio of the value of the stock of energy 
resources to the remaining reserve lifetime (capped at 25 years), covering 
coal, crude oil and natural gas. The new results for 2005 are quite differ-
ent from the previous ones in the Little Green Data Book 2006 for the 
GCC countries. The significant revision of the methodology to estimate 
the depletion of natural resources brought about a sudden, and debatable, 
improvement in the estimate of adjusted savings for the GCC.
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6  conclusIon
This article has argued that, perhaps contrary to established opinion, the 
economic diversification of GCC countries is well underway. In many 
ways, the GCC countries are approaching the diversification levels of the 
reference country Norway. The test for sustainable development of GCC 
countries for the period 1995–2015 showed positive results for most 
years. In 2014, Qatar and Kuwait achieved high rates of adjusted net 
national saving per person; Qatar even surpassed the level of Norway. 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia realised small positive rates. Oman was the only 
GCC country for which the test yielded a negative result. During the last 
20 years (1995–2015), Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia had posi-
tive rates of adjusted net saving throughout the whole period, whereas for 
Oman the rate was only positive in 2012.
A full implementation of the input-output approach will only be pos-
sible if supply and use tables become available for all GCC countries, 
which are comparable, have the same number of products and industries 
and use the same classification of the System of National Accounts 2008—
SNA 2008 (United Nations 2009). At the moment, only selected input- 
output tables are available for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The National 
Statistical Offices of the GCC countries should be encouraged to compile 
annual supply and use tables as an integral part of their national accounts, 
which are in line with the SNA 2008.
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CHAPTER 7
Redefining Economic Sustainability 
in Resource-rich States: Comparative Lessons
Manal Shehabi
1  IntroductIon
In economic development discussions in both policy and academic milieus 
alike, the term “economic sustainability” has been repeatedly used, but its 
definition remains elusive. At times, it is implicitly defined, while at others 
it is defined in terms of economic indicators (such as gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) per capita or share of export to GDP). The way the term is 
used can have various economic foci—such as fiscal, debt, export, and 
growth sustainability. In the context of “resource-dependent econo-
mies”—defined herein as resource-rich states that depend on the exporta-
tion of natural resources such as hydrocarbons as a primary source of 
economic revenue—the issue of “economic sustainability” is also variant 
and has come to mean different things over time. Initially, economic sus-
tainability was linked to trade theory, and thought to be dependent on the 
export of natural resources, but that theory failed to achieve the promised 
growth and development in many resource-rich states—many of which 
were the world’s poorest and most troubled economies. With time, 
M. Shehabi (*) 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, UK
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“sustainability” has changed to reflect the political and economic prob-
lems in resource economies. In recent and contemporary discussions, eco-
nomic diversification has mostly become the dominant recipe for economic 
sustainability in resource-dependent economies. While diversification is 
important, adopting policies that focus solely on it fails to reflect the eco-
nomic performance of these states and the full scope of economic chal-
lenges they face. Defining economic sustainability is important to the 
extent that it affects the design and implementation of economic policy 
meant to achieve long-term growth and development.
Against this background, this chapter redefines economic sustainability 
in resource-dependent states. The definition reflects the economic chal-
lenges they face due to resource dependence with reference to economic 
growth theory and by way of a comparative assessment of successful states. 
First, the chapter summarizes the changing definition of economic sus-
tainability in this context. The chapter then redefines economic sustain-
ability as an issue that needs to be considered from two main perspectives: 
a volatility perspective and a depletion perspective. The definition then 
reverts to economic growth theory as a basis for designing sustainability-
promoting economic policies that take into account both perspectives. A 
comparative assessment follows, drawing on examples from three main 
cases: Botswana, Chile, and Kuwait (the primary case study herein).
2  the changIng understandIng of economIc 
sustaInabIlIty In resource states
In its basic form, “economic sustainability” entails continuation of the 
economy; in the context of resource-dependent states, its definition has 
substantially changed over time. In the wake of the expansion of the 
export-led growth economic theory, the dominant driver for economic 
sustainability in the 1970s (especially in poor countries) was believed to be 
economic growth achieved by specialized exportations of abundant natu-
ral resources. Support for this strategy drew from international trade theo-
ries, which proved important in explaining economic performances and 
business motives.
Export-led growth was based on the concept of comparative advantage, 
a key driver in economic trade theory. The Ricardian model articulated pat-
terns of and gains from trade in terms of comparative advantage: countries 
specialize in the activities in which they are relatively more productive. 
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The relationship between factor endowment and patterns of trade, known 
as the Heckscher–Ohlin Theorem, states that a country will have a com-
parative advantage in, and therefore export, the goods that use relatively 
intensively that country’s abundant factor (Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933). 
Hecksher–Ohlin models are driven by differences in factor intensities across 
countries, entailing that sustainability in resource-rich states would require 
exporting natural resources.
Export-led growth shaped development policies of resource states, sup-
ported by evidence of a positive relationship between exports and eco-
nomic growth (such as Michaely 1977; Bhagwati 1978; Balassa 1978; 
Krueger 1984). Yet such models had shortcomings in explaining actual 
trade trends, first noted in the US in the 1950s.1 Further, export-led 
growth theory neither predicted weak economic performance in resource-
dependent economies (like Bolivia, Nigeria, and Venezuela), nor explained 
problems they commonly faced (such as lower growth or price and 
exchange rate volatility). Thus, the validity of the export-promotion 
hypothesis was challenged (by studies like that of Jung and Marshall 
(1985)).
Achieving sustainability by exporting natural resources was further 
challenged following the exposure of surprising political, economic, and 
developmental realities in resource-dependent states by the exhaustively 
debated “resource curse” literature in the 1990s (a term coined by Auty 
(1993) similar to the “paradox of plenty” by Karl (1997)). Since the 
1970s, many of these states have underperformed resource-poor countries 
and failed to achieve expected socio- economic and political development 
commensurate with their resource wealth. A significant negative relation-
ship is shown to exist between economic growth and the intensity of 
petroleum and other mineral resources (Sachs and Warner 1995). The 
curse and various associated elements, such as state intervention, also fea-
ture as a common denominator in many political economy models of 
resource-dependent economies. This counterintuitive situation has been 
attributed to a host of factors, such as institutional quality (Sala-i-Martin 
and Subramanian 2003; Bulte et al. 2005), rent-seeking behavior (Gelb 
1988; Auty 2001; van der Ploeg 2011), weak public governance, and cor-
ruption. Yet no general consensus exists regarding its exact cause.
1 This discrepancy is pointed out by Leontief (1953) in what is known as the Leontief para-
dox. It refers to the US’s exporting labor-intensive commodities and importing capital-
intensive commodities despite being the most capital-abundant nation in the 1950s.
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Subsequent research emerged extending the neoclassical framework of 
trade patterns beyond resource endowments and examining determinants 
of comparative advantage other than the abundance of natural resources. 
Such determinants include infrastructure (such as transportation), institu-
tions, innovation, macroeconomic volatility, and human capital and edu-
cation of labor supply (Lederman and Xu 2007). Shortcomings of the 
resource curse literature have not passed unnoticed. Studies on the rela-
tionship between resources and growth (such as Delacroix 1977; Davis 
1995; Monzano and Rigobon 2001; Maloney 2002; Wright and Czelusta 
2004; Alexıv̄ and Conrad 2009) show inconclusive or no evidence on the 
resource curse and suggest its literature ignores the natural cycle associ-
ated with resource exploitation. Nevertheless, the performance of 
resource-dependent economies continued to be explained as part of the 
resource curse, so the understanding of sustainability development 
changed to entail movement away from resource dependence.
Sustaining exportation of a finite resource is linked to optimal supply, 
but theoretical predications also have limitations. The leading Hotelling 
economic theory has influenced countries’ supply. It suggests that the 
(real) resource price should rise over time at the rate of interest that affects 
producer extraction decisions (Hotelling 1931). Evidence, however, has 
been found that oil production in existing wells does not respond to price, 
unlike drilling activity and costs (Black and LaFrance 1998). Hotelling’s 
rule is also found to be neither a sufficient condition for firm-level extrac-
tion decisions nor explanatory of entire industries’ production levels by 
linear aggregation of firms’ extraction behaviors (Brazee and Cloutier 
2006). Moreover, oil exports, most notably by members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), are impacted 
by global oil market dynamics and geopolitical factors not accounted for 
by Hotelling’s rule.
In the economics literature, too, interactions of industrialization and 
economic sustainability have been explained by the “Dutch disease” 
(Corden and Neary 1982; Corden 1984; Venables and van der Ploeg 
2010). The Dutch disease attributes economic problems of resource depen-
dence to adverse effects on non-resource tradable sectors and expansion of 
non- traded service sectors which result from significant appreciation of 
nominal (and real) exchange rates (or inflation in countries with fixed 
exchange rate regimes) following resource exports (Corden 1984, 2012; 
Corden and Neary 1982; Venables and van der Ploeg 2010; Tyers 2015; 
Tyers and Walker 2016). Importantly, this “disease” is an economic reality 
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of only some sectors and occurs even in successful resource-based econo-
mies such as Norway, Canada, and Australia.
Other explanations of distortions in economic structure include poor 
interindustry linkages that lead to reliance on imported rather than domes-
tic inputs to the resource sector (Tornell and Lane 1999). Another factor 
may be immiserizing growth—the possibility that a country’s export 
growth for a product is so large relative to the world market that a decline 
in its terms of trade is caused. There is no obvious reason, however, as to 
why this phenomenon should occur more due to resource exploitation/
export than the expansion of other export industries. Nonetheless, its exis-
tence instigated calls for economic diversification.
Countries that depend largely on resources appeared “unsustainable” 
due to lack of diversification. Thus, economic sustainability has come to 
entail (and heavily advocate) diversifying the industrial base and, at times, 
a reduction of fiscal rigidities, especially given the exhaustibility of natural 
resources, especially hydrocarbons. Accordingly, many countries (such as 
oil-dependent Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states) adopted devel-
oped plans and “visions” that placed diversification at the heart of its long-
term goals.
Yet considering economic diversification as synonymous with economic 
sustainability appears inadequate and confusing at face value. First, the 
lack of diversification fails to explain the economic challenges faced by 
resource- dependent economies or the successful economic performance 
of states like Botswana, Chile, Australia, Malaysia, and Norway. Another 
example is the GCC states which, despite heavy hydrocarbon dependence, 
achieved enviable wealth, high measures of per capita income levels, and 
impressive improvements in socio-economic and human development 
indicators. Second, diversification is not well defined. Although consid-
ered undiversified, GCC states have a sizable share of non-energy sectors 
in their value added, yet they remain vulnerable to economic challenges, 
the depth of which has been exposed since the oil price collapse in 
mid-2014. Further, their export base and government revenue are domi-
nated by the energy sector (hydrocarbons, electricity, and water desalina-
tion) with relatively low levels of industrial diversification in exports, as 
Table 7.1 shows.
Undoubtedly, sustaining an economy is largely facilitated by export 
diversification, but diversification affects more than exports. Even a closed 
economy is by definition self-reliant and, therefore, quite diversified; but 
it is not necessarily sustainable. Its resources are not optimized and its 
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welfare is not maximized, rendering its performance possibly worse than if 
it were open. The point here is that “diversification” is neither a guarantee 
for sustainability nor assurance for solving problems arising from resource 
dependency, but meaningful diversification is necessary nonetheless.
A continuously changing understanding of “economic sustainability” is 
problematic to the extent that it impacts economic policies (locally and 
those promoted by international organizations, such as the IMF). It 
threatens the durability and consistency of policy implementation and of 
development plans intended to manage the resource sector and to achieve 
long-term economic growth. This problem demands adapting the way 
economic sustainability is defined and, accordingly, introducing new poli-
cies that are consistent over time. This is the focus of the next section.
Table 7.1 GCC energy sectors, 2014
Country Share of energy sectors (%)
In value added In exports In government revenue
Bahraina 40 69 83
Kuwaitb 61 91 91
Omanc 54 84 79
Qatard 32 85 90
Saudi Arabiae 50 80 88
UAEf 45 78 60
Notes: Unless otherwise stated, the share in government revenue was based on data reported by the gov-
ernment and may exclude income from oil and gas investments (which were captured in non-energy 
industries); thus, it may be understated. For United Nations value-added data (2018), sectoral data on the 
share of non-energy in value added were not available in the national accounts, so UN data for mining, 
manufacturing (including refining), and utilities were used as proxies. Therefore, these figures may be 
overestimated. For Qatar, government revenue includes income from oil and gas investments. Sources are 
listed below. For UAE, the share of energy exports is for 2016
aFor Bahrain: National accounts and budget from Bahrain Open Portal Data (2018); government budget 
form Bahrain Ministry of Finance (2018); United Nations value added data (2018)
bFor Kuwait: National accounts from Kuwaiti Central Statistical Bureau (2018); government budget form 
Kuwait Ministry of Finance (2018)
cFor Oman: National accounts from Oman National Centre for Statistics and Information (2018); gov-
ernment budget from Oman Ministry of Finance (2015); United Nations value added data (2018)
dFor Qatar: National accounts from Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (2018), Staff 
Concluding Statement for the 2018 Article IV Mission (2018); International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Qatar Country Report (2013)
eFor Saudi Arabia: National accounts from Saudi General Authority for Statistics (2018); government 
budget from Saudi Arabia Ministry of Finance (2018)
fFor UAE: United Nations value added data (2018); UAE Annual Economic Report (2016, 2017)
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3  redefInIng economIc sustaInabIlIty
3.1  Why a Redefinition Is Required
Ensuring economic sustainability is a common goal in economic develop-
ment plans of resource-dependent states. In the wake of inadequacies of 
existing theories in predicting or solving economic challenges common 
among them, how economic sustainability is understood needs to be 
adapted to form the basis of successful economic policy.
Economic sustainability is a complex concept with various elements. Of 
course, comparative advantage remains a key driver of economic special-
ization and trade. Beyond that, economic performance is affected by pub-
lic debt, public investment, economies of scale, technology, transportation 
costs, and noncompetitive industrial structures. Economic outcomes are 
shaped by public policy, not only in infrastructure, public investments, 
industrial policy, and trade policy, but also in taxation, distribution of 
resource rents among the population, employment, and education. 
Further, in practice, sustainability assessments and subsequent policy 
design have tended to be discipline-driven. If economic rigor is divorced 
from political and/or social analyses, policy becomes myopic and 
counterintuitive.
While economic diversification is necessary for continuity of the econ-
omy, it is insufficient. Setting it as the main sustainability-promoting pol-
icy has inadequacies, for the following reasons.
First, diversification is at odds with the theory of comparative advan-
tage. Second, as previously explained, the term is not well defined. 
Diversification can be pursued in either export, budget, or value-added 
each of which has separate implications on policy and sustainability. 
Although most definitions imply export diversification, a closed economy 
is, by definition, diversified.
Third, successful diversification is constrained by various factors: eco-
nomic development (resource availability, capital limitations, or economic 
structure), political development (conflict, government structure, political 
economy, and oligarchs), or social development (population, health, edu-
cation levels, and constituencies’ requirements). Shehabi (2019) shows 
that the GCC economies’ unique structural constraints and economic dis-
tortions, and not the Dutch disease, are the primary reasons for limited 
diversification of export and government revenues.
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Fourth, as mentioned, the lack of diversification has in the past allowed 
the realization of economic advantages, at least for the GCC states. It was 
not until the collapse of the oil price in mid-2014 that the depth of their 
fiscal and economic challenges was revealed, instigating reforms. 
Development plans including reforms in energy, rent distribution, indus-
trial or private sector development, and labor are intertwined but can also 
be contradictory and present trade-offs. Some states even adopted reforms 
in energy subsidies, human capital development, and resource windfall 
management; but implementation has been weak and resource sectors 
continue to dominate the economy.
Fifth, diversification is required not only due to resource depletion, but 
also due to the lack of sustainability of exports during the life of the 
resource. Export capacity depends on a petrostate’s proven reserves, pro-
duction capacity, local energy needs, and on world demand for conven-
tional energy sources. Local consumption is key in determining a petrostate’s 
ability to sustain its petroleum exports. Many states have had to shift pro-
duction to satisfy local demand, ultimately becoming net-importers for a 
number of years; these include Syria in 2008, Indonesia in 2003, and Egypt 
in 2012. Others, like Oman and Brunei Darussalam, grapple with export 
diversification plans as their proven petroleum reserves are expected to run 
out in 15 and 22 years, respectively. In addition, world demand for and the 
affordability of conventional sources are threatened by technological 
advancements and investments in shale oil and gas from one side, and 
renewable energy from the other. The role of the energy sector in climate 
change has also led to pressures to reduce consumption of fossil fuels and 
expand reliance on renewables. These factors have contributed not only to 
the collapse of oil prices in mid-2014, but also to expectations that low oil 
prices would persist despite minor recovery. Collectively, these factors 
increase uncertainty in oil prices and challenge OPEC’s historical ability to 
manipulate prices through controlling supplies.
The role of technology is not to be underestimated; a case in point is 
the sharp decline of the share of Chile’s once- dominant copper industry 
from the third highest in the world to 4% of the world’s production in 
1911 following a failure to keep up with the technological advances of 
American companies (Collier and Sater 1996: 139).
The sustainability of the revenue of natural resource exports is only a 
part of the economic sustainability equation. Export sustainability is also 
affected by exchange rates and constraints on production and pricing deci-
sions in light of domestic demand requirements and export quotas.
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Moreover, resource-dependent economies, both rich and poor, face 
unique yet common policy challenges, chief among them being the vol-
atility of commodity prices. This volatility harms economic performance 
and output growth in both petrostates and petroleum-importing coun-
tries (Ramey and Ramey 1995; van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009). It 
exposes economies to boom–bust cycles, hampering economic perfor-
mance and output. These cycles are often accompanied by pro-cyclical 
(rather than countercyclical) fiscal policy, where governmental expendi-
tures greatly expand during booms and contract during busts. Such 
tendencies are often further exacerbated by domestic macroeconomic 
and political instability (Frankel 2011). van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 
(2009) find that there is a direct effect of resource dependence on 
growth which is positive, but is often dominated by a negative and indi-
rect volatility effect. Periods of oversupply in the world market that 
reduce petroleum prices and export revenues expose structural defects 
in state services, as in Nigeria and Venezuela in 1983 and in Russia in 
1998.2 More recently, since mid-2014, a 71% price collapse has caused 
severe fiscal deficits and real declines in exports, government revenues, 
and GDP for petrostates. Russia, for example, has suffered a redirection 
of financial flows and exchange rates instability,3 while members of the 
GCC have faced unprecedented deficits, despite a history of significant 
fiscal surpluses.
Moreover, the problems faced by resource-rich states are often exacer-
bated by the political economy of resources and of rent distribution. 
Although heterogeneous, the experiences of many resource-rich states 
indicate the widespread use of politically motivated reactionary policies in 
response to resource price volatility, including price controls, producer 
subsidies, nationalization, restrictions on foreign participation, and stock-
piles. These policies are focused on short-term consequences, rather than 
on the source of the volatility, and do not reduce the exposure of econo-
mies to commodity volatility. Resource dependence is often accompanied 
by overconsumption during or after booms, and buoyed by policies favor-
ing short-term windfall over long-term benefit.
2 In the case of OPEC, while any one country in the cartel can expand supply and raise its 
revenue, this is not possible for the group as a whole if the initial production level is jointly 
profit-maximizing.
3 This situation has been exacerbated by the international sanctions over the Ukrainian crisis.
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Therefore, resource-dependent states face considerable pressures in 
implementing efficient fiscal policy solutions that reduce cyclicality by har-
nessing oil rent windfalls during revenue booms to cushion downturns 
during busts, while simultaneously ensuring efficient allocation of 
resources and diversification of the revenue base to achieve long-term sus-
tainable growth, development, and employment objectives. Stabilizing 
resource income and securing non- exhaustible sources of revenue are also 
important policy objectives. Striking variations in petrostates’ economic 
and political statuses point to the conclusion that economic performance 
depends upon both preexisting heterogeneous conditions and the quality 
of policy regimes. For these reasons, redefining economic sustainability 
considering said challenges is crucial.
3.2  A Redefinition: Back to Basics
This section redefines economic sustainability by offering a broader defini-
tion launching from the linguistic meaning of “sustainability,” both dur-
ing resource dependence and after the depletion of resource export 
revenue, and anchored in economic growth theory.
The premise for the redefinition is the following. Sustainability entails 
continuity of economic activity to achieve continuous growth and devel-
opment. While revenue from an exhaustible resource is, by definition, 
unsustainable, a resource industry no matter its size is only one part of an 
economy. Therefore, the continuity of an economy ought to be ensured 
and evaluated before the exhaustion of the resource as well as after it. A 
resource-rich economy with proven reserves lasting for a given number of 
decades has a “permanent” source of income for that period, which can be 
sufficient to ensure growth and development for that time. Yet the actual 
outcome depends on the way export windfalls are used and the economy 
is managed. As such, economic sustainability can be achieved by continu-
ing to exploit an economy’s comparative advantage, but strategically in a 
manner that extends the length of the resource revenue as well as better 
manages the resource windfall. At the same time, resource revenue is, by 
definition, volatile, so managing it requires reducing macroeconomic vol-
atility. In light of resource exhaustibility, sustainability necessitates secur-
ing alternative sources of revenue generation in the long run. Both of 




As such, it is argued herein that economic specialization based on com-
parative advantage is not contradictory to sustainability or economic 
diversification, and that both concepts are relevant to, but insufficient for 
economic sustainability in resource-dependent states. Dependence on 
resources in and of itself is not unsustainable. Instead, the policies adopted 
to manage this dependence and the ability to maintain income generation 
from it are what determine the extent to which such resource dependence 
is sustainable. Economic sustainability must be achieved by managing 
resource supply, export windfalls, and price volatility, as well as by develop-
ing the resource sector and value-adding non-resource industries.
Therefore, I posit that sustainability in a resource-based economy is an 
issue that has two perspectives: managing the volatility of resource-driven 
revenue and managing the depletion of the resource and/or its export 
revenue after the commodity export revenue has been exhausted. 
Importantly, both perspectives are relevant in the short and long terms, 
but in the short term the volatility perspective is more relevant while in the 
long term, depletion is more prominent and can be offset with the accu-
mulation of other assets.
Accordingly, this chapter proposes to consider economic sustainability 
by designing economic policies that address drivers of economic growth 
taking into account both the volatility and the depletion perspectives. 
Indeed, economic sustainability does not strictly entail economic growth. 
Moreover, the latter in reality is neither simple nor basic. Yet focusing on 
the drivers of economic growth offers the distinct advantage of evaluating 
an economy continuously over time rather than during the resource 
dependence episode or after it only. What follows reverts to the literature 
on economic growth in an elementary growth model, and then adapts it 
to reflect resource-export dependence.
3.2.1  Growth in Theory4
An elementary explanation of growth in resource-dependent states is 
grounded in the traditional neoclassical growth theory emphasizing grad-
ual, steady growth during which the economic structure remains stable. In 
the context of the vintage neoclassical growth theory of Solow (1956, 
1957), as well as Swan (1956) (and subsequent models), the emphasis is 
on gradual, steady growth, during which the structure of the economy 
remains stable.
4 Add reference to annex
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In modified versions of the Solow (1956, 1957) model that include 
human capital,5 the disparity of income between countries is more effec-
tively captured. The steady growth that manifests with physical and human 
capital depreciation and population pressure is offset by new investments 
in physical and human capital, as well as by human capital through educa-
tion and health, technological growth, and productivity. In this steady 
state, the respective economy progresses at a long-term, underlying rate of 
innovation. Newer growth models incorporate a more realistic assumption 
of economy- wide, increasing returns to scale and endogenous technologi-
cal changes at a steady rate.6 When the economy is shocked (by an event 
such as a war or a decline in resource price), the concavity of production 
in physical and human capital ensures that investment exceeds the effects 
of depreciation and population growth during the transition to a new 
steady state. This transitional growth performance can be considerably 
improved if higher savings rates can be mobilized.
In a resource-dependent economy, the production factors which drive 
economic growth are summarized as physical capital, human capital, natu-
ral resource, land and environment, and the residual institutions and tech-
nology. For illustration purposes and to account for the exhaustibility of 
both natural resources and land and environment, these factors will be 
treated as constant, thus having no impact on the growth rate. Accordingly, 
to demonstrate the Solow (1956, 1957) growth model, this section refer-
ences an augmented, simplified version to account for both physical capital 
and human capital, collectively, as capital (K), given that both types of 
capital accumulate in a similar manner. The model simulates the shock of 
the advent of war and recovery postwar, as in the case of Kuwait. The 
Elementary model is described in Appendix 1. In it, the population growth 
rate (n) matches the labor force and employment growth rates. Knowledge 
(being labor-augmenting technology; θ) grows at a constant exogenous 
rate. The economy grows at a steady state, in terms of per effective 
worker ke.
To simulate the war, a shock is first represented by a large destruction 
in capital and a significant reduction in population. Initially, output will 
fall, and the remaining capital falls short of the steady-state level, leaving 
investment at a level above its capital break-even point, causing growth to 
5 For further reading, see Mankiw et al. (1992).
6 For additional reading, see Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1993), 
Lucas (1988), and Romer (1986, 1990).
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increase in the period following the war. This effect is enlarged if the sav-
ing rate also rises. The surplus of new investment is then over the break-
even point and larger with an even faster recovery.
As the capital per worker rises temporarily, the productivity of capital 
increases, inducing a temporarily higher growth rate in the reconstruction 
(post-shock) phase. Diminished returns eventually return and the growth 
approaches the long- term path of growth. Additional accumulation of 
capital during this phase would shift the production possibility frontier 
curve, reaching a higher level of growth. Similarly, efficiency gains (repre-
sented normally as a movement along the production possibility or fron-
tier curve) or higher savings produce new investment surplus over the 
break-even point, speeding up the recovery.
Upon the end of the shock and at the commencement of recovery 
efforts, the capital-to-labor ratio converges to pre- shock levels and GDP 
grows at diminishing rates that were larger than pre-shock levels to even-
tually converge with pre- shock growth levels, as in Fig. 7.1. The steady 
state postwar ( ke1) exceeds that prewar (ke0 ).
3.2.2  An Elementary Numerical Simulation
Notwithstanding shortcomings of the theoretical model, this section dem-
onstrates the impact of sustainability- promoting policies on Kuwait’s eco-
nomic growth postwar through an elementary numerical simulation 





Fig. 7.1 Rapid GDP growth rate at the start of the recovery. (Source: Author’s 
analysis)
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following from the aforementioned theory.7 The simulation examines 
policies that favor capital accumulation (through sovereign wealth fund 
(SWF) assets), savings and investments, human capital, and technological 
advancement.
Postwar, Kuwait’s economy grew at unmatched speed, owing largely to 
SWF investment that funded reconstruction. Although a large part of this 
growth was temporary (reflecting a reconstruction boom), a period of 
extraordinary growth was driven also by a surge in investment, growth in 
technology (including that employed in the rebuilding of the oil indus-
try), and an inflow of labor (human capital), mostly of expatriates. A large 
part of the human capital was maintained and postwar reform focused on 
increasing the skill set of domestic labor.8
To simulate postwar recovery, the capital-to-labor ratio is first shocked. 
The savings rate is positively shocked to account for faster capital accumu-
lation and further investment in human capital postwar. The rate of tech-
nical growth is also positively shocked to simulate the acquisition of 
knowledge and technical assistance from abroad.
Results show that the rate of output growth (dY/Y in Fig. 7.2) was 
larger than that of capital accumulation. They also reflect the expectation 
of capital and output growth rate exceeding prewar levels and growing at 
substantial, yet diminishing, rates and reaching a new higher level of 
steady-state growth, as Fig. 7.2 shows.
Although the simulation is elementary, its results mirror actual results 
of the Kuwaiti GDP recovery path postwar. This confirms that Kuwait’s 
postwar growth is partially due to a reconstruction boom, but also par-
tially due to the recovery of capital, human capital, savings, and techno-
logical advancement.
3.2.3  Natural Resources and Technology
While excluding natural resources is common practice in standard growth 
models (as in the previous example), examining economic growth in the 
7 The rates at which physical and human capital accumulate and depreciate are assumed to 
be equal for purposes of this illustration. Although not entirely realistic, this assumption is 
rationalized based upon the low elasticity of Kuwait’s output with respect to human capital 
(0.10), based on 2004 data within the GTAP VIII database for Kuwait.
8 Additionally, postwar growth in income per capita occurred due to an initially low popu-
lation because Kuwait had lost close to 40% of its prewar residents. This growth slowed as the 




presence of depleted natural resources is consistent with the goals of 
achieving economic sustainability. As mentioned earlier, economic sustain-
ability entails extending the usable length of the natural resource, which 
requires ensuring appropriate extraction rates. For demonstration, a sim-
ple example is presented, setting the natural resource as the only input of 
production, and the available resource that can be extracted is a portion of 
the total available resource value. The mathematical representation to 
solve this elementary example is expressed in Appendix 1.
If the state of technology is constant over time, the output will eventu-
ally become nil when no more of the resource can be extracted. 
Nevertheless, if the level of technology is allowed to change over time, it 
counteracts the exhaustibility of the resource. Relaxing the assumption of 
constant technology, technology is now growing at a constant exogenous 
rate (g). This set-up enables addressing the question of sustainability: what 
is the trade-off between producing output today and leaving the resource 
in the ground for future production?
Fig. 7.2 Simulated Kuwait recovery reaching a new steady state due to shocks in 
capital-to-labor ratio, savings rates, and productivity. (The impact of the war on 
Kuwait was simulated through the following shocks: (a) an 80% destruction in 
physical capital and (b) a 45% reduction in population. Postwar recovery simula-
tion included a 30% increase in savings rates, reflecting increased investment in 
human capital and a doubling of productivity. Output elasticities of capital and 
labor were calibrated to equal the following values in the GTAP VIII database 
entry for Kuwait in 2004: 0.75 for capital (being the sum of elasticities of capital 
and skilled labor of 0.68 and 0.07, respectively. Source: Author’s simulations)
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Assuming the resource is extracted at a constant exogenous rate (ε), the 
quantity of the remaining resource will decline exponentially over time. 
Solving the equation yields an extraction rate that is consistent with steady-
state levels and a zero growth rate of output, which is g = ε∗.
It is clear that there is a positive relationship between the rate of extrac-
tion and output: a lower extraction rate would lead to a lower level of 
output. A higher extraction rate, on the other hand, would lead to a lower 
growth rate of output, which could even become negative at very high 
levels of extraction. Setting this value at zero yields an extraction rate that 
is consistent with steady-state levels and a zero growth rate of output in ε∗, 
which thus represents the sustainable level of output. Therefore, the levels 
of output in economy can be determined by examining the extraction rate 
chosen in relations to ε∗. If it exceeds ε∗, then the initial level of output will 
exceed the sustainable level, but will decrease overtime, as Fig. 7.3 shows.
Importantly, including the remaining factors of production would 
complicate the algebraic representation but yield the same general 
conclusion.
3.3  The Takeaway
The theoretical model shows that higher economic growth than that 
recorded in the previous period (reaching a new steady state) can be 
achieved by increased savings, increased capital per effective worker, 
Fig. 7.3 Relationship between resource use and growth
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improvements in labor productivity, and improvements in labor-augment-
ing technology to increase economic efficiency. This technology captures 
the residual of policies that impact economic growth, including but not 
limited to noneconomic factors—such as institutional quality, legal envi-
ronments, cultural standards, industrial regulation, and the political econ-
omy. Achieving sustainability requires designing policies that address 
drivers of economic growth while balancing both the volatility and the 
depletion perspectives, in the short and long runs. This balance is key and 
difficult as the different terms can have competing interests and trade-offs.
As the theory confirms, there is an intuitive trade-off between produc-
ing output today and leaving the resource in the ground for future pro-
duction, a trade-off that in reality is known and present in the minds of 
many policymakers, international aid institutions, and citizens of resource-
rich states. This is difficult because competition over rent distribution 
favors faster production, which contributes to larger short-term growth 
but faster depletion. Yet the model highlights the role of technological 
progress and its impact on the sustainability of the resource that is already 
available. Advancements in technology can contribute to efficient extrac-
tion as well as extending the length of the available resource and its export 
revenue.
Another critical factor at the heart of this balancing act is the trade-off 
between local consumption and exports of a given supply. This is a serious 
challenge particularly for countries that depend on resources as an impor-
tant input in production (such as oil being an input in manufacturing or 
transportation) as well as final demand. In resource-dependent states, the 
political economy of resources has historically resulted in large govern-
ment expenditure and financial commitments to fund generous resource 
rent distribution and guaranteed public employment, which, in turn, have 
translated into excessive consumption and severe fiscal pressures. The bal-
ance between monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policy is critical in mod-
erating commodity-sourced volatility and in mitigating Dutch disease 
effects, which is necessary for long-term diversification and sustainability. 
Technological and efficiency advancement as well as policy reform (at the 
fiscal, institutional, social, legal, and even cultural levels) are key in mod-
erating domestic consumption and extending the levels of output available 
for exportation. Striking a balance requires transparent use of resource 
rents in the short run, and the design and implementation of welfare-
improving, productive long-term development. This development can be 
achieved through policies that focus on (a) human capital development, 
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which boosts value added and productivity and can build future industries 
and knowledge economies; (b) physical capital, which can contribute to 
industrialization and domestic infrastructure; (c) savings, which can pro-
vide new accumulation of assets for the future; and (d) technological 
advancements, which can contribute to the emergence of new industries 
and increase efficiencies (like renewable energies, tradable services, and 
knowledge economies).
4  lessons and comparatIve assessments
For resource-dependent states, navigating resource price volatility 
demands the best from their economic wealth management and economic 
policies. Although growth performance of many resource-dependent 
economies has been poor, a small group of economies have done well, 
such as Norway, Australia, Botswana, Malaysia, Chile, and the Gulf states. 
This section highlights comparative successful policy lessons drawing on 
successful experiences of developing states:
• Chile and Botswana, both states with exemplary performances that 
avoided the so-called curse
• Kuwait, an example of a GCC state with an enviable economic 
performance
The subsequent discussion highlights how policies focused on drivers 
of economic growth and also enabled said states to manage challenges 
associated with dependence on an inherently volatile and nonrenewable 
resource, and move toward sustainability.
4.1  Fiscal Rigor and Savings for Capital Accumulation
Growth-enhancing policies that consider both perspectives entail manag-
ing resource windfalls and accumulating savings and investments for the 
future; SWFs are a means of achieving these two objectives. SWFs are 
government-owned investment funds commonly established during peri-
ods of government surplus.9 They are typically created to serve as stabiliza-
tion funds, savings funds, pension reserve funds, or reserve investment 
corporations. In resource-rich states, they are established to reduce the 
9 For further reading, see Collier et al. (2010) and van der Ploeg and Venables (2012).
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impact of volatile petroleum windfall on exchange rates. SWFs also offer a 
mechanism to reinforce fiscal discipline through rules mandating recur-
rent contributions to the funds and withdrawal limitations from them. 
They also offer a mechanism to diversify government portfolios and add 
new dimensions to foreign assets management. Unlike reserves, SWFs 
buffer the real exchange rate from terms of trade shocks with fixed 
exchange rate regimes and in relatively closed economies, with varying 
results. An IMF study concludes that there is no evidence that fiscal rules 
have had an effect on fiscal outcomes (Ossowski et al. 2008). Yet among 
resource economies, the successful cases of Kuwait, Norway, Chile, and 
Botswana have all had successful SWF experiences.
SWFs are key in achieving sustainability in resource-rich states because 
they (a) impose fiscal rigor and revenue management; (b) offer savings 
that can be used in fund development as well as non-resource industries; 
and (c) save a portion of the resource income in an asset that can be used 
in the future after the natural resource is exhausted to produce non-
resource goods. These factors are drivers of growth in the short, medium, 
and long terms.
Chile’s fiscal constitutions for its copper-based stabilization SWF have 
been largely successful (Frankel 2011). Chile has had an overall successful 
experience of resource dependence—unlike its troubled fellow Latin 
American country Venezuela—which is caused by successful management 
of resource windfall. Figure  7.4 shows various SWF accumulations of 
Latin American countries, with Chile being the leader of the pack.
Botswana, a great success story, has delinked the government from cur-
rent resource revenues, so that revenues that do not meet government 
spending and investment criteria are invested abroad through Botswana’s 
SWF (IMF 2012).
The role of SWFs is clear in Kuwait’s case, which diverts petroleum 
revenue to external assets invested in its SWF, managed by the Kuwait 
Investment Authority (KIA). Established in 1953 (eight years prior to 
independence), the KIA is the oldest country-owned fund in the world.10 
The KIA managed a fiscal stabilization fund (General Reserves Fund 
(GRF)) and a savings fund (the Future Generations Fund (FGF)).
Uses of KIA funds can address both the volatility and the depletion 
perspectives of sustainability, as follows. Either budget surpluses are 
10 Predated only by two state-owned funds within the US state of Texas, which were estab-
lished in 1854 and 1876. It was nearly 20 years before other countries established SWFs.
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invested in the GRF or funds are withdrawn from it to smooth out short-
term governmental expenditures during deficits, thus shielding the econ-
omy from the negative impacts of petroleum price volatility. As for the 
FGF, Kuwaiti law requires that a minimum of 10% (increased by an addi-
tional 15% in 2012 and reverted in 2014) of the annual general revenues 
allocated to this fund are employed by the Ministry of Finance for various 
investments, with the associated returns and profits also allocated to the 
same fund. KIA savings created large foreign asset portfolios that acted as 
an insurance policy to finance capital accumulation and fiscal commit-
ments during low oil price periods. The funds are a primary source of 
Kuwait’s fiscal stabilization. Its funds were invested in ways that diversified 
revenue sources away from petroleum, hedged oil income risks, and earned 
interest. In an economy-wide analysis, Shehabi (2017) confirms that rev-
enue inflow from the KIA is a key adjustment mechanism that partially 
absorbs negative impacts of oil price shocks.
The indispensable role of the KIA in Kuwait’s postwar recovery follow-
ing the Iraqi invasion in 1990–1991 demonstrates the successful role of 



























Fig. 7.4 SWF accumulations in select Latin American economies. (Source: 
Aizenman and Riera-Crichton (2014))
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SWFs. The war caused massive destruction of Kuwait’s petroleum assets 
and industry. Funds accumulated in KIA from prewar fiscal surpluses and 
SWF contributions (estimated at $25–$50 billion in 198911) funded post-
war reconstruction (from extinguishing oil-well fires to rehabilitating the 
petroleum industry). The ensuing petroleum production and exportation 
allowed the resumption of capital savings.
Despite its advantages, Kuwait’s SWF accumulations are juxtaposed 
against substantial government expenditures and fiscal commitments. One 
shortcoming is that Kuwait’s petroleum windfall has been invested abroad 
rather than domestically where it could expand industrial capacity12 
(Shehabi 2019).
The main lesson here pertains to the role of fiscal policy and savings of 
nonrenewable-resource rents in managing volatile petroleum windfall rev-
enue, shaping economic performance, and providing savings for capital 
accumulation and development. Such savings can be used for expanding 
non-energy industries and their exports, and local infrastructure, as well as 
developing human capital and capabilities for acquiring new comparative 
advantages.
4.2  Human Capital
Investments in human capital are key to successful economic growth. Not 
only do they improve the performance of resource-dependent economies, 
but they are also essential for growing the non-resource sector necessary 
for diversification efforts and managing the depletion perspective. Many 
of the countries that have experienced the resource curse have missed this 
opportunity. Meanwhile, countries like Japan and Germany after the 
Second World War were able to recover despite complete destruction of 
their economies in part due to the preservation of prewar human capital 
and the subsequent investments in it.
The role of guest workers in economic development is a key unique 
feature of the GCC economies. Drawing one example from Kuwait, guest 
workers represent an important part of these economies’ human capital 
11 Due to legal requirements preventing the disclosure of the funds’ details, this range is 
estimated by calculating annual contributions and an estimated low-range return to capital of 
2%. A study by the Arab Planning Institute in 1992 estimated that Kuwait spent approxi-
mately $40–$50 billion of its foreign investment portfolio on reconstruction.
12 This is true even during low oil prices when non-energy sectors can theoretically expand 
(through reverse Dutch disease).
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and are drivers of economic growth and development. A major feature of 
Kuwait’s petroleum economy has been the accompanying spike in popula-
tion and human capital as expatriates moved to Kuwait on a temporary 
basis (without a path for naturalization or permanent residency) to fill 
shortages in some unskilled and mostly skilled human capital given 
Kuwait’s relatively high levels of illiteracy and small population size during 
the 1970s.13 The ability to secure human capital from expatriate labor was 
also key to achieving postwar reconstruction, as explained earlier 
(Shehabi 2018a).
Notwithstanding the challenges surrounding dependence on foreign 
labor, the structure of their labor contracts had an unintended positive 
outcome on the economy. Expatriate laborers work temporarily in the 
GCC, with their stay linked to employer-sponsorship programs through 
the kafala system, and they have flexible labor contracts, often with lower 
wages than their national counterparts. In model-driven simulations, the 
expatriate labor exit offers another key stabilization mechanism of the 
Kuwaiti economy in the face of the volatility of petroleum revenue 
(Shehabi 2017). The dynamics of the labor market entails different impacts 
of this contractionary shock on the two labor segments. Typically, as the 
real wages of expatriate workers are assumed to be sticky (in both the 
short and long runs), employment levels adjust instead. Since most 
Kuwaitis are employed by the public sector, where contracts are rigid, 
their employment is unaffected, while their real wages change slightly. By 
contrast, the flexibility of expatriate labor contracts allows affected indus-
tries to adjust their employment levels, causing similar declines in the 
employment levels of skilled and unskilled expatriates. The flow of guest 
workers exponentially increased during oil booms, and decreased during 
busts. Thus, an example of successful policy includes model-driven policy 
solutions that focus on the management of labor contracts for expatriate 
labor (Shehabi 2017). While expatriate labor exit acts as a cushion absorb-
ing oil price shocks, there is a distinct trade-off between efficiency gains 
from expatriate labor and the goals of Kuwaitization of the labor force 
13 The surge in liquidity in the 1970s (owing to booming oil revenues following the 1973 
embargo and the nationalization of the petroleum industry) could only be initially accom-
modated by investments in land, construction, and real estate projects, which required 
importing a significant number of workers, especially as many Kuwaiti males were not inter-
ested in construction-type jobs.
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(Shehabi 2018b). Managing this will be important in ensuring future eco-
nomic sustainability.
Human capital is very important in the sustainability of resource-rich 
economies because they can contribute to acquiring new comparative 
advantages. They can create new industries, products, and services. Human 
capital is also the seed for growth-enhancing innovation and 
competition.
4.3  Technology, Institutions, and Taxes
Technology is undoubtedly a transformative engine and a contributor to 
growth. In its most traditional definition, technological advancement 
enhances productivity and efficiency and improves economic performance. 
In growth theory, as mentioned in the Sect. 3.2.3, technology captures 
the residual of policies that impact economic growth, including but not 
limited to noneconomic factors such as institutional quality, legal environ-
ments, cultural standards, industrial regulation, and the political economy.
Technology can play an unequivocal role in extending resource export 
revenue, transform resource industries, and even reverse the threat of 
depletion and overcome volatility. To demonstrate, the challenges of 
diminished oil export revenue with climate change mitigation can be alle-
viated if new technologies enable oil exporters to continue to export 
energy that is green and adaptive to changing demand trends in the oil 
market. Such technologies include investments in energy efficiency, car-
bon capture and storage, and hydrogen. This is an opportunity for oil 
exporters given their existing comparative advantage and specialization 
in energy.
Undoubtedly, institutions (part of the overall “technology” driver of 
growth) are important to securing sustainable long-term economic 
growth. Botswana offers a success story in striking institutional quality 
that is favorable to growth. It has not only achieved democratic progress 
with transparency in rent distribution, but has also affected the develop-
ment of the resource sector. Instead of the commonly used auctions, 
Botswana negotiated rights to diamond extraction with the single domi-
nant market player De Beers (Venables 2016; Besada and O’Bright 2018). 
In doing so, Botswana was able to avoid the lack of competitiveness and 
transparency, as well as a limited state’s share of revenue that would have 
resulted from awarding the auction to a single market player. The country 
was also successful in attracting foreign direct investment, thus achieving 
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economic diversification while also promoting linkages (Besada and 
O’Bright 2018). Further, Botswana’s institutional quality is recognized by 
Mehlum et al. (2006), who find negative (and larger) effects of resource-
richness on growth only for economies with poor institutional quality, 
with the break-even point being around the institutional quality of 
Botswana.
Taxation is another crucial factor. Norway, Australia, and Canada—
resource-dependent states that are considered successful—have sophisti-
cated tax systems (personal, corporate, indirect, and international taxes). 
These taxes offer a source of government revenue that serves three pur-
poses: increasing the size of non-energy contribution to government rev-
enue; offering additional sources of revenue that can be used to fund 
current or capital expenditures and public infrastructure; and reducing the 
need to withdraw from SWF assets during times of fiscal pressures. 
Taxation and low subsidies are necessary for economic sustainability—
although difficult to achieve from a political economy perspective in many 
resource-dependent states.
4.4  Industrial Reform and Regulation of Oligopolies
While regulation is a part of institutions and, therefore, of the larger “tech-
nology” growth driver, regulation of oligopolies merits its own distinct 
discussion. This is due to its unequivocal role in ensuring competition, 
efficiency, long- term creative destruction, and economic growth. In assess-
ing efficiency and economic policy, the role of oligopolies is critical. 
Oligopolies exist in almost all countries, including the most advanced 
ones. Some industries, such as utilities and communications, are also natu-
rally oligopolistic because they require very large fixed costs to be estab-
lished and require large scales to run them. In small resource-dependent 
economies, it is not surprising that the high levels of minimum efficient 
scale delivered by modern technology and the smallness of these econo-
mies should lead to the emergence of oligopolies or monopolized indus-
tries, particularly in protected services.
Nevertheless, these oligopolies can play a detrimental role in economic 
sustainability. It has been accepted in economic theory that competition 
induces innovation and, therefore, economic growth through the process 
of “creative destruction”. This process, coined by Schumpeter, entails an 
ongoing process in which innovation is induced by competitive forces and 
destroys rents conferred in the short term by former innovation, 
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maintaining efficiency (Schumpeter 1942: 82–83). Oligopolies limit inno-
vation-inducing competition. They sustain high markups, which are pure 
profits above the average cost, thus distorting economic efficiency. 
Oligopolies also collude on prices or quantities, further distorting mar-
kets. In resource-rich states, oligopolies are pervasive to varying degrees 
and contribute directly to limiting competition and, consequently, sustain-
able economic development and growth. A large number of resource-rich 
states have state-owned resource industries and large public sectors that 
control industries which are commonly monopolies or oligopolies. They 
cause a big loss in economic efficiency. In an economy-wide assessment, 
Tyers (2015) suggests that the full exploitation of oligopoly market power 
in Australia would cause a reduction of real GDP by as much as a third in 
the long run.
Subsidizing consumption widens the gap between actual prices paid at 
the market and prices set by producers, thus increasing the profits earned 
by oligopolistic industries. Moreover, oligopolies tend to be owned by the 
business elite who tend to influence or depend on the government (or the 
ruling class), as is evident in the case of the GCC states. Through these 
dynamics, oligopolies can interfere with market dynamics and economic 
policy through their power in the market and/or the policymaking pro-
cess, advancing their own interests at the expense of economic growth and 
development.
To limit the role of oligopolies and enhance competition, the govern-
ment can use regulation to ensure that oligopolies do not collude or set 
their prices above the average price of production. Competition policy 
refers “to government policy to preserve or promote competition among 
market players and to promote other government policies and processes 
that enable a competitive environment to develop” (UNCTAD 2009: 3). 
Various instruments can be used to implement competition policy, such as 
competition law, regulation of prices, competition advocacy, consumer 
protection, standards, intellectual property rights, international trade, 
investment, and licensing (UNCTAD 2009: 3).
Policy lessons are drawn in this chapter from illustrations from Kuwait 
and Chile. In Kuwait, like in many resource- dependent and GCC states, 
oligopolies capture a large part of efficiency in the economy and are highly 
distortionary. Shehabi (2017, 2019) shows that oligopoly markups cap-
ture a very large size of economic efficiency in the market. The expansion 
of exports of non-energy sectors is very limited in Kuwait mainly because 
oligopolies have few incentives to export internationally where they 
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cannot sustain large markups as they do domestically (Shehabi 2019). 
Even in a low oil price environment and after reducing energy subsidies, 
the large size of oligopolies and their pure profits continue to entail lim-
ited expansion of trade and limited economic diversification effects in the 
export market of non-energy sector (reverse Dutch disease) dynamics 
(Shehabi 2019). Achieving sustainability thus requires oligopoly reform.
Competition and productivity reforms are an important example of a 
policy solution that promotes economic sustainability, as shown by Shehabi 
(2017, 2019) in model-driven assessments. These reforms improve the 
overall economic performance and restore the fiscal balance, and can 
accompany important sustainability-promoting reforms, such as energy 
subsidy reform, which alone is not sufficient to restore the fiscal balance 
(Shehabi 2017, 2019). Further, competition reform can yield substantial 
improvements in performance by reducing oligopoly markups. These 
reductions yield effects on overall economic activity that largely exceed the 
neoclassical gains in allocative efficiency from removing price distortions 
due to taxes, subsidies, and regulation (Shehabi 2017, 2019). Therefore, 
it has positive impacts of economic growth and fiscal sustainability both in 
the short and long runs.
Another example of successful industrial policy is a real-life example 
from Chile’s forest resources and creating a competitive advantage in 
them. Chile, dubbed the “tiger” of Latin America, achieved large eco-
nomic growth advancements owing to economic reforms of a military 
dictatorship government (Clapp 1995). For more than 60 years, Chile had 
very oligopolistic, inefficient, highly subsidized, and corrupt plantations 
and forest resources. It also had a high 75% reforestation subsidy estab-
lished in 1974. Chile applied forest policy, a form of industrial policy, to 
create one of the world’s most competitive forest resources at relatively 
low costs (Clapp 1995) within a brief period spanning approximately one 
generation. Government policies included state activism to promote forest 
expansions; state withdrawal through reduction of subsidies; privatization 
of the states’ pulp mills and other parts of the industry; and guarantees 
against expropriations (Clapp 1995). These policies attracted foreign 
direct investments specifically to expand the forest resources industry. 
Combined with the opportunity of an increased forest products trade, the 
implementation of these policies enabled Chile to earn a comparative 
advantage in a new industry and export it.
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5  Key messages
The chapter argues that economic sustainability in resource-rich states is 
not economic diversification only; rather, it is a process that pans out in 
the period during which revenue is dependent on an abundant yet exhaust-
ible commodity, as well as in the subsequent period, when the commodity 
export revenue is depleted. The chapter offers a broader definition of eco-
nomic sustainability that has two main perspectives, volatility and deple-
tion, spanning both the short and long runs. It links economic sustainability 
in resource-dependent states to that of the drivers of economic growth 
through policies that focus on both the volatility and the depletion per-
spectives. Lessons are offered from successful examples of three different 
cases, namely Kuwait, Botswana, and Chile.
Successful growth-sustaining policies include a focus on appropriate 
management of resource windfall to achieve fiscal sustainability along with 
long-term diversification. Examples of successful policies include balanc-
ing capital investments between domestic and foreign markets, the design 
of countercyclical (rather than the oft-used pro-cyclical) fiscal policy, 
human capital investments, and avoiding boom–bust cycles by delinking 
spending from the volatility dynamics of resource export revenues. 
Successful experiences of Chile, Botswana, and Kuwait confirm the role of 
SWF assets in offering fiscal stabilization as well as long-term savings. 
Other examples include model-driven policy solutions that focus on the 
management of labor contracts for expatriate labor, improvements in insti-
tutional quality, and competition reform as important policy solutions for 
achieving economic sustainability. Notwithstanding implementation chal-
lenges, these policies were successful in achieving favorable economic per-
formance because, as this chapter argues, they address both the volatility 
and the depletion challenges.
In addition to evidence from these real-case examples, achieving sus-
tainability requires designing policies that also manage the trade- off 
between producing output today and leaving the resource in the ground 
for future production, as well as the trade-off between local consumption 
and exports of a given supply. Technology plays a pivotal role not only in 
creating new industries but also in transforming the resource industry into 
a more sustainable source that can overcome threats of depletion.
A key message here is that comparative advantage can be acquired, and 
not only restricted to the factor or product most abundantly available. 
This acquisition will in turn contribute to generating new sources of 
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revenue that are diversified not only in the non-tradable but also in the 
exporting sectors. To that end, the growth-enhancing factors will help 
build new comparative advantages most importantly through technologi-
cal advancements, human capital, industrial regulation, the political econ-
omy, and even the institutions, cultures, and mores needed for economic 
transformation.
Therefore, a key policy question for achieving sustainability in resource-
dependent economies is how to best apportion investment into various 
components of financial, physical capital, and human capital assets. 
Sustainability-promoting policies are those that target enhancing the driv-
ers of economic growth while addressing solutions for the volatility and 
the depletion perspectives, in both the short and long terms.
appendIx 1: classIcal growth model
Under the Solow (1956, 1957) assumptions of full employment and a 
constant rate of labor force participation, the population growth rate (n) 
















Knowledge (being labor-augmenting technology; θ) also grows at a 











With a closed economy assumption absent government spending, out-
put equals the sum of consumption and investment, and the equation of 
motion for collective capital stock is
 K K I Kt t t t+ − = −1 δ ,  (7.3)
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where the second term is depreciation at an exogenous and constant rate.14 
Savings and investment decisions are exogenous, as are factor accumula-
tion and technological growth, which represents one of the shortcomings 
of the original Solow approach. Employing a standard Cobb–Douglas 
production function, with both physical and human capital (K), labor (L), 
and labor-augmenting technology (θ), and ignoring for now the produc-
tion factors of land and natural resources, constant returns to scale and 
diminishing marginal returns are
 
Y AK Lt t t t= ( )
−α αθ 1 ,
 
(7.4)
whereby θL = Le, effective labor, and 0 < α < 1.
After some manipulation, the following is a corresponding equation of 
motion for output per effective worker with population growth:
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where ie is investment per effective worker, which is the savings rate times 
output per effective worker, expressed as sf(ke) where f is the production 
function or the relationship between output and capital per effective 
worker. It follows that, multiplying all variables in the function by 1/θL, 
yields the following corresponding function in terms of per effec-
tive worker:
 y Aket et=
α .  (7.6)
The steady state of capital per effective worker remains the same from 
one period to the next and is expressed as
14 In the Mankiw et al. (1992) model, human capital is a separate factor of production 
represented by H and grows in a manner whereby H H I dHt t t
H
t+ − = −1 .
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where ibe is the break-even level of investment that maintains a constant 
level of capital per effective worker. Thus, in an economy growing at a 
steady state, in terms of per effective worker,
 
sf k n g ket et( ) = + +( )δ  (7.8)
where the steady state is
 
i sA k i n g ke t t b et= = = + +( )α δ .  (7.9)
This equation for the steady-state capital per effective worker can be 





















From this, the following relationships emerge between the population 
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The standard approach is to show this steady state graphically, as in 
Fig. 7.5, where the steady-state levels of capital, consumption, and income 
per effective worker are
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 k c i y c ie e e e e e, , , .= +  
As such, aggregate variables of effective workers, capital, and output 
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(7.13)
In the context of resource-rich states, to simulate the impact of com-
modity price volatility or conflict, a shock in the economy is first repre-
sented by a large destruction in capital (γ) so that
 
K Kt t+ = −( ) < <1 1 0 1γ γ, .where  (7.14)




A n g ng n g ngt
t
+ −= −( ) + +( ) < + +( )1 11 γ α α .
 
(7.15)
Fig. 7.5 Steady-state growth and transition following a capital shock in the 
Solow model
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The remaining capital falls short of the steady-state level, leaving invest-
ment at a level (ie1) above its capital break-even point, causing growth to 
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This effect is enlarged if the saving rate also rises (see Fig. 7.5). The 
surplus of new investment is then over the break- even point and larger 
with an even faster recovery.
Thus, a temporarily contracting economy decreases the capital-to-labor 
ratio and raises capital per worker, increasing the productivity of capital 
and leading to temporarily higher growth rates in the reconstruction 
phase. Diminished returns eventually return as the long-term growth path 
is approached. If there is an accumulation of capital during the recovery 
(or reconstruction) phase, this recovery can be represented as a shift in the 
production possibility frontier curve. A speedy economic recovery post an 
economic shock may occur due to efficiency gains, represented normally 
as a movement along the production possibility or frontier curve. The 
shock (whether a drop in the resource price or a war) would typically have 
an impact on labor, increasing unemployment and decreasing the labor 
force and population.
Using a numerical simulation that represents a resource economy on 
the eve of a shock, the shock is simulated through a large negative shock 
to capital and a significant reduction in population, shown in Fig. 7.6.
Upon the end of the shock and at the commencement of recovery 
efforts, the capital-to-labor ratio converges to pre-shock levels and GDP 
grows at diminishing rates that are larger than pre-shocks levels to eventu-
ally converge with pre-shock growth levels, as Fig. 7.1 shows.
Natural Resources and Technology
Evaluating economic growth in the presence of depleted natural resources 
is consistent with the goals of achieving economic sustainability in 
resource-dependent economies. As the standard growth model, presented 
earlier, does not take into account natural resources as an input, the fol-




To demonstrate this, the total available quantity of a resource (X) at a 
given time t can be represented as Xt, while the quantity of the resource 
extracted can be expressed as Et, so that Et = Xt.
For simplification purposes, the other factors of production examined 
earlier will be ignored, assuming that the natural resource is the only input 
of production for now. The Cobb–Douglas production function can be 
expressed as
 Y AEt t= .  (7.17)
The assumption of constant technology can be relaxed and technology 
is now growing at a constant exogenous rate (g), expressed in (7.2). This 
set-up enables addressing the question of sustainability: what is the trade-
off between producing output today and leaving the resource in the 
ground for future production? Assuming the resource is extracted at a 
constant exogenous rate (ε), so that
 Et Xt= ε ,  
the quantity of the resource remaining will decline exponentially over 
time, as follows:
 X X et
t= −0
ε .  (7.18)
The initial level of output will thus be
 Y A X0 0 0= ε .  (7.19)






Fig. 7.6 Transition in capital per effective worker and growth rate following a 
shock to capital stock in the augmented Solow model
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It is thus clear that there is a positive relationship between the rate of 
extraction and output: a lower extraction rate will lead to a lower level of 
output. The growth rate of output can thus be expressed as the following, 

















This equation clearly shows that a higher extraction rate leads to a lower 
growth rate of output, which could even become negative at very high 
levels of extraction. Setting (7.20) equal to zero yields the extraction rate 
that is consistent with steady-state levels and a zero growth rate of output, 
which is
 g =
∗ε .  (7.21)
ε∗ thus represents the sustainable level of output. Therefore, examining 
the levels of output in the economy can be determined by examining the 
extraction rate chosen in relation to ε∗. If it exceeds ε∗, the initial level of 
output will exceed the sustainable level, but will decrease over time, as 
Fig. 7.4 shows.
Importantly, including the remaining factors of production would 
complicate the algebraic representation but yield the same general 
conclusion.
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CHAPTER 8




After the oil price started plummeting in the summer of 2014 and remained 
low throughout the next years (until 2017 when the OPEC Reference 
Basket average price recovered to USD 52), the fuel producing countries 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council started implementing energy pricing 
reforms. For many years, such pricing reforms had been planned and envi-
sioned but, due to their quintessential role in the domestic political econo-
mies of Gulf countries, never really implemented. This is not unlike the 
broad and abstract goal of diversifying the economy away from oil to a 
more productive economy, and of changing the domestic social contract 
from one that is reliant on public employment and universal price support 
to one with private employment, market-based pricing structures and tar-
geted social safety nets.
In recent years, since the oil price drop, all GCC countries have taken 
energy pricing reform measures (Fig. 8.1). Both fuel and electricity prices 
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have increased substantially. This chapter takes stock of those energy price 
increases and aims at giving a holistic account of where countries are at 
toward the end of 2018. After explaining the rationale for low energy 
prices, this chapter takes stock of fuel pricing reform and electricity tariff 
policies in all GCC countries.
2  the trIple ratIonale of low energy prIces
There are three compelling reasons that make energy pricing reform so 
difficult in GCC countries. A first reason is the centrality of low energy 
prices in welfare protection and distribution. Governmental involvement 
in domestic pricing policies is legitimized across the developing world 
because energy has no close substitute and provides essential functions to 
human life (Maxwell 2010). Low energy prices are intended to alleviate 
poverty (Komives et al. 2008; Commander 2012) by safeguarding com-
modity prices, keeping inflation in check and sheltering consumers from 
the volatility of international commodity markets (Commander 2012; 
Fattouh and El-Katiri 2013; Kojima 2013; Overland 2010). In energy 
producing countries in the Gulf, pricing policies are an important part of 

















































































Fig. 8.1 Oil price movements and energy price reforms. (Source: Author)
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right of the people and an obligation of the government (Hartley and 
Medlock 2009; Luong and Weinthal 2010; Victor et  al. 2011). GCC 
states are rentier states, in which the government is the principal receiver 
of oil revenues and the key responsible one to redistribute this income 
(Beblawi 1990). Increasing energy prices, ceteris paribus, represents a uni-
lateral modification of the social contract.
A second rationale for low energy prices lies in their economic function. 
Low energy prices have been used to promote economic development by 
supporting factors of production in general and competitiveness for inter-
national trade in particular (Whitley and van der Burg 2015). In other 
words, low prices have been used as a part of industrial policy with the 
explicit goal of supporting export competitiveness of domestic industries 
(Commander 2012). Resource-rich countries in the Gulf in particular 
have used their hydrocarbon endowment to incentivize energy-intensive 
industrialization (IEA, OPEC, OECD and World Bank 2010). Energy 
pricing reforms have two types of impacts on firms. First, they affect firms 
directly by increasing their energy input cost. Second, there are indirect 
effects via the rise of prices from intermediary goods or services (that also 
rely on energy). These indirect effects can affect the supply chains of non- 
energy intensive goods or services (Rentschler and Kornejew 2017). The 
sectors that suffer the most are logically energy-intensive industries such as 
heavy manufacturing, transport, petrochemicals, cement, aluminum and 
steel (Rentschler and Kornejew 2017; Bazilian and Onyeji 2012; 
Rentschler et al. 2017). These sectors are dominant industries for within- 
diversification in Gulf countries.
The third rationale is political. Given the potential social and economic 
impacts of pricing reform, implementing price increases is often politically 
costly and can even threaten political stability (Baig et al. 2007). It is now 
uniformly recognized that political economy factors are the primary barri-
ers to reforming energy prices. Low energy prices are considered an instru-
ment to stay in power and control political stakeholders through systems 
of patronage and rentierism (Cheon et  al. 2014; Hartley and Medlock 
2009; Overland 2010; Victor 2009). Governments use them to direct 
(financial) benefits to key political stakeholders, thereby consolidating 
power (Cheon et al. 2014). In rentier states like the ones in the GCC, low 
prices are used across the board to maintain the support of the public for 
the elite in power (Overland 2010). It should be no surprise that world-
wide, fuel prices are lower in more centralized, non-democratic states (van 
Beers and Strand 2013).
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3  the sustaInabIlIty ratIonale for energy prIcIng 
reform, and results In the gcc
All GCC states reformed prices after the fuel price drop in 2014. Even 
though the nature of popular reception varies in different countries, 
energy price reforms seem to be one policy that authorities have recog-
nized to be crucial for adjustment to falling oil revenues. The fiscal benefit 
from increasing energy prices is key to economic sustainability in two main 
ways: first because it gives governments more domestically sourced reve-
nue, and second because it lowers demand of its key export commodity.
In terms of fiscal consolidation, overall pre-tax energy (gasoline, diesel 
and electricity) subsidies fell from $116 billion in 2014 to $47 billion in 
2016 based on a price-gap model (IMF 2017). This type of subsidy quan-
tification model reflects the opportunity costs of resources consumed 
domestically as opposed to being traded on the international market. That 
said, the fiscal capacity opened up by charging higher energy prices has 
been of crucial importance to GCC governments. Increasing energy prices 
has been considered as one of the most important measure to reduce non- 
wage recurrent spending (IMF 2017). The additional fiscal revenue has 
helped governments to prevent the international oil price collapse from 
threatening their domestic stability, while awaiting a recovery of oil prices 
that eventually started in 2017 (Fig. 8.2).
So far, it appears that fuel pricing reforms have paid off in terms of 
lowering demand. Average annual gasoline and diesel demand growth was 
around 6.2% and 4%, respectively (2010–2015) but slowed down to 0.4% 
and −6% in 2016. It is however difficult to attribute this slowdown to pric-
ing reforms, as economic output also reduced over the last few years 
(APICORP 2017). In Saudi Arabia, gasoline demand leveled out even 
before the January 2018 reforms and diesel demand had already fallen 
10%. The latter can be attributed to less economic activity and the sourc-
ing of more gas for power generation. In Oman, gasoline and diesel con-
sumption fell by 6.2% and 7.2%, respectively, from 2015 to 2016 
(APICORP 2017). Unsurprisingly, given the relatively modest fuel price 
increases, the UAE has seen less demand reactions in recent years. On the 
contrary, fuel demand has actually increased in 2016.
The fiscal benefit of pricing reform and the reduction of demand are 
the main reasons to implement reforms for economic sustainability, but 
they are not the only ones (van Asselt and Skovgaard 2016). The fiscal 
crisis resulting from the oil price collapse has been in certain ways a 
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blessing to target excessive rentierism. Low domestic prices are correlated 
with higher levels of corruption through the involvement of government 
officials in black markets or industries that rely on cheap energy 
(Strand 2016).
Underpricing also leads to a misallocation of resources within the econ-
omy, often wrongly incentivizing energy intensive sectors and crowding 
out more productive sectors (Fattouh and El-Katiri 2013; IEA 2014; 
Maxwell 2010). Energy-intensive sectors tend to offer few and low-skilled 
jobs. In addition, in some countries with a lot of expatriate labor, it is less 
costly to focus on that labor as factor of production than it would be to 
focus on capital. Low-skilled labor is often abundant, while energy effi-
ciency investments would be expensive and necessitate higher-skilled and 
therefore more expensive employees. In many countries, this has inevita-
bly led to large shares of expensive public labor (Commander 2012), fur-
ther burdening state coffers. The misallocation of energy resources has 
resulted in a rise in energy intensity of GDP and lowered incentives for 
energy efficiency, particularly in end-use sectors (Fattouh and El-Katiri 
2013; IEA 2014; Anand et al. 2013).
A positive reallocation of resources within the economy does take time, 
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Fig. 8.2 Current account balance (% of GDP, 2011–2018). (Source: IMF 2016 
(up until 2013); IMF 2017 (as of 2014). Note: 2017 and 2018 are projections)
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down. In an environment of low oil prices coupled with end-use energy 
price reforms, overall growth prospects in the medium-term have been 
subdued, though non-oil growth has been improving in some countries. 
Estimates from IMF staff show that the reforms indicated by GCC gov-
ernments could lead to an increase of 1.7 to 6.6% of their non-oil GDP by 
2020 based on each country’s reform path, and an additional 1.5 to 3.0 
percentage points of non-oil GDP would be generated with the introduc-
tion of VAT, as proposed by different countries and contained in the rati-
fied GCC VAT agreement.
4  fuel prIcIng reform In the gcc
While all GCC countries reformed energy prices, they did so in remarkably 
different ways. The UAE, Oman and Qatar were able to implement a peri-
odic adjustment system that linked prices to international and regional 
prices. Kuwait tried to do the same but was unable to implement it. Like 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, they relied on one-off price increases. Unlike 
Kuwait, however, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were able to implement more 
than just one ad hoc price adjustment. Below, we report price adjustments 
until June & July 2018. In the summer of 2018, the international oil price 
saw its highest price level since the 2014 plummet. In the fall of 2018, the 
crude oil price fell again before recovering in the spring of 2019. During 
this time, ad hoc reformers implemented no further reforms, whereas 
gradual reforms kept adjusting prices in line with international price move-
ments (both downward and again upward). In June 2019, price levels 
were almost identical in all GCC countries compared to those of the year 
before (and reported here).
4.1  The ‘Gradual’ Fuel Price Reformers
The UAE has been the first of GCC countries to seriously reform its fuel 
prices. In August 2015, transport fuel prices were liberalized and linked to 
international market prices using price formulae. As a result, gasoline price 
increased by 25% and diesel prices decreased by 29% (IMF 2015). Since, 
international market prices have been gradually going up and UAE prices 
have followed this trend. Fuel prices have been liberalized for all actors, 
including industry and commerce (Table 8.1).
Like many other countries, Oman first started raising energy prices for 
commerce and industry, before moving to residential consumers. Indicative 
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of the fiscal need for reform in Oman is the fact that they already increased 
natural gas prices for industry and power producers in January 2015, well 
before reforms happened in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. It reformed fuel 
prices in the wake of Saudi reforms in January 2016. At the same time, it 
introduced a new pricing formula that links Omani prices to prices on the 
international market and in the UAE. Ever since, Oman has stuck to the 
formula and increased energy prices alongside international market prices 
(Table 8.2).
When reforming fuel prices, Oman also experienced opposition. In 
exchange, they installed a cap twice, and broke it twice. The second cap 
was set at 0.48 USD/L for regular gasoline. The government abolished 
that cap after having introduced the ‘National Subsidy Scheme’. This 
scheme continues to provide subsidized fuel at a rate of 0.47 USD/L to 
less wealthy families. In total, 220,000 people signed up to the scheme in 
January 2018 (Times of Oman 2018). Under this scheme, nationals who 
own a car or boat and have a monthly income of below 950 riyals can 
apply for 200 L of subsidized fuel per month. The scheme only applies to 
regular gasoline, and when the price is above 0.47 USD/L (Al Mukrashi 
2017; Sultanate of Oman 2018).
Like Oman, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, Qatar also revised gasoline 
prices in early 2016. In a very early move, Qatar had reformed diesel prices 
Table 8.1 Fuel Prices in the UAE (July 2018)
Product Unit July 2015 August 2015 July 2018
Gasoline 98 USD/L 0.50 0.61 0.7
Gasoline 95 USD/L 0.47 0.58 0.67
Gasoline 91 USD/L 0.44 0.56 0.65
Diesel USD/L 0.79 0.56 0.72
Source: Collected by author
Table 8.2 Fuel Prices in Oman (continuously adjusted since January 2016)
Product Unit 2015 Jan 2016 Feb 2017 Jun 2018
Gasoline 95 USD/L 0.31 0.42 0.47 0.59
Gasoline 91 USD/L 0.31 0.36 0.45 0.56
Diesel USD/L 0.38 0.42 0.53 0.65
Source: Collected by author
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already in 2014 (by about 50% for local companies but 75% for joint ven-
tures) (Walker and Kovessy 2016). In May of the same year, the Qatari 
government announced plans to liberalize fuel prices and adjust them 
alongside international market prices, regional prices and cost of produc-
tion—a move similar to the one taken by Oman and the UAE. This plan 
was implemented as of June 2016, after which there were monthly revi-
sions to the fuel price. This move has been rather remarkable, given Qatar’s 
high population-reserve ratio. Much like Kuwait, it could be expected that 
the Qatari government had less of a need to implement deep pricing 
reforms. One explanation, however, may be the impacts of Qatar’s politi-
cal isolation from other GCC countries, and the opportunism of its 
Government to use geopolitical threats to advance domestic reforms 
(Table 8.3).
4.2  The ‘Ad hoc’ Fuel Price Reformers
Saudi Arabia implemented significant energy pricing reforms in two epi-
sodes in January 2016 and January 2018. In January 2016, the Government 
reformed prices predominantly in reaction to the fiscal crisis as a result of 
the oil price drop. The Saudi Government targeted a full energy and water 
subsidy phase out by 2020 under its Vision 2030 plan, spearheaded by the 
then Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (IMF 2016) 
(Table 8.4).
The first stage of reforms was successful without introducing compen-
sation measures or communication plans (APICORP 2018). After the first 
price reforms, energy demand growth decreased from 3.5% to 1.7% even 
though the net effect of pricing reforms is difficult to estimate as overall 
GDP went down as well (APICORP 2018). The anti-corruption cam-
paign of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was believed to help 
Table 8.3 Qatar fuel prices (adjusted continuously since June 2016)
Product Unit 2015 Jan 2016 Jun 2017 Jul 2018
Gasoline 97 USD/L 0.23 0.32 (35%) 0.43 0.56
Gasoline 90 USD/L 0.28 0.36 (30%) 0.44 0.55
Diesel USD/L 0.28 0.41 (48%) 0.45 0.56
Source: Collected by author
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public perception on the reforms. At the same time, reforms were unpop-
ular, and inflation spiked right after reform.
In subsequent years, however, reform slowed down and was repeatedly 
postponed as the oil price recovered and the Government planned for 
compensation measures. There was a transparent commitment not to 
implement further reforms before the cash transfer scheme (citizen’s 
income) was ready to be launched. At the same time, delays happened 
because the government was cautious not to slow down industrial output 
(Mahdi and Nereim 2017). In its latest budget, the Saudi government 
pushed back the plan to remove subsidies to 2025 (Gnana 2017). The 
January 2018 price rises mainly targeted gasoline prices, but also increased 
diesel prices for industry (Table 8.5).
As opposed to the first reforms, the second reforms were prepared with 
a large communication campaign and accompanied, as promised, by the 
cash transfer program. Citizen’s Account started operating in January and 
aimed at distributing SAR 30 billion to 3.7 million households in 2018. 
However, there were social media reactions against the cash transfers as 
the first round was not enough to compensate for the distributive losses 
(APICORP 2018). SAR 30 billion was allocated to Citizen’s Account for 
2018, but SAR 50  billion was going to military and civil servants 
(APICORP 2018). This indicates the relative importance of these stake-
holders: the people matter, but perhaps the military and civil servants are 
more important to retain the ruling coalition. Saudi Arabia is also careful 
about its energy intensive industries. While there was indeed a pricing 
reform in 2018 for industrial diesel but not for transport diesel, the cost 
Table 8.4 Energy pricing reforms in Saudi Arabia (January 2016)
Product Unit 2015 2016
Natural gas USD/mmbtu 0.75 1.25 (67%)
Ethane USD/mmbtu 0.75 1.75 (133%)
Gasoline 95 USD/L 0.16 0.24 (50%)
Gasoline 91 USD/L 0.12 0.2 (67%)
Diesel transport USD/L 0.07 0.12 (79%)
Diesel industry USD/barrel 9.11 14.1 (55%)
Arab light crude USD/barrel 4.24 6.35 (50%)
Arab heavy crude USD/barrel 2.67 4.4 (65%)
Kerosene USD/barrel 23.00 25.7 (12%)
Source: Collected by author
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per liter of industrial diesel remains lower than the one for transport diesel 
(0.10 USD/L versus 0.12 USD/L).
Like Oman, Bahrain had its first taste of energy pricing reforms by 
increasing natural gas tariffs for industrial users in March 2015. An earlier 
attempt to reform electricity prices for residential users had failed due to 
the opposition from members of parliament (APICORP 2018). Again, 
like Oman, it followed in the footsteps of Saudi Arabia in January 2016 
and reformed fuel prices. It raised gasoline prices and planned for diesel 
price increases of 0.05 USD/L on an annual basis. Gasoline prices were 
not reformed annually. They remained stable until a next reform in 
January 2018.
For diesel, on the other hand, Government had been planning since 
2013 to raise prices to 0.37 USD/L in January 2015, 0.42 USD/L in 
January 2016 and 0.47 USD/L in January 2017. These price rises were 
delayed but since January 2015, the annual price increase of 0.05 USD/L 
did happen. Fishermen were given support, but it did not cover their 
losses (Table 8.6).
The Kuwaiti government increased diesel prices by 200% in January 
2015, but immediately had to scale back reforms to 100% after parliamen-
tary and other protests. In addition, large users (such as in industry) con-
tinued to receive diesel at the prior price. In September 2016, the 
Government implemented a gasoline price increase of about 70% on aver-
age and combined this with a plan to revise prices alongside international 
price movements. After heavy protests and a challenging of the price rise 
Table 8.5 Fuel pricing reforms in Saudi Arabia (percentage changes between 
brackets)
Product Unit 2015 Jan 2016 Jan 2018
Natural gas USD/mmbtu 0.75 1.25 (67%) Unchanged
Ethane USD/mmbtu 0.75 1.75 (133%) Unchanged
Gasoline 95 USD/L 0.16 0.24 (50%) 0.54 (127%)
Gasoline 91 USD/L 0.12 0.2 (67%) 0.37 (83%)
Diesel transport USD/L 0.07 0.12 (79%) Unchanged
Diesel industry USD/barrel 9.11 14.1 (55%) 16.15 (15%)
Arab light crude USD/barrel 4.24 6.35 (50%) Unchanged
Arab heavy crude USD/barrel 2.67 4.4 (65%) Unchanged
Kerosene USD/barrel 23.00 25.7 (12%) Unchanged
Source: Collected by author
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before Court, the government was able to maintain its gasoline price 
increase, but dropped the plan to adjust prices periodically (Moerenhout 
2018). It is not planning any further price increases at the moment (Kuwait 
Times 2018) (Table 8.7).
4.3  GCC Fuel Prices in Comparison
In comparison to prices in other countries in the region, such as Jordan 
and average world prices, GCC countries still offer fuel at some of the low-
est rates worldwide. Within the GCC, the UAE, Oman and Qatar have 
higher prices than other countries, even though Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
have also invested heavily into cutting gasoline consumption (Fig. 8.3).
It appears fashionable to conclude that countries in the Gulf still have a 
long way to go in terms of fuel pricing reform. Experiences in fuel price 
changes across the world indeed show that changes may be reversed in the 
wake of popular protest or in the wake of changing international oil prices. 
This is of course no different in the case of GCC countries. That said, 
progress has been remarkable on two fronts. First, three countries were 
able to implement periodic fuel price adjustment systems and have stuck 
to revising fuel prices upward so far. Especially in Qatar, this has led to 
strong price increases over two years’ time. That aside, Saudi Arabia and 
Table 8.6 Fuel prices in Bahrain (percentage changes between brackets)
Product Unit 2015 Jan 2016 Jan 2018
Gasoline 95 USD/L 0.27 0.42 (58%) 0.53
Gasoline 91 USD/L 0.20 0.33 (56%) 0.37
Diesel USD/L 0.26 0.32 0.42
Source: Collected by author
Table 8.7 Fuel prices in Kuwait
Product Unit 2014 Jan 2018
Gasoline 98 USD/L 0.27 0.50
Gasoline 95 USD/L 0.20 0.32
Gasoline 91 USD/L 0.18 0.26
Diesel USD/L 0.17 0.35
Source: Collected by author
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Bahrain have proven that one-off reforms can be followed up again, espe-
cially with the introduction of mitigation measures. Of all GCC-countries, 
Saudi Arabia has by far increased gasoline prices the most. Even if it came 
from far, the fact GDP/capita is lower and a rentier mentality potentially 
higher makes such adjustments all the more surprising (Fig. 8.4).
5  gcc electrIcIty prIcIng reforms and tarIffs
Most GCC countries have also increased electricity prices over the past few 
years. This has happened in various steps, to various extents and according 
to various pricing policies. Who bears the burden varies across countries, 
but in all countries, there are blocked tariffs and some form of cross- 
subsidization, either between expatriates and nationals, or between vari-
ous consumer groups. Many electricity prices likely do not reach cost 
recovery levels. In the absence of production costs, governmental prices 
are often an (imperfect) proxy to cost-recovery levels. Most known elec-
tricity tariffs for government hover around 0.08 USD/kWh. This is close 
to the official production cost figure quoted by the Bahraini Government 
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Fig. 8.3 Transport fuel prices (USD/L, July 2018). (Source: Author)
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5.1  Cross-Subsidies Between Consumer Groups
Many GCC countries provide some level of cross-subsidization to indus-
try. Between the start of reforms in 2016 and January 2018, Saudi Arabia 
increased electricity tariffs for residential users (< 6000 kWh/month) by 
on average 260%. Industrial users, however, were shielded from price rises, 
even if they still fall well below what the government pays. They now pay 
the same tariff as the lowest residential consumer group (Saudi Electric 
Company 2018). Similarly, in Dubai, industrial tariffs up to 10,000 kWh/
month are the same as the lowest residential consumer group (up to 
2000 kWh/month) (Dubai Electricity & Water Authority 2018).
Some GCC countries have flat rates for industry, disregarding however 
much electricity is consumed per month. Oman has such a flat rate, even 
if the level of the rate depends on the time of year (it is double as high in 
the 4 warmest months of the year) (Qatar General Electricity & Water 
Corporation 2018). Qatar also has a flat rate for industrial users, which is 
less than half the rate paid by Government and about half the rate paid by 
the highest residential consumer groups (Qatar General Electricity & 
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Fig. 8.4 Price changes (%) before and after reforms (July 2018). (Source: Author)
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commerce. The latter pays the same rate as the lowest residential con-
sumer group, while industrial users still pay less than the highest residen-
tial users. Saudi Arabia’s industrial tariff is also a flat rate and the same as 
the lowest residential consumer bracket (Saudi Electricity Company 
2018). Besides industrial and commercial users, agricultural tariffs are also 
often cross-subsidized (for example in Oman, Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi).
Another type of cross-subsidization is between expatriates and nation-
als. In Abu Dhabi, nationals pay more for electricity when they consume 
more than 30 kWh/day for apartments and 400 kWh/day for villas. For 
expatriates, however, this is respectively 20 kWh/day and 200 kWh/day. 
Tariffs also diverge strongly. Nationals pay 0.018 USD/kWh or 0.02 
USD/kWh (depending on their consumption), while expatriates pay 
0.073 USD/kWh or 0.083 USD/kWh (Abu Dhabi Distribution Company 
2017). Bahrain also charges non-nationals and nationals with multiple 
accounts more than nationals with one single account (Bahrain Electricity 
and Water Authority 2018).
5.2  Blocked Tariff Designs
All GCC countries work with some type of blocked tariff designs to distin-
guish between high and low users. Blocked tariffs are particularly used in 
the residential sector and can vary by daily usage (Abu Dhabi) or monthly 
usage (others). The lowest consumption bracket in Qatar and Dubai is 
2000  kWh/month, in Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman 3000  kWh/month, 
and in Saudi Arabia 6000 kWh/month. Some jurisdictions also have addi-
tional subsidies for low income groups. For example, in Abu Dhabi, social 
cardholders that are also nationals pay nothing up to 333 kWh/day and 
then 0.018 USD/kWh above that. Expatriates with social cards pay noth-
ing up to 79  kWh/day, after which they pay 0.073 USD/kWh (Abu 
Dhabi Distribution Company 2017).
Many GCC countries have flat rates for industry. Blocked tariff designs 
for industrial users are however present in Abu Dhabi in the case of large 
industrial users with an installed capacity of more than 1 MW and only 
when they consume electricity during peak hours (Abu Dhabi Distribution 
Company 2017). This measure is to maintain the stability of the grid and 
adequacy of supply. As opposed to many countries, Bahrain also has 
blocked tariffs for Industry and Commerce that are similar to what resi-
dential consumer groups pay (Bahrain Electricity and Water Authority 
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2018). This shows the particular controversy around residential electricity 
tariffs, particularly for less wealthy households with just one account.
5.3  Electricity Pricing Reforms and Tariffs in Comparison
All GCC countries have been reforming electricity prices since the drop of 
fuel prices. In Saudi Arabia, the recent reform of January 2018 hikes tariffs 
for the lower consumption bracket. In total, consumers up to 6000 kWh/
month pay 2.6 times more than in 2015 (APICORP 2018). In 2016, low- 
level consumers (<4000 kWh/month) were shielded from reforms when 
prices were raised by 2/3rd for the middle bracket (4001–6000 kWh/
month) and raised and unified for any consumer above that. The Authority 
of Electricity Regulation of Oman has cut subsidies to large consumers 
(using more than 150  mWh/year) in Government, Commerce and 
Industry in January 2017. As a result, 10,000 of such users no longer 
receive subsidies and pay cost-reflective tariffs. Government hoped for sav-
ings of roughly RO 100 million annually from this measure alone (GI 
Consultancy 2017). Oman is currently conducting a review of how these 
measures impacted the specific large consumers. In the UAE, prices went 
up during the last years, but these mainly impacted expatriates. Also in 
Qatar, an unexpected tariff increase in October 2015 was followed by oth-
ers in subsequent years. Kuwait also increased tariffs, starting with the 
commercial sector (Figs. 8.5 and 8.6).
6  commerce, Industry and energy prIcIng reforms
Commercial and industrial stakeholders have not been saved from reforms, 
and the question remains as to which place will be given to energy inten-
sive industries in the various economic diversification plans of GCC states. 
A pertinent concern for energy-intensive industries that have been benefi-
ciaries of the state’s largesse in the form of subsidized energy input will be 
how to address the effect of new prices on their production activities, 
while governments seek to tackle possible cost-push inflation and the bur-
den on consumers in addition to advancing their economic diversifica-
tion agenda.
So far, little attention has been given to industrial users and specifically 
energy-intensive industries in terms of compensation measures for energy 
pricing reforms. These industries will have the greatest interest in preserv-
ing low energy prices not only because they have been accustomed to years 
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of low prices following long-time government strategies to maximize the 
country’s comparative advantage. Well-designed policy plans can help to 
consolidate the gains from the upward revision of energy prices, while also 
allowing enough space to producers and consumers to adjust to new eco-
nomic realities.
Energy intensive industries take up a unique position in the political 
economies of many Gulf countries. From one side, they are used to recycle 
oil rents and are often closely linked to government (either informally or 
through the use of state-owned enterprises). From another side, they 
mainly benefit rich owners, while they do not offer large employment pos-
sibilities to the well-educated youth. Rather they rely on migrant labor and 
leave the public sector to deal with the employment of nationals. As a 
result, the performance (and survival) of energy intensive industries is 
determined by two opposing forces: one that seeks to maintain rents to 
keep politically connected businesses in check, and one that seeks to 
reform industrial prices to avoid deeper residential price increases.








>10000 9001-10000 8001-9000 7001-8000 6001-7000 5001-6000
4001-5000 3001-4000 2001-3000 1001-2000 <1000
Fig. 8.5 Residential electricity block tariffs in the GCC (July 2018). (Source: 
Collected by author. Note: Bahrain (1) = Bahraini nationals with only one account; 
Bahrain (2) = Non-Nationals and Bahraini nationals with multiple accounts)
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In some ways, residents benefit from low energy prices given to indus-
tries: directly, when they purchase goods from these companies, or indi-
rectly, when other goods use energy intensive products as intermediary 
inputs. These inflationary effects can seep through the value chain and add 
to the costs of regular residents. At the same time, however, residents also 
compete with industries and commerce for cheap energy. Since they do 
not benefit from private sector employment much, the vast value of low 
energy prices stays with high-level managerial positions. As a result, it 
could be expected that when public discontent threatens political stability, 
commercial and industrial tariffs will be adjusted upward first (like it has 
happened in many other countries). On the contrary, when the wider pub-
lic is able to accept reforms, residential consumers will also be targeted. 
This political reality does not help to design a comprehensive plan for 
economic diversification. It does, however and again, prove the quintes-
sence of developing more targeted welfare protection mechanisms, such as 
cash transfers.










>10000 9001-10000 8001-9000 7001-8000 6001-7000 5001-6000
4001-5000 3001-4000 2001-3000 1001-2000 <1000
Fig. 8.6 Industrial electricity tariffs in the GCC. (Source: Collected by author. 
Note: Oman (1) = 8 non-summer months; Oman (2) = 4 summer months; Abu 
Dhabi (1) = for industrial users with installed capacity below 1 MW and those with 
installed capacity above 1 MW, but outside of peak hours; Abu Dhabi (2) = for 
industrial users with installed capacity above 1 MW and consuming power during 
peak hours)
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7  conclusIon
As a result of the oil price collapse in 2014, 2015 and 2016, all GCC 
countries have implemented considerable energy pricing reforms. While 
the level of depth of reforms has depended on various factors, such as 
resource reserves, population size, GDP per capita and geopolitical driv-
ers, all countries have stuck to implemented reforms to date (June 2019). 
This is noteworthy, as it often happens that pricing reforms in resource- 
rich countries are reversed when the international price increases again, as 
was the case in 2017 and 2018.
GCC countries have chosen different strategies to adjust fuel prices. 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain have opted for ad hoc pricing reforms, 
whereas the UAE, Qatar and Oman have implemented an automatic price 
setting mechanism that links domestic prices to regional and international 
oil price movements. The literature suggests that the implementation of 
an automatic price adjustment mechanism is more sustainable in the long 
run. However, it is important to observe the results from ad hoc price 
increases as well, particularly in Saudi Arabia, which has seen the largest 
percentage increase in domestic fuel prices. Relative to regional peers and 
global averages, GCC countries still have rather low fuel prices, but it is 
uncontestable that the price gap between domestic and international 
prices has been significantly reduced in all countries. Similar to fuel, GCC 
countries have also all implemented electricity pricing reforms since the 
collapse of the oil price.
The price increases have contributed to economic sustainability in two 
main ways. First, they have allowed governments to raise more domestic 
revenue and, as a result, prevent a further collapse of their already sizeable 
deficits in the wake of the oil price collapse. This can be reasonably linked 
to domestic stability more generally. Since conflict has longer-term impacts 
on economic sustainability, the ability to mitigate international oil price 
fluctuations via domestic pricing reforms is a rather essential tool to pro-
tect an economic collapse. Second, they have led to a reduction of energy 
demand in many (but not all) GCC countries. It is however difficult to 
attribute this slow down to pricing reforms, as economic output also 
reduced in a general economic downturn.
Despite these advantages, the impact of pricing reforms on economic 
sustainability suffers from a potential temporal conundrum. Besides the 
aforementioned short-term benefits, pricing reforms should also restore a 
more proper allocation of resources in the economy. Short-term effects, 
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however, can be negative, particularly in countries that try to use within- 
sector diversification to add productivity to their allocation state models. 
If countries adjust prices too quickly, they may undermine their own com-
parative advantage and they may change the social contract unilaterally, 
provoking public discontent. All-in-all, now the oil price has picked up, we 
may see a slowing down of pricing reforms among ad hoc reformers to 
restore stability for residential and industrial consumers. While the need 
for counter-cyclical economic and fiscal policies is widely recognized, this 
is not realistic in the GCC given the domestic political economy. This type 
of policy-making can only be achieved when the hydrocarbon-rich coun-
tries of the GCC simultaneously advance on other much-needed reforms, 
including the development of targeted welfare protection, taxation reform, 
education reform and, most importantly, labor market reform (Table 8.8).
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CHAPTER 9
Fiscal Sustainability and Hydrocarbon 
Endowment Per Capita in the GCC
Monica Malik and Thirumalai Nagesh
1  IntroductIon
GCC economies remain highly dependent on the hydrocarbon sector in 
terms of the composition of GDP and as a source of government revenue 
and export base. However, variations persist across the region, with the 
economies of Bahrain and Dubai the most diversified and Kuwait the least. 
The key non-oil sectors across the GCC tend to be in the following areas—
construction, real estate, tourism, retail, hospitality, aviation and petro-
chemical and energy-intensive industries (such as aluminium). The policy 
focus again intensified towards economic diversification from end-2014 
with the sharp fall in the oil price. New development plans have been 
announced to reach this objective, most notably in Saudi Arabia, with the 
National Transformation Plan and Vision 2030, both announced in 2016. 
These plans are a blueprint to diversify the Saudi economy (fiscally and in 
terms of composition of GDP) and highlight the government’s commit-
ment to transform the economy away from oil.
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In this chapter, we focus on fiscal sustainability, given the importance of 
fiscal policy in the GCC. Most of the hydrocarbon earnings (via national-
ized companies) accrue to the regional governments who then are the 
main conduit for this revenue to enter the domestic economy and the 
central factor dominating economic activity and domestic demand. As 
such, governments in the GCC play a much larger role in the economy 
than is generally the case for other emerging market countries and are 
often the key employers, especially for the national population. The role of 
government spending is especially vital for the macro-management of the 
GCC economies, given their limited control of monetary policy with their 
currencies being pegged to the USD. We highlight that the fiscal side is 
just one aspect of overall economic sustainability, albeit linked to other 
areas. Indeed, the diversification in the economic base will support the 
deepening non-oil revenue. However, fiscal reforms and consolidation at 
times of lower oil price cycles result in weaker domestic activity, including 
investment (public and indirectly private) and impeding diversification 
plans. In this chapter, we focus on fiscal reforms between 2014 and 2018, 
particularly on the UAE and Saudi Arabia as they have seen the greatest 
fiscal reforms during this period, though it also highlights fiscal strength 
and developments in other GCC countries.
Despite the renewed emphasis on shifting away from the hydrocarbon 
sector, the GCC countries that are currently the most resilient and best 
able to cope with the low oil price environment are those with large hydro-
carbon reserves relative to their populations (hydrocarbon rich per capita). 
These countries tend to use less of their resources supporting the popula-
tion, resulting in stronger fiscal fundamentals that bolster their economic 
sustainability despite high exposure to the hydrocarbon sector. We high-
light in the chapter that the economic strength of these countries are 
reflected in a number of economic indicators, including low debt and high 
foreign currency reserves, which in turn feed into their stronger sovereign 
rating. This reflects their stronger saving rates when oil prices are higher, 
alongside lower budget breakeven oil prices. This does not mean that 
these economies should not look to diversify. Rather, it highlights that 
their fiscal strength results in less pressure on the economy during times of 
low prices and reform. Thus, fiscal sustainability at this stage is mostly 
unrelated to the degree of economic diversification. Fiscal diversification 
has largely been weak across the region, with hydrocarbon revenue remain-
ing the main source of government income. That some countries have a 
relatively higher share of non-oil revenue in total revenue, in many cases, 
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reflect weaker hydrocarbon endowment rather than a diversified revenue 
base (especially tax) or lower subsidy levels.
The underlying fiscal strength and sustainability of GCC economies is 
especially important at a time when the region has seen relatively limited 
success in widening the economic base (composition of GDP) much 
beyond pre-2014 levels. There have been some signs of greater fiscal 
reforms, especially in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. However, this has placed 
downward pressure on their economies, including the private sector—
who are often proposed key drivers of economic diversification and raising 
employment opportunities for nationals. Thus, government-led initiatives 
will be central to boosting and deepening economic activity, alongside 
developing a framework to access private capital and expertise—local or 
international. Notably, a number of GCC countries are promoting labor 
nationalization programs, in varying degrees, to help create job opportu-
nities for nationals, especially the youth. Reducing the share of govern-
ment spending on wages will also be critical to boosting fiscal sustainability 
across the GCC, especially for the hydrocarbon poorer per capita coun-
tries, alongside reforms to increase non-oil revenue.
The other area of policy adjustment and economic support has been on 
the oil front since 2017—the pullback in OPEC+ oil production has 
helped to reduce global inventories and has provided fundamental support 
to the oil price. The rise in global oil prices since mid-2017 reduces some 
of the fiscal (and external) pressure seen from end-2014, particularly in 
1H2016. In turn, this has allowed an increase in government spending for 
2018. GCC fiscal positions improved in 2018 despite the increase in gov-
ernment spending, thanks to the higher oil revenue. However, the fall in 
oil price at the end of 2018 and the ongoing development in hydrocarbon 
technology that are likely to impact future supply and demand (including 
shale oil, renewable energy and electric vehicles) highlight the need for 
further reforms to strengthen and deepen fiscal sustainability in the GCC.
2  VarIatIons In Gcc Hydrocarbon EndowmEnts 
and EconomIc sustaInabIlIty
The size of hydrocarbon reserves per capita is a key factor for fiscal sustain-
ability currently rather than just the size of the hydrocarbon reserves 
themselves or hydrocarbon revenue as a percentage of total government 
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revenue. Based on per-capita hydrocarbon endowments, the GCC coun-
tries can be broadly divided into two categories (Figs. 9.1 and 9.2):
• Hydrocarbon richer per capita: These countries have higher hydro-
carbon reserves (and production) relative to their populations. They 
include Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE (Abu Dhabi led).
• Hydrocarbon poorer per capita: These countries have relatively 
smaller hydrocarbon reserves (and production) relative to their pop-
ulations. They include Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia. Within this 
group, Oman and Bahrain are in relatively weaker positions 
versus Saudi.
The per-capita hydrocarbon ratio is particularly important in the GCC, 
given the relationship between the state and citizens—that is, the social 
contract. In simple terms, in GCC economic frameworks, hydrocarbon 
revenue falls to the government (via the national oil and gas companies) 
and is then distributed and mobilized for the well-being of the population 
and country. This has also meant that there is a framework to support the 
citizens from cradle to grave in various ways, including covering education 
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Fig. 9.1 GCC: Hydrocarbon endowment per capita (reserves) based on national 
population. (Source: BP [hydrocarbon reserves data], regional statistical agencies 
[population data 2016–18], authors’ calculations and methodology)
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to build housing. There are, however, variations across the region on the 
level of support provided by the government to nationals, including with 
the differences in the pace of reforms seen since 2015 also contributing to 
this. Moreover, the public sector has been a key employer of nationals and 
there has been a limited tax base. This social contract is seeing signs of 
change, especially with the fall in the oil price and the rise in the domestic 
population. Indeed, the region has seen a pullback in subsidies and the 
introduction of fees and some taxes since 2015. At the same time, strong 
population growth means that the younger generation of GCC nationals 
may not fully be able to rely on the state to provide them with jobs. 
Nevertheless, the social contract remains largely in place despite these 
adjustments.
The nature of the economies and impact of the social contract has 
resulted in hydrocarbon richer countries generally having to spend less of 
their hydrocarbon income to support their populations. This has also 
meant that these countries have seen larger fiscal surpluses and foreign 
currency reserve build-ups during periods of higher oil prices. Moreover, 
after the collapse of the oil price at end-2014, they have largely seen 
smaller deficits and thus, have required lesser fiscal adjustment to balance 
their budgets (Fig. 9.3).

























Gas Production / Capita
Oil Production / Capita
Total Hydrocarbon Production / Capita
Fig. 9.2 GCC: Hydrocarbon endowment per capita (production) based on 
national population. (Source: BP [hydrocarbon output data], regional statistical 
agencies [population data 2016–18], authors’ calculations and methodology)
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3  Hydrocarbon EndowmEnt sEEn In VarIous FIscal 
and EconomIc IndIcators
The hydrocarbon endowment of the GCC countries is reflected in a num-
ber of fiscal and economic indicators, including:
• Budget breakeven (BBE) oil price: This is the required oil price for 
a fiscal budget to be balanced. GCC budget breakeven oil prices have 
largely fallen since the peak in 2014 until 2017 as GCC governments 
reduced spending and introduced fiscal reforms. The hydrocarbon 
richer per capita countries have lower BBE oil prices, alongside lower 
external breakeven oil price (the oil price needed for the current 
account to be balanced). This lower BBE oil price again reflects that 
less of the hydrocarbon resources are spent on the national popula-
tion and more of the income from resources are saved. After the 
2014 shock, the UAE and Kuwait remain the most comfortable fis-
cally and have seen an improvement in their budgetary performance 
with the rise in the oil price from the oil price trough; whereas 
Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia lagged behind. It is feasible that 
the BBE price will again rise in the future if international oil prices 
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Fig. 9.3 GCC: Hydrocarbon endowment per capita reflected in current account 
and fiscal balances. (Source: Regional statistical agencies, ADCB estimates 
[2019, 25])
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recover or stabilize, and governments look to support growth and 
sentiment (Table 9.1).
• Debt to GDP: The hydrocarbon poorer per capita countries gener-
ally have higher government debt levels relative to GDP. The GCC 
countries largely entered this oil price crisis with low government 
debt levels (with the exception of Bahrain), as they used the strong 
oil prices from prior years to reduce their debt levels. Again in the 
case of the UAE the low overall debt position relative to GDP stems 
from Abu Dhabi, with Dubai seeing higher levels. However, the 
larger fiscal deficits in Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia from 2015 
with the correction in the oil price have resulted in greater funding 
requirements and a faster acceleration of government debt. This rise 
in the debt stock is resulting in more government spending being 
allocated to interest payments and debt servicing. For most GCC 
countries except Bahrain, interest payments still account for a small 
share of overall spending (Figs. 9.5 and 9.6).
• Foreign currency reserve position: The hydrocarbon richer per 
capita countries have been able to build up significant foreign cur-
rency reserves, reflecting their larger fiscal surpluses during times of 
higher oil prices. Moreover, there has been less pressure to draw 
down these reserves to cover fiscal deficits. Income from these 
reserves, often invested by their sovereign wealth funds (SWF), pro-
vides an additional source of income (investment) to the govern-
ment and in a way is a form of revenue diversification. Saudi Arabia 
was looking to sell 5% of Aramco,1 in part to increase overseas invest-
ment and thereby boost and diversify government income. The 
1 Aramco listed its shares domestically on the Tadawul exchange on 11 December 2019, 
raising USD25.6 billion from a 1.5% stake sale. Subsequently, it also  exercised its “greenshoe 
option” to sell an additional 450 million shares, taking the total stake sale to 1.725%.
Table 9.1 GCC: Fiscal budget breakeven oil price (USD per barrel)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Bahrain 76 81 99 112 116 119 116 118 107 103
Oman 65 66 71 81 83 96 103 96 89 84
Saudi 57 65 67 78 79 92 106 95 96 78
UAE 44 66 70 74 77 76 83 65 60 65
Qatar 29 27 33 38 43 50 54 50 53 57
Kuwait 34 29 45 43 49 52 56 49 47 51
Source: IIF (2018, 3)
9 FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY AND HYDROCARBON ENDOWMENT PER CAPITA… 
222





























Fig. 9.4 GCC: Hydrocarbon endowment also reflected in regional FX reserve* 
positions. (*Includes reserves with SWFs and held at central banks. Source: 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, Regional Central Banks, ADCB estimates [GDP])




























2014 2018 PP Increase, % of GDP
Fig. 9.5 GCC: Hydrocarbon poorer per capita countries have largely seen a 
faster rise in government debt. (Source: IMF, ADCB estimates)
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reduction of foreign currency reserves since 2015 is however most 
clearly visible in the Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority’s net foreign 
asset (NFA) position, which highlights the drawdown in reserves to 
help fund the fiscal deficit. For other GCC countries, a significant 
part of their foreign currency reserves are held by SWFs and thus 
there is limited visibility (Fig. 9.4).
• Sovereign ratings: foreign currency reserve positions and govern-
ment debt levels are also reflected in the sovereign ratings of GCC 
countries. The hydrocarbon richer per capita countries have substan-
tially higher sovereign ratings, underpinned by large foreign cur-
rency reserves and low debt levels. Notably, despite the sharp 
correction in the oil price, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait have not seen any 
ratings downgrades by the three main ratings agencies since 2014. 
Moreover, their ratings remain among the strongest globally. On the 
other hand, Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia have seen multiple 
downgrades over this same period. The ratings are reflected in the 
cost of borrowing and the risk premium, with hydrocarbon poorer 
per capita countries more susceptible to changes in global sentiment 





















































Total GCC Debt, USD billion (LHA)
Total GCC Debt, % GDP (RHA)
Fig. 9.6 GCC: gross government debt has risen sharply since 2014, limited fiscal 
space for some countries. (Source: IMF, ADCB estimates)
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and dependent on capital inflows (to cover fiscal and current account 
shortfalls and to support investment and diversification programs) 
(Table 9.2).
• GDP per capita and unemployment: Reflecting the fact that 
fewer resources in relative terms have to be used to support their 
populations, the hydrocarbon richer per capita countries also tend 
to have higher GDP per capita and spending power. Moreover, 
unemployment levels for nationals tend to be lower, though 
regional data on this front is limited. The hydrocarbon richer 
countries also tend to have a larger share of expatriates in their 
populations, given their relatively smaller national populations 
relative to economy size and the ability of the public sector to 
employ nationals.





Current Change Mid- 
2014
Current Change Mid- 
2014
Current Change
Bahrain BBB BB- 4 
notches 
down
Baa2 B2 6 
notches 
down
BBB B+ 5 
notches 
down
Kuwait AA AA No 
change
Aa2 Aa2 No 
change
AA AA No 
change
Oman -NA- BB+ 2 
notches 
downa
A1 Ba1 6 
notches 
down
A BB 6 
notches 
down
Qatar AAb AA− 1 notch 
down
Aa2 Aa3 1 notch 
down




AA A+ 2 
notches 
down
Aa3 A1 2 
notches 
down
AA− A− 3 
notches 
down





AA AA No 
change
Aa2 Aa2 No 
change
AA AA No 
change
Source: Bloomberg
a2 notches down from 3 Jan 2017
bRatings started from 3 June 2015
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There are, naturally, variations within the GCC based on government 
policy and effectiveness. During times of high oil prices, Kuwait saw sub-
stantially larger fiscal surpluses as a percentage of GDP (2005–2008), as 
the government made limited progress in its investment plans, partly due 
to the difficult relationship between the cabinet and the National Assembly. 
Meanwhile, in the case of Qatar, government debt was higher at end-1990, 
reaching 74.4% of GDP in 1999, given borrowing to develop the gas 
industry. However, the rise in gas income resulted in a sharp reduction in 
government debt to 8.9% of GDP in 2007, and FX reserves rose. As noted 
earlier, GCC countries used strong oil revenues in 2002–2014 to reduce 
debt levels, though aggregate government debt have risen from 2014 to 
well above the 2002 peak in absolute terms, largely driven by the hydro-
carbon per capita poorer countries. Notable, Saudi Arabia started issuing 
external debt from end-2016, earlier all of the government debt was SAR 
denominated.
4  FIscal rEForm momEntum
The period between 2003 and 2014 generally saw strongly expansionary 
government spending from the GCC countries. This pickup in govern-
ment was supported by the strengthening in the oil price from around 
2002, though the pace of spending increase also varied between the GCC 
countries. For example, Saudi Arabia initially took a more cautious 
approach, whilst focusing on reducing government debt levels. Notably, 
this debt repayment also supported liquidity in the banking sector (with all 
government debts being domestic at this point, including those held by 
banks and pension organizations), indirectly providing a boost to eco-
nomic activity. Much of the initial increases in spending during this period 
was led by UAE (Dubai) and Qatar (including the development of the gas 
sector) and partly debt led, though with the broader pace rising across the 
GCC from around 2003.
The increase in government spending until 2011 was both on the cur-
rent and the capital fronts, though overall the capital expenditure had 
limited impact in broadening the economic base. In many cases, a signifi-
cant part of the investment was to upgrade infrastructure, compensating 
for weak periods of investment in the 1980s and 1990s with low and vola-
tile oil prices, and for the rise in population. However, we also note that, 
in many cases, higher investment spending was implemented by govern-
ment related entities (GREs), and thus not reflected in the governments’ 
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budgets. From 2012, there was a shift across the GCC toward current 
expenditure, likely impacted by the MENA Arab Spring developments. 
The overall rise in government spending was reflected in the rise in the 
BBE oil price of the GCC countries from 2004 to a peak in 2014, and 
supported by the overall rise in the oil price (ex-2009). GCC countries 
largely saw fiscal surpluses over this period (ex-2009), with the exception 
of Bahrain, which saw a sustained deficit since 2009. However, with the 
sharp correction in the oil price from end-2014, the focus of fiscal policy 
shifted towards retrenchment and reform (Figs. 9.7 and 9.8).
Since end-2014, the pace of fiscal reform in the GCC has gathered 
momentum. This is especially important, given (1) the large youth popu-
lation and national population growth rates and (2) medium- to long- 
term structural challenges to the oil price, including from new technology 
(shale, renewable energy sources). GCC economies will have to create 
jobs to cater for the entry of nationals into the work force (please see our 
labor market and reform chapter), with educational reforms also vital for 
supporting the needs of the private sector and economic development. 
Without this job creation, greater pressure will fall on the governments to 
support the national populations, through jobs creation or by a support 
framework.



















































GCC Weighted Spending Growth, % (LHA)
Brent Crude, USD p/b (RHA)
Fig. 9.7 GCC: Government spending growth was strong between 2003 and 
2014. (Source: Reuters (oil price), spending growth calculated from regional sta-
tistical agencies and IMF GDP data)
 M. MALIK AND T. NAGESH
227
The fiscal reforms have been much wider than seen in previous oil price 
downturns, indicating that areas that were previously seen as sensitive are 
open to change and reform. For example, subsidies have been reduced, 
which was not the case in the 1980s and 1990s, when the main fiscal 
adjustment was through the retrenchment of spending. A significant 
development for the GCC was the introduction of VAT in Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE on 1 January 2018 and in Bahrain in January 2019. This was 
a vital initial step in developing tax revenue in the region, which has a weak 
tax base.
5  PHasEs In Gcc FIscal rEForm
The pace and focus of fiscal consolidation across the GCC has varied over 
the past few years. For the main fiscal reform measures introduced, please 
see Appendix A.






































GCC Total Spending Growth
Fig. 9.8 GCC: Drivers of total GCC spending growth, by capital and current 
expenditure. (Source: Calculated from regional statistical agencies and IMF 
GDP data)
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5.1  Phase 1: Expenditure Cutbacks and Subsidy Reforms 
in 2015 and 2016
The initial response by governments was to substantially cut back govern-
ment expenditure, especially on the capital front. It is generally harder to 
retrench current expenditure in the GCC, given the dominance of public 
sector wages. Weighted GCC government expenditure fell by c.11.4% in 
2015 and by a further 11.1% in 2016. In 2015, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE saw a double-digit contraction in government spending. Between 
2014 and 2018, Qatar and Kuwait saw a significant pullback in govern-
ment spending. The UAE drop was the least among the hydrocarbon 
richer per capita countries, as Dubai adopted an expansionary fiscal posi-
tion, whereas Abu Dhabi actually was particularly proactive in cutting gov-
ernment spending. The hydrocarbon richer per capita countries are 
generally in a stronger position to reduce government spending as a lower 
amount of total expenditure goes on public sector wages, reflecting the 
difficulties in cutting this key component of current expenditure. 
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia and Oman also saw a significant retrenchment 
in total expenditure during this period, with only Bahrain seeing limited 
pullback in expenditure during this period (Figs. 9.9 and 9.10).






























Fig. 9.9 GCC: Government sharply pulled back spending in 2015 and 2016 in 
response to the lower oil price. (Source: Calculated from regional statistical agen-
cies and IMF data)
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Alongside a direct pullback in government spending, GCC govern-
ments also adopted wider measures to strengthen their fiscal positions. 
First, a number of countries have also focused on streamlining govern-
ment related entities (GRE), so as to reduce costs and potentially increase 
returns for the government. This has included job cuts alongside mergers 
amongst entities in similar economic areas. The objective is to boost effi-
ciencies and extract cost synergies. This trend was most visible in Abu 
Dhabi, where mergers were seen in a number of areas including amongst 
banks and companies in the hydrocarbon sector. In Abu Dhabi, there have 
also been signs that GREs have had to become more reliant on raising 
their own funding or unlocking value of their assets to meet spending and 
development plans, thereby reducing the support required from the cen-
tral government. A later example of this is the part privatization of 
ADNOC distribution in December 2017. In Qatar, the rationalization 
included reducing the GRE workforce, with Qatargas and RasGas also 
merging. The new entity, called Qatargas, started operations on 1 January 
2018. There were wider adjustments, with a number of the major GCC 
corporates having some form or degree of government ownership, includ-
ing national oil companies, national utilities companies, telecoms opera-































Fig. 9.10 GCC: Change in government spending from 2014 to 2018. (Source: 
Calculated from regional statistical agencies and IMF data)
9 FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY AND HYDROCARBON ENDOWMENT PER CAPITA… 
230
Second, there were also increases in a number of government fees and 
the introduction of new ones. Importantly, progress was made on subsidy 
reforms—which is vital to improving fiscal sustainability, especially as the 
marginal ability to reduce spending moderate after the first few years. 
Subsidy reforms have mostly centered on rising fuel and utility prices, with 
the UAE kicking off the process in 2015 after some earlier price adjust-
ments in the UAE and Qatar. Notably, these reforms have impacted 
nationals as well as expatriates, alongside corporates. UAE and Saudi 
Arabia have made some significant reductions in their subsidy framework, 
whilst Kuwait has seen limited reforms with ongoing opposition from the 
National Assembly. See Moerenhout in this volume for a detailed over-
view of energy subsidy reforms.
Third, there were moderate labor sector reforms. In a significant move, 
Saudi Arabia moved to reduce public sector wages and benefits in October 
2016. This was notable, as reducing public sector wages had been/is seen 
as socially sensitive, especially, given the greater proportion of nationals 
working in the public sector versus the private. However, these were fairly 
short-lived.
5.2  Phase 2: Reduction in Pace of Reform in 2017; 
Stabilization in Spending
The pace of fiscal reform moderated markedly in 2017, which partly high-
lights reform fatigue and the difficulty of sustaining a multi-year reform 
program, in our view (Fig. 9.11). The weakening in economic momentum 
as a result of fiscal adjustments limited the ability of the economy to absorb 
new measures. This is particularly magnified in the GCC by the dominant 
role of the government in driving economic activity. Notably, a critical fac-
tor supporting the more gradual pace of fiscal adjustment in 2017 was a 
rise in the oil price, especially in 2H2017. Central to this was the change 
in OPEC’s oil policy from one of increasing oil production to increase 
market share (2015 and 2016) to one of cutting output to help reduce the 
global oversupply and push up the price. The non-OPEC countries 
involved in this deal included Oman and Bahrain, alongside large global 
producers, such as Russia. Compliance was strong in 2017, in a large part 
due to greater-than-required production cuts from Saudi Arabia.
Most of the narrowing in GCC deficits in 2017 was largely due to 
higher oil revenue, albeit overall spending was also restrained and the pace 
of fiscal reform slowed. Weighted GCC fiscal spending was virtually flat in 
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2017, rising by a modest 0.9%. This spending growth calculation is based 
on delayed payments from previous years made by Saudi Arabia govern-
ment contractors in end-2016 (around SAR80 billion) being included in 
the 2016 fiscal accounts, alongside for “surplus projects” (SAR25 billion) 
(Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2016a, 14).
There were some limited new fiscal reforms, including the introduction 
of an excise tax on harmful goods (cigarettes, sugary and energy drinks) in 
Saudi Arabia (June) UAE (October) and Bahrain (December). Kuwait 
and Oman also reduced water and electricity subsidies in 2017, aimed at 
certain sectors (Appendix A). Saudi Arabia did not progress with further 
subsidy reforms that were planned for the year under its Fiscal Balance 
Program 2020 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2016b, 38). These included 
linking electricity 100% to reference prices and raising gasoline and diesel 
prices. Both were initially planned for mid-2017. Overall, there were lim-
ited major fiscal reforms in 2017.
There were however also some reversals of earlier reforms. In Saudi 
Arabia, public sector wages and benefits introduced in October 2016 were 
reversed (April 2017). A decree reinstated all allowances, financial benefits 
and bonuses to public employees and military staff. Moreover, a two- 
month salary bonus for forces fighting on the frontline in Yemen was 
announced. Moreover, in December 2017, the government pushed out its 
balanced budget target to 2023 from the 2020 date initially set in the 












































































































- Deep cutbacks in government spending, particualrly 
capital
- Subsidy refroms -fuel and utility prices raised
Impact -Marked softening in domestic demand
Oil policy focusing on maintianing market share
Oil policy focusing on market rebalancing -namely reducing global inventories to support 
the oil price, but suppling market at times of stress
Phase 3 –2018-2019
- Variation in deepening non-oil revenue -VAT (UAE, 
Saudi and Bahrain), excise tax
- Some limited further subsidy reforms
- Increase in govt. expenditure
Impact -Further moderate pick-up in domestic 
demand, though still weak
Brent crude, USD p/b
Phase 2 -2017 
- Stabilisation in government 
expenditure
- Tentative increase in 
government revenues (excise 
tax)
Impact -Some breathing space to 
absorb earlier fiscal consolidation 
and relief pickup in non-oil 
activity; Limited growth support
Fig. 9.11 GCC: Phases of fiscal reforms relative to oil price developments and 
policy. (Source: Reuters (oil price), authors’ assumptions)
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allows more time to introduce reforms as well as to generate greater gov-
ernment expenditure. Subsidy price reforms (including fuel, gas for indus-
try and utility prices) will be stretched over a longer period, with 
adjustments occurring until 2025 to reach international levels.
5.3  Phase 3: Shift to Expansionary Fiscal Stance from 2018; 
Introduction of VAT
After years of fiscal reforms that have placed downward pressure on eco-
nomic activity, GCC governments’ priorities started showing some signs 
of shifting to supporting growth from 2018 on. The fiscal budgets for 
2018 indicated a clear shift towards expansionary spending stances to sup-
port economic activity. The stronger oil price outlook for 2018 supported 
the higher government spending, requiring a weaker magnitude of overall 
fiscal adjustment (expenditure and reforms combined). We estimate that 
aggregate government spending rose to 7.2% in 2018, though again there 
were variations is the rise in expenditure across the region. Saudi Arabia 
particularly saw a significant increase, with total spending rising by 10.8% 
in 2018. Most of the marked fiscal improvement in 2018 in the GCC fiscal 
positions was largely due to higher hydrocarbon revenues and GCC fiscal 
positions strengthened despite the pickup in government spending.
Most of the fiscal reforms across the GCC focus on deepening non-oil 
revenue (Figs. 9.12 and 9.13), while raising government expenditure to 
support economic activity and meet wider medium-term economic goals, 
including diversification. Nevertheless, the reform measures were more 
generally periodic with differences between countries. The most signifi-
cant and coordinated policy was between Saudi Arabia and the UAE with 
the introduction of VAT. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain also imple-
mented another round of energy subsidy reforms. There have been some 
relatively small moves to boost non-oil revenue, including raising the cost 
of government fees and introducing new ones. As noted earlier, some 
GCC countries (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and UAE) have introduced an 
excise tax on harmful goods, such as tobacco and sugary drinks. There 
have only been limited attempts at tax reform across the region, with only 
Oman making some progress. Oman raised the corporate tax rate from 
12% to 15% for all companies in February 2017, eliminating the exemp-
tion on the first OMR 30,000 of taxable profits that was previously in 
place. Oman also sold 10% stake on the Khazzan gas field at the end of 
2018 to Malaysia’s Petronas, as a way to raise revenue.
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Fig. 9.12 Global: GCC countries more reliant on hydrocarbon revenues than 
other commodity producers. (Source: IMF [2016, 9])




























Fig. 9.13 GCC: Hydrocarbon earnings still dominate revenues; Kuwait and 
Bahrain see smallest reduction. (Source: Calculated from regional statistical agen-
cies and IMF data)
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5.4  VAT Introduction, the Main Reform in Phase 3
The introduction of VAT is a highly positive development toward deepen-
ing and diversifying government revenues and deepening taxable income. 
The weak tax across the GCC has been a central factor for hydrocarbon 
revenue’s dominance of total revenue despite the recent moves to reduce 
subsidies and broaden and increase government fees. The GCC states 
depend on hydrocarbon revenues more than other high commodity- 
exporting economies, with hydrocarbon revenues still accounting for 
between 50–85% of total revenues despite the fall in the oil price. We 
believe that the 5% standard VAT rate has been set to balance raising gov-
ernment revenue with limiting downside pressure on economic activity 
(by dampening domestic demand). The 5% rate is low on a global basis. 
The average VAT rate globally is c.15%, with most countries having seen a 
rise in their VAT rates over time.
The UAE raised AED27 billion in revenue from VAT in 2018—equiva-
lent to around 1.8% of GDP. ADCB estimated that Saudi Arabia should 
have raised c.1.5–1.6% of GDP in the first year of its VAT introduction 
(ADCB 2017, 1). ADCB noted that the UAE and Saudi Arabia will likely 
see the greatest proportional revenue generation in the GCC. In the case 
of the UAE, this reflects the larger share of private consumption in the 
economy. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has implemented a broad VAT base 
aimed at maximizing revenue from the new tax, including in areas such as 
private education and healthcare. Revenue raised by VAT is expected to 
increase from the second year as private consumption normalizes.
Whilst the introduction of VAT in the GCC was meant to be coordi-
nated to avoid competitive distortions across the region, there are indica-
tions that other GCC countries could see delays. Under the Unified VAT 
Agreement, which outlines a common framework, other GCC countries 
have 12 months to introduce the tax once the first two have done so. 
Indeed, by the time of publishing, only Bahrain had introduced VAT in 
January 2019 linked to its Fiscal Balance Program, which was announced 
in October 2018 and aims to balance the fiscal budget by 2022. The fiscal 
program is vital for the GCC five-year support package for Bahrain. 
However, indications suggest the VAT base is likely to have been narrower 
than those in UAE and Saudi Arabia, with more areas being zero-rated. 
For example, oil products would be exempt from VAT in Bahrain.
In Kuwait, the National Assembly’s budget committee announced in 
May 2018 that the government will postpone the implementation of VAT 
until 2021. Finance minister Nayef al-Hajraf noted in an interview that 
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the government is facing opposition from parliament to VAT (Bloomberg 
2018). Qatar has as yet given no indication as to when it plans to imple-
ment the indirect tax despite having made solid progress with the frame-
work in 2017. Meanwhile, Oman has announced that it will postpone 
introduction until 2021, as outlined in the July 2019 Government of 
Oman bond prospectus (Reuters 2019). Earlier indications suggested that 
Oman will likely introduce a narrow VAT base that will exclude areas such 
as food, included in Saudi Arabia and the UAE (ADCB 2018, 9).
5.5  Measures to Support Growth
However, Saudi Arabia and UAE both introduced measures in 2018 to 
bolster economic activity, which had been impacted by the fiscal policy. In 
the UAE, a number of wider factors were also acting as headwinds to the 
non-oil sectors, including the indirect impact of fiscal reforms in other 
countries contributing to weak external demand. We believe that the 
direct support in Saudi Arabia was much greater in 2019, with the mea-
sures introduced largely cancelling the fiscal reforms (VAT, subsidy reduc-
tions, rise in expatriate fees, etc.). On an individual household basis, we 
believe that some will not be fully insulated from the impact of fiscal 
reforms, particularly those working in the private sector and expatriates. In 
the case of the UAE, the support measures were wider based (i.e. rather 
than fiscal based), including changes to investment regulation. Thus, we 
believe that the UAE likely saw fiscal consolidation in 2018 with the intro-
duction of VAT, while in the case of Saudi Arabia it was largely offset by 
the higher government spending.
In the case of Saudi Arabia, a public sector support package was 
announced in early January, just days after the introduction of VAT and 
the reduction in electricity and fuel tariffs. The one-year package was 
aimed at reducing the burden of the fiscal reforms implemented, with a 
number of corporates following the government by temporarily boosting 
wages for some nationals including Aramco and SABIC.  The support 
package included a cost of living allowance and bonus for civil servants 
and military personnel (see later for more details). Thus the overall effect 
of the government’s fiscal reforms measures in 2018 was muted by the 
measures that it introduced to shield the national population from the 
introduction of VAT and lower subsidies. Alongside the handout package, 
Saudi Arabia also introduced a Citizens Account Program—transfers to 
support low- and middle-income families—introduced in end December 
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2017. The program eventually developed into a comprehensive social 
security platform. Notably, the public sector handout package was 
extended for a further year and will also be paid in 2019. The preliminary 
data for 2018 indicated that the government’s current expenditure (which 
includes wages) rose by a significant 14.3% in 2018, up SAR103.2 billion. 
Investment spending contracted by SAR2.6 billion in 2018, down −1.2% 
(Fig. 9.14).
In the case of the UAE, a number of economic support packages were 
announced in mid-2018—on both a country-wide and emirate levels—
with additional details being announced subsequently. The support pack-
ages look to (1) reduce short-term pressure on corporates; (2) boost the 
competitiveness of the economy; (3) structurally strengthen the business 
environment and raise investment levels (domestic and international); and 
(5) support human capital development and accumulation, amongst oth-
ers. On a country-wide basis, there have been announcements related to 
changes to residency and investment laws, including lengthening resi-
dency visas for up to 10 years for professionals in key sectors and for for-
eign investors establishing businesses in the country. Moreover, companies 
will be allowed to own 100% of their business outside free trade zones (the 
current limit is 49%) in certain sectors. The various packages also had a 
number of measures on the fiscal side, inclusive of reductions in fees for 
government services (Abu Dhabi and Dubai), alongside the outlook for 
higher spending in areas, such as housing, roads, infrastructure and 































Fig. 9.14 GCC: Gradual recovery in real non-oil GDP growth from 2017 with 
modest pickup in government spending and more limited fiscal reforms. (Source: 
Calculated from regional central banks, statistical agencies and IMF data, ADCB 
estimates (2019, 4))
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healthcare. For more details of the measures introduced to support eco-
nomic activity, please see Appendix B. There have been more announce-
ments related to these measures in 2019, either providing more details or 
broadening the measures.
Fiscal developments in 2019 so far indicate an overall continuation in 
the 2018 fiscal stance, that is, one of expansionary spending stance, mea-
sures to support growth, with limited fiscal reforms in 2019, as govern-
ments continue to look to support their respective countries’ growth 
outlook over further fiscal consolidation. A number of countries announced 
expansionary budget, with the UAE and Saudi budgets pointing to the 
greatest planned increase in spending. Data showed that total government 
spending in Saudi expanded by 8.5% in 1Q2019. Fiscal reforms in 2019 
have remained patchy and relatively limited—such as the introduction of 
an excise tax in Qatar and Oman, rise in water prices in Oman and higher 
expat levies (individuals and corporates) in Saudi Arabia. However, the 
Saudi government announced a relief scheme for some companies to ease 
the impact of rising labor costs in February 2019. Saudi Arabia also 
announced new retail fuel prices for 2Q2019 (effective 14 April), with 
Aramco announcing that retail fuel prices will be set on a quarterly basis, 
subject to crude oil export prices. The only key exception where we expect 
to see rising fiscal consolidation and reforms is Bahrain, linked to its 
medium-term fiscal adjustment program. Meanwhile, OPEC+ countries 
again decided to cut output from January 2019 to support the oil price, 
with the production targets extended from July 2019. Nevertheless, the 
ability to loosen fiscal policy remains limited with the current oil price, 
though with the variations linked to the hydrocarbon endowment and the 
BBE oil price.
6  GrEatEst adjustmEnt by country
Alongside the variations in the timeline of reforms, there has been varying 
progress in the pace of reform across the GCC as well. The UAE and to a 
lesser degree Saudi Arabia have been the most proactive in introducing 
fiscal reforms. This reflects that other economic, social and political factors 
are important for the ability of regional governments to progress with fis-
cal reforms. However, we believe that hydrocarbon endowment will likely 
play a strong role, especially in terms of implementing a multi-year reform 
program. Factors likely contributing include the variations in GDP per 
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capita amongst the national population across the region and their ability 
to absorb fiscal adjustments, especially on a cumulative basis.
The UAE has frontloaded much of the fiscal adjustment and cutback in 
spending. The pace of subsidy reform in Abu Dhabi and the broadening 
and raising of government fees have occurred at a steady and staggered 
pace since early 2015 and early 2018 (with the introduction of VAT). The 
UAE, with its high hydrocarbon endowment per capita and greater pace 
of fiscal reform, has one of the strongest fiscal positions among GCC 
countries, in our view. Moreover, it benefits from the more diversified 
nature of Dubai’s economy, which however was not immune to the fall in 
the oil price, given the softening in regional demand.
In Saudi Arabia, the pace of reform has been patchier despite announc-
ing a very ambitious fiscal reform program in 2016 for a balanced budget 
by 2020, though this target was then extended to 2023. There have been 
two main phases of subsidy reforms in Saudi Arabia—(1) end-2015 and 
January 2016 and (2) January 2018. The impact of the second round of 
subsidy reforms on Saudi citizens and the introduction of VAT was damp-
ened shortly after, with the introduction of an allowance package for pub-
lic sector employees. Moreover, the reduction in public sector benefits in 
Saudi Arabia was short-lived and was reversed. Overall, this still reflects the 
sensitivity and cautiousness in implementing fiscal reforms that touch 
Saudi households (Table 9.3).
The other four GCC countries have seen a more moderate pace of fiscal 
reform, in our focus time period. There have been no major reforms in 
Qatar since 2017—following the regional developments, the govern-
ment’s focus is on stabilizing and supporting the economy. In Kuwait, 
there has been substantial populist opposition to fiscal reform, led by the 
National Assembly. This is the most independent legislature in the GCC 
and a central stumbling block for the government to make progress with 
its fiscal reforms. For Bahrain, wider GCC support was vital for the invest-
ment program, given the limited fiscal reforms. However, going forward, 
the pace of fiscal reforms in Bahrain is expected to strengthen for contin-
ued GCC support. GCC countries (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE) 
pledged USD10 billion in aid to Bahrain in October 2018, significantly 
reducing short-term funding pressures. The GCC support package will be 
spread over five years and will be linked to Bahrain’s Fiscal Balance 
Program, which was announced straight after the aid package and aims to 
balance the budget by 2022. As noted earlier, VAT was already introduced 
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in 2019 and the 2019 draft budget sees a 12% drop in government spend-
ing in 2019.
The hydrocarbon poorer per capita countries tend to spend more on 
wages and salaries as a total share of spending, whilst debt servicing costs 
have also been increasing with rising debt levels. Moreover, with higher 
GDP per capita in the hydrocarbon richer per capita countries, their popu-
lations can more easily absorb fiscal reforms, though it is also of course a 
function of other factors, including a change in the social contract. The 
larger expatriate populations relative to domestic populations in the 
hydrocarbon richer per capita counties also support greater fiscal reforms. 
On the other hand, the nationals of the relatively hydrocarbon poorer per 
capita countries are more impacted by the subsidy reforms, resulting in 
some cases in greater pushback. Moreover, the need for fiscal reform tends 
to be greater in these countries, though this can be a positive point in 
ultimately supporting fiscal reforms going forward.
7  conclusIon
GCC fiscal reforms have been much wider than seen in previous oil price 
downturns, with areas that were previously seen as too sensitive to tackle 
are open to reform and change. GCC countries have implemented a num-
ber of reforms since 2014, alongside a deep pullback in government 
spending—the main earlier method of adjusting to lower oil price. The 
reduction in subsidies and the introduction of taxes, including for the 
Table 9.3 Components of allowance package, announced on 6 January 2018
Monthly cost of living allowance for one year
  • Military and Civil servants SAR1000
  • Retirement Pension and Social-benefit Recipients SAR500
Social Security Benefit payment SAR500
Student allowance 10% increase
VAT covered by government for first home purchase for nationals Up to 
SAR850,000
VAT covered for private healthcare and education services for 
nationals
–
Payment to military personnel serving in Southern border SAR5000
Annual Bonus for Military and Civil servants who worked in 2017 –
Source: Various media sources, cited in ADCB (2018, 2)
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national population, has been significant developments in our view. 
Despite this, oil income continues to be the main revenue source for GCC 
government and the need for further reforms to deepen tax revenue 
remains. Thus, while GCC economies continue to be reliant on hydrocar-
bon revenue and the social contracts remain, we continue to see hydrocar-
bon richer per capita countries as being the most sustainable in fiscal terms 
and in the strongest position to withstand a low oil price backdrop. These 
governments can better support their national populations.
However, the reforms program has not been uniform, either on a coun-
try basis or in a steady implementation of the adjustment period. On a 
country basis, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have seen the greatest pace of 
fiscal reforms out of all the GCC countries since 2015—one hydrocarbon 
richer per capita and one hydrocarbon poorer per capita. This indicates 
that other economic, social and political factors are important for the abil-
ity of regional governments to progress with fiscal reforms beyond the 
hydrocarbon endowment per capita of countries. However, we believe 
that hydrocarbon endowment will likely play a strong role, especially in 
terms of implementing a multi-year reform program. Factors likely con-
tributing include the variations in GDP per capita amongst the national 
population across the region and their ability to absorb fiscal adjustments, 
especially on a cumulative basis. Indeed, Saudi Arabia implemented a 
number of measures to limit the impact of reforms, particularly following 
the introduction of VAT and subsidy reforms in early 2018. In the case of 
the UAE, fuel prices have been liberalized and utility prices are likely close 
to market rates. Most of the UAE’s fiscal reforms have had to be absorbed 
by the economy, with limited measures to dampen the impact of reforms. 
However, the UAE has generally had to raise prices by a lower magnitude 
than Saudi Arabia, as they were not so low in absolute terms to start with.
The GCC developments highlight the difficulties in implementing a 
multi-year fiscal reform program during times of low oil prices, whilst also 
looking to widen the economic base. This is especially the case when the 
government has largely remained the main driver of economic activity and 
domestic demand, either directly through government spending and pol-
icy or via government-related entities. The narrow economic (diversifica-
tion) and private sector base highlights the difficulty in implementing a 
multi-year fiscal adjustment and austerity program. The fiscal consolida-
tion had led to a sharp slowdown in economic activity, which in turn limits 
the ability of the economy to absorb new fiscal reforms. In many other 
regions and countries, fiscal policy is often counter-cyclical to the wider 
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economy, whilst, in the GCC, the impact of consolidation is magnified by 
corporate entities are closely linked to governments and their spending 
plans. Moreover, with the largely ongoing social contract and the difficul-
ties in the government to increase employment numbers, labor policies are 
placing additional pressures on the private sectors at times when they are 
expected to drive growth and support the diversification of the economy.
It remains vital for GCC countries to continue with their fiscal reform 
programs, to reduce the reliance on the oil sector. Two factors will be 
central to boosting fiscal sustainability across the region, in our view: (1) 
the deepening of the tax base and (2) lowering the wage composition of 
government spending. Hydrocarbon earnings still dominate government 
revenue and are the main factors driving the overall fiscal position (magni-
tude of surplus or deficit). GCC tax levels remain low (corporate income 
tax, individual income tax and VAT) on a MENA and global basis. For 
some countries, further subsidy reforms are also required. A number of 
factors will be important for developing the tax base, including reducing 
the role of the public sector, improving the business climate and a frame-
work for supporting private sector growth. We focus on the issue of labor 
in our next chapter.
The need to progress with the fiscal reforms is vital, given the ongoing 
challenges to the oil sector is expected to face, including from improving 
technology, which will have supply and demand implications. Having a 
medium- to longer-term fiscal reform program, which progresses at a 
steady and gradual pace, could help with the implementation. At the same 
time, wider economic objectives could also be included to improve the 
sustainability of a fiscal reform framework and raise the capacity of the 
economies. Focus should also be on targeted measures, spending and 
investment to support key sectors for diversification, which will be vital in 
deepening the economy and absorbing further fiscal reforms. Indeed, the 
earlier period of high government spending growth from the early-2000s 
did not result in any meaningful economic diversification of the economy 
and the rise in government spending from 2008 has tended to be on the 
current side (rather than capital). Measures to attract FDI and strengthen 
the business environment will also be important. The gradual pace of 
reform should continue during times of higher oil prices and government 
spending should be very much targeted towards boosting investment 
rather than on increasing handouts, though developing an effective social 
protection framework to support the most vulnerable is important. Greater 
diversification and further developing the private sector will also be neces-
sary for increasing the employment opportunities for nationals.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9 FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY AND HYDROCARBON ENDOWMENT PER CAPITA… 
252
rEFErEncEs
ADCB Economic Research. 2017. GCC Economic Update – Assessing the eco-
nomic impact of VAT. (Published on 14 June 2017, authors Monica Malik and 
Shailesh Jha).
ADCB Economic Research. 2018. Oman Economic Update  – Previous invest-
ment paying dividends and boosting export capacity. (Published on 3 September 
2018, authors Monica Malik and Thirumalai Nagesh).
ADCB Economic Research. 2019. GCC Economic Update  – Fragile non-oil 
growth recovery with limited pick-up in momentum. (Published on 13 
February 2019, authors Monica Malik and Thirumalai Nagesh).
Bloomberg. 2018. Odd One Out? Kuwait Is Struggling to Pass VAT Agreed by 
Gulf (published 10 May 2018, authors Fiona MacDonald and Zainab Fattah).
IMF. 2016. Diversifying Government Revenue in the GCC: Next Steps. 
(Date 26 October 2016) https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/
eng/2016/102616.pdf.
Institute of International Finance. 2018. Hydrocarbon Exporters Breakeven Oil 
Prices have declined. (Published on 1 February 2018, authors Garbis Iradian 
and Boban Markovic).
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Finance. 2016a. 2017 Budget. https://
www.mof.gov.sa/en/financialreport/budget2017/Documents/The_
National_Budget.pdf.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 2016b. Fiscal Balance Program, Balanced Budget 2020. 
https://vision2030.gov.sa/en/bb2020.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 2017. Fiscal Balance Program, 2018 Update. https://
vision2030.gov.sa/en/bb2020.
Reuters. 2019. Oman to delay VAT to 2021 amid sluggish growth (published 30 July 
2019, author Davide Barbuscia) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oman-econ-
omy-vat/oman-to-delay-vat-to-2021-amid-sluggish-growth-idUSKCN1UP1TM.
 M. MALIK AND T. NAGESH
253
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits any noncommer-
cial use, sharing, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long 
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a 
link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if you modified the licensed 
material. You do not have permission under this licence to share adapted material 
derived from this chapter or parts of it.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to 
the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence 
and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the 
permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copy-
right holder.
9 FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY AND HYDROCARBON ENDOWMENT PER CAPITA… 
255© The Author(s) 2021
G. Luciani, T. Moerenhout (eds.), When Can Oil Economies Be 
Deemed Sustainable?, The Political Economy of the Middle East, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5728-6_10
CHAPTER 10




The social contract between the government and the population in GCC 
countries is central to the issues of fiscal reform and adjustment to the 
lower oil price, as we highlighted in our earlier chapter. The social contract 
is based on a framework of distribution of hydrocarbon earning and wealth 
to the national population, including areas, such as employment, health-
care, education, housing and subsidized fuel and utilities. A significant 
fiscal reform program, both on the revenue and expenditure sides, will 
result in a re-defining of this contract. The ability to continue to provide 
the same degree of support by GCC governments to the national popula-
tion is both impacted by the fall in hydrocarbon prices from end-2014 and 
the strong population growth over the last few decades. However, as 
noted earlier, there are marked variations on the ability to support the 
national population based on hydrocarbon endowment per capita.
M. Malik (*) • T. Nagesh 
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One of the main pillars of the social contract is the role of the public 
sector in the employment of nationals, whilst conversely, the private sector 
has benefited by the ability to employ cheaper expatriate labor. Historically, 
with the rise in oil revenue, particularly from the 1970s, though also ear-
lier, the influx of expatriate labor has been central for the quick transfor-
mation of the economy and the development of infrastructure. The IMF 
noted that productivity growth in the region has been unsatisfactory, and 
the strong economic expansion has been fuelled by low-cost foreign labor. 
This expatriate labor force has also been highly flexible and elastic, adjust-
ing to economic growth cycles. Meanwhile, the public sector employment 
of nationals was central to the quick rise in the living standard, alongside 
the deployment of wider social distribution. The IMF noted that for the 
Middle East Region “countries in the region have used public employ-
ment and compensation policies to achieve multiple socioeconomic objec-
tives, including employment and redistribution of wealth” (IMF 2018, 9). 
Public sector employment has generally been better paid than the private 
sector, with the tendency for jobs for life, generous pension schemes and 
























Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE
Fig. 10.1 GCC: Total population growth reflects economic cycles and the flex-
ibility of foreign labor. (Source: United Nations)
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With the lower oil price in the 1990s, GCC governments increasingly 
turned policy discussion towards diversification of the economic base and 
private sector development, in part to create job opportunities for nation-
als outside the public sector. Moreover, there were a number of initiatives 
to raise private sector employment directly, such as labor nationalization 
programs, and indirectly, educational reforms. However, the preference to 
work in the public sector remained, and with the sharp increase in the oil 
price in the 2000s, government hiring and spending on wages rose. Again, 
the region saw strong expatriate population growth as the higher oil rev-
enue supported an upgrading of infrastructure, alongside wider spending. 
The IMF noted that the rise in the public sector wage bill was attributable 
to both increase in government employment and high public sector wages 
(IMF 2014, 13). Furthermore, the IMF highlighted that GCC govern-
ments’ public sector wage bills are considerably larger than in other oil- 
exporting countries. Since 2014, the emphasis on private sector 
developments and diversification has reemerged and is being stressed, 
though it had remained a central tenet of medium-term development 
objectives (Figs. 10.3 and 10.4).
The need to create jobs for the youth population and, in some cases, to 
reduce the current levels of national unemployment remains one of the 
key focuses of domestic policy and arguably the greatest economic 



















































Saudi, % change (RHA)
Non-Saudi, % change (RHA)
Fig. 10.2 Saudi Arabia: Employment dynamics in the public sector. 
(Source: SAMA)
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Fig. 10.3 Saudi Arabia and Kuwait: Significant variations in composition of pub-





































Total Population, million (LHA)
Youth Population (under 20), % of total (RHA)
Fig. 10.4 GCC: Large youth population requires strong job creation. (Source: 
United Nations)
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challenge. We had argued in one of our earlier research reports on the 
Vision 2030 plan that “Ultimately, creating jobs for younger people and 
diversifying the economy will be the key litmus test to determine whether 
or not the transformation process has been successful” (ADCB 2017b, 3). 
Youth unemployment is already high in some countries, notably in Saudi 
Arabia and Oman, which are both relatively hydrocarbon poorer per cap-
ita countries with less diversified economies. The World Bank noted that 
“The main social concern for Oman is the lack of jobs and the adverse 
effects of subsidy reform on vulnerable households (World Bank 2018). 
Indeed, the greater social pressures in these two countries are reflected in 
their recent labor and fiscal policies. The national unemployment rate in 
the hydrocarbon richer per capita countries is lower, with a relatively small 
population which can more easily be absorbed by the public sector. 
Nevertheless, the young demographic profile across the region points to 
the need for strong job creation over the next five to ten years.
In this chapter, we develop the themes from our previous one—on 
hydrocarbon endowment per capita and fiscal reform—focusing on the 
context of population dynamics and the labor market. We note that the 
fiscal reform program this time has impacted the national population, 
making it significant and broader than the previous rounds. Nevertheless, 
any changes in the social contract were always going to be gradual and 
take time to redefine. There have been instances of measures introduced 
to mitigate the impact of the reforms on the domestic population and 
reduce short-term social pressures. Alongside the fiscal reforms, a number 
of labor reforms have also been introduced to support job creation in the 
private sector for nationals. With the rise in oil price from 2017, there have 
also been some tentative signs of greater hiring by the government, along-
side raising support in other areas, such as housing (Figs. 10.5 and 10.6).
2  natIonal PoPulatIon ImPacted by reforms; 
Greatest burden on exPatrIates
The broader nature of the fiscal adjustment has meant that the national 
population has been directly affected, making this reform cycle notable, 
especially compared to the previous one. The national population has 
been impacted by measures, such as the higher prices linked to the reduc-
tions in subsidies (fuel and utilities), the introduction of VAT and the 
excise tax. The fact that fiscal reforms have included areas that were 












0-9y 10-19y 20-29y 30-39y 40-49y 50-59y 60-69y 70-79y 80 plus
Fig. 10.5 GCC: Demographic profile of GCC population dominated by young 
and working age population. (Source: United Nations Population Division)






























Hydrocarbon Richer-per-Capita Hydrocarbon Poorer-per-Capita
Fig. 10.6 GCC: UAE and Qatar have higher GDP per capita among the GCC 
countries. (Source: IMF, WEO April 2019)
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previously seen as being too sensitive to change or tackle is a significant 
step, even though the social contract remains in place. This potentially 
opens the door for deeper and wider fiscal reforms going forward in the 
medium- to longer-term. Nevertheless, overall a greater burden of the fis-
cal reforms has fallen on the expatriate population and in some cases cor-
porates, with the national population relatively more shielded, especially 
from 2017. With the corporate sector impacted by fiscal reform, it raises 
questions over the short-term ability of the private sector to drive real 
GDP growth and support the diversification of the economy. In some 
cases, the private sector has faced additional pressure due to labor market 
reforms. The development of a framework to boost private sector activity, 
including through PPP schemes, remains vital.
The trend to target more of the reform burden at expatriates was seen 
in a number of instances in the region, including in the last two rounds of 
utility subsidy reductions in Abu Dhabi. In January 2016, utility prices 
were increased just for higher-consumption expatriates. In January 2017, 
prices were raised for both expatriates and nationals, alongside corporate 
and government entities, though with the cost markedly higher for expa-
triates than nationals in absolute terms. According to the official statement 
announcing the January 2017 utility price changes, the amended tariffs 
reflect the actual cost of supplying water and electricity to all categories 
of  customers. This implies that prices have been largely liberalized 
(Table 10.1). In Kuwait, utility reforms of August 2017 targeted corpo-
rates, government entities and the investment sector. The investment sec-
tor includes real estate, and thus the higher prices affect the majority of 
expatriates who rent properties. When presenting the draft budget for 
FY2018–2019, the Kuwaiti minister of finance noted that the main reform 
“starts with curbing spending, while maintaining a healthy rate of capital 
expenditure on infrastructure and minimizing the impact of our fiscal 
reforms on citizens”.
As mentioned in our previous chapter, the Saudi government moved to 
reduce the impact of price increases on nationals following the rise in util-
ity and fuel prices and the introduction of VAT on 1 January 2018. A 
package of hand-outs for public sector employees was announced within 
one week of the 1 January price increases and came after signs of disap-
pointment with the latest austerity measures and after the cash handouts 
from the Citizens Account introduced at end-December 2017 fell short of 
covering rising living expenses. The Citizens Account is a means-tested 
cash-transfer program to support low- to middle-income households from 
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the negative consequences of fiscal reform. The first payment was on 21 
December 2017 ahead of the introduction of VAT and the second round 
of subsidy reforms. The swift response by the government in announcing 
the handout package is particularly notable given the wider reforms 
(including social), alongside developments, such as the anti-corruption 
drive in November 2017. We argued in our earlier research that economic 
reforms “are creating and redefining the economic, social, cultural and 
political structures in the Kingdom, as well as their relationships to each 
other” (ADCB 2017b, 2). As such, the government was quick to announce 
a package of support measures to reduce the impact of fiscal reforms for 
some nationals (particularly in the public sector) at a time of significant 
social, economic and political change. ADCB estimated that c.70% of 
Saudi households likely benefited from the government allowance 
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Water usage below 700 liters/day in 
apartments and 7000 liters in villas
AED0 AED1.7 AED2.09
Water usage above 700 liters/day in 
apartments and 7000 liters in villas
AED0 AED1.89 AED2.6
Expatriates
Power consumption below 
20 KwH/day in apartments and up 





Power consumption above 
20 KwH/day in apartments and up 









Water usage below 700 liters/day in 
apartments and 5000 liters in villas
AED2.2 AED5.95 AED7.84
Water usage above 700 liters/day in 
apartments and 5000 liters in villas
AED2.3 AED9.9 AED10.55 AED10.41
Source: Reuters, various media sources, cited from ADCB (2017a, 11)
aPrice increases effective 1 January 2017
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packages in 2018, with c.45% likely seeing higher net income from the 
Citizen Account program (low-income Saudi households) (ADCB 2018, 
1). Thus, expatriate households will be the most impacted by the reforms, 
especially when considering the levy on dependents from mid-2017 (see 
below). Notably, the public sector handout package for citizens (intro-
duced in January 2018) was extended for 2019, alongside annual public 
sector bonuses for all state employees from the start of 2019.
In Oman, the government announced mitigation measures to support 
the vulnerable population in 2018. These included i) allocating 
OMR100 million (USD260 million) to support vulnerable households, ii) 
a new fuel subsidy scheme where households with an income below 
OMR600 will receive 200 liters of petrol per month at a subsidized rate 
(World Bank 2018). As highlighted in our earlier chapter, Oman has seen 
relatively limited fiscal reforms in this cycle, which perhaps reflects the 
greater social pressures linked to high unemployment rate, especially 
amongst the youth. Oman has focused on progressing with projects, in 
part to create jobs, alongside maximize revenue from each barrel of oil and 
raising gas output. Outside the hydrocarbon and petrochemical side, key 
areas of investment include logistics (ports, airports, etc.), tourism, utili-
ties for industrial needs and other related infrastructure (road and rail). 
Foreign investment has been vital for supporting the investment drive, 
whilst also relying on raising debt and drawing down FX reserves to help 
cover the fiscal deficit. Out of the GCC countries, Oman has made the 
most progress with broadening the economic base since 2014. Bahrain 
also has made limited progress until 2019. These additional fiscal support 
packages, announced for public sector employees, reinforce the preference 
for nationals to work for government entities. Support measures have also 
been seen in other areas of the GCC. However, the UAE unified holiday 
between the private and public sectors in March 2019, with the aim of 
enhancing the attractiveness of the private sector for Emiratis.
3  Hydrocarbon endowment Per caPIta 
and tHe labor market
Alongside the fiscal reforms, a number of policy measures have been intro-
duced targeting the labor market to increase job opportunities for nation-
als in the private sector. Private sector job creation will be vital for (1) 
reducing social pressure, (2) the number of jobs required to be created by 
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the public sector and (3) the ability to introduce further subsidy and tax 
reforms going forward. Some countries have introduced or widened poli-
cies that target reducing the size of the foreign workforce, with the aim 
that these jobs will be replaced by nationals. The success of the programs 
has varied, though they have not addressed underlying factors, such as the 
cost of labor and skills mismatches. Within the GCC, the labor market 
pressures differ greatly, again reflecting the differences in hydrocarbon 
endowment per capita. The lower share of government spending on wage 
growth in the UAE and Qatar relative to other GCC countries (Figs. 10.7 
and 10.8) reflects the ability for the government to absorb the domestic 
labor force and support spending in wider areas, bolstering non- 
hydrocarbon economic activity. Reflecting this, expatriates make up a 
greater proportion of total population in hydrocarbon richer per capita 
countries versus the relatively poorer per capita ones. In the case of the 
UAE, the more diversified economic base also lowers reliance on govern-
ment jobs. In the case of Bahrain, the relatively more diversified economic 
backdrop supports the greater share of foreign employment in the labor 
force, versus Saudi and Oman. Kuwait stands out amongst the countries 
with higher hydrocarbon endowment per capita. We believe that the rela-
tively high share of government spending to the total likely mirrors (1) the 
preference and ability of the government to employ nationals, (2) 









UAE Qatar Oman Bahrain Kuwait Saudi
Fig. 10.7 GCC: Government spending on wages high in the region, though 
lower in the UAE and Qatar. (Source: IMF (2018, 9))
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relatively limited progress with the government investment program and 
(3) a less diversified economy. Government subsidies, handouts and public 
sector wages in Kuwait are some of the most generous in the region.
All GCC countries already had employment nationalization program to 
some degrees. The hydrocarbon richer per capital countries generally have 
lower employment targets and quotas for nationals in the private sector. 
The need for job creation among nationals remains high in the hydrocar-
bon poorer per capita countries, with the public sector unable to absorb 
all job seekers. Saudi Arabia and Oman have particularly focused on poli-
cies to replacing foreign labor with national in this round of reforms, in 
line with their challenging employment positions, and particularity from 
2017 (Table 10.2).
The latest data for Saudi Arabia show that the unemployment rate for 
nationals stood at 12.5% in 1Q2019 (male at 6.6% and female at 31.7%), 
up from 11.5% in 4Q2015. The youth unemployment rate is significantly 
higher, at 36.3% in 1Q2019 for the 20–24 age range (ADCB 2019, 1). 
Going forward, Saudi Arabia could face added demand for jobs from 
greater female participation, which stood at around 20.5% in 1Q2019. 
The Saudi government has introduced a number of measures to support 



























Share of National Population (%) Share of Expatriate Population (%)
Fig. 10.8 GCC: Hydrocarbon richer per capita countries tend to have larger 
expatriate population in relative share. (Source: Calculated from regional statistics 
agencies and World Bank for UAE data)
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female employment, including setting quotas for certain sectors, as well as 
introducing childcare programs. In Oman, the World Bank (citing ILO 
data) indicated that unemployment “was 17% in 2017, while youth unem-
ployment is approximately 49% — a pressing challenge in Oman where 
over 40% of the population is under the age of 25” (Figs. 10.9 and 10.10).
4  labor market reforms and PolIcIes to reduce 
foreIGn labor
Below we highlight some of the main labor market reforms introduced in 
this economic cycle. There are also some signs of greater public sector hir-
ing in Saudi Arabia, potentially reflecting the fact that the private sector is 
not generating sufficient jobs to reduce current unemployment levels 
meaningfully. It could also reflect the hiring by institution driving the 
transformation program such as the PIF, alongside the development of 
new institutions around key diversification projects. The number of Saudis 
employed in the civil services was, however, lower than in 1Q2016 by 
some 4.2  K—though insufficient to reduce the government wage bill, 
especially when considering the pay increases. Meanwhile, regarding the 









Governmental Private Sector Non-Profit Org.
Saudi Non-Saudi
Fig. 10.9 Saudi Arabia; Higher wages and benefits in the public sector support 
demand for government jobs. (Source: Saudi Arabia General Authority for 
Statistics)
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hydrocarbon richer per capita countries, Kuwait has seen the most popu-
list pressure to reduce foreign employment levels, despite the low unem-
ployment level and generous public sector packages, even on a GCC basis.
Saudi Arabia: The government has increased the number of sectors 
that require 100% Saudiization, particularly in the retail sector. This 
started with 100% Saudiization in mobile phones retail shops in 
September 2016, followed by car rental companies in March 2018. 
Also, in early 2018, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Labor issued a decree to 
implement 100% Saudiization in 12 new, mostly retail areas, including 
those concerned with watches, eyewear, medical equipment, electrical 
and electronic appliances, auto parts, building materials, carpets, cars 
and motorcycles, home and office furniture, children’s clothing and 
men’s accessories, home kitchenware and confectionery. Implementation 
started at end-September 2018  in three phases (to end by January 
2019) though the Saudiization target was scaled down to 70%, from the 
100% initially outlined (Albawaba 2018). Notably, the move to nation-
alize jobs in areas such as retail indicates that Saudis are accepting non-
managerial positions, which perhaps would not have been the case in 
previous decades.
% unemployment











































Fig. 10.10 Saudi Arabia: Unemployment rate amongst Saudi nationals remains 
high, especially females. (Source: Saudi Arabia General Authority for Statistics)
 M. MALIK AND T. NAGESH
269
Saudi Arabia also announced its decision to Saudiize management 
and specialist professions in the tourism hospitality sector in July 2019. 
The implementation will come into effect starting 28 December 2019 
for operating and specialized jobs, 22 June 2020 for supervisors and 
assistant managers, and 16 December 2020 for managers. The decision 
includes hotels classified as 3-star and above, resorts, hotel suites, and 
villas classified as 4-star and above. Jobs in booking, marketing and 
front offices will be 100% Saudiized, whilst 70% will be required for 
sales managers and events and conferences sales managers. Tourism and 
hospitality are expected to be key sectors of jobs creation, going for-
ward with a number of developments planned (NEOM, Red Sea, 
Al-Ula, Amaala, etc.). These Saudiization measures are likely aimed at 
ensuring that a significant part of new jobs being created as this sector 
develops go to nationals.
Moreover, the Saudi government has also raised fees and levies on for-
eign labor aimed at achieving two policy goals: (1) raising more non-oil 
revenue and (2) creating job opportunities for Saudis in the private sector. 
Saudi Arabia introduced a tax in July 2017, whereby expatriates have to 
pay SAR100 per month per dependent, including children and domestic 
staff. The fee was expected to raise SAR1  billion in 2017. These were 
some of the main fiscal reforms introduced by Saudi Arabia in 2017, 
alongside an excise tax on harmful products. This fee will rise by SAR100 
per year from 2018 to 2020 and will mostly affect professional expatriates. 
Saudi Arabia also announced a levy on expatriate employees at companies 
from January 2018, where foreign labor is equal to or exceeds national 
employees. Again the fee will rise on an annual basis, though by SAR200 
per year. The wage (and skills) gap between nationals and expatriates will 
likely not be bridged by this levy and thus will be an additional cost for 
companies to absorb (Table 10.3) (Figs. 10.11 and 10.12).
Oman: To support job creation for Omanis, a six-month ban on hiring 
expatriates began in January 2018  in 10 different industries, including 
media, information technology, marketing, insurance and aviation. The 
expatriate visa ban was extended for an additional six months at end-May, 
and extra sectors were added, including carpentry, metal, aluminium 
workshops and brick factories. The Omani government has also been 
looking to increase the number of nationals in the public sector. The visa 
ban was extended for a fourth time in mid-2019, again with four more 
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Table 10.3 Schedule of fees and levies on expatriates
Dependents for Expatsa No. of Expats equal to no. of 
Saudis in a companyb
Expats more than Saudis 
in a companyb
2017 SAR 100 per month from 
July onwards
2018 SAR 200 per month from 
July onwards
300 per month from January 
onwards
400 per month from 
January onwards
2019 SAR 300 per month from 
July onwards
500 per month from January 
onwards
600 per month from 
January onwards
2020 SAR 400 per month from 
July onwards
700 per month from January 
onwards
800 per month from 
January onwards
Source: Saudi Arabia Fiscal Balance Program 2020 (2016b, 51)
















Civil Service Public sector
Fig. 10.11 Saudi: Public sector employment seen rising though civil services 
hiring remains broadly steady. (Source: Saudi Arabia General Authority for 
Statistics)
categories added. Omanization quotas have also been increased in certain 
sectors, including industry and tourism. On 3 October 2017, Oman 
announced that 25 K jobs would be created for nationals in both the pri-
vate and public sectors starting from December.
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Kuwait: Some resentment against the expatriate population has been 
visible in Kuwait, including among some MPs in the National Assembly 
looking to capitalize on growing resentment against non-nationals. MP 
Safa Al-Hashem was quoted as saying that “Before asking citizens to pay, 
the government should reform the population mix by levying taxes on 
foreigners” (Bloomberg 2017). The populist belief is that lowering expa-
triate numbers will help to reduce the subsidy burden. The government 
introduced a framework in 2017 to reduce the number of foreign workers 
in ministries and government institutions to create jobs for nationals. 
According to Kuwait Times, some 2799 expatriate jobs were terminated 
from the government sector in the first year of implementation of the 
Kuwaitization push to replace expat employees with nationals (Kuwait 
Times 2018). The government issued a decree to reduce the number of 
expatriates in all government departments by fiscal year 2019–2020 to 
reach a 90% Kuwaitization rate (Arab Times). However, the president of 
the Civil Service Commission indicated that Kuwait is not in a position to 
replace all expatriates working in the public sector due to a shortage of 
potential Kuwaiti employees (Gulf News 2018). Meanwhile, a ban on 
recruiting expats under the age of 30 holding diplomas and higher degrees 
came into effect in July 2018 in an attempt to increase the hiring of younger 




































Fig. 10.12 Saudi: Unemployment rate amongst Saudi youth (20–24 years) high 
at 36.3% in 1Q2019. (Source: Saudi Arabia General Authority for Statistics)
10 GCC FISCAL REFORMS AND LABOR MARKET POLICIES 
272
Elsewhere, Abu Dhabi also announced plans to create at least 10 K jobs 
for Emiratis in the private and public sectors over the next five years in 
June 2018, as part of a multi-year stimulus plan (Ghadan 21). Dubai’s 
2019 budget looks to create 2498 additional positions. In Bahrain, the 
cabinet approved hikes in fees imposed on foreign labor licenses under a 
job nationalization program to BHD500 (from BHD200) in February 
2019 within the draft budget (Banker Middle East 2019). It also pro-
posed higher unemployment benefits for Bahrainis. On the other side, a 
key component of Bahrain’s Fiscal Balance Program is to introduce a vol-
untary retirement scheme to reduce government spending on wages. 
However, the progress with this is likely to be gradual.
GCC governments have also looked to progress with housing and edu-
cation projects for nationals, alongside schemes to promote housing loans 
(via the government entities or in conjunction in the private sector). A 
number of housing projects have been announced in the UAE for nation-
als. In Saudi Arabia, an objective of Vision 2030 is to raise home owner-
ship by nationals and a number of affordable housing programs have been 
introduced. In January 2018, SAMA raised the maximum loan-to-value 
rate for mortgages for first-time homebuyers to 90% from 85% in an effort 
to stimulate mortgage lending. Banks are also partnering with Real Estate 
Development Fund (REDF) to help develop the affordable housing seg-
ment, with the REDF providing support to eligible customers in the form 
of down payments, guarantees or full or partial payments on the interest 
on the mortgage.
5  Pressure on exPatrIate PoPulatIon 
and economIc ImPact
Oman and Saudi Arabia have particularly seen large declines in expatriate 
populations in the past few years. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the data 
points so far to a relatively limited number of jobs being created for nation-
als, especially given the magnitude in the contraction of expatriate employ-
ment. In the case of Oman, official statement indicates some positive 
trends in private-sector job creation, suggesting that there has been some 
success in Omani nationals replacing expatriates. However, a question 
remains over labor policy and the private sector’s ability to expand and 
drive economic activity and create new jobs in the medium to longer term. 
Looking ahead, the hydrocarbon weaker per capita countries will continue 
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to face the twin challenges of narrowing the fiscal deficit and ensuring that 
the economy creates sufficient job opportunities for the youth.
The expatriate labor force in Saudi Arabia declined in 2017 and 2018 
with the dependent’s fee, corporate levy on expatriate labor and rising 
Saudiization requirement. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the unemploy-
ment rate for Saudi nationals has remained high. Around 1.53  million 
expatriates left the labor market in 2017 and 2018 combined, whilst the 
number of Saudis employed in the private sector rose by just 52.9 K over 
the same period. The rise in expatriates jobs in 1Q2019 by some 223.8 K 
to 9.65 million was solely driven by domestic workers, with foreign labor 
working in the private and government sectors continuing to decline 
(ADCB 2019, 1). The fact that expatriate workers are not always being 
replaced by nationals partly reflects the skills mismatch among domestic 
workers and the higher costs of national labor (ADCB 2018, 7). However, 
there are signs of a rise in public sector employment of Saudis from 
3Q2018 to 1Q2019 (period data available) (Figs. 10.13 and 10.14).
In Oman, official statement indicated that 64,386 jobs were created for 
Omanis in the private sector in 2018 amid the expatriate visa ban. 
Meanwhile, official data show that a total of 67.4 K expatriates left the 





































Fig. 10.13 Saudi Arabia: Saudi nationals largely not replacing expatriate jobs 
lost. (Source: Calculated from Saudi Arabia General Authority for Statistics data)
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private labor force in 2018, indicating that Omani nationals have largely 
been replacing expatriates in this year. The latest data continues to point 
to a further decline in the expatriate labor force in 2019, contracting by 
3.7% y-o-y in May (public sector: −3.9%; private sector: −4.5%). The sec-
tor seeing the greatest fall in 5M2019 was construction, alongside mining, 
utilities, transport and storage and financial.
Any moderation in the unemployment rate among nationals will be 
positive for the consumption outlook, especially given the propensity to 
save and the high level of remittances associated with expatriate labor. 
However, in the more immediate term, the fall in the expatriate popula-
tion is contributing to weakness in private consumption. Moreover, the 
fall in expatriate workers in Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait is resulting in 
a fall in rental prices, quite marked in some areas. The IIF noted that the 
“Weakness in the real estate market has both reflected and contributed to 
weak economic growth in much of the GCC” (2019, 1). Investment in 
the real estate sector is popular with nationals; the fall in population and 
rental prices is impacting income of individuals and, in some cases, corpo-
rates. The Times of Oman indicated that some areas of Muscat were see-
ing rental drops as much as 40–60%, with indications of vacant properties 






























































Total Government Private Domestic
Fig. 10.14 Oman: Expatriate labor force contracted in 2018 with visa ban on a 
number of sectors. (Source: Calculated from Oman’s Ministry of National 
Economy data)
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2019). In the UAE and Qatar, the lack of private sector job growth has 
also contributed to the fall in rental prices, though the sharp rise in supply 
has also been a key factor. GRE restructuring has largely been aimed at 
extracting cost efficiencies, though it has also resulted in labor market 
weakness and job losses largely of expatriates.
More detrimental to regional economies would be a skills shortage and/
or a moderation in productivity. Indeed, in Oman and Saudi Arabia, who 
have particularly seen a significant loss in expatriate labor, there have been 
indications that the private sector has faced rising costs from this—including 
having to find replacement labor, skills mismatches and the generally higher 
cost of national labor versus expatriate labor. In Saudi Arabia, in sectors see-
ing 100% Saudiization, a number of companies have gone out of business, 
especially SMEs, given the higher cost of hiring nationals. In Saudi Arabia, 
the average wage per month of an expatriate working in the private sector 
was around SAR4060  in 1Q2019 and SAR7099 for a national. Around 
3000 mobile phone retailers closed down following the 100% nationaliza-
tion of labor in this sector in September 2016 (EFG Hermes 2018, 10). 
The introduction of a fee on expatriate labor in January 2018  in Saudi 
Arabia is an extra burden (Saudi Gazette, 14 February 2018). The pressure 
on corporates has been compounded by a shift in the payment system, from 
an annual work permit renewal to a one-time lump-sum payment at the 
beginning of the year for all foreign workers employed—that is, collective 
invoicing. The loss of jobs in the private sector is reducing its productive 
capacity and further suppressing household demand, at a time of either fiscal 
austerity or weak government spending growth. Private sector companies 
have had to discount prices to support sales, thus adding additional pressure 
on margins, alongside the rise in costs of labor.
Recognizing that the increase in expatriate labor costs has been one of 
the many challenges facing the private sector, there have been some adjust-
ments to the plan to reduce the impact on corporates. Businesses with 
fewer than nine employees are exempt from the expatriate levy for their 
first five foreign workers. Moreover, in early 2019, the government 
announced a scheme to reimburse some firms for the rising cost of expatri-
ate labor fees, with SAR11.5  billion (USD3.1  billion) being allocated. 
However, the payment mechanism and eligibility criteria will be central in 
our view. The decree indicates that the scheme will only be available to 
companies with a higher or equal number of Saudi employees versus expa-
triates. Thus, a number of labor-intensive sectors that are struggling to 
attract Saudi employees or are impacted by the higher cost of Saudi labor 
might see limited benefits.
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6  conclusIon
Reducing the wage composition of government spending will be critical 
to boosting fiscal sustainability across the GCC, especially for the hydro-
carbon poorer per capita countries, and reducing their budget breakeven 
oil process. Raising the skills set of the population and human capital to 
meet the need of the private sector will be important for reducing depen-
dence on government employment. This process will take time and is 
required at all educational levels, though it will still have to adapt to 
changing landscapes, including technological advancements and digital 
transformation. Factors such as labor market dynamics, productivity levels 
and mismatch in worker skills have also impeded FDI into the region, 
alongside private sector development. Without upgrading the human cap-
ital base of the economies, there is a risk that investment will mostly be on 
infrastructure without developing or attracting businesses and resulting in 
job creation. Better aligning the benefits (salaries, holidays, etc.) of the 
public in line with the private sector should also reduce the demand of 
working for the government. The youth population in GCC countries 
tends to be high, thus the employment demand is expected to rise, espe-
cially in Oman and Saudi Arabia. Creating private sector jobs will be cen-
tral for reducing the reliance on the state for employment, which in turn 
will allow a greater scope for reducing wage spending.
Providing institutional support to the private sector during the transi-
tion period will also be important. Non-oil activity has remained weak 
across the GCC with the fiscal austerity of the last few years. Even though 
the pace of fiscal reforms has slowed and there has been a shift to expan-
sionary government spending from 2018, oil prices have not recovered to 
a point for governments to provide a meaningful stimulus. The private 
sector is expected to provide jobs, new jobs at a time of weak economic 
activity and growth and, in some cases, with or after rising cost of doing 
business including labor. As noted, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the marked 
drop in the expatriate labor force, which is not being replaced by nation-
als, is resulting in an erosion of the production base. The private sector in 
the regions has traditionally relied on cheap foreign labor, and has argu-
ably also been a part of the social contract, and had to also adjust. As we 
noted in our earlier chapter, the UAE has introduced a number of mea-
sures to support the private sector, including reduction in fees and regula-
tory reforms. This is supported by its stronger fiscal position in the region. 
However, other countries are not in a position to do this and still have 
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significant fiscal reforms to introduce. Developing further training and 
apprentice schemes between the government and the private sector could 
be a way to complement educational reforms, support job creation and 
help reduce the burden on the private sector until workers reach the skill 
requirement.
Thus, the development of a framework to boost private sector activity, 
including through PPP schemes, remains vital. Moreover, in Saudi Arabia, 
the Public Investment Fund (PIF) is playing a central role in the transfor-
mation plans and the development of new industries (tourism, finance, 
industrial, etc.). This includes leading the development of major projects 
(such as NEOM, Al-Ula and Amaala) and the redevelopment of cities such 
as Jeddah and Medina. The development of these new sectors and the role 
of the PIF could potentially create or define a new private sector with a 
different relationship with the state, albeit still connected. The inclusion of 
the current private sector in these developments and projects will also be 
critical on how it develops and their role in creating new jobs. Looking 
forward, with increased globalization and for expanding the non- 
hydrocarbon and petrochemical export base, the domestic labor force will 
have to compete internationally on cost and productivity. This will espe-
cially be the case for the relatively hydrocarbon weaker per capita coun-
tries, where their economies will depend more on domestic labor. Any 
higher cost of labor will have to be supported by productivity gains. This 
level of productivity, alongside the sectors that will drive diversification 
away from hydrocarbons, has further significance for the level of wages 
and spending capacity of household, as the private sector will increasingly 
have to play a greater role in job creation. If the private sector does not 
provide adequate employment opportunities, then benefit payments and/
or public sector wage would have to increase further.
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CHAPTER 11
Economic Diversification and Job Creation 




This chapter aims to discuss economic diversification in the Arab Gulf 
countries with special emphasis on job creation. The article will use the 
concept of value chains to provide insight into the type of jobs and espe-
cially the knowledge content of these jobs that is likely to be most benefi-
cial to pursue in order for the Gulf countries to further develop their 
societies. As such, value chains are used solely to illustrate the job catego-
ries in the production process. As such, it is not the intention to discuss 
the Arab Gulf economies within the framework of Global Value Chains 
(GVCs) by, for example, discussing the path of upgrading their GVC par-
ticipation or how the Gulf states could reap further benefits from the 
global value chains.




The issue of diversification has once again reached the top of the politi-
cal agenda in the region. The ‘2014 oil price collapse,’ which halved the 
income from oil in year 2015 to 2016 compared to the previous years, 
demonstrated how volatile the income from oil is and, not least, just how 
closely tied the performance of the Gulf economics are to the oil income. 
The crisis, thus, has served as a stark reminder how profoundly dependent 
the Gulf countries continue to be on oil and gas incomes, and thus how 
little diversified their economics are.
In addition to discussing the diversification of their economies away 
from a near total dependency on the revenues from oil and gas, this chap-
ter discusses a second key challenge to the Gulf economies, namely cre-
ation of jobs to accommodate their fast-growing population. Contrary to 
earlier, job creation for the national population has recently become a 
political aim of the diversification effort.
Normally diversification is viewed within a framework of risk reduction. 
In economic terms, risk is reduced when an economy changes from rely-
ing on one or a few sources of income to a broader variety of sources. 
Diversifying the Gulf economies thus, usually translates into policies 
directed at reorienting production from oil and oil-based activities into 
non-oil activities. This emphasis is in line with the way economists mea-
sure diversification, namely as the size of the output from—or the contri-
bution of—the non-oil sector (Jörg 2012, 41).
This chapter, however, argues that, in order to address the issues of 
employment for a fast-growing number of young entrants to the working 
age, diversification within the GCC states should rather focus on the con-
tent, that is, knowledge and technological content of the jobs created, 
than on whether or not the jobs are located in the oil sector. In this respect, 
it does not matter whether or not the jobs are created within or outside 
the oil sector.
When it comes to job creation, the Gulf countries are facing two signifi-
cant challenges: first, the demographic challenge visible in the significant 
growth of the national labor forces. Approximately 500,000 nationals will 
enter working age (25 years) each year during the next decade and a half 
in the Gulf countries, and even though not each and every one of these 
individuals will seek employment (salaried work), this still represents a 
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formidable challenge.1 Saudi Arabia, with a national population of approx-
imately 20 million, is expected to have 400,000 new entrants a year and 
estimates that 4.5 million new jobs will need to be created before 2030 to 
meet this challenge (McKinsey Global Institute 2015, 5), while Kuwait, 
with a native population of a mere 1.3 million, is expected to have 28,000 
entrants a year and estimates that 384,000 jobs are required before year 
2030 (Tony Blair Associates 2009, 199). Note that these numbers only 
refer to the national population, thus excluding the migrant workforce.
The second and related challenge is that the public sector, which, until 
now, has been the main employer of the national labor force, cannot any 
longer act as the sole provider of jobs for the national population. In other 
words, the many new entrants among the working age youth must find 
jobs in the private sector. Thus, the challenge is of a double nature. First, 
it is to invigorate the private sector so its demands for labor increases and, 
secondly, to ensure that the national labor forces are willing and able to 
take the jobs offered in the private sector.
2  dIversIfIcatIon In the Gulf countrIes
Diversification entails a broad societal process, which transforms a country 
from a single source of income, in this case oil or gas, to a society where 
multiple sources of income are generated across the primary, secondary, 
and tertiary sectors, and where large sections of the population participate. 
Private sector involvement is generally seen as a necessity for attaining 
diversification. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia (ESCWA) defines diversification as:
Within the context of the GCC countries, economic diversification means 
reducing overly dependence of the oil sector by developing a non-oil econ-
omy, non-oil exports and non-oil revenue sources. By implication, it also 
means reducing the leading role of the public sector in the GCC economies 
by promoting the growth of the private sector. (ESCWA 2001, vii)
And the benefits of diversification are, as stated by the General 
Secretariat for Development Planning in Qatar,
1 Annual number of GCC nationals reaching working age (25  years) over the coming 
15 years: Bahrain 13,642; Kuwait 28,434; Oman 54,360; Qatar 7236; Saudi Arabia 402,186; 
UAE n.a. Calculated by the author on behalf of GLMM data in Hvidt (2018a, 17).
11 ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND JOB CREATION IN THE ARAB GULF… 
284
A more diversified economy is inherently more stable, more capable of cre-
ating jobs and opportunities for the next generation and less vulnerable to 
the boom and bust cycles of oil and natural gas prices. (GSDP 2011, 10)
Diversification is not a new strategy among the GCC states. It has been 
on the political agenda since oil and gas became the main and almost sole 
source of income in these countries some half a century ago (Henry and 
Springborg 2001, 26ff; Hvidt 2007; Luciani 2012b; McBrierty and Al 
Zubair 2004, 116ff; Niblock and Malik 2007; Rivlin 2009, 218ff; Seznec 
and Kirk 2011). Notable projects like aluminium smelting in Bahrain, the 
industrial cities of Yanbu and Jubail in Saudi Arabia, and the ports in 
Dubai were established in the 1970s with the specific aim of diversifying 
the economies by means of investing oil money in productive assets.2 In 
addition, extension of education, health services, infrastructure develop-
ment, and so on has been seen as key elements of the diversification strat-
egy from the earlier days (ESCWA 2001, 8).
Historically, there have been different reasons for diversification. In the 
1970s, the finite nature of the oil resources led to a quest to build viable 
economies which could secure income in the post-oil era. During the 
1980s and 1990s, oil prices showed significant volatility and the focus of 
diversification shifted to counteract fluctuations in state incomes (ESCWA 
2001, 3; Hvidt 2013, 11ff).
As I interpret it, today’s quest for diversification includes both ele-
ments. The finite nature of oil has resurfaced in the form of climate con-
siderations, which aim to ‘green’ the energy mix. While there is no 
immediate threat to oil producers from renewable energy systems (e.g. 
solar panels combined with electric cars) and CO2 neutral nuclear energy, 
the global climate considerations have and do inflict uncertainties upon 
the analysts and decision makers in the Gulf as to the long-term call for oil 
and gas.3
The second element is clearly present in today’s diversification efforts. 
For the Gulf countries, their dependence on oil incomes has in fact 
increased, not decreased over the past two decades, which is reflected in 
the rising fiscal break-even price of oil. Fifteen years (1999–2014) of rising 
2 The Emirate of Dubai possesses meager oil reserves and, as such, the ports were built in 
order to secure a stable income in the future.
3 Luciani (2012a, 184). He argues, that even though demand for fuel might decrease, the 
global refining industry will continue to demand sizable inputs of oil and gas in the future.
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oil prices have led to significantly higher levels of government spending in 
the region, and so did attempts to weather the effects of the Arab spring 
in 2011, which manifested itself as knee-jerk reactions to increase public 
spending (foremost on public sector salaries), in order to preempt actual 
or potential public uprisings. Both factors, in combination with increasing 
population sizes, have resulted in the simple fact that it has become con-
siderably more expensive to run the government in each of the countries. 
As such, government spending has increased by an annual average of 11 
per cent in real terms in 2003–2014.4 According to IMF statistics, the 
break-even oil prices peaked in 2014, with Bahrain at $103 per barrel, 
Kuwait $54, Oman $94, Qatar $56, UAE $79, Saudi Arabia $105,5 but 
have, since then, generally fallen as a consequence of the attempt to 
weather the 2014 oil price collapse through substantial ad hoc measures to 
cut public spending, that is, within public services (among them hospitals) 
and development projects and some more permanent features related to 
reduction in subsidies, for example, on fuel, water, and electricity.6
A third element in the historical reasons for diversification seems 
recently to be present, namely job creation. This is most visible for three 
countries: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman. See especially the Saudi 
vision 2030.
On a more aggregated level, multiple problems exist in the Gulf econo-
mies, which arise from the developmental issues particular to the oil- and 
gas-driven economies. The oil-based or distribution state model applied in 
all Gulf states relies on the sale of hydrocarbons, is state-led and state- 
driven, emphasizes wealth distribution, makes extensive use of migrant 
labor, and is characterized by a significant underdevelopment of produc-
tive assets. However, with rapidly increasing population sizes, and rising 
popular demands on the governments, this model can no longer ade-
quately support these societies.
Furthermore, this model suffers from problems such as low growth 
rates, lack of public and private incentives to accumulate human capital, 
lack of competitiveness in manufacturing, and so on, the likelihood of 
shocks and spill-over effects in the economies, and various rentier effects. 
4 https://www.e-marmore.com/Blog/Economy/January-2018/Why-are-the-breakeven- 
oil-prices-coming-down-for-G.
5 IMF (2018, Table 6)
6 Saudi Arabia and UAE have, furthermore, implemented 5 per cent VAT in 2018, and the 
other Gulf countries are to follow.
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All these factors make it imperative for the countries to pursue economic 
diversification strategies (El-Kharouf et al. 2010, 135ff).7
As such, this model generally fails to support further development of 
the GCC states in two important respects. First, it has not shielded the 
economies from fluctuations in incomes, and second, and of most interest 
to this chapter, it has failed to create sufficient job opportunities to accom-
modate the many new entrants to the job market (Hvidt 2011, 88ff, 
2015, 30ff).
The current development plans published in the region all emphasize 
diversification and underline the significant pressure to reform their econ-
omies. The Vision 2030 launched in Saudi Arabia in 2016 is an example of 
the urgency of this reform process and is a statement of how job creation 
for nationals have accented on the political agenda (Govt. of Saudi 
Arabia 2016).
Generally, the countries which have the lowest income per capita are in 
most need of diversification. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman are most 
challenged, while the so-called super rentiers Kuwait, UAE, and foremost, 
Qatar, experience less urgency to diversify.
3  value chaIns
Value chains have generally been studied with the purpose of identifying 
increased profitability in a given company, either by making each part of 
the chain more efficient or by adding or deleting parts of the chain. Adding 
more parts of the value chains hold the potential of reaping more of the 
value added. In the oil value chain, for example, moving from only under-
taking oil production to also, for example, include refining diversifies the 
product (from crude oil, to a variety of usable products, e.g. gasoline, 
naphtha, jet fuel, kerosene, etc.). In this perspective, adding steps of the 
value chain will imply a diversification of the product, and thus of the 
markets.
And of primary importance for the argument in this chapter, this pro-
cess of product diversification furthermore holds significant implications 
for a diversification of job content, and thus skill levels of the workers 
undertaking the jobs: The more diversification takes place within the value 
7 The authors (pp. 135–136) provide a detailed literature review of various economic rea-
sons that make a
diversification strategy imperative for the resource-based GCC states.
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chain (adding more stages in the production chain), the greater varieties 
of jobs will be demanded. Generally, the more primary productive activi-
ties are pursued, the higher the demand for supporting activities, which 
implies jobs related to services. And service-related jobs generally have a 
higher knowledge content and provide more value added than jobs in 
‘pure’ manufacturing or oil extraction.
The concept of value chains was first introduced by Michael E. Porter 
in 1985  in his book “Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining 
Superior Performance.” In his book published in 1998, he further devel-
ops the concept of a value chain as the tool to analyze the sources of com-
petitive advantages of a firm and define a value chain as the collection of 
activities that are performed within a firm to design, produce, market, 
deliver, and support its products (Porter 1998, 36) (Fig. 11.1).8
The value chain displays total value and consists of value activities and 
profit. Value activities are the physically and technologically distinct activi-
ties a firm performs (Porter 1998, 38). For companies that produce goods, 
8 Porter (1998, 39) writes that the “value chain is a theory of the firm that views the firm 
as being a collection of discrete but related production functions, if production functions are 
defined as activities.”
Fig. 11.1 Porter’s value chain. (Source: Porter 1998, 7)
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Fig. 11.2 The smiley model. (Source: WTO Director of Trade Abdelhamid 
Mamdouh Presentation, Doha 27 November 2016)
the value chain starts with the raw materials used to make their products 
and consists of everything added before the product is sold to consumers.
As seen in the illustration above, Porter divides a business’s activities 
into two main categories: primary and secondary activities, where the sec-
ondary activities are seen to support or to service the primary activities.
Building on this insight, but with a less rigorous division between pri-
mary and secondary activities, the so-called ‘Smiley-model’ was proposed 
by Stan Shih, founder of Acer computer company in 1992 (Ye et al. 2015, 
2) (Fig. 11.2).
The ‘Smiley—model’ depicts information of the magnitude of value- 
added as it relates to various stages in the value chain. The insight derived 
from this model is that the activities related to manufacturing and assem-
bly, that is to production in itself, yields the least value added (most likely 
due to the standardization of those processes, and thus exposure to high 
levels of competition), while the secondary activities related to the prod-
uct, namely to design, R&D, innovation, logistics, marketing, and so on, 
yields high levels of value added. A classic illustration of this relationship is 
that the manufacturing costs of a jacket, that is, the cost of all inputs and 
the cost of processing (e.g. cost of labor and use of production facilities) 
only make up 9 per cent of the price of the final product. Thus, the 
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secondary services and profit make up the remaining 91 per cent (WTO 
Director of Trade, Presentation, Doha 27 November 2016).
Furthermore, as shown in Fig.  11.3, the Smiley in this particular 
value chain has attained a more pronounced U-shape over the last four 
decades. In other words, the value-added in the manufacturing activities 
compared to the innovation and marketing activities of the chain is get-
ting wider. This development is believed to take place in most value 
chains under the impression of improved manufacturing processes and 
increased global competition, thus providing even further incentives for 
the Gulf states to empathize job creation in the services part of the 
value chains.
Dubai has spearheaded development toward these goals, for example, 
through its aviation industry, airports, ports, the financial institutions, for 
example, Dubai International Financial Center, and so on.
4  the challenGe of Job creatIon In the Gulf
Diversification is an activity that is pursued both within the oil and gas 
sectors and outside it, that is, within the oil value chain (upstream, mid-
stream, or downstream) or by economic activities outside the oil value 
chain, which could be either import substitution activities, which are 
Fig. 11.3 Transition to the smiley curve. (Source: (De Backer 2013, Slide 16))
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activities that aim to produce the goods or services, which the country 
otherwise would have to import (building materials, aluminium frames, 
cladding, cement, steel rebars) (El Beblawi 2011, 185ff), or it could be 
international services, or advance business services (i.e. logistics, bank-
ing, finance, aviation, etc.). For these three categories of economic 
activities, the aim related to diversification is to attain more jobs within 
the job categories that provides high value added to the various eco-
nomic sectors.
4.1  Diversification Within the Oil and Gas Sector
As mentioned in the Gulf countries, the oil and gas industry continues to 
be the dominating source of export earnings and income for the public 
sector (Hvidt 2013, 13).
The general structure of the Gulf oil sector is that the Gulf countries 
export the bulk of the oil production basically untreated, namely as crude 
oil.9 This implies an industry where relatively few highly skilled engineers 
and technicians plus larger contingents of blue-collar workers lift the oil 
from the ground and transport it to the shipping terminals for export. In 
a value chain perspective, thus the national oil companies only reap a rela-
tively modest part of the potential profit, but furthermore, lots of poten-
tial jobs with high knowledge content (service jobs) associated with the 
downstream activities (refining, delivery, sales to consumers) are left to 
other firms and countries. To my knowledge, Kuwait is the only Gulf 
state which operates the full value chain in the international market. 
Under the brand of Q8, it operates more than 4400 filling stations in 
Europe, owns and operates a refinery in Rotterdam, and owns a tanker 
fleet, and so on.10
However, reality is more complex. While it is true that national oil com-
panies in the Gulf countries primarily export their oil as crude, they, how-
ever, depart from this picture in two ways. First, the Gulf countries have 
built structures and capacities to supply their own markets with refined oil 
products and, as such, operate refineries, filling stations, and handles the 
9 In average the Gulf countries exported 78 per cent of their oil production as crude in 
2017. This number does not include Bahrain. The number is derived from a comparison 
between crude oil exports and crude oil production for each country, see OPEC (2018, 
Table 3.6 and 5.3).
10 See www.q8oils.com/EN/Mainnavigation/Aboutus/Q8.aspx, accessed 30-05-2018.
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logistics related to marketing and transport, but only within each country 
(Hvidt 2018b).
Second, the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and 
Kuwait have built a substantial refining and petrochemical business aimed 
first and foremost at the global market (Luciani 2012a). While the share 
of total crude and gas that is used as feedstock in the petrochemical indus-
try remains relatively low (Luciani 2012a, 184), the Gulf countries have 
risen to become the world’s leading suppliers in petrochemicals (basis 
products for rubber, plastics, gels, fibers, etc.) (Seznec 2011, 30ff). Since 
much of the expansion in the Gulf-owned petrochemical industry, both 
within the Gulf countries and especially on a global scale, are done with 
foreign partners and through mergers and acquisitions (208ff), it is most 
likely that the number of nationals employed in this sector, especially in 
the high-level technological jobs, is relatively small. However, as pointed 
out by Luciani (2012a, 184), the Gulf countries could and should use 
their oil and gas resources to develop industrial and progressively techno-
logical capabilities for the benefit of the countries, by investments in such 
high tech industries.
This leads to the conclusion that diversification has in fact been pursued 
actively within the oil sector in the Gulf countries.
4.2  Moving Downstream Via Technological ‘Upskilling’ 
in the Gulf Countries
The stated political aim in the Gulf countries is to pursue a diversified 
knowledge economy according to their development plans. This aim 
seems to fit well with the fundamentals of the Gulf region. Besides Saudi 
Arabia, the Gulf countries are made up of small states with tiny native 
populations. As such, a development strategy which aims to create sizeable 
numbers of industrial jobs with low or medium knowledge content makes 
little sense, because the workforce would largely have to be imported.11 
But to aim for fewer jobs with higher technological or knowledge content, 
11 A similar argument is made in GSDP, Qatar National Development Strategy 2011–2016, 
March 2011.
(Doha: Qatar General Secretariat for Development Planning, 2011), 55, and by 
M. A. J. Althani, The Arab.
Spring & The Gulf States: Time to Embrace Change (London: Profile Books, 2012), 52.
11 ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND JOB CREATION IN THE ARAB GULF… 
292
which yields a better pay targeted at the regions’ own population, seems 
logical.
The labor markets of the GCC countries are of a dual nature wherein 
nationals, as a part of the social contract, primarily seek employment in the 
public sector, which is better paid, and offers both a higher level of job 
security and shorter working hours than jobs in the private sector 
(McKinsey Global Institute 2015, Exhibit E3). Private sector employment 
not only entails lower pay, longer working hours, and less job security but 
is also more competitive, meritocratic, and takes place in a gender-mixed 
environment, which might present a cultural challenge to segments of the 
national population (Ulrichsen 2018, 12ff; World Bank 2017, 4).
The key reason for this is that the private sector is overwhelmingly char-
acterized by jobs that are low-skilled and pays low wages, which is facili-
tated by state policies permitting the sourcing of cheap migrant labor. As 
such, private sector employment is less attractive to nationals than public 
sector employment.
In a report titled The Jobs Agenda for the Gulf Cooperation Council 
Countries, the World Bank (2017, vii) argues that in order to make the 
jobs more attractive in the longer run salaries must be increased in the 
private sector and suggests that this should be achieved through reforms 
that increase the productivity of the private sector by shifting economic 
activity to “higher value-added sectors, more technology-intensive pro-
duction, diversified and more sophisticated exports, and technology- 
driven foreign direct investment (FDI).” As documented by IMF, relative 
to other countries, productivity gains in the GCC countries have contrib-
uted little to growth since 1970. Rather, growth has been attributable to 
“hiring more hands” and thus neither to capital nor total factor productiv-
ity (IMF 2017, 26).
The inclusion of more nationals in the private sector remains however a 
contentious subject, which relates not only to the salaries paid but also to 
the motivation, willingness, and ability of the nationals to take a job in this 
sector (World Bank 2017, vii).
According to ability, that is, the educational qualifications of the nation-
als, the issue is whether or not the nationals will be able to compete on 
qualifications with imported skilled workers?12 A review of the available 
indicators of educational achievement in the GCC countries highlights 
structural problems within and around the educational system that lower 
12 Assuming the same salary.
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the quality of teaching, minimize research outputs, and lessen the useful-
ness to society of the education provided. In this respect, it is questionable 
how well the current educational system prepares its graduates to play an 
active role in a future knowledge economy (Hvidt 2015, 31ff). At the 
international level, a link between high incomes from natural resources 
and lower political emphasis on education is proven (Gylfason 2001).
A second issue is related to the likely success of the political initiatives 
to make private sector employment attractive to nationals. In all Gulf 
states, there are policies of localization often termed Emiratization, 
Omanization, Bahrainzation, or Saudization, which aim to pressure and/
or encourage nationals to take jobs in the private sector on the one hand 
and, on the other, to open the private sector to employment of nationals, 
which, as mentioned above, not always is the first choice of employees. 
One such initiative is the drive to localize production. For example, Saudi 
Arabia aims to localize 50 per cent of defense spending and 75 per cent 
of the oil and gas industry, meaning that, all inputs should come from 
local sources and that a very high percentage of the higher skilled jobs 
within these sectors should be undertaken by Saudi nationals (Vision 
2030). Other measures include implementation of quotas for employing 
nationals within various categories of private sector firms (e.g. the Saudi 
Nitaqat system) or even more ridged, restricting certain job functions to 
nationals only. For example, in January 2018, the Saudi government 
announced it would add to its growing list of Saudi-only jobs by includ-
ing the sale of watches, eyewear, medical equipment and devices, electri-
cal and electronic appliances, auto parts, building materials, carpets, cars 
and motorcycles, home and office furniture, children’s clothing and 
men’s accessories, home kitchenware, and confectionery (Young 2018, 
17), and Oman which has placed a temporary ban on visas for 87 job 
categories within information and technology, accounting and finance, 
marketing and sales, administration and human resources, insurance, 
information and media profession, and medical professions (Khaleej 
Times 2018).
Such policies are implemented across the six countries, however, pri-
marily in the three countries with the highest challenge related to unem-
ployment for nationals, namely Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain.
This chapter focusses solely on the national population. However, it is 
recognized that presently the migrant labor force outnumber the nationals 
in the Arab Gulf countries. In Saudi Arabia and Oman, approximately half 
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the jobs are held by migrants, while in the smaller Gulf states, such as 
Qatar and UAE, 80–90 per cent of all jobs are held by migrants.13 And 
these migrants do not only hold jobs as construction workers, drivers, and 
nannies. An estimated 1/3 of them classify as highly skilled migrants and 
as such undertake jobs with a high knowledge content both in the private 
and the public sectors of the Gulf economies (Hvidt 2019, 76). It is gen-
erally these jobs which would be of interest to the Gulf economies to 
replace with their nationals.
Besides the obvious point that it is positive for the national economy if 
jobs can be undertaken by a national compared to a migrant worker, who 
usually transfers a substantial part of his/her salary and savings out of the 
country, the localization efforts of the jobs should be seen as a long-term 
strategy of ‘upskilling’ the national labor forces to undertake the kind of 
jobs to be offered in the high-end of the private sector.
High value-added jobs have, as seen above, a much larger potential for 
income generation and thus play an active part in attracting the national 
labor force, but, furthermore, high value-added jobs or high technology 
jobs come with a much larger development potential, in that jobs with 
high skill levels or knowledge content not only increases technological 
change, the key factor behind development, but also increases the ability 
to quickly adjust to new and changing demands in a rapidly changing 
world (Hvidt 2019, 76). As pointed out by Ian Bremmer in his latest book 
Us vs. Them: The Failure of Globalism (2018, 45), not only are the profits 
larger in the technology driven sectors, but, in the next decade, the world 
will experience an even higher rate of technological change than seen in 
the previous decades. The technologies of artificial intelligence (AI), 
robotics, and machine learning have now reached a stage where they prof-
itably can be applied across sectors. These technologies are likely to trans-
form the job market as we know it, placing an even higher premium on the 
jobs which develop, interact with, and control the digital processes, includ-
ing the increasingly cheaper and more sophisticated robots. The implica-
tion is that the Smiley curve is likely to attain an even more pronounced 
U-shape, thus leaving countries and sectors which do pursue technological 
upskilling behind (Bremmer 2018, 97). Stated differently by UNIDO and 
World Economic Forum (2014, 8) today, competitiveness of nations or 
13 GLMM Demographic and Economic Data base, table titled: “GCC: Total population 
and percentage of nationals and non-nationals in GCC countries (national statistics, 
2010–2017),” available at http://gulfmigration.org; accessed October 1, 2018.
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city states is less about decreasing costs related to production or transac-
tions, and more about harnessing added value through improving 
capabilities.
4.3  Upskilling of the National Labor Force
Mueller’s (2012) analysis of GCC Industrial development is useful to illus-
trate the process of upskilling the labor force. He points out that non-oil 
manufacturing industry is likely to make a substantial contribution to fur-
ther development in the Gulf countries because (1) it is an essential ingre-
dient of socio-economic development responsible for 1/3 of variation in 
per capita income across developing countries; (2) a broader manufactur-
ing base is better able to take advantage of new opportunities as compared 
to an economy which is specialized in a narrow range or resource-based 
products; and (3) manufacturing industries are drivers of innovation and 
main source, user, and diffuser of technological progress (Mueller 2012, 
140). He notes that the manufacturing sectors in GCC are comparatively 
weak when it comes to technological status and capabilities, but elaborates 
on the crucial role that research-intensive industries play for growth in 
both the manufacturing and the service sectors. In other words, the two 
sectors are interlinked:
research-intensive industries generate higher growth rates in terms of pro-
ductivity, value added and high-skilled employment. Besides, research- 
intensive industries are the source of new cross-cutting technologies, which 
contribute to enhancing the growth potential of the economy as a whole. 
The expansion of industrial R&D activities also stimulates the development 
of knowledge-intensive services, and it is the interplay of industrial and ser-
vices sectors that determines the technological capabilities of an economy. 
(Mueller 2012, 149) (my emphasis)
As such, the process of ‘upskilling’ the national workforce should be 
seen as a process, which generally raises the knowledge level in all eco-
nomic activities throughout a society. This is generally what we under-
stand as a knowledge economy (Hvidt 2015, 27–28).
As mentioned, all Gulf states have statements in their development 
plans of transforming their economies into such knowledge economies 
and have taken steps to fulfill those aims (Hvidt 2015, 24ff). However, to 
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transform into a knowledge-based economy is neither an easy nor a fast 
process. It is a comprehensive process, in which appropriate incentives for 
the population to upgrade their skills and become active participants in 
this economy have to be established. Among such efforts, the economy 
must adjust simultaneously both on the supply and on the demand side. 
As such, private business owners should be able to see their benefit in rais-
ing the technological level, while, at the same time, potential employers 
should approach the labor market with the skills and motivation to ade-
quately fulfill such jobs. And, in all cases, there should be a possibility to 
make a profit.
A good number of initiatives have been taken over the past two decades 
to foster this development. For example, the internationalized service sec-
tors, like the aviation industry, the financial sector, shipping services. In 
addition, the transformation process toward higher-knowledge level jobs 
is manifest in the stated-owned industries like the aluminum smelters, the 
oil industry, the shipyards, the property developers, and so on. However, 
as pointed out above, in discussion of the World Bank report related to the 
labor market, generally the jobs, especially in the private sector, remain 
characterized by low efficiency and thus low knowledge content.
5  conclusIon
This chapter has discussed diversification and job creation in a value chain 
perspective. Instead of viewing diversification in a narrow sense, as often 
done by economists, merely as the percentage of exports deriving from 
non-oil sectors, the value chain perspective as applied in this article directs 
the focus for both scholars and decision-makers toward analyzing the type 
of job and the knowledge content of the jobs, which the policies are attempt-
ing to create.
The incorporation of the value chain perspective leads to the under-
standing that, for diversification to be successful, it is not of particular 
interest whether or not a newly created economic activity falls within or 
outside the oil sector, but whether the new activity fosters jobs in the low 
value-added segment or in the high value-added one. Job creation in the 
high value-added segments potentially stimulates a virtuous process, 
which, on the one hand, necessitates upskilling of the labor force but, at 
the same time, fosters further upskilling. As such, this process includes a 
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larger potential for growth and economic development in the long-term 
perspective. For the virtuous process to gain momentum, the govern-
ments in the region need to adjust their policies, for example, related to 
access to cheap foreign labor, in order to create the right incentives.
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CHAPTER 12




The simultaneous collapse of oil production and social stability in 
Venezuela has provided a vivid preview of a potential pathway for oil- 
export states deprived of hydrocarbon rents to fund their national budgets.
While Venezuela’s predicament in 2019 was based on domestic policy-
making, some observers suspect that climate action could provoke similar 
results, leaving oil exporting states with insufficient revenues to maintain 
public order (Van de Graaf and Verbruggen 2014, 2015, 456–62; Van de 
Graaf 2018, 97–121).
The notion of an encroaching threat to hydrocarbon demand and 
rents—as opposed to the debunked “peak oil supply” conundrum of the 
prior decade—is leading policymakers to reassess long term assumptions 
about the oil business in two ways: by promoting diversification into alter-
nate businesses, and by protecting and enhancing the competitiveness of 
their oil industries.
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The two strategies appear compatible. The first prepares the economic 
landscape for a day when oil rents no longer dominate the state’s fiscal 
revenue, whether from a plateauing of global oil demand or any other 
reason. The second seeks to insulate flows of oil and gas rents against the 
more direct challenges emanating from climate policy.
Saudi Arabia, the global oil market’s largest supplier, has taken steps in 
both directions. Its initiatives toward diversification are well known and 
covered elsewhere.1 This chapter looks at the other, less explored climate 
strategy: near-term actions that the kingdom and other producer states 
have taken or may take in the next few years to maintain oil exports amid 
the emergence of restrictions on fossil fuels.
Some of the strategies that Saudi Arabia has developed are altering the 
nature of its participation in the oil business. From simply supplying 
energy commodities, the kingdom is increasing its involvement in import-
ing markets and in bolstering oil-consuming technology.
One strategy involves investment into refining and other infrastructure 
ties with developing states where expectations for growth in oil demand 
are high. A related effort emphasizes low-emission and non-combustion 
uses for crude oil, which are consistent with a transitioning energy system. 
Another has the kingdom increasing cooperation with the global climate 
regime, pursuing a commitment to energy efficiency which does double 
duty in domestic oil demand management. Yet another strategy seeks to 
lobby the international community to moderate its targets for greenhouse 
gas emissions, and accept a higher level of human climate damage.
While this chapter applies these strategies to Saudi Arabia, other pro-
ducer countries should be expected to take similar steps. The realization 
that the world is over-endowed with hydrocarbon reserves that may never 
be produced is forcing a strategic alteration in oil market behavior. Oil and 
1 Sources on the subject are too numerous to cite, but a few bear mentioning: Martin 
Hvidt, “Economic Diversification in GCC Countries: Past Record and Future Trends,” 
Research Paper, Kuwait Programme series, 2013; Ali Aissaoui, “Saudi Arabia’s Economic 
Diversification: Progress in the Context of the GCC and Challenges,” in Resources Blessed: 
Diversification and the Gulf Development Model, ed. Giacomo Luciani (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 
2012), 1–24; Bassam A.  Albassam, “Economic Diversification in Saudi Arabia: Myth or 
Reality?,” Resources Policy 44 (2015): 112–17; Tim Callen et al., Economic Diversification in 
the GCC: Past, Present, and Future (International Monetary Fund, 2014); Giacomo Luciani, 
“Resources Blessed: Diversification and the Gulf Development Model,” in The Gulf Region: 




gas markets appear likely to grow more competitive, with producer states 
vying for market share and differentiating products based on environmen-
tal criteria.
What this portends for markets and demand over the longer term is 
unclear. One envisions the eventual emergence of multiple potential path-
ways. A cooperative path would see producers collude to manage reduc-
tions in production so that prices remain above their cost of extracting the 
marginal barrel. One can also imagine the emergence of a more hostile 
dynamic, pitting fossil fuel producers against the efforts of climate-focused 
states and international organizations. The second pathway might be 
accompanied by a “green paradox” conundrum, where low-cost produc-
ers maintain or even ramp up production, driving down oil prices and 
helping fossil fuels compete against alternatives.2 Given that global carbon 
dioxide emissions that had fallen from 2014 to 2016 returned to the path 
of growth in 2017—rising by 1.6% that year and again by 2.7% in 2018 
(Jackson et  al. 2018)—an intensification of international efforts to dis-
courage fossil fuel use appeared likely.
2  contrastIng strategIes
This chapter focuses on three types of nearer-term producer country cli-
mate strategies outlined above. Although they sometimes overlap, I have 
titled them “Dig In,” “Join In,” and “Throw In.”
• DIG IN: Producer governments overtly defend their oil and gas 
export industries. Their primary concern is not with the direct effects 
of climate change but indirect effects of climate action on global 
demand for exportable hydrocarbons, and the socioeconomic dam-
age posed by loss of economic rents. By “digging in,” states assume 
GHG accords such as the 2015 Paris Agreement remain aspirational 
rather than binding, and act to insulate or harden the hydrocarbon 
sector against the aims of such accords. Such actions include steps to 
enhance competition with rival producers and to protect  technologies 
2 For more detailed discussion of possible oil market reactions to peak demand, see 
Anupama Sen and Bassam Fattouh, “Economic Diversification in the MENA in the Context 
of Peak Oil and the Energy Transition,” in Workshop on Sustainability in the GCC (Gulf 
Research Meeting, University of Cambridge, UK, 2018).
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linked to continued demand. This includes developing uses for crude 
oil that remain viable in a climate-constrained market.
 – LOCK IN: An important subset of the “Dig In” strategy is the 
bilateral “Lock In” of markets in key import states through direct 
investment.
• JOIN IN: Producer governments “join in” to pursue economically 
rational domestic energy policies that provide secondary benefits in 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The Paris Agreement’s 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) provide useful politi-
cal cover for unpopular—albeit environmentally beneficial—actions 
like Saudi Arabia’s reform of energy subsidies. Domestic reforms 
have the added benefit of freeing up oil and gas that can be exported 
at market prices.
• THROW IN: The “Throw In” strategy suggests the adage “throw 
in the towel.” Here, elites sympathetic to the interests of producer 
states and fossil fuel companies concede that climate change is inevi-
table and argue that damage caused by human greenhouse gas emis-
sions is preferable to costly GHG mitigation in line with the 
Paris goals.
3  saudI arabIa’s clImate ProfIle
How does Saudi Arabia fit within the taxonomy above? Like other large 
producers of carbon-intensive fossil fuels, Saudi Arabia finds itself at the 
center of the global climate conundrum, increasingly recognized as major 
fossil fuel producer, exporter, subsidizer, and consumer. Saudi Arabia also 
stands to become an early and significant victim of climate change, since 
its arid geography and harsh summer climate is highly vulnerable to dam-
age (Pal and Eltahir 2016, 197–200).
Saudi Arabia also carries an outsized legacy of GHG emissions, which 
began in the pre-nationalization era, due to large-scale methane venting 
that far outweighed its relatively minor emissions of carbon dioxide of the 
period. While Saudi CO2 emissions have grown nearly 6% per year, roughly 
the same rate as its primary energy demand (EDGAR 2017), the king-
dom’s methane emissions peaked during the 1970s, a period when the 
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kingdom’s overall GHG emissions reached levels that were only surpassed 
within the last few years (Fig. 12.1).3
At the time, the national oil company, then known as Aramco, was 
owned and operated by four US companies. After the Saudi government 
took full control in 1980, GHG emissions dropped as Saudi Aramco built 
up its Master Gas System based on capturing waste methane and redirect-
ing it to the power sector (Krane 2014). Fugitive (non-combustion) CO2 
from the oil industry was another major source of emissions which was 
curtailed after nationalization, dropping below 50% of total CO2 emis-
sions by 1979 and reaching 2.2% in 2008.
Once upstream fugitive emissions were reduced, the power sector grew 
to become the kingdom’s largest source of carbon dioxide emissions. By 
2008, electricity generation was responsible for 43% of GHG emitted, fol-
lowed by transport at 27% and industry at 17%. Fugitive emissions from 
the Saudi energy industry totaled 10.5m metric tons of CO2 equivalent in 
3 Atmospheric methane has far more potent heat-trapping properties than CO2, but, after 
a decade or two, its harm is reduced as it decays into CO2. Over a decade, methane warms 
the planet by 86 times as much as CO2. See: Gayathri Vaidyanathan, “How Bad of a 

















































































































Fig. 12.1 Saudi Arabia GHG emissions by gas type
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2008, amounting to just 3% of the kingdom’s entire GHG emissions of 
382m metric ton (EDGAR 2011).
Today’s Saudi emissions flow mainly from Saudi energy consumption. 
By 2017, Saudi Arabia—the world No. 1 oil exporter—had become the 
world No. 5 oil consumer, after the United States, China, India, and 
Japan. It consumed more oil than much larger countries, including Russia, 
Brazil, or Germany (BP 2018). As such, Saudi Arabia is a leading global 
emitter of GHGs. The kingdom was the world No. 9 carbon emitter in 
2016, according to BP data, ahead of populous oil producers like Brazil, 
Mexico, and Indonesia, as well as developed states like Canada and 
Australia, but behind Iran, South Korea, Germany, and Japan. However, 
BP data only reflect CO2 emitted from fossil fuel combustion, and ignore 
other sources. When all GHGs are factored in, Saudi Arabia ranked as the 
No. 15 emitter in 2012, according to the most recent data collected by 
the EU’s Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR). 
EDGAR GHG data rank the kingdom behind Brazil, Mexico, and 
Indonesia, as well as Canada and Australia (Table 12.1 and Fig. 12.2).
When compared with its peers in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 
Saudi Arabia was the least prolific per-capita emitter, far outpaced by 
Table 12.1 Saudi Arabia benchmarked against selected countries in terms of 
GHGs, population, and economy











capita (ton of 
CO2eq)
Average annual 
growth rate of 
GHG emissions 
since 1970
Australia 281 23 967 26.4 1.70%
UAE 2625 9 532 25.3 2.20%
Canada 2516 35 1452 20.6 1%
USA 424 314 15,863 19.5 0.20%
Saudi 
Arabia
7442 29 1444 19.2 2.50%
Russia 4858 143 3602 15.9 0.60%
Iran 1371 76 1271 10.3 2.50%
Mexico 1333 121 1972 6 2.60%
Brazil 532 200.5 3032 5.6 2.80%
Indonesia 315 249 2302 3.3 3.40%
Source: IEA, World Bank and EDGAR
2012 data (most recent GHG emissions data available)
 J. KRANE
307
wealthy Qatar and Kuwait, and even ranking behind the United Arab 
Emirates, Oman, and Bahrain (Fig. 12.3). The high levels of per-capita 
GHG emissions in the smaller monarchies are partly due to small popula-


























































Fig. 12.3 GHG and CO2 emissions per capita in GCC. (Source: EDGAR)
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sector, including its LNG and gas-to-liquids industries, is a major emitter 
of both carbon dioxide and fugitive methane.4 Other factors include high 
per-capita incomes, large homes, low electricity prices, and a hot climate 
that generates demand for indoor cooling (Krane 2015b). Electric power 
in the residential sector is nearly free in Kuwait, and is free in unlimited 
quantities for Qatari citizens.
Of course, most of the emissions from Saudi Arabian energy products 
are tallied in the countries where final combustion takes place. When 
aggregated, the carbon emitted from Saudi Aramco’s oil production has 
been identified as the world’s No. 1 current and No. 2 historical source of 
GHGs among all commercial fossil fuel companies. Hydrocarbons pro-
duced by Saudi Aramco are responsible for about 4.3% of current global 
GHG emissions and about 3.2% of aggregate atmospheric accumulations.5 
Chevron, the former Standard Oil of California, which discovered oil in 
Saudi Arabia in 1938 and held the original Saudi concession, is responsible 
for about 1.2% of current emissions and 3.5% of historic emissions, the 
highest share among historical emitters.6
4  the ImPortance of oIl In saudI 
PolItIcal economy
The GHG emissions attributed to Saudi Aramco are not only a byproduct 
of the company’s business, but of the commercial activity that underpins 
the kingdom’s economy, its governance structures, and its stature in inter-
national relations.
Saudi concerns around climate change center on the reduction or loss 
of potentially enormous oil rents. The oil sector in Saudi Arabia, like those 
of other low-cost producers, is extraordinarily profitable. Crude oil that 
costs less than $10 to produce and export sold for $60 per barrel at the 
4 Fugitive methane constituted nearly half of Qatar’s 2012 GHG emissions, or about 70 of 
150 megatonnes of CO2 equivalent, according to EDGAR’s dataset. EDGAR, “Fossil CO2 
& GHG Emissions of All World Countries, 2017.”
5 These figures include flaring and venting of GHGs during production. See: Benoit Mayer 
and Mikko Rajavuori, “National Fossil Fuel Companies and Climate Change Mitigation 
under International Law,” Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 44 (2016): 55.
6 Emissions are from upstream production and final consumption of oil and gas products 
produced by Chevron. Mayer and Rajavuori. See also: Richard Heede, “Tracing 
Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement 
Producers, 1854–2010,” Climatic Change 122, no. 1–2 (2014): 229–41.
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time of writing. Subtracting investment and other costs along with a rea-
sonable rate of return, a substantial portion of the sales revenue—perhaps 
80%—could be described as economic rent. A threat to oil rents thus con-
stitutes a threat to the Saudi government’s operating budget and to the 
nature of tribal-autocratic governance that controls the state.
The profitability of oil also undercuts producers’ appetite for diversifi-
cation. The long term persistence of rents is a nearly unique aspect of the 
oil business and is partly due to production constraints that maintain high 
prices. In other sectors, rents are typically driven out over time by new 
entrants and competition. The durability of rents undermines the already 
lackluster determination for economic diversification, since it entails 
acceptance of lower profits and a loss of rents. A thorough diversification 
might even force the state to augment its income through taxation, under-
mining the rentier polity.
Finally, carbon extraction and marketing are even of strategic impor-
tance for Saudi Arabia, given that oil exports form the basis for the king-
dom’s geopolitical stature and its important partnership with the United 
States, which provides hard security for the region. A reduced role in oil 
markets would weaken Saudi Arabia’s external security and downgrade its 
international standing.
Therefore, Riyadh, like producer governments elsewhere, should be 
expected to protect an industry so central to the survival of its regime, 
even to the detriment of the climate affecting its national territory. The 
following sections describe the shape such actions might take.
5  strategy no. 1 “dIg In”: reduce VulnerabIlIty 
of oIl sector to clImate actIon
To executives of a national oil company (NOC) such as Saudi Aramco, the 
default concern about climate change represents qualms around “security 
of demand” for crude oil within the ongoing clean energy transition 
(Smith 2010). Securing demand and markets takes several forms.
5.1  Climate Obstructionism
In the past, Saudi concern was manifested in an obstructionist stance in 
international climate fora. Depledge argued that Saudi Arabia joined 
UN-led climate treaty negotiations because its leadership feared a 
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successful agreement and wished to thwart, delay, or weaken it. The king-
dom’s confrontational stance was based on fears that mitigation policies 
would harm the kingdom more than the damage of climate change itself 
(Depledge 2008, 9–35).
Saudi tactics documented by Depledge involved the following:
• Allowing its position to be determined and led by the national petro-
leum ministry
• Highlighting skeptical views on climate science and downplaying the 
harmful effects of atmospheric carbon accumulations
• Employing negotiating techniques aimed at postponing or block-
ing progress
• Aligning with coal lobbies and other interests which oppose cli-
mate action
• Using financial incentives to persuade delegations from poorer coun-
tries to back the Saudi position.
As the global consensus on climate became more urgent, obstructionist 
Saudi tactics triggered negative publicity and damaged the kingdom’s 
public image.7 During the 2018 UN climate talks in Poland, the Saudi 
team reprised its obstruction tactics, backed by negotiators from the 
United States, Russia, and Kuwait. The quartet blocked a measure that 
would have supported the findings of an Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) report (Plumer and Friedman 2018). But the 
kingdom has also turned to a more sophisticated set of strategies to pro-
tect its oil business.
5.2  Petrochemicals and Non-Combustion Uses for Crudes
First among these is to focus on applications for oil and gas that do not 
involve burning it. The most important of these “non-combustion uses” 
is in producing petrochemicals. Demand for petrochemicals has grown 
more robustly than demand for oil-based fuels8 and with higher  shareholder 
7 See, for example: Jad Mouawad and Andrew C. Revkin, “Saudis Seek Payments for Any 
Drop in Oil Revenues.” New York Times, Oct. 13, 2009; https://www.nytimes.
com/2009/10/14/business/energy-environment/14oil.html; and Gerard Wynn, “U.N. cli-
mate talks threaten our survival: Saudi Arabia.” Reuters, April 8, 2009.
8 The IEA in 2018 estimated that petrochemicals formed the fastest-growing demand 
source for crude oil, with an estimated 25% of overall growth focused on the sector by 2023. 
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returns than other sectors, including, at times, the upstream oil and gas 
business that provides petrochemical feedstocks (Ezekoye et  al. 2018). 
Attractiveness for investors is augmented by the perceived longevity of the 
petrochemical business, since petrochemical-based plastics have few sub-
stitutes and remain vital to post-transition energy systems. For instance, 
plastic is crucial for the manufacture of solar panels, wind turbine blades, 
thermal insulation, batteries, and other components of electric vehicles 
(IEA 2018).
Thus the conversion of crude oil and natural gas into chemical products 
comprises perhaps Saudi Aramco’s most promising climate hedge. 
Chemicals represent a growing “climate proof” use for hydrocarbons, 
through which oil and gas feedstocks are converted into precursor resins 
and polymers that form the basis for finished products ranging from auto 
parts to cushions, paint, and toothpaste. The carbon is sequestered in the 
finished product, rather than released upon combustion, as is the case with 
gasoline and other fuels.
Saudi-based companies have made major investments in petrochemical 
plants, both inside the kingdom and outside. Domestic investment 
includes the $20  billion Sadara joint venture with Dow Chemical, the 
largest single-phase chemical plant ever built. Internationally, Saudi 
Aramco and SABIC, the state-held petrochemical giant, have proposed 
joint venture projects in the United States, China, Malaysia, and India.9 
Demand for plastic goods is closely correlated with GDP growth, with 
large markets emerging in developing countries, where populations are 
moving into the middle class. To increase its competitiveness in the sector, 
Saudi Aramco is investing in technology for direct conversion of crude oil 
into chemicals, bypassing the refining phase and reducing energy inputs 
(Brelsford 2018).
Lubricant production is another climate-compliant use for crude oil, 
since lubricants are (ideally) not combusted. Improvements in lubricant 
See: “Oil 2018,” International Energy Agency, March 5, 2018. https://www.iea.org/
oil2018/.
9 Examples include an ethylene plant proposed in Texas in 2017 that would combine 
investments from SABIC and Exxon Mobil; a Saudi Aramco-Sinopec-ExxonMobil inte-
grated refining and petrochemical plant operating in Fujian, China since 2009. Further, in 
2018, Saudi Aramco announced a combined refining-petrochemical venture in India that 
would link it with three Indian firms; and in Malaysia, the Saudi company announced joint 
ventures with Petronas, Malaysia’s state-owned oil company, for an integrated refinery and 
petrochemical project in southern Malaysia.
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performance have also decreased fuel consumption by reducing friction 
and improving the efficiency of machine operations (Boonen and 
Vanderreydt 2017). As with plastics, lubricating oil can be recycled, which 
improves environmental efficiency, but reduces growth prospects of 
the market.
5.3  Differentiating Among Crude Oil Grades by 
Carbon Intensity
Saudi Arabia and other big Middle East oil producers have long enjoyed 
low average costs of producing their oil reserves, in comparison with other 
oil producing states. Now it turns out that low-cost producers like Saudi 
Arabia enjoy a related advantage: crude oil with low carbon intensity.
That is because cost of production is partly based on the energy 
expended in lifting crude oil from the reservoir to the surface, and in pro-
cessing and transporting it. Lifting costs are lowest in reservoirs with low 
water content and high levels of natural drive pressure, requiring minimal 
use of energy-intensive recovery techniques such as steam flooding 
(Masnadi et al. 2018, 220).
A further factor affecting carbon intensity of oil production relates to 
the flaring of natural gas produced in association with crude oil. Flaring—
or burning off gas at the wellhead—releases even more CO2 into the 
atmosphere. Saudi Arabia and some of its neighbors, such as the UAE, 
Qatar, and Kuwait, flare very little natural gas, preferring to capture the 
gas for domestic use. Other producers like Russia, Iran, Iraq, and the 
United States flare enormous amounts of gas, exacerbating the carbon 
footprint of their crude oil (Fig. 12.4).10
Altogether, producing, transporting, and refining crude oil accounts 
for 15% to 40% of the entire lifecycle GHG emissions—including final 
combustion—of oil-based transport fuels. Among major producers, crude 
oil from Saudi Arabia exhibits the lowest carbon intensity. Other relatively 
low-carbon oil is produced by Ghana, Norway, Azerbaijan, and Kuwait. At 
the high end of the scale is ultra-heavy crude from Canada’s oil sands and 
10 Russia was No. 1 in flaring in 2016, followed by Iraq, Iran, Venezuela, Algeria, and the 
United States. Big oil producers in the Persian Gulf flared much smaller amounts. Saudi 
Arabia was No. 13, Kuwait was No. 25, Qatar was No. 28, and the UAE was in 31st place, 
with less gas flared than even minor oil producing countries such as the United Kingdom and 




Venezuela’s Orinoco Belt, where energy-intensive steam flooding is used 
to increase viscosity of crude oil that, in its natural state, appears closer to 
a solid (Masnadi et al. 2018).
Given such a timely environmental advantage, Saudi Aramco will begin 
highlighting the low carbon intensity of its crude oil as a marketing strat-
egy (Interview with Saudi oil official, Feb. 13, 2018). Low carbon inten-
sity could even translate into a price advantage in countries that levy 
carbon taxes, if carbon taxes were designed to differentiate among crude 
grades by carbon intensity. More typically, carbon taxes apply an average 
value to oil products irrespective of origin.
As Table 12.2 shows, Saudi medium crude priced at $70/barrel with a 
$25/ton carbon tax would cost $81.64 per barrel. A barrel of Venezuelan 
Orinoco crude would be priced at $85.98, a $4.34 premium. At a $50 
carbon tax, the effect would be magnified. The Saudi barrel would be 
nearly $9 cheaper, at $93.29, versus $101.97 for the Orinoco.
5.4  Backing Internal Combustion Engines over EVs
The kingdom also plans strategic investments to prolong the use of gaso-
line in transportation, by maximizing the efficiency of the internal com-
bustion engine, so that oil-fueled transportation remains cost-competitive 
Fig. 12.4 Top 30 flaring countries. (Source: NOAA/GGFR)
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with electric vehicles. From the Saudi perspective, an efficient hybrid vehi-
cle is preferable to an all-electric vehicle that uses no petroleum. Saudi 
Aramco touted its vehicle research—and the “unparalleled energy density 
of hydrocarbons”—at the North American International Auto Show in 
Detroit in 2018. On display were high-efficiency gasoline compression 
ignition engines as well as a car with on-board carbon capture and storage 
capability (Interviews with Saudi Aramco, Feb. 13, 2018).11 In August 
2018, Saudi Aramco announced it would cooperate with Japanese auto 
manufacturer Mazda to develop more efficient engines and gasoline that 
would reduce GHG emissions from the transport sector (Saudi Aramco 
2018). These developments would improve petroleum’s competitiveness 
versus alternative fuels and technologies.
5.5  The ‘Lock In’ Strategy
A subset of the “Dig In” strategy is the “Lock In” approach, where NOCs 
purchase oil and gas infrastructure inside importing countries. Refineries 
have been the main target, and Saudi Aramco the largest proponent.
Aramco has created joint ventures that provide influence or even con-
trol over the refinery configuration and, by extension, the supply of crude 
11 See also: “Aramco showcases flagship technologies at Detroit auto show,” Saudi Aramco 
press release, Jan. 31, 2018. http://www.saudiaramco.com/en/home/news-media/news/
flagship-technologies-detroit-auto-show.html.






































3.5 $0.54 $1.07 $11.64 $23.28 $81.64 $93.28
Venezuela 
Orinoco
31.9 $4.88 $9.76 $15.98 $31.97 $85.98 $101.97
Source: Baker Institute using CO2 intensities from Masnadi et al. (2018)
*Includes upstream CO2 emissions as well as those from transport, refining and final combustion; 
Venezuelan heavy crude oil typically sells at a discount to more valuable lighter grades, a distinction that 
is not captured in these figures
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oil to the refinery process. Aramco has bought stakes in refineries in 
China,12 South Korea (S-Oil n.d.), Japan (Showa Shell Sekiyu K.K. 2016), 
and the United States (Gramer 2017) and was in the process of negotiat-
ing further purchases in India (El Gamal 2018) and Malaysia (Lee and 
Cheong 2018). Similarly, the Kuwait Petroleum Co. has purchased a 35% 
ownership and operational stake in a refinery in Vietnam configured 
around Kuwaiti crude (Vu 2018).
At times, when oil markets are in oversupply—perhaps due to weaken-
ing demand amid a transition to cleaner energy—Saudi Aramco can ensure 
that Saudi crudes have preferential access to Saudi-owned refineries (Krane 
2015a, 99–104). The tactic is reminiscent of that adopted in the early 
twentieth century by the Seven Sisters cartel, which controlled market 
entry through integrated ownership of upstream, midstream, and down-
stream infrastructure. Other states, which lack the “integration” pursued 
by Aramco could find ready markets lacking.
6  strategy no. 2 “JoIn In” clImate actIon
For now, climate change in producer states is primarily seen as an indirect 
threat to demand for oil and gas. But producer countries are also vulner-
able to the direct threat of climate change, and to the multilateral call to 
“join in” the campaign against global warming. As international resolve 
has coalesced around the desirability of GHG mitigation, the Saudi cli-
mate negotiating stance has grown more accepting of the scientific con-
sensus and the need for action. The 2015 Paris Agreement saw Saudi 
Arabia and its neighbors declaring nationally determined contributions 
(NDCs) to reduce emissions of GHGs.
Notwithstanding the backtracking described above, Saudi Arabia has, 
at least in public, shifted its stance to one of support for climate action. 
12 Aramco owns a share of the Fujian Refining & Petrochemical Co. (company website, 
http://www.frep.cn/en/view-category?categoryId=ff800808129f00d8e0129f00d
94e31100) and is in the process of purchasing stakes in two more, as well as entering long-
term supply contract with a private Chinese refiner. See: Rania El Gamal, “Saudi Aramco eyes 
partnerships as it expands refining, petrochems.” Reuters, June 12, 2018; https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-saudi-aramco-downstream-exclusive/exclusive-saudi-aramco-eyes-
partnerships-as-it-expands-refining-petrochems-idUSKBN1J81M9; See also: “New Private 
Chinese Refinery In Talks For Long-Term Saudi Oil Supplies,” Oilprice.com, May 31, 2018; 
https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/New-Private-Chinese-Refinery-
In-Talks-For-Long-Term-Saudi-Oil-Supplies.html.
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Energy minister Khalid Al-Falih issued a statement in support of the 2016 
Congress of Parties (COP) 22 in Marrakesh. “We view the Paris Agreement 
as balanced and fair, and this will pave the way to effective implementation 
in addressing our climate goals and sustainable development goals holisti-
cally,” al-Falih said. “It is encouraging to note that the Paris Agreement 
has achieved the threshold for entry into force, and Saudi Arabia is deter-
mined to see it implemented.” (Ministry of Energy, Industry & Mineral 
Resources of Saudi Arabia 2017)
The revised Saudi posture accepts the necessity of reducing GHG emis-
sions, but in a selective way. Domestically, the kingdom has launched two 
reforms of fossil fuel subsidies, raising prices and reducing demand for 
transport fuels, electricity, and desalinated water. These reforms have eco-
nomically rational goals of reducing government spending on energy pro-
vision and decreasing the “cannibalism” of exportable energy commodities. 
But they serve double-duty as environmental policy, since they also reduce 
growth in the kingdom’s GHG emissions.
Internationally, Saudi Arabia promotes an altogether different strategy, 
featuring efforts that protect the interests of oil-exporting states in ways 
that do not harm demand for fossil fuels. Supported strategies include:
• Carbon capture and storage (CCS): CCS involves capturing car-
bon emissions after combustion and storing them permanently 
underground. CCS technology has progressed slowly, and adoption 
has been undermined by expense and inefficiency, and the slow 
uptake in carbon pricing required to spur adoption. CCS actually 
increases fossil fuel input for the same energy output because captur-
ing and compressing CO2 requires combusting additional fuel. Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE are members of the Carbon Sequestration 
Leadership Forum, and the kingdom has pledged to capture and use 
CO2 in various applications, including in petrochemical produc-
tion and EOR.
• Flaring reductions: As mentioned, Saudi Arabia has succeeded in 
curtailing wasteful flaring of natural gas, but other countries—
including the United States—have been less successful. Altogether, 
3.5% of global gas consumption, or 149 billion cubic meters—more 
than Japan’s entire 2017 consumption—is burned as waste (World 
Bank n.d.). Many fossil fuel proponents acknowledge that “cleaning 




• Focus on “alternate” GHGs: Saudi officials want more attention 
paid to GHGs, such as methane and nitrous oxides, which, although 
forming a smaller portion of overall emissions, carry much higher 
heat-trapping properties than CO2. Nitrous oxides are largely used 
in fertilizers in the agricultural sector. Most methane pollution flows 
from leaks in upstream oil and gas infrastructure. Saudi Arabia has 
championed the Global Methane Initiative to reduce fugitive meth-
ane emissions (Global Methane Initiative n.d.).
The Saudi COP 22 brief also argues that fossil fuels should be retained 
in a future energy mix due to their synergies with renewables. The king-
dom sees CO2 emissions as a “harmful side effect” that can be mitigated 
with technological solutions (Ministry of Energy, Industry & Mineral 
Resources of Saudi Arabia 2017). In 2014, Saudi Aramco joined the Oil 
and Gas Climate Initiative, a group of 13 major oil companies each pledg-
ing $100 million for research into low-emissions fossil fuel technology.
6.1  Renewables and Nuclear Power
The Saudi climate approach also leans on aspirations for replacing oil-fired 
power generation with zero-carbon renewable and nuclear electricity gen-
eration within the kingdom. There are strong economic rationales for 
policies that push oil out of the Saudi power generation sector, given oil’s 
international market value and the very low cost of solar power in a coun-
try with world-leading insolation and plenty of empty land. But, as of 
mid-2018, neither nuclear nor renewable generation had an appreciable 
presence in the kingdom. In 2017, Saudi Arabia produced just 0.04% of 
its electricity—135 gigawatt-hours of a total of nearly 376,000 GWhs—
from solar means, the only non-hydrocarbon source of electricity currently 
online in the country (BP 2018). Instead, a rising share of the Saudi power 
market was being claimed by natural gas (Table 12.3).
Table 12.3 Power gen-
eration by source in KSA




Source: ECRA (2017) and BP (2018)
12 CLIMATE STRATEGY FOR PRODUCER COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF SAUDI… 
318
6.2  Social License to Operate
In coming years, the kingdom and Saudi Aramco appear likely to highlight 
these efforts, as well as the low carbon-intensity of its crude, lack of flaring 
and fugitive methane, and its investments in high-efficiency engines to 
claim credentials as an “environmentally responsible” supplier of necessary 
fossil fuels. The business associations it has supported around these issues 
may in future set minimum compliance standards and issue “green” certi-
fications or endorsements for fuels that meet standards.
Oil’s lack of substitutes in the transportation sector, particularly the 
aviation market, means that these sectors are unlikely to be decarbonized 
for decades. Oil-based fuels will be necessary far into a climate-constrained 
energy future. Attention will necessarily turn to the GHG footprints of the 
various grades of crude in the global oil supply. Suppliers that minimize 
CO2 and GHG emissions from their upstream, midstream, and down-
stream supply chains will gain competitive advantage, allowing consumers, 
refiners, and importing states to differentiate among “clean” and “dirty” 
oil-based fuels.
Saudi Arabia is positioning itself to present a strong case as a “climate 
friendly” fuel supplier. As such, the social acceptability of Saudi crude oil 
is more than a “Join In” in climate action strategy. It also becomes a “Dig 
In” strategy, since it might also extend the longevity of Saudi supply in the 
global oil market—and the social stability in a kingdom where politics are 
structured around oil rents.
7  strategy no. 3 “throw In” and accePt 
clImate damage
Finally, there is the “Throw In” strategy, a collective approach whereby 
producer governments lobby for a relaxation of the atmospheric GHG 
accumulation limit of 450 parts per million of CO2 equivalent. This is the 
maximum GHG concentration associated with limiting the global aver-
age temperature increase to 2  °C, which forms the basis for the Paris 
agreement.
As an alternative, fossil fuel producers, scholars, and others have been 
developing a relaxed climate strategy they describe as a more “pragmatic” 
path toward decarbonizing global energy systems. The strategy amounts 
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to a concession (i.e. “throwing in the towel”) that costs of compliance 
with 2 °C emissions limits are unreasonably high, and that more climate 
damage would be preferable to the economic disruption implied by thor-
oughgoing and rapid decarbonization.13
Among the institutions developing the strategy are Saudi Arabia’s 
Ministry of Energy, Industry and Mineral Resources; Japan’s Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry; as well as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
the European Union and African Union, and academics from think tanks 
and universities. At the time of writing, no official document had been 
released.14
The “pragmatic” climate strategy stresses the deficiencies of fossil fuel 
substitutes and how these energy sources have failed to gain traction in the 
developing world, where much power demand growth continues to be 
met by fossil fuels, mainly coal. The narrative points out that climate pol-
icy must become cost-competitive for developing countries, and that mar-
ket mechanisms are needed to motivate advances in technology. It repeats 
well-known arguments that renewables and electric vehicles are disadvan-
taged by price, energy density, and intermittency. Therefore, tradeoffs are 
needed among the three categories of climate spending:
• Adaptation: Investments and engineering techniques that reduce 
exposure to geographic and climatic changes
• Mitigation: Reducing emissions, including by reducing fossil fuel use
• Damage: Economic losses from climate change.
Most of the tradeoffs lie in the mitigation-versus-damage balance. If 
strict mitigation measures are imposed before substitute technology is 
mature, proponents of the strategy argue that costs of mitigation could 
outweigh the costs of damage and adaptation, resulting in a larger-than- 
optimal expense. In Fig. 12.5, Path 3 represents an “unbalanced” climate 
policy dominated by mitigation.
13 These strategies are outlined in Samantha Gross and Yuhji Matsuo, “Towards More 
Pragmatic Global Climate Goals and Policies,” scholarly paper (Riyadh: KAPSARC, October 
2017), http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/7608.pdf. Also see slides 17–20 in: Yukari Yamashita, 
“Climate Change and Economic Growth in Asia: What Are Realistic Goals?” (Powerpoint 
presentation, March 16, 2017), https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/
files/0587096b/Pragmatic_Approach_Baker_Institute_yamashita.pdf.
14 In the interest of full disclosure, the author declares his involvement in the process.
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However, the pragmatists’ “optimum” path (Path 2  in Fig.  12.5), 
which minimizes total cost, provides insufficient decarbonization to meet 
the 2 °C carbon target. Average warming might reach 3 °C and bring cata-
strophic climate damage. But the costs of widespread damage would—
proponents argue—be more than offset by reductions in spending on 
mitigation. This finding also implies less harm to fossil fuel producers and 
to developing economies seeking low-cost energy services.
These raw estimates raise questions in regards to the accounting meth-
ods used, which are based on modeling carbon taxes required to bring 
about sufficient reductions in demand. A very rough comparison of actual 
climate mitigation and damage costs highlights potential weaknesses in 
the assumptions. For instance, between 1980 and 2018, the United States 
sustained some $1.5 trillion in damage from 219 weather and climate 
disasters (Smith 2018). The portion of those damages attributed to cli-
mate change is unknown. By contrast, the US government spent a tenth 
Fig. 12.5 Comparison of cost paths with varying levels of spending on mitiga-
tion, adaptation, and damage. (Source: Institute for Energy Economics)
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of that amount, less than $150 billion, between 1993 and 2014 (a shorter 
period) on climate research, technology, and assistance (US Government 
Accountability Office n.d.).
More specifically, in 2017, the United States experienced a record $306 
billion in damages from weather and climate disasters (Fig. 12.6). That 
amount is five times the 2017 revenues of Saudi Aramco15 and more than 
70% of OPEC’s 2016 oil export revenues.16 If anthropogenic climate fac-
tors were responsible for 20% of the damage—due to intensified drought- 
induced wildfires and flooding from extreme rainfall—paying for that 
15 The Saudi Aramco revenues estimate comes from a rough doubling of Saudi Aramco 
reported revenues of $33.8 billion in the first half of 2017. See: “The Aramco Accounts: 
Inside the World’s Most Profitable Company,” Bloomberg News. April 13, 2018 (https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-13/the-aramco-accounts-inside-the-world-
s-most-profitable-company). The US climate-related weather damages come from: Adam 
B. Smith “2017 U.S. billion-dollar weather and climate disasters: a historic year in context,” 
Climate.gov; Jan. 8, 2018. (https://www.climate.gov/news-features/blogs/
beyond-data/2017-us-billion-dollar-weather-and-climate-disasters-historic-year).
16 The 13 OPEC member states earned a combined $433 billion in 2016. See: “OPEC 
Revenues Fact Sheet,” US Energy Information Administration, May 15, 2017. https://
www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.php?RegionTopicID=OPEC.
Fig. 12.6 US 2017 billion-dollar weather and climate disasters. (Source: NOAA)
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portion alone would require Saudi Aramco’s entire 2017 revenues. Of 
course, 20% may be too large an estimate of the anthropogenic role, but 
the damages tallied are also incomplete and do not account for heat- 
related mortality, decreased crop yield, increased electricity demand, and 
other factors such as negative feedback loops from shrinking snow and ice 
cover, or methane releases from thawing permafrost (Fig. 12.7).17
Finally, the 2018 IPCC report estimates global economic damages 
from 2 °C warming by 2100 at the nearly unfathomable sum of $69 tril-
lion (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change n.d.). Tallying the 
additional damage from a further degree of warming, including changes in 
coastlines and increased human migration and conflict, threatens to ren-
der an already tenuous concept inconceivable. It is hard to envision any-
thing pragmatic about a goal based upon 3 °C warming, except perhaps in 
the very short term.
17 It is worth adding that no amount of mitigation spending in 2017 would have affected 
climate change-related disasters in 2017. Results could only be expected in future years. 
Effective mitigation requires GHG reductions outside the United States as well. Further, the 
future “payoff” in tempering climate change could be difficult to measure given natural cli-
mate variability, making current spending justifications difficult.




In summary, the “throw in” strategy revolves around speculation that 
humanity will be better off by delaying strict mitigation because improved 
technology will emerge in the future and reduce GHG emissions without 
terminating the fossil fuel industry. Given that such technologies have nei-
ther been demonstrated nor deployed, the “throw in” strategy may be 
described as a multilateral version of Saudi Arabia’s obstructionism 
approach.
8  conclusIon: a fourth strategy
The three strategy types above outline near-term practices producer states 
might adopt to coexist with climate action, seeking not just to survive, but 
to recast their businesses in ways that provide competitive advantages.
Despite the increasing climate consciousness in Saudi Arabia and its 
improved relations with the global climate regime, some of the strategies 
outlined here are best described as alterations in the manner in which fos-
sil fuels harm the Earth’s climate, geography, inhabitants, and their prop-
erty. While improvements in upstream production techniques can assist at 
the margins, it is worth noting that the fossil fuel sector—oil, gas, and 
coal—remains responsible for two-thirds of the ongoing GHG emissions 
that continue to accumulate in the atmosphere. To the extent that strate-
gies outlined here assist producers with marketing fuels that continue to 
be combusted in unabated fashion, they prolong damage to the Earth’s 
climate, despite providing short-run economic benefits, particularly in 
developing countries.
A fourth strategy—briefly mentioned in the introduction—offers 
greater promise than the three above: Diversification beyond the oil and 
gas business. For companies, particularly shareholder-owned oil compa-
nies, diversification is part of the constant challenge of adjusting to evolv-
ing markets. When governments nationalized their oil concessions in the 
1970s, the big Western oil companies created new opportunities else-
where. Climate action is hastening the next major shift in the energy 
business.
For producer countries, nonoil diversification also makes sense. The 
more prudent of these states have actively begun creating new economic 
sectors that complement and eventually can replace those facing the risk of 
climate action. Ironically, a robust fossil fuel export sector is useful in 
funding investments aimed at diversifying away from fossil fuels. Some oil 
producers have taken steps in this direction. The United Arab 
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Emirates—and Dubai in particular—have built diversified economies that 
are already unwinding lopsided dependence on oil exports and prices. 
Saudi Arabia has announced a similar effort. Structural barriers in the 
GCC labor markets add complexity to diversification.
Perhaps the largest hurdle to diversification is, as mentioned, the con-
tinued availability of economic rents that have persisted in the oil business 
for more than a century. Inevitably, diversification will bring profits that 
appear disappointing in comparison to the lopsided earnings from low- 
cost oil.
Regardless, the oil market appears likely to grow more competitive as 
demand shifts into reverse in the OECD, and developing Asia becomes 
the main growth focus. How oil producing countries adapt in the long 
run remains in question.
A more chaotic oil market could be one result. Producers might seek a 
more bilateral route to marketing of oil, pairing with importers in an envi-
ronment of enhanced competition. Hydrocarbon states which cannot 
compete may find themselves sidelined—either for geological (cost) rea-
sons or above-ground political and institutional deficiencies, or even 
importer embargo.
Alternatively, producer countries could pursue a more cooperative path. 
One envisions an enhanced role for OPEC in allocating producers with 
equitable shares of a shrinking global oil market in the best interests of 
exporters and the global climate. If that happened, OPEC’s organizing 
principle might shift. Rather than managing the price of oil, it might allot 
member countries a share of the market based not just on a member state’s 
output capacity, but on the climate credentials of the oil it produced. The 
preparations outlined in Saudi Arabia, the world’s low-cost, low-carbon 
oil producer, would place it in a strong position in either scenario.
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CHAPTER 13
The Sustainability of GCC Development 
Under the New Global Oil Order
Ibrahim A. Elbadawi and Samir Makdisi
1  IntroductIon
The six-member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have 
been able to sustain fast growth for over 30 years, since the start of the oil 
price boom of the mid-1970s. Though growth has of course been volatile, 
following the various oil cycles, it continued to rise or remained stable at 
high rates throughout the period. And, some GCC countries, such as the 
UAE, and most notably the sub-economy of the Emirate of Dubai, have 
managed to achieve tremendous economic transformations towards more 
diversified and sophisticated economic structures. Moreover, the GCC 
monarchies have been able to avoid civil wars and maintain civil peace. 
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They have also presided over a somewhat functioning social contract that 
helped them to fend off the fallout from the Arab Spring, which swept 
several major countries in their neighborhood.
At the other extreme, the populous oil Arab economies1 have experi-
enced the “resource curse” big time: a disappointing growth record, lim-
ited economic diversification, depleted physical and soft infrastructures, 
massive unemployment, especially among youth, and political instability, 
even civil wars.
And in terms of policies and economic institutions, the contrast of the 
two groups is equally stark (Elbadawi et al. 2017). The GCC countries 
have been able to maintain macroeconomic stability through a credible de 
facto institutional exchange rate peg regime, supported by massive foreign 
account surpluses in the form of reserves accumulation and sovereign 
wealth funds (SWFs). Moreover, the deep fiscal pockets of the GCC coun-
tries allow fiscal stabilization against the oil market shocks, most notably 
ensuring uninterrupted large fiscal outlays for financing infrastructure 
development and other social sector programs as well as expansion of pub-
lic sector employment for nationals. Also, their open trade, capital accounts 
and labor market policies provided a good measure of macroeconomic 
competitiveness to the GCC economies, hence moderating the adverse 
consequences of the rigidity of the exchange rate regime. By contrast, the 
populous oil Arab economies have been plagued by intermittent bouts of 
inflationary spells, overvalued real exchange rates and fiscal dominance 
and less buoyant growth.
The received literature suggests that the “resource curse” is a long-term 
phenomenon but is conditional on poor political governance. Empirical 
evidence shows that in resource economies lacking political inclusiveness 
and effective “checks and balances” institutions, resource rents are likely 
to be a hindrance rather than a boon to growth. Moreover, resource rents 
tend to have corrosive effects on the quality of economic and political 
institutions (e.g. Collier and Goderis 2009; Elbadawi and Soto 2012a). 
Also, the evidence from the empirical strand of the civil war literature finds 
that, in the absence of political inclusiveness and accountability, the 
1 Though Saudi Arabia is relatively populous, in terms of rents per capita, it is more com-
parable to the high rents per capita GCC countries of Kuwait, Qatar and UAE than the other 
populous oil Arab economies of Algeria, Iraq and Yemen. As discussed in the literature, rents 
per capita above a certain threshold have been a major factor in explaining the superior per-
formance of the GCC economies relative to the populous oil Arab economies (e.g. Ali and 
Elbadawi 2012; Elbadawi 2016).
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presence of resource rents increases the risks of conflicts for both “loot” 
and “grievance” motives (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Bodea and 
Elbadawi 2007).
However, while the literature seems to adequately account for the poor 
management experiences of the populous oil Arab economies and most 
other resource-abundant countries, it seems to provide little predictive 
power for the case of the GCC. In fact, Elbadawi (2016) has shown that 
there is a small group of 12 exorbitantly high oil rent per capita countries 
that are mostly non-democratic (hereafter HRPC), including the GCC, 
which seem to defy the fundamental tenets of the received literature that 
non-democratic governance affects growth negatively. He finds that there 
exists a resource rents threshold, beyond which countries might be able to 
achieve fast growth and civil peace as well as avoid revolt regardless of the 
prevailing standard in terms of accountable political institutions. This 
finding lends support to theory suggesting that high-enough resource 
rents per capita could lead to a developmental, if non-democratic, political 
equilibrium (Ali and Elbadawi 2012).
This chapter reviews the development experiences of the GCC coun-
tries in the context of three development goals: growth, civil peace and 
political stability; it undertakes a synthesis of the literature, largely drawing 
from the authors’ own work. However, the main contribution of the chap-
ter relates to identifying the prospects for the sustainability of the GCC 
development model in the emerging new “global oil order”, expected to 
eventually lead to a low oil price “equilibrium” in the longer run.
Section 2 reviews the received literature on the causal links from rents 
per capita to growth, especially the evidence on the existence of non- 
monotonic growth effects. Section 3 reviews the literature on the scale- 
contingent role of resource rents as a determinant of conflicts and 
democratic transitions. In this context, it discusses the significance of 
threshold effects in explaining the apparent success of the GCC monar-
chies in avoiding civil wars as well as pre-empting potential revolts. Section 
4, which is the hallmark of this paper, asks the pivotal question as to the 
sustainability of the GCC development model in the emerging new global 
oil order. Section 5 concludes.
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2  Growth and InstItutIons In the Gcc: resource 
rents threshold Matters
As discussed, the received literature suggests that resource-abundant2 
economies tend to grow slowly and that such countries are likely to be 
impacted by the “resource curse”, with only few exceptional cases of 
countries that happen to be endowed with robust political and economic 
institutions (e.g. Collier and Goderis 2009; Elbadawi and Soto 2012a). 
However, though this literature has been borne out by the experiences of 
most resource-abundant countries, the six GCC countries seem to have 
defied this empirical finding. They have been able to grow rapidly over the 
longer term, despite their entrenched non-democratic governance.
We argue that the level of resource abundance, as measured by resource 
rents per capita, is central to explaining the superior growth performance 
of the GCC, compared to other less endowed populous oil and mineral 
economies. The distribution of countries by this criterion reveals consider-
able heterogeneity. For the period 2000–2013, the median rents per cap-
ita for the HRPC group (comprising countries with rent per capita in 
excess of $2000) was $5322, more than eight times the median for the 
second most resource-abundant group of 15 countries, whose rents per 
capita are within the range of $400 to $2000 (Table 13.1). In view of their 
vast hydrocarbon resource base and relatively small populations, it is not 
surprising that the high resource-endowed GCC countries have domi-
nated the list of the top ten countries in terms of rents per capita. It is, 
however, notable that they also dominated the top ten fastest growing 
countries during the last three decades (Figs. 13.1 and 13.2). By compari-
son, the populous oil Arab economies, among other resource economies, 
achieved much lower growth rates.
The comparative growth experiences of the GCC and other less 
resource-abundant countries suggest the existence of association, not nec-
essarily causation, between unusually high rents per capita and long-term 
growth. Moreover, governance data also reveal that the median country 
from the HRPC group, including the GCC, receives the lowest scores in 
two global political governance indicators: Polity2, the widely accepted 
2 Throughout this paper, we use the concept of “resource abundance” (measured by 
resource rents per capita), as opposed to the alternative concept of “resource dependency”, 
which is given by rents/GDP. The latter has been criticized in the empirical growth and 
conflict literature, due to reverse causation (Elbadawi and Soto 2012a; Ross 2004, 2009).
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measure of political inclusiveness; and Polcon, a new index of the effec-
tiveness of political constraints on the executive and legislative branches of 
government3 (Fig. 13.3).
At the same time, looking at the HRPC group, and specifically the 
GCC, their record of avoiding civil wars and maintaining stability is 
impressive. It stands in contrast to that of other resource-dependent 
3 The Polity2 is a global database developed by the “Polity IV: Regime Authority 
Characteristics and Transitions Datasets” project; and the Political Constraint Index 
(POLCON-V) is also a global index due to Henisz and Zelner (2010).
It is not surprising that most country groups, especially the HRPC, received low scores on 
both indices (Fig. 13.3). A more detailed country-specific analysis of the two indexes sug-
gests that the Polity2 index (rescaled so that 1 stands for full democracy, and 0 stands for 
extreme autocracy) for the median political regime in the three country groups with rents 
less than $400 is likely to be “partial democracy”. Instead, for the group with rents less than 
2000 but higher than $400, which includes the populous oil economies of Algeria and Iran, 
it is likely to be an “autocracy”; and except for Norway and Trinidad and Tobago, the rest of 
the countries in the highest resource-abundant group are all judged to be extreme autocra-
cies. Furthermore, the resource-rich countries tend to fare much worse according to the 
Polcon, with the median index below 0.4 for all groups, which suggests weak systems of 
political checks and balances. Again, except for the two democracies of Norway and Trinidad 
and Tobago, the Polcon index for the HRPC group is close to zero, suggesting that a system 
of “formal” checks and balances does not even exist in these countries (Elbadawi 2016).
Table 13.1 Typology of resource rents per capita (average: 2000–2013)
Resource rents per 
capita






































Notes: (1) Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and 
soft), mineral rents and forest rents. (2) For the GCC, resource rents per capita were computed as a ratio 
of total rents to national population, where the latter was calculated using 49% in Bahrain, 68% for Saudi 
Arabia, 61% for Oman, 16% for the UAE, 32% for Kuwait and 16% for Qatar
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Real Average Economic Growth Rate per capita (1985 to 2016)
Fig. 13.1 Average rent per capita (2000 to 2016). (Source: World Bank- 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) and authors’ own elaboration. Notes: (1) 
Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents 
(hard and soft), mineral rents and forest rents. (2) National population for GCC 
countries are taken from Gulf Labor Markets, Migration and population (GLLM) 
programme (https://gulfmigration.org/glmm-database/) since national popula-
tion represents a very small portion of the total population)
Fig. 13.2 Real average economic growth rate per capita (1985 to 2016). 
(Source: World Bank-IFS Data and authors’ elaboration)
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long- duration conflicts (Table  13.2). Similarly, the long-reigning GCC 
monarchies have not only been able to maintain domestic political stabil-
ity, but to avoid, so far at least, the contagion effects of the Arab Spring 
(Table  13.3). While it is not surprising for full democracies, such as 
Norway and Trinidad and Tobago, to enjoy political stability, this has been 
a challenging goal for authoritarian elites in relatively limited resource- 
abundant societies (Elbadawi 2016). The explanation, as discussed later, 
relates to the role played by relatively abundant resource rents.
The aforementioned evidence naturally motivates the question as to 
whether unusually high resource abundance (such as that of the GCC and 
other countries in the HRPC group) is likely to promote growth regard-
less of the quality of the underlying political institutions. This question 
was addressed by Elbadawi (2016), who, firstly, estimates a baseline 
Fig. 13.3 Median average polity and political constrains in resource-rich econo-
mies. (Source: Table 10.3 of Elbadawi 2016)
Table 13.2 Armed civil conflicts, 1970–2010
Resource rents per capita Number of countries Longest war duration
Rents Pc < 20 USD 10 41 years
20 < Rents Pc < 200 36 41 years
200 < Rents Pc < 400 4 41 years
400 < Rents Pc < 2000 7 26 years
Rents Pc > 2000 USD 2 1 year
Source: Table 10.2 of Elbadawi (2016)
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growth model that accounts for the level resource rents per capita and its 
squared value as well as other standard growth fundamentals other than 
political governance institutions. He finds that there exists a statistically 
significant but non-monotonic resource-abundance effect on growth, 
where resource abundance constitutes a hindrance to growth for countries 
with rents per capita lower than $1800, while those on the higher side of 
the tipping level should be able to unconditionally turn the resource rents 
into positive growth regardless of the quality of the underlying institutions. 
In view of such exorbitantly high threshold, only the HRPC group, espe-
cially the GCC, qualifies for such type of the growth process. In the 
extended model that also accounts for economic and political institutions, 
Elbadawi estimates a much lower tipping point at $148 when he controls 
for both Polity and Polcon. These results suggest that, conditional on 
good political governance, societies with moderate to high rents per capita 
(currently about 51) should be able to realize positive conditional growth 
from their resource endowments.
However, though the tipping point of the rent per capita was signifi-
cantly reduced after controlling for the two indicators of political gover-
nance, the effect of rents remains. This suggests that whatever the GCC 
political construct, growth performance of the region has been anchored 
Table 13.3 Political regimes types and years in power
Country Duration and regime type
Rents per capita > $2000
Kuwait 1962 Present Monarchy
Saudi Arabia 1928 Present Monarchy
Oman 1742 Present Monarchy
UAE 1972 Present Monarchy
Bahrain 1971 Present Constitutional monarchy
Qatar 1971 Present Monarchy
Brunei 1984 Present Constitutional monarchy
Norway 1886 Present Democracy
Trinidad and Tobago 1962 Present Democracy
Gabon 1961 Present Party-personal
Equatorial Guinea 1968 Present Personal-military
Equatorial Guinea 1979 1978 Personal-military
Libya 1952 1969 Monarchy
Libya 1970 2010 Personal
Source: Table 10.3 of Elbadawi (2016)
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by their unusually high rents per capita, and that the ensuing growth- 
promoting political equilibrium has not been explicable in terms of the 
two global political indicators.
3  MaIntaInInG cIvIl Peace and PolItIcal stabIlIty: 
resource rents threshold also Matters
Looking at the HRPC group, and specifically the GCC, noteworthy is 
their record of avoiding civil wars and maintaining stability. It stands in 
contrast to that of other resource-dependent countries [populous?] which 
have been impacted by frequent and long-duration conflicts (Table 13.2). 
Similarly, the long-reigning GCC monarchies have not only been able to 
maintain domestic political stability but to avoid, so far at least, the conta-
gion effects of the Arab Spring (Table 13.3). While it is not surprising for 
full democracies, such as Norway and Trinidad and Tobago, to enjoy 
political stability, this has been a challenging goal for authoritarian elites in 
relatively limited resource-abundant societies (Elbadawi 2016). The expla-
nation, as discussed later, relates to the role played by relatively abundant 
resource rents.
3.1  Resource Rents, Threshold Effects and Civil Wars
Like growth collapse, civil wars have been prominently analyzed in the 
economic and political science literature as a major manifestation of the 
resource curse.4 It has been argued that the existence of a “lootable” 
resource base is both a motive for rebellion and a facilitating factor. 
Because they need to purchase arms and recruit fighters, rebel organiza-
tions cannot survive without access to natural resource rents or other 
sources of easy financing, such as financial and military aid from sympa-
thetic diaspora or friendly governments. For example, in Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004), the equilibrium level of the risk of conflict is given by 
equating the marginal product of rebel labor and government strength 
(measured by the economic strength and the size of the military) to their 
respective marginal costs for a given level of natural resources. This 
4 See, for example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon (2005), Miguel et  al. 2004), 
Sambanis (2004), Bodea and Elbadawi (2007), Caselli and Coleman (2013) and Elbadawi 
and Soto (2015), as representative examples on natural resource and conflicts.
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framework solves for the risk of civil war onset as increasing with the natu-
ral resource endowment and decreasing with the opportunity cost of 
rebellion.
Again, though the linear effect of resource rents on the hazard of con-
flicts seems to account for the experiences of many, if not most resource- 
endowed countries, it does not, however, cohere with the evidence from 
the HRPC group, especially the GCC. As argued by Elbadawi (2016), 
“very high resource rents might in fact be a deterrent to conflict, either 
through the ‘Hobbesian’ effect of providing the state with substantial 
resources to crush potential insurgency or through strengthening the 
‘authoritarian bargain’, which proved to be effective in preempting incipi-
ent conflicts in highly resource endowed societies”. Subscribing to this 
argument, he estimates a model to test for the marginal effect of the 
resource per capita for HRPC group, which is given by an interactive term 
between rents per capita and the dummy for the HRPC group. In addi-
tion to the level effect of the rents per capita and the two political institu-
tional variables, the model also accounts for the standard controls in this 
literature, including income per capita and population size.
As in the received literature, the overall linear rents effect remains posi-
tive and highly significant, but the threshold effect was negative and highly 
significant as well. This suggests that the HRPC group was able to sub-
stantially ameliorate the risk of civil war associated with resource rents. 
Moreover, marginally expanding the threshold to include the 15 countries 
in the following group (with rents per capita higher than $400 but lower 
than $2000) renders the threshold effect insignificant. As for the two 
political institutions, political checks and balances were found to be 
robustly and negatively associated with the hazard of civil war. Moreover, 
checks and balances appear to have weakened the linear rents effect, which 
was reduced in terms of order of magnitude and degree of significance 
when the former is included in the regression. Instead, and contrary to the 
model’s prediction, democracy was not found to exert any significant 
influence.
3.2  Resource Abundance, Threshold Effects 
and Democratic Transitions
Until recently, the Arab world has been immune to the various democracy 
waves that swept the developing countries since the end of WWII. This 
prompted some scholars to claim that Arab societies are culturally 
 I. A. ELBADAWI AND S. MAKDISI
339
different, attributing lagging Arab democratic development to the so- 
called neo-patriarchy thesis. However, the popular uprising that swept the 
Arab world since 2010 suggests this is not what explains “Arab exception-
alism” to democracy. An alternative thesis for explaining the limited 
democratization in the Arab world is provided by Elbadawi and Makdisi 
(2011, 2017) and Elbadawi et  al. (2011), who argue that, along with 
conflicts, the dominance of the hydrocarbon resource on Arab economies 
appears to be the main culprit, because it allowed incumbent autocrats to 
build a much more durable “authoritarian bargain” than has been possible 
in less resource-dependent regions.
However, again the resource rents as instrument for “greasing” the 
authoritarian bargain are not likely to have a linear effect. This is why sev-
eral incumbent regimes in the oil-rich but populous Arab countries have 
experienced repeated revolts, coups and, more recently, mass protests, 
while the GCC monarchies remain fairly safe. This points to the limits to 
the effectiveness of the authoritarian bargain for the former; hence, sug-
gesting that the role of resource rents as a hindrance to democratic transi-
tion might be subject to scale effects, akin to the cases of growth and 
civil peace.
Ali and Elbadawi (2012) develop a game-theoretic political economy 
model that accounts for two strategies that might be adopted by an incum-
bent autocrat to avoid or prevent a revolt by the citizenry (see also Desai 
et al. 2009; Esfahani and Gurakar 2014; Hodler 2006; Robinson et al. 
2006). They show that there exists a threshold of rent per capita, above 
which the dominant strategy will be to spend on public employment and 
other public goods. Instead, for those less-endowed societies (i.e. below 
the threshold), elites will primarily rely on political repression as the main 
strategy for holding on to power. The predictions of this model are 
strongly corroborated by the evidence provided by Elbadawi (2016).5 
Indeed, the HRPC group seems to rely much less on political repression 
than does the median country in the rest of the resource countries. 
Furthermore, the former, especially the GCC countries, spend much more 
5 The evidence provided by Elbadawi (2016) is based on a direct measure of government 
repression that is available in the recently developed Cingranelli–Richards data set (2008). 
This measure, called Physical Integrity Rights, constructs an annual variable that ranges from 
0 (worst repression) to 8 (repression free) and accounts for the incidence of torture, extraju-
dicial killing, political imprisonment and disappearances that are attributable to the 
government.
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(on per capita basis) on education and health as well as building vastly 
superior infrastructure.
To assess the effectiveness of the two alternative strategies in preventing 
a revolt, Elbadawi and Makdisi (2013) estimate an extended version of the 
modernization democratic transition model that accounts for the poten-
tial role of resource rents per capita and political repression as hindrances 
to democratic transition. In addition to the standard modernization con-
trols, such as income per capita and economic growth, their model also 
accounts for the effects of home wars, unemployment and the legacy of 
previous political instability, given by the number of times a country expe-
rienced a transition from democracy to autocracy.
They find that political repression, like unemployment, seems to fully 
explain the resource rents effect as a hindrance to democracy in low or 
moderate rents per capita group, such as the populous oil Arab economies. 
However, it does not fully account for the resource effect for the highly 
endowed group, most notably the GCC. Drawing on the implications of 
these findings, the two authors interpret their findings as corroborating 
the predictions of Ali and Elbadawi’s model, that is, in high-resource but 
population-scarce countries, the elites are likely to rely more on expanding 
public employment and less on political repression. Instead, the opposite 
is likely to happen in moderately endowed but populous countries.
4  Gcc develoPMent sustaInabIlIty: soMe 
challenGes ahead
No doubt the GCC had a very strong growth record (Fig. 13.2). However, 
growth has been largely driven by factor accumulation in the form of mas-
sive investments and even more through large-scale utilization of unskilled 
and semi-skilled labor, mainly drawn from the Indian subcontinent. This 
growth model has obviously served the GCC well and allowed the build-
ing of state-of-the-art infrastructure at exceptionally low cost of labor. But 
one major drawback of the GCC growth strategy has been low and even 
declining total factor as well as labor productivity. This feature of the 
growth process raises serious doubts about the sustainability of growth, 
indeed of the entire GCC development model. Probing deeper into this 
issue, let us consider the case of the UAE, the second largest economy in 
the GCC and the Arab world. The economy of the UAE, most notably 
that of the Emirate of Dubai, has achieved the most significant 
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transformation. In about 35  years (from 1975 to 2010), the country’s 
output multiplied by five times (in real PPP prices), with an annual average 
growth rate for the period at 5.4%. However, though this growth was 
among the highest in the world, it has been associated with disappointing 
productivity growth rates.
The local economy of Dubai, the poster child of economic diversifying 
growth in the entire region, provides even more impressive economic 
development experience. The Emirate’s economy has multiplied by 
11 times during roughly the same period (1975–2008), growing by an 
exceptional nine percent per annum during the last 15 years of that period 
(Elbadawi and Soto 2012b). Nonetheless, despite its exceptionally com-
mendable growth and much deeper economic transformation, Dubai has 
not been able to distinguish itself in terms of productivity growth. In fact, 
both average labor and total factor productivities remained stagnant for a 
long period of time (1987–20086) following the substantial decline in the 
early 1980s. This contrasts sharply with the other city-states, where aver-
age labor productivity has grown steadily with time (Fig. 13.4).
It has been argued that the prevailing social contract in the GCC, which 
essentially underpins the political settlement for resource mobilization and 
distribution in these societies, is not capable of generating high productiv-
ity growth, even in the most successful growth model of the UAE, and 
especially Dubai. In the context of this social contract, nationals are pro-
vided assured public employment at high-enough wages reflecting their 
wage reservation levels as wealthy societies, while granting the private sec-
tor a privileged access to an unlimited supply of unskilled foreign labor. 
The public sector commitment to meet the demand for employment by 
nationals provides strong incentives, for entrepreneurs prefer to employ 
labor-intensive rather than more sophisticated and high productivity pro-
duction techniques.
One frequently cited reason is the so-called kafala system, “which pro-
vides significant market power derived from the fact that an employee is 
forbidden to change occupations while the contract is in force and is 
required to leave the country upon expiration. This absence of horizontal 
mobility allows employers to extract economic rents: when choosing pro-
duction technologies, therefore, employers would tend to focus on labor 
intensive techniques that, in addition to the normal profit obtained from 
6 This trend will likely to have continued following the post-2008 global economic 
recession.
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selling goods, would allow them to extract the highest rents from the 
worker. Naturally, this skews production towards labor-intensive technol-
ogies. It also biases employment toward low-skilled workers that have less 
ability to negotiate salaries in contrast with highly skilled workers are bet-
ter educated and scarcer and, thus, better equipped to counterbalance the 
market power of employers. This aspect of the kafala would explain why 
labor productivity in the UAE is lower than in countries with similar GDP 
per capita” (Soto and Haouas 2012). However, even without the kafala 
system, the free access to the essentially unlimited supply of labor in the 
nearby southern Asian labor markets, coupled with large-scale public- 
sector contracts for entrepreneurs and developers in the construction and 
real estate sectors, would probably constitute a sufficient reason to steer 
their preferences toward the prevailing low-productivity model.
The 2008 global economic crisis and its aftermath have served a wakeup 
call to governments and societies at large about the need to reconsider the 
growth model and its underlying social contract. It is now a widely held 
view, by academic researchers and business experts alike, that eventually 
the price of oil will be converging to lower long-term trend, driven by the 
accelerating pace of technological advances in renewable energy as well as 
Fig. 13.4 Real GDP per working-age person (2000 = 100). (Source: Elbadawi 
and Soto 2012b)
 I. A. ELBADAWI AND S. MAKDISI
343
the shale oil and gas energy sources (Arezki and Matsumoto 2018). This 
realization has been borne out in the recent development strategies 
announced by GGC governments, all of which aimed at achieving transi-
tion to high-productivity, knowledge-based economies. Naturally, under 
the new oil order, such a transition is unavoidable, where these countries 
could no longer afford to use their deep fiscal pockets (e.g. reserves and 
SWFs) to finance expanding budgets or to maintain the credibility of their 
fixed exchange rate regimes. Moreover, guaranteed public sector employ-
ment of nationals is no longer possible in a few GCC countries, and major 
reforms to end the labor market segmentation will be required. However, 
the most difficult part of the new emerging GCC development agenda 
would be the realignment of political governance so as to allow for the 
required labor market and other public sector policy reforms.
At this juncture, perhaps the most compelling question to ask with 
regard to development sustainability of the GCC countries would be the 
following: In which direction might the political equilibrium in these soci-
eties shift as a consequence of the new global oil order?
To address this pivotal question, we consider the received institutional 
economics literature on the processes of formation and transition of eco-
nomic and political systems in a society (e.g. North et al. 2009; Acemoglu 
2008). According to this literature, a society is governed by a “limited 
access orders” (LAOs), when a relatively small but cohesive group of elites 
manage to exercise monopoly over the projection of organized violence 
and are able to restrict access to economic and political power. The elites, 
therefore, will tend to deploy the coercive power of the state in order to 
extract rents from the rest of the society. Furthermore, the restricted access 
to rents provides an incentive to the ruling elites to favor cooperation with 
each other and avoid or reduce violence against the population. An LAO 
might get trapped into a “fragile” state, when the ruling elites cannot 
agree on a formula for rents distribution due to the shifting balance of 
power among the various players. Instead, should the balance of power 
allow elite factions to establish a stable and predictable, if inter-personal, 
formula for distributing rents, the system becomes a “mature” limited 
access order (LAO). In this case, the elites have vested interest to invest 
and have the economy grow. However, even under mature LAOs, growth 
is not likely to be sustainable due to the marginalization of most of the 
population. Moreover, depending on external factors and internal devel-
opments alike, mature LAOs could very well collapse into a violent fragile 
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state or, alternatively, graduate into an impersonal open access 
order (OAO).7
OAOs are built around impersonal rules that are broadly accepted by 
the society, and hence are self-reinforcing and not subject to ad hoc 
changes. These rules, or social contracts, must ensure open access as well 
as full accountability of those in positions of power to the general public. 
As articulated by Esfahani and Gurakar (2014), “The constraint on 
changes in the key rules under OAO is the cost of coordination and con-
sensus building across large numbers of individuals and organizations. As 
a result, those who are elected to lead the state apparatus face constraints 
in getting other actors to help them change the rules in their favor, par-
ticularly because the other actors expect everyone else to hold them 
responsible if they deviate from the rules. Openness of access to political 
and economic leadership positions further means that those who are put 
in charge of political offices are replaceable by other contenders. So, they 
cannot expect to have much leverage over other members of the society to 
establish their own personal fiefdoms within the state. This in particular 
implies that the armed forces as state organizations cannot use the means 
at their disposal to violently gain direct or indirect control over the gov-
ernment. Rather, the military and security forces are placed under the 
consolidated control of civilians who represent the public” (p. 6).
Subscribing to the aforementioned conceptual framework, the prevail-
ing GCC politico-economic institutional setup might be described as a 
relatively advanced form of “limited access order” (LAO), where projec-
tion of organized violence is firmly under the incumbent authorities and 
rents distribution is governed by inter-personal networks, but at the same 
time adjudication and settlement of disputes among the elites become 
increasingly formalized through courts and other formal arrangements. It 
follows that the prospects of significantly lower oil prices under the new 
global oil order, and the ensuing reductions in rents per capita, might very 
well push the GCC political equilibrium from an advanced LAO to a frag-
ile state of LAO, akin to the one that prevails in some of the populous 
Arab oil countries. Such unfortunate transition would surely put an end to 
the GCC’s relatively successful development model. On the other hand, it 
is possible that the path dependence of the political process in some at 
least of the GCC member countries might create some positive inertia, 
7 For example, Esfahani and Gurakar (2014) analyze the interplay of these factors in shap-
ing the contrasting path from LAOs for the cases of Iran and Turkey.
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leading them to develop into an impersonal “open access order” (OAO), 
whereby the society graduates to a stable institutional equilibrium.
5  concludInG reMarks
Thanks to relatively abundant resource rents, as measured by resource 
rents per capita above a specified threshold, the GCC countries have been 
able, thus far, not only to avoid the negative politico-economic conse-
quences of the oil curse but also to generally maintain high rates of eco-
nomic growth along with political stability. However, with the expected 
future persistence of a lower oil price equilibrium along with growing 
popular demands in the region for political change in the direction of 
democratic governance—whatever the outcome, so far, of the Arab upris-
ings of 2011—great challenges face the GCC countries.
Accordingly, we would argue, the stability of the prevailing “mature” 
LAOs that seem to characterize the economic and political order in the 
GCC will be seriously challenged by the prospects of lower oil prices in the 
future, along with other emerging regional and domestic developments, 
such as the youth bulge and the rising regional tensions and continuing 
civil wars and conflicts in the neighboring countries.
Thinking ahead, the fundamental question that would need to be 
addressed, in separate research, is whether or not the GCC countries are 
capable of initiating the required change in their political and economic 
model. And in either case, what would be the consequent politico- 
economic implications for the GCC in particular, but also for the 
wider region?
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CHAPTER 14
When Can Oil Economies be Deemed 
Sustainable?
Giacomo Luciani and Tom Moerenhout
When can oil economies be deemed sustainable? We did not expect to find 
an unequivocal and final answer to this question when we set out collect-
ing the chapters of this book, and in fact do not believe that an unequivo-
cal and final answer exists. Our more modest purpose was to question a 
stereotype—that all Gulf economies are not sustainable—and start a criti-
cal discussion of what these economies and polities should do to guarantee 
themselves a relatively stable future.
Unsurprisingly, the different authors that contributed to this collection 
manifest different sensitivities and lay their emphasis on various aspects, 
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but points of convergence are not missing, and they are important. In this 
last chapter, we shall try to pull together some of the strings and propose 
at least some overall conclusions, on which further debate and research 
may be encouraged.
1  The end of oil
The most immediate way in which the issue of sustainability of the oil 
economies is commonly framed is to point to the time when oil runs out.
There really is no case of an oil-producing country having completely 
run out of oil, but having faced declines, yes. That said, globally, since the 
end of the first decade of the current century, we have ceased worrying 
about peak oil supply—a presumed physically determined fate—and now 
discuss peak oil demand and unburnable carbon, that is, the possibility 
that oil may lose its economic value because of the energy transition. The 
potential impact of declining oil rents on government finance is high-
lighted in almost all chapters in the book:
there is an inescapable imperative to prepare for a world in which hydrocarbons 
are no longer the main source of revenue, even if there may be alternative ways 
to monetize hydrocarbon resources that do not contribute to global emis-
sions—Al Saffar
However, there is also convergence on the view that the decline in oil 
rents will be a gradual phenomenon, and not a sudden one. On the one 
hand, global oil demand is likely to continue to be robust for a while, 
projected to increase at a compound annual average growth rate of 0.5% 
until 2040 (driven mainly by demand growth in India, China and the 
Middle East). On the other hand, oil-producing countries can also imple-
ment policies to resist or counter the process. On the first point, Fattouh 
and Sen write that a
key observation that can be drawn from the range of peak demand forecasts is 
that oil will continue to be an important part of the energy mix for the foresee-
able future. The incumbent advantages of oil as an energy source, including its 
high energy density and an existing infrastructure ecosystem geared around it, 
imply that even if oil demand peaks, it is unlikely to ‘fall off a cliff’.
If we reason on the basis of a 20-year time horizon—certainly a very 
long-term one for fiscal, monetary, industrial and indeed almost all 
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policies—we should accept that, while the oil rent is likely to decline over 
this period of time, it will not disappear altogether. The speed with which 
the oil rent may decline is a function of volumes sold and prices obtained. 
These two aspects are interlinked and very much depend on policies of 
major oil-importing countries, investment decisions of major national and 
international oil companies, producer subsidy allocations in hydrocarbon- 
rich countries and, more generally, how the economy will react to the 
combination of an energy transition and rising energy demand.
If the demand peak is driven by policies based on regulation or on 
imposing a high price on carbon, it is possible that supply may exceed 
demand and drive prices down. However, this is not the situation at the 
moment, and current concerns are rather that investment in the develop-
ment of new oil sources may be insufficient to compensate for the natural 
decline of producing fields and unable to meet the still growing global 
demand. Therefore, the outlook may be one of growing, rather than 
declining, prices. The recent past has taught us that oil prices are on an 
unpredictable trajectory and that this uncertainty affects both investment 
in the sector and fiscal sustainability of many, but not all, producing coun-
tries. Limiting this volatility will be a key objective to secure a more stable 
oil rent (a point stressed by Manal Shehabi in Chap. 7).
Furthermore, a decline in global demand for hydrocarbons does not 
necessarily translate into a decline of demand for Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) oil and gas exports. Hydrocarbons produced in the GCC 
are amongst the cheapest in the world, and there are strategies that the 
Gulf countries can adopt—and are adopting—to defend or increase their 
market share. On this point, several of our authors (notably Fattouh and 
Sen, Luciani and Krane) converge.
Fattouh and Sen believe that “As the world’s lowest-cost oil producers, 
Arab oil-exporting countries will most likely be required to fill this gap”, 
that is, the gap between investment required to meet expected future 
demand and what is actually being undertaken. Their main preoccupation 
is with the very significant investment effort required, as “any expansion 
in productive capacity will require massive investments running into bil-
lions of dollars”. This in turn has political implications, because “Countries 
also require relatively stable political environments to make these invest-
ments. In the absence of such stability, it is possible that some countries 
with cheap reserves will be unable to develop these reserves”.
On oil prices, they also stress the need for producing countries to have 
a proactive attitude towards coordination with major producers in other 
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regions, beyond the temporary character of recent OPEC+ production 
decisions:
maintaining cooperation in a more competitive world is very challenging and 
while producers have the incentive to cooperate, the cooperation between produc-
ers has to take a different shape to what has existed in the past. For instance, 
producers should not only be concerned with low oil prices, but also be proactive 
when prices are too high, as high oil prices induce strong supply and demand 
responses and speed up the energy transition.
Krane elaborates on three possible alternative strategies that the pro-
ducing countries may follow in order to defend their hydrocarbon exports, 
which he dubs “Dig in”, “Join in” and “Throw in”. The first alternative 
includes developing non-fuel uses for hydrocarbons, decreasing the car-
bon emissions related to their production, improving the efficiency of 
internal combustion engines and integrating vertically into the markets of 
major importing countries, notably in Asia. The second alternative focuses 
on carbon capture and sequestration, reduction of flaring and emissions of 
greenhouse gases (GHG) different from CO2 and promoting the uptake 
of non-carbon technologies, notably renewables and nuclear, to reduce 
the countries’ own emissions. The last strategy envisages acceptance of 
global warming above endorsed goals in the Paris Agreement and is clearly 
not of the author’s liking, but it pretty much corresponds to de facto 
behavior of all major emitting countries—whether we like it or not.
We find the same leading ideas expressed in other chapters of this book. 
Ali al Saffar writes about the need to “capture more value from hydrocar-
bons” and “using natural gas strategically in support of diversification 
goals”, where he includes downstream integration and the development 
of petrochemicals. He also writes about “tapping the large, underutilized 
potential of renewables” and “phasing out subsidized use of energy” (the 
latter also the main focus of the chapter by Tom Moerenhout) to reduce 
domestic consumption of oil and redirect the same to exports. Finally, he 
advises “supporting the development of cleaner and more efficient energy 
technologies”, where he includes Carbon capture, utilization and storage 
(CCUS). Similarly, Fattouh and Sen write: “Oil producers will need to be 
far more strategic in developing their energy sector, including the renew-
ables sector, and strengthening forward and backward linkages to help 
diversify their economies”.
Luciani supports essentially the same package of strategies, writing in 
particular about decarbonizing the production of oil, CCUS and 
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integrating downstream toward non-fuel uses. He adds the perspective of 
the transition toward a hydrogen economy which would at least initially 
be based on producing hydrogen from hydrocarbons and capturing the 
resulting CO2, rather than only looking at more expensive methods of 
hydrogen sourcing out of electrolysis or other biomass-based 
technologies.
Thus our discussion allows us to place the issue of sustainability in a 
perspective of gradualism where hydrocarbons remain an essential compo-
nent of the GCC economies’ competitiveness for several decades, which is 
as far into the future as one may meaningfully discuss. None of the authors 
believe that hydrocarbons alone can guarantee sustainability, but the view 
that the Gulf economies are not sustainable because oil and gas will soon 
and rapidly lose all economic value is not supported by current market 
trends as well as medium-term projections. Neither of course it is pro-
posed that Gulf oil producers can be passive and keep enjoying the rent: 
on the contrary, much initiative and adaptation will be needed to defend 
the rent. But losing access to the oil rent is neither an inescapable fate nor 
likely a sudden development.
2  need for diversificaTion?
Together with the belief that hydrocarbon rents may soon disappear, the 
discourse on sustainability is frequently associated with the need for eco-
nomic diversification, that is, development of non-oil sectors, which is 
frequently interpreted as moving away from oil. In this view, all develop-
ments, either downstream or upstream from hydrocarbon production, are 
considered as doomed, since they depend on oil, which is expected to 
disappear. Unsurprisingly, when considering the trends and projections 
discussed earlier, our authors offer critical visions leading to a much more 
nuanced conclusion.
First of all, however, it is asserted that—contrary to the most widely 
accepted stereotype—diversification has already occurred. Luciani and 
Beutel both emphasize this point, based on different and complementary 
statistical evidence. Beutel, in particular, proposes a detailed analysis based 
on national accounts and input-output analysis, leading to some quite 
unexpected conclusions with respect to the degree of diversification of the 
Gulf economies, the pace of change and the international relativities—in 
particular with respect to Norway. Luciani rather relies on the Economic 
Complexity Index developed at Harvard University, and similarly points 
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to some unexpected relativities. Skeptics will point to deficiencies in all of 
the statistical tools used in these two chapters: indeed, diversification is 
one of the most elusive characteristics of an economy, depending, as it 
does, on relative prices and peculiarities of classification. Nevertheless, the 
simultaneous use of several indicators and their convergence in showing 
that diversification has in fact taken place is a result to be taken into 
account. Whether such diversification has happened to a sufficient extent 
and whether it has occurred in sectors or stages of production that can 
contribute structurally to economic sustainability, remain open for 
discussion.
Does this mean that the level of diversification is not a problem? 
Certainly not, but one should keep in mind that “diversification” is not a 
panacea as not all diversification is necessarily positive. In Manal Shehabi’s 
opinion, “setting diversification as the key recipe for economic sustain-
ability in resource-rich states appears on face value inadequate and confus-
ing”. This is because diversification may take place with the development 
of activities, which may be commercially viable only contingent to existing 
conditions and policies, but not necessarily sustainable in the longer run. 
If such diversification is pursued at large scale, and subsequently locked in, 
then oil-producing states would find it difficult to be sufficiently adapt-
able, much like other non-oil producing states with the rise of global 
value chains.
From what was highlighted in the previous paragraph, it is clear that 
diversification may very well take place leveraging the comparative advan-
tage in hydrocarbons and integrating upstream and downstream compo-
nents of hydrocarbon production, pure and simple. In fact, many authors 
considered this as welcome, rather than optional. Progressively, this may 
contribute to the creation of a local market for more knowledge-intensive 
and higher value- added employment. This point is emphasized in particu-
lar by Martin Hvidt, who focuses on value chains as the directing principle 
for diversification: “adding steps of the value chain will imply a diversifica-
tion of the product, and thus of markets”.
this process of product diversification holds significant implications for a diver-
sification of job content, and thus skills levels of the workers undertaking the 
jobs: The more diversification takes place within the value chain (adding more 
stages in the production chain), the greater varieties of jobs will be demanded. 
Generally, the more primary productive activities are pursued, the higher the 
demand for supporting activities, which implies jobs related to services. And 
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service related jobs generally have a higher knowledge content and provide more 
value added than jobs in ‘pure’ manufacturing or oil extraction.
Similarly Shehabi writes: “economic specialization based on compara-
tive advantage is not contradictory to that of economic diversification, and 
that both concepts are relevant to but insufficient for economic sustain-
ability in resource-rich states”. In a significant point of convergence, none 
of our contributing authors believe that diversification away from oil is a 
decisive factor of sustainability.
3  fiscal susTainabiliTy
In contrast to diversification away from oil, which is relativized in the dis-
cussion, the importance of fiscal sustainability is underlined by almost all 
our authors. The GCC governments remain excessively dependent on oil 
revenue for the financing of expenditure, and especially current expendi-
ture. Individual authors offer somewhat different and interestingly com-
plementary approaches to this crucially important aspect. Four main theses 
are proposed:
 1. An important distinction must be made between higher- and lower- 
rent per capita countries within the GCC
 2. Contrary to the view that the GCC implicit political pact is rigid, 
some significant fiscal adjustment has taken place since the 2014 col-
lapse in oil prices
 3. Reducing dependence on oil income is only possible if a sufficient 
domestic taxation base is developed, with very significant implica-
tions for the development strategy.
 4. Less progress has been made in reducing public sector employment 
and nationalizing employment in the private sector, even though 
this is an imminent threat to the sustainability of GCC economies 
(discussed more later).
3.1  The Difference between Rentiers and Super Rentiers
The importance of the level of per capita oil rent with respect to the ques-
tion of sustainability is emphasized especially by Elbadawi and Makdisi, 
and Malik and Nagesh. Quoting previous research by Elbadawi, the first 
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two authors assert that “there is a small group of 12 exorbitantly high oil 
rent per capita countries that are mostly non-democratic (hereafter 
HRPC), including the GCC, which seem to defy the fundamental tenets 
of the received literature that, non-democratic governance affects growth 
negatively. He finds that there exists a resource rents threshold, beyond 
which countries might be able to achieve fast growth and civil peace as 
well as avoid revolt regardless of the prevailing standard in terms of 
accountable political institutions”. In other words, these super-rentiers, 
which currently in the GCC include Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) (certainly at least Abu Dhabi), have been able to escape 
the resource-curse and have sufficient financial resources to survive future 
social and political challenges.
Malik and Nagesh argue that “based on per-capita hydrocarbon endow-
ments, the GCC countries can be broadly divided into two categories”. 
On the one hand, there are countries with higher hydrocarbon reserves 
(and production) relative to their populations. They include Kuwait, Qatar 
and the UAE (Abu Dhabi led). On the other hand, there are hydrocarbon- 
poorer per capita countries with smaller hydrocarbon reserves (and pro-
duction) relative to their populations. They include Bahrain, Oman and 
Saudi Arabia. Within this group, Oman and Bahrain are in relatively 
weaker positions versus Saudi.
The higher oil rent per capita countries have accumulated large foreign 
currency reserves, have maintained a budget surplus or small deficit even 
after the decline in oil prices and enjoy large sovereign funds whose reve-
nue may in the future progressively substitute for a declining oil rent. It is 
therefore possible to envisage a scenario in which the state in these coun-
tries may continue to be financed from revenue directly accruing from 
abroad, rather than having to rely on domestic taxation. As a result, it can 
be expected that these countries will continue to implement pro-cyclical 
policies. These countries also display the highest share of expatriates in the 
resident population, meaning that the politically relevant share of the total 
population is small and relatively easy to be catered to. In contrast, in the 
three remaining members of the GCC, oil rents per capita are smaller 
either because oil revenue is less generous (Bahrain) or because the 
national population is much larger (Saudi Arabia) or a combination of 
both factors (Oman).
Thus, it is clear that the problem of sustainability is of a completely dif-
ferent nature in the two subsets of GCC member countries. For the 
higher-rent per capita countries, the essential problem is continuing to 
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accumulate in their sovereign investment funds and making sure that 
returns on their international investment are sufficient to meet the fiscal 
requirements of the state. For the lower-rent countries, the issue of devel-
oping a domestic taxation base is inescapable and entails as a corollary, the 
need to develop competitive activities and sources of value added that the 
state may tap to raise the required income.
3.2  Fiscal Adjustment
A frequently repeated reason for doubting the sustainability of the Gulf 
economies is that the political order is based on an implicit pact between 
the rulers and their people that conditions the acceptance of the former on 
the part of the latter to the continued availability of historically established 
transfers in the form of employment in the public sector, free services and 
various consumption subsidies. The presumed rigidity of this implicit 
social contract is deemed to prevent adjustment and is therefore 
unsustainable.
The experience of fiscal policy reform since 2014 demonstrates that 
adjustment is on the contrary possible, at least partially. Adjustment has 
been sought through reduction of expenditure and, to a more limited 
extent, the imposition of new fees and taxes. “The initial response by gov-
ernments was to substantially cut back government expenditure, especially 
on the capital front” (Malik & Nagesh). Abandoning or delaying invest-
ment projects has traditionally been the easiest step to reduce expenditure 
quickly, together with delaying payments to enterprises working for the 
government and implementing public projects—with the subsequent 
liquidity crisis, which inevitably ensues. But then steps have also been 
taken to reduce subsidies, especially on energy products.
Subsidies reform is the main focus of the chapter by Tom Moerenhout: 
“When the oil price plummeted in 2014, GCC revenues collapsed and all 
governments increased fuel and electricity prices. By doing so, they pri-
marily avoided an even more menacing collapse of state budgets, which 
could have led to domestic instability”. That is not to deny the fact that 
low fuel prices have justifications: they serve to contain increases in the 
cost of living, they enhance the competitiveness of energy-intensive indus-
tries and they contribute to political stability. But in the long run, adjust-
ment is needed because consumption has grown out of control and 
endangers the export potential.
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The pace of pricing reforms is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
there is urgency, not only for fiscal adjustment but also because of pro-
jected demand growth for oil and electricity in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region. This demand growth is substantial and carries 
large opportunity costs. Not for a small part, this demand growth will be 
caused by the need for energy-intensive end uses, such as running air- 
conditioning and salt water desalination as a result of climate change 
effects. On the other hand, however, Moerenhout warns that overly rapid 
price adjustments for industry might erode the comparative advantage of 
Gulf countries and complicate efforts to achieve within-sector 
diversification.
Since 2014, all GCC countries have enacted some reform of the subsi-
dies system. Three countries—notably the UAE, which was the pioneer, 
Oman and Qatar—have been able to implement gradual but systematic 
reform, which created regular adjustment mechanisms linked to regional 
and international price movements. In contrast, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
Bahrain have resorted to ad hoc adjustments that are not automatic—but 
the adjustment has nonetheless been very significant. Also important, the 
adjustments were not rolled back as soon as oil prices increased. Thus, we 
may conclude that the taboo of untouchable energy prices has been bro-
ken, and governments have learned that, under the appropriate condi-
tions, they can impose adjustments to subsidies. Encouragingly, some 
countries have started with attempts to implement better targeted social 
welfare measures, such as cash transfers.
Similarly, new fees and taxes have been imposed by almost all of the 
GCC countries. True, there has been an attempt to increase the fees paid 
by expatriates rather than nationals, but this is mostly a question of appear-
ances, because the cost of employing expatriates increases, and eventually 
this is felt in domestic prices paid by nationals. The imposition of fees on 
the presence of expatriates’ family members has led to a wave of returns to 
their countries of origin, which has in turn translated into a slump in 
demand for real estate accommodation and a broad range of consumer 
goods. The net positive effect of such measures for enhancing government 
revenue is thus relatively limited.
The most important step undertaken in the GCC is the decision to 
implement a coordinated Value Added Tax (VAT), as detailed in Malik 
and Nagesh, although not all member countries may respect the engage-
ment in the envisaged time window. The 5% rate at which the VAT is cur-
rently imposed is relatively small, but constitutes a very important 
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development, especially from a political point of view. Certainly, VAT is a 
tax on consumption rather than income, and as such, it has less of a politi-
cal impact in the relationship between each citizen and the state, but it is 
nevertheless a tax and may, in due course of time, prompt a request for 
greater fiscal transparency and accountability, especially if the rate were to 
increase significantly.
3.3  Developing a Domestic Taxation Base
The difficulties experienced in imposing new taxes and diversifying the 
sources of state revenue point to the need for cultivating a domestic taxa-
tion base. This is the central message of Ishac Diwan in his chapter on 
fiscal sustainability and the labor market in Saudi Arabia. Although the 
chapter focuses specifically on the Saudi case, the crucial point about the 
need for developing a domestic tax base is valid for all lower-rent per 
capita countries; however, for higher-rent per capita states, much depends 
on whether they will be able to substitute the oil rent with income from 
international investment, thus dodging the need for diversification of 
income sources.
Diwan argues that “Expats do create a buffer for the economy, but are 
unlikely to be part of the tax base”. This is because “expats are being paid 
their reservation wage, and while they can be fired at will, it is not possible 
to compress their net incomes by much and keep them employed”. At the 
same time, the majority of nationals are government employees, and while 
they may earn extra income from private sector activities, the resources 
that may be squeezed out of household budgets by way of VAT or an 
income tax are perforce limited relative to government expenditure. 
Finally, corporate taxes are limited by total profits of private corporations, 
many among which are very small and presumably surviving on a precari-
ous equilibrium.
Hence, the key conclusion and answer to “the question of interest is 
therefore what growth model can deliver a larger tax base?” is one that 
supports growth in the private sector and at the same time discourages 
employment of expatriates and encourages the employment of nationals 
and an increase in labor productivity, that is, value added per employee.
This crucial conclusion points to the fact that fiscal sustainability is not 
independent of the chosen growth strategy. Malik and Nagesh concur 
with this conclusion when they write, “Two factors will be central to 
boosting fiscal sustainability across the region, in our view: (i) the deepen-
ing of the tax base and (ii) lowering the wage composition of government 
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spending”. Of course, lowering the burden of wages on total government 
spending means reducing public sector employment and shifting some 
roles from the public to the private sector. Luciani writes about the need 
for developing taxation and notes “The need for nurturing a strong base 
for taxation is the main argument to conclude that economic sustainability 
eventually requires the consolidation of a competitive and independent 
private sector”.
4  susTainabiliTy and The labor MarkeT
Several of our authors underline the importance of reforming the GCC 
labor markets for sustainability. There are two opposing views of this issue, 
depending on whether we focus on high- or low-rent per capita countries. 
In the former group, dependence on expatriate labor is extreme, and pro-
vides an element of flexibility in the face of potential downturn of available 
rent, which may be said to considerably enhance sustainability. Shehabi 
writes “the expatriate labor exit offers another key stabilization mecha-
nism of the Kuwaiti economy in the face of the volatility of petroleum 
revenue”. The same can be said of Qatar and Abu Dhabi, although pos-
sibly not for the UAE as a whole. In other words, if push comes to shove 
and the revenues from oil exports and sovereign wealth funds collapse 
dramatically, these countries are able to send home a large share of their 
expatriate population. Radical and fast-paced changes would certainly 
allow for very significant reduction in government expenditure: it would 
also lead to a collapse of real estate and many businesses, which could also 
lead to the deterioration of effective standards of living for a part of the 
national population. That being said, a new equilibrium at a lower ratio of 
expatriates to nationals could be found without too much affecting the 
condition of most nationals.
The situation is different for low-rent per capita countries, because the 
flexibility offered by expatriate workers is proportionately lower (though 
still high compared to nearly any other producing country in other 
regions). Comparatively to high-rent GCC countries, the damage deriving 
from quickly drawing their numbers down would thus be higher. The fis-
cal equilibrium in these countries is also much more fragile, necessitating, 
as discussed here, the development of a domestic taxable base which expa-
triates cannot offer.
Elbadawi and Makdisi point to the importance of productivity:
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growth has been largely driven by factor accumulation in the form of massive 
investments and even more through large scale utilization of unskilled and 
semi-skilled labor, mainly drawn from the Indian sub-continent. This growth 
model has obviously served the GCC well and allowed the building of state-of- 
the-art infrastructure at exceptionally low cost of labor. But one major draw-
back of the GCC growth strategy has been low and even declining total factor 
as well as labor productivity.
The decline in productivity casts a shadow on the possibility of raising 
more revenue from domestic sources.
The open door to essentially unlimited importation of expatriate labor 
bids wages down and discourages nationals from active participation in the 
labor force.
Huge gains could be made if they were instead encouraged to do so, because 
Saudi nationals are both grossly underemployed and increasingly well edu-
cated, thus increasing the opportunity cost of low participation. To give a sense 
of the potential gains if national labor was employed more effectively, a simple 
projection model suggests that with participation rates growing from 40 to 60 
percent of the working-age population, and unemployment dropping to its nat-
ural rate, non-oil national income would more than double if the additional 
workers join the non-oil sector at current productivity levels. Improvements in 
labor productivity would add to this growth rate further. Altogether, it can be 
estimated that this addition to national wealth is comparable in magnitude to 
the kingdom’s current oil wealth. (Diwan)
Underemployment of nationals is a cause of unsustainability. For 
Diwan, the issue is closely connected to the prospects for raising domestic 
taxation:
A path of labor intensive growth leveraged on expat labor can allow for larger 
taxation of corporate profits, but if it does not manage to increase employment 
among Saudis, it would require more social spending to preserve social peace, 
and thus, would not be conducive to correcting the macro-imbalances. On the 
other hand, growth based on the expansion of Saudi labor would lead to a 
broader tax base over time
Already now, the GCC is confronted with high unemployment. In ear-
lier work, Tom Moerenhout has pointed to increasing youth unemploy-
ment as a potential threat to national security, adding even more pressure 
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when considering a poor female labor participation rate. Currently, most 
GCC countries have around 40% youth unemployment for 20–24-year-
olds, declining to a still sizeable 15% for 30–34-year-olds. As Martin Hvidt 
highlights, approximately 500,000 nationals will enter working age each 
year during the next decade and a half in Gulf countries, exacerbating 
what is often labeled as a “ticking time bomb”. Hence, political stability is 
directly challenged by the inability to mobilize the domestic workforce 
and increase its productivity level.
The issue is not simply one of substituting expatriates with nationals. 
Drawing down the number of expatriates has not so far succeeded in cre-
ating an equivalent number of jobs for nationals. Mobilization of the 
domestic work force can only be achieved through investment to change 
the capital per worker in the private sector:
The good news is that the education level among young Saudis has risen, which 
makes it possible for them to occupy jobs at relatively high productivity levels. The 
bad news, however, is that existing incentives have pushed firms in the private 
sector to create jobs that require either very low skills (especially in services) or 
very high skills (especially in the energy sector). To create jobs that are attractive 
for Saudis, who have mostly mid-level skills, there is therefore a need for struc-
tural change in the production methods used by the private sector, in response to 
changes in factor endowments and prices. (Diwan)
5  PoliTical susTainabiliTy
At this juncture, perhaps the most compelling question to ask with regard to 
development sustainability of the GCC countries would be: in which direction 
might the political equilibrium in these societies shift as a consequence of the 
new global oil order? (Elbadawi & Makdisi)
That is indeed an essential dimension of sustainability, because one can-
not expect the needed economic policy adjustments to take place without 
parallel adjustments in political equilibria. This is especially true of the 
low-rent per capita countries, where greater reliance on a private sector 
less dependent on government expenditure and capable of walking on its 
own legs is a prerequisite of sustainability. In addition, the need to increas-
ingly rely on taxation of domestic value added inevitably raises the issue of 
accountability and legitimacy of power structures. In other words, the 
low-rent per capita countries will need to gradually evolve from being pure 
rentier states to being states whose existence is based on the ability to 
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extract a surplus from the domestic economy, which is a key determinant 
of demand for democratic participation, “No taxation without representa-
tion”, also in the Persian Gulf. In earlier work, Luciani noted that in the 
late 1990s, when these states were fiscally challenged after 15 years of low 
oil prices and growing deficits, it seemed that a national bourgeoisie might 
emerge and become a significant political actor. Timid yet promising 
attempts were made in the direction of an enlargement of the political 
sphere, but following the Arab Spring, all hatches were closed down and 
authoritarianism has toughened.
Elbadawi and Makdisi analyze the situation using the concepts of lim-
ited versus open access order:
the prevailing GCC politico-economic institutional set up might be described as 
a relatively advanced form of ‘limited access order’ (LAO), where projection of 
organized violence is firmly under the incumbent authorities and rents distri-
bution is governed by inter-personal networks, but at the same time adjudica-
tion and settlement of disputes among the elites become increasingly formalized 
through courts and other formal arrangements. It follows that the prospects of 
significantly lower oil prices under the new global oil order, and the ensuing 
reductions in rents per capita, might very well push the GCC political equilib-
rium from an advanced LAO to a fragile state of LAO, akin to the one that 
prevails in some of the populous Arab oil countries. Such unfortunate transi-
tion would surely put an end to the GCC’s relatively successful development 
model. On the other hand, it is possible that the path dependence of the political 
process in some at least of the GCC member countries might create some positive 
inertia, leading them to develop into an impersonal ‘open access order’ (OAO), 
whereby the society graduates to a stable institutional equilibrium.
Unfortunately, all evidence is in the direction of “fragilization” of LAO 
rather than movement toward OAO. This is all the more so since at the 
regional level, conflicts and tensions have been increasing systematically, 
and the GCC countries have implicated themselves deeper and deeper into 
such conflicts and proxy wars. With the row between Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE on one side and Qatar on the opposite side, the very significance of 
the GCC is also questioned. As Luciani has noted in an earlier work, 
regional disaggregation is a problem for sustainability, because it hinders 
the emergence of economic activities that are regional in nature and dam-
ages the development prospects of all countries in MENA.
As far as the social contract goes, Moerenhout has argued in an earlier 
work that the effects from the fragilization of LAO and the discontent 
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with austerity measures can potentially be countered by the rapid develop-
ment of more targeted social safety nets. As cash transfers can keep rentier 
state dynamics intact in the short term, they appear as the best option to 
compensate for loss of household welfare. However, they are not a pana-
cea to resolve the structural deficiencies of GCC states. The success of cash 
transfers will ultimately depend on their design and implementation, as 
well as on the introduction of complementary short-term mitigation mea-
sures and longer-term adjustments in, among others, the labor market.
6  can The Gcc econoMies be susTainable?
The discussion of sustainability that is presented in this book may not offer 
a definitive definition of the term, but nevertheless converges on some 
useful policy indications.
Sustainability does not necessarily mean diversification, and especially 
not diversification away from hydrocarbons. Rather, the comparative 
advantage in hydrocarbon production must be leveraged to integrate 
upstream and downstream in the value chain, while at the same time 
defending the acceptability of hydrocarbons through the decarbonization 
of their production, development of non-fuel uses and carbon capture and 
sequestration. At the same time, increasing reliance on renewable and 
other non-carbon energy sources must be pursued, as well as greater 
energy efficiency.
Diversification contributes to sustainability if it is accompanied by the 
emergence of a private sector less dependent on government expenditure 
and capable of offering better, more productive jobs to the national work-
force. Reliance on expatriate labor must be reduced and taxes progres-
sively introduced to pay for current public sector expenditure.
For the high-rent per capita countries, a scenario of growing revenue 
from international financial placements (sovereign wealth funds) comple-
menting declining oil revenue cannot be excluded. The success of such a 
strategy, based on consolidation of, rather than transition from, the rentier 
nature of the state, cannot a priori be excluded. The outcome very much 
depends on the ability to invest wisely and attain a sufficiently high rate of 
return—not something that is guaranteed at this stage. It also very likely 
depends on a process of demographic retrenching, shedding a large por-
tion of the expatriate population and raising the ratio of nationals to expa-
triates in the resident population. It is not inconceivable that these states 
may survive as patrimonial monarchies.
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For low-rent per capita countries, including Bahrain, Oman and Saudi 
Arabia, a similar strategy is not possible. To the extent that the state will 
attempt to preserve its rentier nature through the accumulation of a large 
sovereign wealth fund (a possibility which in practice may be open to 
Saudi Arabia only), it will need to increasingly erode the benefits extended 
to the national population. In the absence of improved employment 
opportunities in the private sector, hidden or overt unemployment is 
already a growing problem, and discontent will inevitably ensue. 
Sustainability will be threatened not so much by immediate fiscal and/or 
trade imbalances, but by the inability to adapt institutions to the require-
ments of a sustainable economy. The status quo may be preserved through 
repression, possibly even for a long time, but the sustainability challenge 
will have been lost.
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